Hodgson v. "Corizon" Medical Staff

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 7/24/12. (jmk, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 7/25/12)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MATTHEW HODGSON

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Plaintiff

*

v

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CORIZON MEDICAL STAFF

*

Defendant

Civil Action No. ELH-11-3515

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***
MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Matthew Hodgson (“Hodgson”), plaintiff, is a federal detainee confined at the
Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center (“MCAC”), now known as the Chesapeake Detention
Facility.1 He filed suit, pro se, against Corizon Medical Staff (“Corizon”),2 under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. See ECF 18. Corizon has filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, ECF 10, which plaintiff opposes. ECF 18.3 No hearing is
necessary to resolve the motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). I have construed the
motion as a motion for summary judgment and, for the reasons that follow, I shall grant the
motion.
Background
Hodgson alleges that the following events took place between June and November of
2011. ECF 1 at 3. He claims a male nurse, who would not provide his name, gave him three
1

Hodgson is a defendant in a criminal matter pending before this Court. See ELH-11-

0212.
2

Plaintiff did not sue any particular Corizon staff members. The actual name of the
organization is Corizon, Inc., f/k/a Correctional Medical Services, Inc. See ECF 10-1.
3

Hodgson appended four exhibits to his opposition, including his own Affidavit.

tablets of the wrong medication, some of which he swallowed before he realized the error.
Hodgson states he spit out two of the tablets and gave them back to the nurse who had provided
them. A short time later, he was called back to the medical unit where the head nurse, Anthony,
had the tablets Hodgson had spit out. As a result of taking the wrong medication, Hodgson
claims he began to vomit and developed blisters on his neck, face, and forehead, as well as inside
of his mouth. Hodgson alleges that Dr. Michael Lawrence told the nurses that Hodgson needed
to go to the hospital, but he was never taken. Instead, Anthony told Hodgson that “one bad pill
won’t kill [him].” ECF 1 at 4. On two different shifts, Hodgson complained to staff about the
symptoms caused by the medication, including a claim that he developed blood in his urine that
worsened over time. Hodgson alleges he was later informed by Dr. Lawrence that the symptoms
he experienced were due to an allergic reaction to the medication. Hodgson claims he was never
told the name of the medication he was given and that the same nurse who gave him the wrong
medication also gave his medication to another inmate.
In addition, Hodgson claims that Dr. Lawrence recommended surgery for him and
advised that, without it, he could become paralyzed.4 According to Hodgson, surgery was not
provided because Corizon was unwilling to pay for it. Hodgson states Dr. Lawrence also
recommended physical therapy, an MRI, and evaluation by a pain management doctor, but only
the physical therapy was approved. Notwithstanding that approval, Hodgson claims he never
received physical therapy. ECF 1 at 4.
Further, Hodgson states that Dr. Lawrence prescribed Neurontin and Oxycodone three
times a day, but on numerous occasions he has not received his medication.

In addition,

Hodgson claims Dr. Lawrence advised him that if he experiences incontinence, this would be a

4

Plaintiff did not specify the surgical procedure.
2

very dangerous sign with his medical condition, and he should inform medical staff because he
would need to be rushed to the hospital. Hodgson states, however, that when he informed
officers and medical staff that he had experienced incontinence, he was ignored, overlooked, and
treated rudely. Hodgson claims Dr. Lawrence admitted to all the incidents on the record at a
hearing conducted in this court.
In its motion, defendant notes that Corizon is a private corporation that contracted with
the State of Maryland to provide medical services to inmates at certain State institutions. ECF
10-1 at 6. It operates through its agents and employees. Id. Corizon argues that it cannot be
held liable because principles of respondeat superior do not apply to actions filed under 42
U.S.C. §1983. Alternatively, defendant asserts that plaintiff has received constitutionally
adequate medical care, as evidenced by his medical records.

ECF 10-1. In support of its

Motion, Corizon submitted as Exhibit A the detailed Affidavit of Michael Lawrence, M.D., dated
March 5, 2012 (ECF 10-2), and Exhibit B, the medical records of Hodgson (ECF 10-3). The
following facts are derived from the defense exhibits.
Melecia Helwig, P.A. evaluated Hodgson on May 12, 2011.

His only complaint

concerned pain in his right foot, which he had broken when he was thirteen years of age. It was
repaired with orthopedic hardware, and Hodgson informed medical staff that it was supposed to
be removed.5 He was prescribed Tylenol #3 (acetaminophen with codeine), a narcotic pain
medication, for the pain in his foot. Ex. A ¶ 3; Ex. B at 3 – 5.6
On June 1, 2011, Dr. Lawrence changed Hodgson’s pain medication to Oxycodone, also
a narcotic medication. On June 6, 2011, he added Neurontin, an antiepileptic medication used to
5

An x-ray of Hodgson’s right foot in May 2010 revealed that the hardware was intact.
See Ex. B, at 1.
6

Page numbers reference ECF pagination.
3

treat chronic pain, to Hodgson’s medication regimen. Ex. A ¶ 4. When the prescription for
Oxycodone expired on June 15, 2011, Dr. Lawrence renewed it six days later. Id. According to
Dr. Lawrence, Hodgson frequently refused to take the morning and lunchtime doses of
Neurontin, and he twice refused the evening dose in June. Id.; see also Ex. B at 6, 31 – 34.
At an unspecified time, Hodgson told Dr. Lawrence he had a history of chronic low back
pain. Apart from one straight leg raising test,7 Hodgson “had no objective signs or symptoms of
any neurological problems, such as numbness or decreased reflexes.” Dr. Lawrence advised
Hodgson that if he became incontinent, he would require “additional testing or possibly surgery.”
Ex. A ¶ 5. But, he maintains that he never advised Hodgson he needed immediate surgery or that
Corizon would not pay for such surgery. Id.
Hodgson complained of pain in his left testical on June 11, 2011. Ex. B at 6. On June
14, 2011, Hodgson told a psychiatric counselor, Marie Simmons, LCPC, that he had been given
the wrong medication on several occasions and, when he tried to tell medical staff about the
problem, “he was not taken seriously.” Ex. A ¶ 5. Hodgson also told Simmons that he was
experiencing enuresis for one or two months and noticed blood in his urine a few nights before
the visit with Simmons.

The following day, June 15, 2011, Dr. Lawrence prescribed

Ciprofloxacin, an antibiotic, to treat a possible case of epididymitis, which Dr. Lawrence
suspected was due to Hodgson’s complaint of testicular pain and blood in his urine. Id.at ¶ 6.
Hodgson wrote a letter to the Warden on June 21, 2011, claiming he was given the wrong
medication on June 14, 2011.

Id.

In the letter, Hodgson claimed his throat swelled, he

developed red dots on his face and chest, and he had blood in his urine. However, according to
Dr. Lawrence, Hodgson’s medical records do not reflect submission of a sick call request form
7

Hodgson tested positive for “straight leg raising (SLR) sign,” meaning he felt pain when
lifting one leg at a time while lying on his back. Ex. A ¶ 5.
4

or any other attempts to alert medical staff about his alleged reaction to the medication provided.
Id.; see also Ex. B at 6-8, 34-35. Moreover, Dr. Lawrence avers that he did not tell Hodgson he
needed to go to the hospital at that time, because he exhibited “no objective signs or symptoms
of an allergic reaction.” Ex. A ¶ 6; see Ex. B at 7 – 9 and 35 – 36.
On July 15, 2011, Hodgson was transferred to the Inpatient Mental Health Unit
(“IMHU”) of the Baltimore City Detention Center because he reported that he was experiencing
anxiety and having thoughts of suicide. Ex. A ¶ 7; Ex. B at 10. Hodgson’s admission evaluation
was performed by Kristin Discepolo, LCPC, who noted Hodgson’s report that he breaks out in
hives when he is anxious. A urinalysis performed the same day was negative for blood and
bacteria. On July 16, 2011, Gary Heiland, R.N., noted Hodgson had a small circumferential rash
on both wrists, which Hodgson attributed to anxiety. See Ex. B at 10-20. The following day
Hodgson was discharged from IMHU with a diagnosis of “Adjustment d/o.” Ex. B at 19.
After Hodgson’s return to MCAC, he was evaluated by Dr. Lawrence on July 18, 2011,
who again prescribed Oxycodone for pain. Ex. A ¶ 8. The prescription for Neurontin was still in
effect. Because Hodgson continued to complain of scrotal pain and hematuria, Dr. Lawrence
ordered a repeat urine culture, which was performed on July 20, 2011, and yielded negative
results. Id. During the month of July 2011, Hodgson refused all of his morning Neurontin doses
and most of his afternoon and evening doses. He also missed three doses of Oxycodone, twice
because he was “out to court” and once because the medication was unavailable. Id. ; see also
Ex. B at 21 – 22 and 37 – 40.
Another urinalysis was performed on August 2, 2011, and it was negative for blood. Ex.
A ¶ 9. A repeat urine culture was performed on August 8, 2011, and it was positive for bacteria.
Id. Dr. Lawrence prescribed Bactrim, an antibiotic, to treat Hodgson’s urinary tract infection.

5

During the month of August, Hodgson refused his morning Neurontin dose thirteen times, his
afternoon dose eight times, and his evening dose seven times. Two doses of Oxycodone were
missed because it was unavailable. Ex. A ¶ 9; see Ex. B at 23 – 25, 41 – 44.
Hodgson was temporarily transferred to an out-of-state correctional facility8 in midSeptember 2011, and returned to MCAC on September 26, 2011. Upon his return, plaintiffs
prescriptions were restarted. Ex. A ¶ 10. However, when plaintiff’s prescription for Neurontin
expired on October 31, 2011, it was not renewed, because of plaintiff’s repeated refusals to take
it. On November 13, 2011, Hodgson submitted a sick call slip, complaining of back pain and
incontinence. The nurse who evaluated Hodgson noted he was able to walk with steady gait and
appeared to be more concerned about obtaining a written order to shower if he experienced
incontinence. Hodgson was thus referred to his regular chronic care clinic appointments for
follow up. Ex. A ¶ 10; Ex. B at 26 – 28 and 45 – 62.
On December 20, 2011, Hodgson was taken to the University of Maryland Medical
Center (“UMMC”) for a neurology consultation regarding his back pain and incontinence. Ex. A
¶ 11. The neurologist noted that Hodgson offered no real complaints related to neurological
issues and refused to see him until he received more information about Hodgson’s complaints.
Ex. A ¶ 11; Ex. B at 29 – 30 and 63. Nevertheless, Hodgson continued to receive Oxycodone for
his complaints of plain. Ex. A ¶ 12.
In connection with Hodgson’s criminal case, Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm held two
hearings with respect to Hodgson’s complaints concerning his medical care. One hearing was
held on July 25, 2011, and the other was held on September 7, 2011. Hodgson was represented
8

Dr. Lawrence avers that the facility is in New Jersey. Hodgson asserts that he was
actually transferred to Virginia. ECF 18-1, Affidavit of plaintiff, at 2 – 3. In his view, Dr.
Lawrence’s error establishes that defendant knows very little about his treatment or his case.
Whether Hodgson was transferred to New Jersey or Virginia is not material to the issues.
6

by his criminal defense attorney.

Corizon participated through counsel at the hearing on

September 7, 2011, and Dr. Lawrence also was present. A transcript of the hearing was filed in
the criminal case on May 16, 2012. See ELH-11-0212, ECF 90.
Dr. Lawrence told Judge Grimm that he had approved Hodgson for an orthopedic consult
for back pain in May 2011, but Wexford denied it. Instead, “Wexford” (i.e., Wexford Health
Sources, Inc.), only approved physical therapy. A later request for an MRI was also denied.
Eventually, pursuant to a Letter Order of Judge Grimm (ELH-11-0212, ECF 29 and ECF 30),
Hodgson was evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon; no surgery was recommended. Instead, the
orthopedist recommended an evaluation by a neurologist. Therefore, Judge Grimm ordered a
prompt neurological evaluation, to include an MRI, if recommended.
Additional facts will be included in the Discussion.
Standard of Review
Defendant’s motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A motion styled in this manner
implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md.
2011). Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual
disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450
(4th Cir. 2007). However, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters
outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). When the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative” as one for summary

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judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration, the parties are
deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court “does not have an
obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d
253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).9
A district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not
consider it.” 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed.
2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the
parties’ procedural rights.” Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of
extraneous material “is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action,” and “whether discovery
prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id. at 165-67.
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate “where the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont, supra, 637 F.3d at 448-49. However, “the
party opposing summary judgment ‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted
without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds
that more time was needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302
F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954,
9

In contrast, a court may not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment
sua sponte, unless it gives notice to the parties that it will do so. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261
(stating that a district court “clearly has an obligation to notify parties regarding any courtinstituted changes” in the posture of a motion, including conversion under Rule 12(d)); Finley
Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk So. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for
summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by indicating that it will not
exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous materials.”); see also
Fisher v. Md. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., Civ. No. JFM-10-0206, 2010 WL 2732334, at
*3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68772, at *8-10 (D. Md. July 8, 2010).
8

961 (4th Cir. 1996)). To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the non-movant
typically must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)),
explaining why, “for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,”
without needed discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244-45 (discussing
affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)).10
Plaintiff has not filed an affidavit under Rule 56(d).11 In my view, it is appropriate to
address the defendant’s motion as one for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which provides in part:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
10

Notably, “‘Rule 56(d) affidavits cannot simply demand discovery for the sake of
discovery.’” Hamilton v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 807 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (D. Md.
2011) (quoting Young v. UPS, No. DKC-08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *20, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14266, at *62 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011)). “Rather, to justify a denial of summary judgment
on the grounds that additional discovery is necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit
must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’” Scott v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637,
641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A non-moving party’s Rule 56(d)
request for additional discovery is properly denied “where the additional evidence sought for
discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat
summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995);
see Amirmokri v. Abraham, 437 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 266 F. App’x. 274
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 885 (2008).
11

If a non-moving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration
of summary judgment, the party fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit at his peril, because “‘the
failure to file an affidavit . . . is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for
discovery was inadequate.’” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). But, the non-moving
party’s failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a summary judgment
ruling that is obviously premature. Although the Fourth Circuit has placed “‘great weight’” on
the Rule 56(d) affidavit, and has said that a mere “‘reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and
the need for additional discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment is not an adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,’” the appellate court has “not
always insisted” on a Rule 56(d) affidavit. Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the
Fourth Circuit, failure to file an affidavit may be excused “if the nonmoving party has adequately
informed the district court that the motion is premature and that more discovery is necessary”
and the “nonmoving party’s objections before the district court ‘served as the functional
equivalent of an affidavit.’” Id. at 244-45 (internal citations omitted).
9

The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).
Because plaintiff is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But, the court must also abide by the “ ‘affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from
proceeding to trial.’ ” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corporation v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
Discussion
The constitutional protections afforded a pre-trial detainee under the Fourteenth
Amendment are coextensive with those provided by the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “‘[D]ue process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as

10

the eighth amendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.’” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979
F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentile, 849 F. 2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988))
(emphasis in Hill); see also Riley v. Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir. 1997) (pre-trial
detainee=s Fourteenth Amendment right with respect to excessive force is similar to prisoner=s
Eighth Amendment right; both require more than de minimus injury). The inquiry with respect
to the conditions alleged is whether or not those conditions amount to punishment of the pre-trial
detainee because due process proscribes punishment of a detainee before adjudication of guilt.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535. However, Anot every inconvenience that is encountered during
pre-trial detention amounts to >punishment= in the constitutional sense.@ Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.
2d at 870.
In order to state a constitutional claim under § 1983 for denial of medical care, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the action or inaction of the defendants amounted to deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). In
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit explained that deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need is defined as medical treatment that is “so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shot the conscience or to be intolerable to
fundamental fairness.” Moreover, “mere negligence” is not enough. See Short v. Smoot, 436
F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2006); Grayson v. Deed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). Deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was
suffering from a serious medical condition and that, subjectively, the prison staff were aware of
the need for medical attention but failed either to provide it or ensure that the needed care was
available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

11

(1992) (there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with unqualified access to health
care).
The subjective component requires Asubjective recklessness@ in the face of the serious
medical condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839B 40. ATrue subjective recklessness requires
knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk.@ Rich v. Bruce, 129 F. 3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1997). AActual knowledge or awareness
on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference
>because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted
punishment.=@ Brice v. Virgiinia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F. 3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Farmer 511 U.S. at 844).

If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an

official may avoid liability Aif [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not
ultimately averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be
judged in light of the risk the defendant actually knew at the time. Brown v. Harris, 240 F. 3d
383, 390 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F. 3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Here, Corizon Medical Staff is the only defendant named in the complaint. Corizon is a
corporation that previously administered medical care for prisoners confined at MCAC.
Hodgson blames Corizon for dispensing the wrong medication to him and for allowing his
prescriptions to lapse. But, in his Opposition, he seems to complain that Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., a corporation responsible for utilization review, for delays in obtaining necessary
medical treatment.12 ECF 18, at 5.
The law in the Fourth Circuit is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply in '1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F. 3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no

12

Plaintiff did not sue Wexford.
12

respondeat superior liability under '1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F. 3d 391, 402 (4th Cir.
2001) (no respondeat superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials Ais not
based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on >recognition that
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates= misconduct may be a causative
factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.=@ Baynard v.
Malone, 268 F. 3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F. 2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.
1984)).
Supervisory liability under ' 1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) the supervisor=s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor=s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F. 3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
As noted, Hodgson asserts that he was given the wrong medication and that
recommended medical tests were not been performed. He incorrectly contends that, at the
hearing held by Judge Grimm on September 7, 2011, Dr. Lawrence admitted to the error in
regard to the medication.13 See ECF 14. Moreover, his claim as to the improper administration
of medication states, at most, a claim of negligent medical care, which does not suffice to state a
constitutional claim. See Johnson v. Quinones 145 F. 3d 164, 166 (4th Cir. 1998) (negligence or
malpractice does not support an inference of deliberate indifference).

13

In my review of the transcript filed in United States v. Hodgson, Criminal Case ELH11-212, I saw no reference to the administration of medication to Hodgson.
13

Further, plaintiff claims that he was sent to the mental health unit as punishment for
cursing at a correctional officer. Hodgson relies on orders issued by Judge Grimm requiring his
release to the custody of U.S. Marshals so he could be evaluated by a neurologist; an order
requiring evaluation of the medical complaints Hodgson related to the court; and a portion of a
letter from the federal public defender requesting a downward departure in sentencing based, in
part, on alleged poor medical care received by Hodgson at MCAC. ECF 18 at Ex. A and B. Yet,
no medical records have been submitted by Hodgson, nor does he forecast other evidence to
support his claim that he suffers from a serious illness that was not treated.
The medical records submitted by defendant, however, reflect that Hodgson’s complaints
were addressed as they arose. Despite Hodgson’s claim that his back was causing symptoms, he
had a normal gait. See ECF 10, Ex. B at 28. His urinary incontinence and complaints of
testicular pain were addressed with several urinalysis tests, followed by a course of antibiotics as
well as a physical examination, which revealed no testicular masses. Id. at 21- 25; see Wright v.
Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849(4th Cir. 1985) (disagreement with medical opinion is not deliberate
indifference). Hodgson was also examined by an orthopedist, who found no basis to conclude
that he required surgery. Indeed, despite Hodgson’s assertions otherwise, no medical staff has
acknowledged or recommended a need for surgery to address his condition.14
As indicated, the record does not support Hodgson’s assertion that Dr. Lawrence
admitted to the administration of the wrong medication during the hearing held by Judge Grimm
on September 7, 2011. Hodgson’s claim that the hives he experienced are evidence that he
experienced an allergic reaction to the wrong medication is also not borne out by the record. The
incident leading to his transfer to the mental health unit involved Hodgson’s anxiety about being
14

Neither Hodgson’s complaint nor the medical records submitted by defendant identify
a diagnosed back condition.
14

locked into a small dark cell, triggering his claustrophobia. See Ex. B, 10-20. According to the
psychology staff who responded to the housing unit, Hodgson cursed at a correctional officer and
made statements that he would kill himself if he was forced to go into a cell that was dark. Ex. B
at 13. Based on those statements, he was placed on suicide watch. In the course of his
evaluation, Hodgson admitted that anxiety gives him hives.
On the record evidence before the Court, Corizon is entitled to summary judgment in its
favor. A separate Order follows.

July 24, 2012
Date

/s/
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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