Engler et al v. Harris Corporation et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 10/18/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SUSAN ENGLER, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
v.
Civil Action No. GLR-11-3597
:
HARRIS CORP.,
:
Defendant.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Harris Corporation’s
(“Harris”) Motion to Sever Plaintiffs Susan Engler, Jacqueline
Hamrick, and Antoanna Romaniuk’s (collectively the “Plaintiffs”)
remaining gender discrimination and retaliation claims.1 (ECF No.
12).
This is a Title VII employment discrimination case in
which the Plaintiffs allege they were terminated or forced to
resign as a result of Harris’ failure to end discriminating,
harassing, and retaliatory behavior by male employees in its
Columbia, Maryland, office.
The issue before the Court is whether the Court should
grant Harris’ Motion to Sever Plaintiffs’ claims where Harris
asserts that the risks of prejudice and jury confusion resulting
from a joint trial of Plaintiffs’ claims outweigh any benefits
1
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims include Ms. Hamrick’s and
Ms. Engler’s gender discrimination claims and all three
Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.
(See ECF No.11 at 1; and ECF
No. 30).
of
maintaining
briefed
and
no
(D.Md. 2011).
consolidation.
hearing
is
The
issues
necessary.
See
have
been
fully
Local
Rule
105.6
For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion
to Sever is granted.
I.
A.
BACKGROUND2
Ms. Engler
In
September
of
2006,
Harris
RF
Communications
Division
(“Harris RFCD”) hired Ms. Engler as a Contract Manager in its
Columbia,
Maryland,
office.
Ms.
Engler
complains
that
throughout her time at Harris, male employees were “hostile,
rude, and demeaning.”
The Amended Complaint alleges instances
such
being
as
Ms.
Engler
excluded
from
meetings,
having
information withheld from her, and being “chastised” and treated
with “disrespect and contempt.”
Ms. Engler also contends that
she “did not receive the same administrative assistance as other
similarly situated male managers.”
Ms. Engler further asserts
that male employees often questioned her knowledge of contracts.
Additionally, Ms. Engler maintains that Senior Programs Manager,
Mark Cates, repeatedly and unnecessarily monitored the “comings
and goings” of her and other female employees.
In August of 2008, Ms. Engler spoke with her boss, Paul
Wilson, Contracts Director-1, regarding her concerns about the
2
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the Amended Complaint.
2
conduct
of
male
Wilson
spoke
employees
with
Dana
in
Harris’
Mehnet,
Columbia
President
of
office.
Harris
Rochester, New York, regarding Ms. Engler’s concerns.
of
2009,
Harris
concerns
at
an
Columbia
office.
the
launched
investigation
As
a
into
RFCD
in
In April
the
result,
Mr.
gender
Cortland
Davidson, the local Humans Relations representative, accused Ms.
Engler of “instigating charges of harassment and discrimination”
through
a
“Women
in
Business”
group
that
Ms.
Engler
had
organized in Columbia.
After being told by Mr. Wilson that “things are not going
to improve [in the Columbia office],” Ms. Engler received word
that Harris was laying off employees.
On June 25, 2009, the day
after a debriefing about the results from the investigation into
the gender concerns at the Columbia office, Ms. Engler was laid
off.3
On July 6, 2009, John White, a male Harris compliance
officer, replaced Ms. Engler.
B.
Ms. Hamrick
In January of 2007, Ms. Hamrick transferred from a Harris
office
in
Annapolis
Columbia, Maryland.
during
her
tenure
Junction,
Maryland,
to
Harris
RFCD
in
Ms. Hamrick worked as a Program Manager
at
Harris’
Columbia
office.
She
first
reported to Mr. Cates, until Mr. Cates was laid off in 2009;
3
Harris also laid off Mr. Cates and Bruce Florack, a Level
3 Program Manager, in June 2009.
3
then she reported to Dick Rzepkowski.
“sex
discrimination
and
harassment
Ms. Hamrick alleges that
from
her
male
colleagues”
resulted in “undesirable assignments” that were less important
than those given to male colleagues.
qualified
male
Program
complicated projects.”
Managers
She also argues that less
received
the
“lucrative
and
Ms. Hamrick asserts that Mr. Rzepkowski
“made it clear . . . that he would continue to assign her
insignificant programs while she worked in his group.”
Additionally,
Ms.
Hamrick
maintains
that
two
men
from
Harris’ Rochester, New York, office “subjected [her] to verbal
harassment and hostility.”
Ms. Hamrick alleges, for instance,
that Mr. Rzepkowski made comments that Hillary Clinton and a
female manager at the National Security Agency (“NSA”) got their
positions because of their husbands’ influence.
Ms. Hamrick
further asserts that “no one ever informed her of [a] rumor”
alleging that she was having an affair with Mr. Cates.
Ms.
Hamrick also contends that male managers at Harris “repeatedly
accused
female
employees
of
‘not
working
their
hours,’”
and
that, prior to his termination, Mr. Cates accused Ms. Hamrick of
not working her hours.
Ms. Hamrick claims that Mr. Cates raised
his voice and interrupted her when she tried to address comments
about her performance, but that Mr. Cates did not act this way
with male employees.
Finally, Ms. Hamrick maintains that she
complained to Harris human resources, but they “did not take any
4
action.”
Subsequently,
on
December
21,
2009,
Ms.
Hamrick
resigned due to “continued sex-based discrimination and [the]
hostile work environment.”
C.
Ms. Romaniuk
In November of 2008, Harris RFCD hired Ms. Romaniuk as an
Engineering Manager in the Columbia, Maryland, office.
Several
months after she was hired, Ms. Romaniuk was assigned as an
Engineering Manager for the “JTT” program.
that
she
hardware
did
not
problems
receive
she
the
support
found
with
Ms. Romaniuk alleges
she
the
needed
program
to
correct
and
that
“[m]anagement shifted the blame over the project from the male
employees to [her] and placed her on a Position Performance
[sic] Plan (“PIP”).”
Ms. Romaniuk also argues that “[a]s a
result of male hostility and harassment,” she was excluded from
meetings and “assigned projects already assigned to others which
were behind schedule and cost.”
Further,
Ms.
Romaniuk
contends
that
while
all
male
engineering managers were directed to report to Mark Turner,
Director
of
“forced
[by
Engineering
the
CSP
Software
management]
Manager,”
to
despite
Department,
remain
under
Ms.
Romaniuk
Ms.
Len
Romaniuk
was
Lally,
Senior
repeatedly
asking
management to transfer her from Mr. Lally’s supervision.
Ms.
Romaniuk asserts that “[d]espite [her] repeated objections, Mr.
Lally entered [her] office every day after hours (6:00 PM) and
5
closed the door so they could have a ‘private’ conversation.”
Ms. Romaniuk maintains that having the door closed made her feel
“extremely uncomfortable and threatened.”
Additionally,
“condescending”
Ms.
and
Romaniuk
repeatedly
accent was a problem.
alleges
commented
that
Mr.
that
Lally
her
was
Bulgarian
Ms. Romaniuk argues, for example, that
Mr. Lally told her he “could not understand her” and that “she
was the worst person with a foreign accent that he ever had to
deal with.”
Ms. Romaniuk contends that Mr. Lally viewed her
accent as the reason for her “poor communication skills.”
Ms.
Romaniuk
representative
complained
about
“Mr.
to
a
Lally’s
company
hostile
human
relations
treatment
of
her.”
After six months of complaining to human resources, Ms. Romaniuk
was allowed to attend the meetings from which she had previously
been excluded.
to
male
reports.
Romaniuk
Additionally, Ms. Romaniuk argues that, compared
colleagues,
on
her
Ms. Romaniuk was placed on a PIP in March 2009.
Ms.
contends,
she
received
however,
that
harsher
her
criticism
performance
was
“equal
and/or superior to similarly situated male colleagues.”
After
Harris conducted its investigation into gender issues at the
Columbia
office,
Harris
management
“removed
the
PIP
and
all
other adverse reports in Ms. Romaniuk’s file” and placed Ms.
Romaniuk
under
the
supervision
Engineering.
6
of
Dan
Pierce,
Director
of
By November 2009, Ms. Romaniuk was placed back on a PIP,
which contained the same performance allegations as the March
2009
PIP.
Ms.
Romaniuk
alleges,
however,
that
Mr.
Pierce
“dredged up” the adverse reports which had been removed after
the investigation.
November
2009
superior
to
Ms. Romaniuk claims that at the time of the
PIP,
her
her
performance
similarly
situated
was
again
male
.
.
“equal
.
and/or
colleagues.”
Subsequently, on December 14, 2009, Ms. Romaniuk resigned due to
her
inability
to
tolerate
the
alleged
discrimination
and
harassment.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Plaintiffs may join together in one lawsuit if: “(A) they
assert
any
right
alternative
with
to
relief
jointly,
to
occurrence,
transaction,
respect
or
or
severally,
arising
series
of
out
or
of
in
the
the
same
transactions
or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs
“Neither
obtaining
will
a
arise
plaintiff
or
in
nor
defending
the
action.”
a
defendant
against
all
Fed.R.Civ.P.
need
the
be
relief
20(a)(1).
interested
in
demanded.
The
court may grant judgment to one or more plaintiffs according to
their rights, and against one or more defendants according to
their liabilities.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(3).
A court may also
“order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
7
prejudice.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(b).
any claim against a party.”
Further, a court may “sever
Fed.R.Civ.P. 21.
Similarly, “[i]f
actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions . . . .”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a).
Under Rules 20, 21, and 42, district courts are given broad
discretion.
Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 192
(4th Cir. 1982), on reh'g, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983); A/S J.
Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d
928,
933
(4th
Residential,
CVI/Beta
Cir.
483
Ventures,
1977);
F.Supp.2d
Inc.
v.
Equal
482,
Custom
Rights
489
Ctr.
(D.Md.
Optical
v.
2007)
Frames,
Equity
(citing
Inc.,
896
F.Supp. 505, 506 (D.Md. 1995)(internal citation omitted)).
In determining a motion to sever, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has identified the threshold inquiry a
court should consider:
[W]hether the specific risks of prejudice and possible
confusion were overborne by the risk of inconsistent
adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the
burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial
resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of
time required to conclude multiple suits as against a
single one, and the relative expense to all concerned
of the single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives.
Arnold, 681 F.2d at 193.
Recently, this Court has recognized:
[A] presumption in favor of the nonmoving party that
all claims in a case will be resolved in a single
trial and not be severed, placing the burden on the
party moving for severance to show that (1) it will be
8
severely prejudiced without a separate trial; and (2)
the issue to be severed is so “distinct and separable”
from the others that a trial of that issue alone may
proceed without injustice.
Equal
Rights
Ctr.,
483
F.Supp.2d
at
489
(internal
citations
omitted).
B.
Analysis
The Court grants Harris’ Motion to Sever because the risk
of jury confusion and prejudice is greater than any potential
benefit to maintaining consolidation of the claims.
The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that when evaluating a
motion to sever, the risk of prejudice and jury confusion needs
to
be
weighed
against
four
factors:
(1)
“the
risk
of
inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues”;
(2) “the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial
resources posed by multiple lawsuits”; (3) “the length of time
required to conclude multiple suits as against a single one”;
and (4) “the relative expense to all concerned of the singletrial, multiple-trial alternatives.”
Arnold, 681 F.2d at 193.
When faced with severance issues concerning discrimination
claims, the Fourth Circuit has found that when the misconduct in
all
of
the
identical,
plaintiffs’
severance
is
cases
in
a
lawsuit
is
inappropriate
because
the
virtually
need
for
judicial economy outweighs the risk of prejudice and possible
9
jury confusion.
See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F3d. 978,
980—82 (4th Cir. 1997).
For
brought
example,
age
in
Duke
discrimination
v.
Uniroyal
claims
in
Inc.,
two
violation
plaintiffs
of
the
Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against the defendant.
928
F.2d
discharged
1413,
1416
from
(4th
employment
Cir.
on
1991).
the
defendant’s reduction in force.
Id.
same
Both
day
plaintiffs
as
part
of
were
the
Both plaintiffs were the
“oldest and longest tenured” representatives in their regions.
Id.
The
defendant
applied
the
same
employee
performance
criteria to both plaintiffs in order to determine whether each
plaintiff would be terminated.
Id. at 1416—17, 1420.
In Duke,
the force reduction was also implemented by the same individuals
employed by the defendant.
Id. at 1420.
Accordingly, in Duke,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the
defendant’s motion to sever because the plaintiffs’ claims arose
from the same transaction, and the record presented no basis on
which to conclude that evidence was confusing or prejudicial to
the defendant.
Id. at 1421.
Conversely,
when
the
misconduct
in
each
plaintiff’s
allegations in a discrimination lawsuit is based on different
sets of facts, courts have found severance to be appropriate
because the risk of prejudice and jury confusion outweighs any
10
benefit to judicial economy.
See Arroyo v. Chardon, 90 F.R.D.
603, 605—06 (D.P.R. 1981).
For example, in Watkins v. Hospitality Grp. Mgmt. Inc., No.
1:02CV00897,
2003
WL
22937710
(M.D.N.C.
Dec.
1,
2003),
two
plaintiffs brought different discrimination claims against their
employer.
Watkins,
2003
WL
22937710
at
*1.
One
plaintiff
alleged age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, while the
other
plaintiff
Title
VII.
supervisor
alleged
Id.
in
the
different position.
at
race
discrimination
*1—4.
Both
company;
each
Id. at *1—3.
in
plaintiffs
plaintiff,
violation
had
the
however,
of
same
held
a
The court in Watkins observed
that the case involved “two entirely separate sets of events and
two separate causes of action.”
Id. at *11.
Concluding that
there would be significant risk of prejudice and jury confusion
in
a
joint
allegations
trial,
of
a
the
court
series
of
stated
that
offensive
“[a]
comments
jury
hearing
toward
both
[p]laintiffs may view the evidence in the aggregate, prejudicing
them against [the defendant], or they may confuse the evidence
in
some
other
manner
when
looking
towards one [p]laintiff alone.”
Id.
for
discriminatory
intent
Additionally, the court
concluded that the risk of inconsistent adjudications of fact or
law was minimal.
Id.
The court emphasized that even though
some witnesses would overlap, there would be little overlap of
facts.
Id.
Thus, the court reasoned, finding discrimination
11
against
one
inconsistent
efficiency,
plaintiff
and
adjudication.
the
Watkins
not
Id.
court
the
other
Finally,
concluded
would
not
regarding
that
having
cause
judicial
separate
trials was not an undue burden on the parties or inefficient
because separate trials were needed to ensure fairness.
*12.
Id. at
Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s motion to sever
because plaintiffs’ claims rested on different facts.
Id. at
*11—12.
In the present case, the Court grants Harris’ Motion to
Sever because (1) Plaintiffs’ claims rest on different sets of
facts; (2) the similarities between Plaintiffs’ claims are not
compelling; and (3) additional factors and concern for judicial
economy do not outweigh the risk of jury confusion or prejudice.
1.
Plaintiffs’ Claims Rest on Different Sets of Facts
First, similar to the circumstance presented in Watkins,
Plaintiffs’ claims rest on different sets of facts and would
likely lead to jury confusion and/or prejudice.
Specifically,
each Plaintiff in the present case was employed for a different
length of time, held a different position, had different job
duties, and reported to different supervisors.
Not only was the
alleged discrimination perpetrated by different individuals, but
the circumstances surrounding each Plaintiff’s allegations also
vary from Plaintiff to Plaintiff.
12
Moreover, Plaintiffs left
Harris under different circumstances — Ms. Engler was laid off,
but Ms. Hamrick and Ms. Romaniuk resigned.
2.
Similarities
Compelling
Second,
Between
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs’
assert
a
Claims
multitude
of
are
not
unrelated
allegations that could easily confuse the jury or cause the jury
to view the evidence of discrimination in the aggregate.
there
are
similarities
between
Plaintiffs’
claims
While
(e.g.,
all
three Plaintiffs have remaining retaliation claims; two of the
Plaintiffs
have
remaining
gender
discrimination
claims;
all
three Plaintiffs worked in the same division at Harris; the time
period during which Plaintiffs worked at Harris overlaps; and
all three Plaintiffs are represented by the same attorney), each
Plaintiff submitted claims under a separate and distinct set of
facts.
Unlike the situation in Duke, the misconduct in the
present case is neither virtually identical from Plaintiff to
Plaintiff, nor did the claims arise from the same transaction or
occurrence.
Thus, similar to Watkins, the present case carries
a significant risk of jury confusion or prejudice if the claims
remain consolidated.
3.
Additional Factors and Concern for Judicial Economy do
not Outweigh the Risk of Jury Confusion or Prejudice
Third,
the
other
Fourth
Circuit
factors
emphasized
in
Arnold do not outweigh the significant risk of jury confusion or
prejudice.
There is little risk of inconsistent adjudications
13
of
fact
between
or
the
law
because
claims.
there
Thus,
are
very
similar
to
inconsistent adjudications is minimal.
on
the
parties
significant
risk
consolidation
of
and/or
of
jury
witnesses
claims
facts
Watkins,
in
the
common
risk
of
Additionally, the burden
does
confusion
Plaintiffs’
few
not
outweigh
and
prejudice.
may
lessen
the
While
the
burden
because some of the witnesses for each Plaintiff’s claim may be
the same, this benefit is minimal.
Therefore, even assuming the
parties and/or witnesses would be burdened by separate trials,
the significant risk of jury confusion and prejudice to Harris
outweighs
any
benefit
of
maintaining
consolidation
of
the
claims.
As to the remaining factors concerning judicial economy, it
is
unclear
whether
time
maintaining consolidation.
and
resources
would
be
saved
by
On one hand, a consolidated trial
could arguably take less time and use fewer resources because
discovery would not be duplicated.
is
unlikely
to
be
duplicated
different sets of facts.
On the other hand, discovery
because
the
claims
involve
Moreover, it is unclear whether a
single consolidated trial would take less courtroom time than
separate trials, especially given that Plaintiffs’ claims all
stem from different sets of facts.
judicial
economy
favored
Again, even assuming that
maintaining
consolidation,
the
significant risk of potential jury confusion and prejudice to
14
Harris outweighs any potential benefit or convenience that may
result from maintaining consolidation.
Accordingly, the Court grants Harris’ Motion to Sever.
III. CONCLUSION
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that
Defendant’s Motion to Sever (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED.
Entered this 18th day of October, 2012
_____/s/______________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
15
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