Blind Industries and Services of Maryland et al v. Route 40 Paintball Park
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/26/12. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
BLIND INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES
OF MARYLAND, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROUTE 40 PAINTBALL PARK,
Defendant
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Case No.: WMN-11-3562
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Blind Industries and Services of Maryland (“BISM”), Marco Carranza, James
Konechne, and Ronald Cagle filed this lawsuit against Defendant Route 40 Paintball Park. The
Complaint alleges that the Defendant paintball park discriminatorily denied access to the
individual Plaintiffs, who are legally blind. This Memorandum Opinion addresses Defendant
Route 40 Paintball Park’s Motion to Compel, [ECF No. 28], and the opposition and reply
thereto.1 Specifically, Defendant filed this Motion to obtain an answer to its Interrogatory No. 5
and Request for Production of Documents No. 10, both of which seek information and
documents relating to BISM’s social outings2 from the previous six years.
A hearing is
1
This case has been referred by Judge Nickerson to a magistrate judge to resolve discovery
disputes and related scheduling matters. [ECF No. 18].
2
BISM offers a program of education and training for the blind, seeking to help the blind reach
their potential for living and working independently. Compl. ¶ 5. The individual Plaintiffs were
students in BISM’s program at the time of the events alleged in the Complaint. BISM students
plan various social outings as part of the program. The Complaint alleges that the trip to the
Defendant paintball park was one such social outing. Compl. ¶ 14.
unnecessary in this case. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons stated herein,
Defendant’s Motion to Compel is denied.
Defendant served discovery requests on BISM on May 2, 2012. BISM served its answers
to interrogatories and responses to requests for production on June 1, 2012, objecting to
Interrogatory No. 5 and Request for Production No. 10 on the basis of relevance. On July 3,
2012, Defendant wrote a letter to BISM identifying alleged deficiencies in BISM’s responses.
BISM responded in writing on July 30, 2012, again objecting to the requests. The parties spoke
via telephone on August 6, 2012, attempting to resolve the dispute. This conversation was to no
avail, however, and Defendant filed this Motion to Compel on August 8, 2012.
In filing its Motion to Compel, Defendant failed to comply with the Local Rules and this
Court’s Scheduling Order. Local Rule 104.8 requires that motions to compel be served within
30 days of the time that the moving party receives unsatisfactory responses to its discovery
requests.
Here, BISM responded to Defendant’s discovery requests on June 1, 2012, and
Defendant did not file its Motion to Compel until more than two months later, on August 8,
2012. Clearly, Defendant filed this Motion well beyond the allotted thirty day period.
Defendant concedes that its Motion was not timely filed, but argues that technical
tardiness is not fatal. Under the circumstances presented, this Court disagrees. In Webb v. Green
Tree Servicing LLC, No. ELH 11-2105, 2012 WL 3139551, at *1 (D. Md. July 27, 2012), the
plaintiff filed its motion to compel “well beyond” the thirty day deadline set forth in Local Rule
104.8, and less than thirty days before the close of discovery. The Court noted that plaintiff’s
belated motion was especially troubling because if it were granted, it would disrupt the
Scheduling Order by extending the discovery deadline. Id. As such, the court denied plaintiff’s
2
motion to compel.3 Id.; see also In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 331, 332-33
(N.D.Ill. 2005) (noting that while the timeliness for filing a motion to compel depends on the
circumstances of each case, “motions to compel filed after the close of discovery are almost
always deemed untimely.”).
Here, Defendant’s belated filing is unjustified.
On June 1, 2012, BISM expressly
objected, in full, to both the interrogatory and the request for production. Defendant did not have
to undertake any extensive review of documents or records to ferret out the alleged insufficiency
of BISM’s responses, since BISM offered no responses. Moreover, Defendant certainly knew of
the alleged deficiencies at least as of July 3, 2012, as Defendant wrote BISM a letter on that date
highlighting the deficiencies. However, Defendant did not file its Motion until well beyond the
thirty day limit, and several weeks after the discovery deadline of July 16, 2012. [ECF No. 15].
Defendant’s Motion to Compel was also filed after BISM filed its summary judgment motion on
July 23, 2012. [ECF No. 22]. Moreover, Defendant’s tardy motion came after both parties in
this case were warned by this Court that all future filings should be made in accordance with the
Local Rules. [ECF No. 21]. Defendant has not shown, or attempted to show, any good cause for
its delay.
In attempting to distinguish Webb, Defendant further argues that granting its Motion
would not necessitate an amendment of the Scheduling Order or an extension of the discovery
deadline. Reply at 2. If, however, this Court ordered BISM to answer the disputed interrogatory
and produce additional documents, discovery would effectively be re-opened. BISM would have
to search for, sort through, and produce numerous documents to properly respond to Defendant’s
3
Although the court in Webb did deny the motion to compel on other grounds as well, it was
clear in holding that the tardiness of the motion alone was sufficient grounds for denial. See
Webb at 1.
3
interrogatory and document request. Moreover, discovery often begets discovery. Defendant,
upon receiving BISM’s compelled responses, may wish to explore new information received,
thus seeking additional extended discovery. This result is untenable after the close of the
scheduled discovery period. See Webb, 2012 WL 3139551, at *1; see also Packman v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to compel as untimely where plaintiff knew of
insufficient discovery responses before the discovery deadline but failed to file its motion to
compel until after the close of discovery and after defendants had filed their summary judgment
motion).
Defendant also argues that BISM is “not prejudiced by having to respond to discovery
requests in the middle of summary judgment briefing.” Reply at 2. This argument is not
persuasive. The entire purpose of scheduling orders is to “provide concrete deadlines on which
the parties can rely in planning their respective litigation strategies.” McLaughlin v. Diamond
State Port Corp., No. C.A. 03-617(GMS), 2004 WL 2958664, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 21, 2004); see
also Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985) (noting that a
Scheduling Order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly
disregarded by counsel without peril.”). These deadlines allow parties to estimate the costs that
will be incurred as they move towards trial, and to make informed decisions on strategic motions
and settlement negotiations. As such, this Court will not allow Defendant’s disregard for the
Local Rules and Scheduling Order to delay this case or to compel BISM to incur additional
costs.4
4
A ruling for Defendant would also be inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, which states that all
federal rules of civil procedure, including the rules governing discovery, should be “construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
4
Last, BISM argues that the disputed interrogatory and request for production are
irrelevant and outside the scope of permissible discovery. In discovery, parties may seek any
non-privileged information that is relevant to a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Relevant evidence is evidence that has any tendency to make a fact of consequence “more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Parties may also seek
relevant inadmissible information if it “appears reasonably calculated to the lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Here, Defendant seeks documents and information regarding all social outings taken by
BISM students from 2006 to present. Defendant argues that this information is relevant to
determining whether the individual Plaintiffs could have safely participated in paintball
activities. BISM argues that this information is irrelevant because the requests were not limited
to the individual Plaintiffs here, and because the requests are not limited to activities similar to
paintball. This Court agrees with BISM that the only potentially relevant social outings were
those attended by the individual Plaintiffs. Blind individuals, like sighted individuals, have
different limitations and different ability levels. To assume that one blind individual’s ability to
partake in an activity has any bearing on another blind individual’s ability to partake in a similar
activity would be, as BISM states, inappropriate. As such, Defendant’s attempt to compel
information relating to social outings not attended by the individual Plaintiffs is denied on the
basis of relevance as well.
It should be noted that the individual Plaintiffs’ prior social outings might be relevant to
determining whether they could safely participate in paintball. However, Defendant has had the
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Compelling BISM to produce discovery after the discovery
deadline where no good cause has been shown promotes neither the speedy nor the efficient
resolution of this matter, particularly because potentially dispositive motions are now pending.
[ECF No. 22, 24].
5
opportunity to depose the individual Plaintiffs and to question those Plaintiffs about their
participation in social outings. Any information that Defendant may have compelled via the
instant Motion, had it been timely filed, would be largely duplicative. Perhaps as a result,
Defendant has not argued that it will suffer any prejudice without the information it belatedly
seeks to compel.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to compel is denied. A separate
order follows.
Dated: September 26, 2012
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?