Williams v. 1199 SEIU Healthcare Workers et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 7/17/12. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 7/17/2012 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (c/m 7/17/12 bh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERRIE M. WILLIAMS
v.
1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS EAST et al.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*
*
* Civil Action WMN-12-72
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*

MEMORANDUM
Pending before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 9.

The parties have fully briefed the motion, and it is

ripe for review.

Upon consideration of the pleadings, facts and

applicable law, the Court determines that no hearing is
necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
will be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons set
forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Terrie Williams began working as an
Administrative Organizer for Defendant 1199 SEIU United
Healthcare Workers East (1199) on June 16, 2008.

Defendant 1199

is a labor union that represents healthcare workers in several
East Coast areas, including the Maryland/DC region.

Plaintiff

has also named as Defendants George Gresham, President of 1199;
John Reid, Executive Vice President of 1199 and Plaintiff’s
second-line supervisor; Katherine Taylor, who was initially the
Vice President and Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, and later

was named as Interim Executive Vice President; and Lisa Wallace,
who became Vice President and Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor
after Ms. Taylor was named to the interim position.
On January 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Form Complaint
alleging employment discrimination.

She alleges that the

Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA).
Specifically, she alleges that from February 2009 until the
termination of her employment on October 17, 2011, she was
subjected to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment
based on her sex, discriminated against based on her age, and
that she was retaliated against for filing a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Based on the information provided in the Form Complaint,
its attachments, Plaintiff’s supplement to the complaint, and
the charges1 Plaintiff filed with the EEOC, the Court understands

1

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider
documents attached to the complaint and to the motion to dismiss
as long as such documents are integral to the complaint and
authentic. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009). In the employment discrimination context, a
court may consider an EEOC charge and other EEOC documentation
because such documents are integral to the complaint as
plaintiff necessarily relies on these documents to satisfy the
time limit requirements of the statutory scheme. Holowecki v.
Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 565-66 (2nd Cir. 2006);
McDougall v. Maryland Transit Admin., Civ. No. WDQ-11-3410, 2012
WL 1554924 at n.3 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2012) (“a plaintiff’s
2

that Plaintiff’s allegations arise from a general discontentment
in the way she was treated during her employment at 1199.
Plaintiff has submitted over a hundred pages of documentation to
support her claim.

From these submissions the Court has created

a chronology of those events which are most significant to its
analysis of the pending motion:
On May 25, 2010, Plaintiff was given a “Written Warning,”
because she did not go to her “shop” on the weekend and did not
seek approval from her supervisors for a change in her schedule.
ECF No. 4-1 at 61.

The warning also notes that Plaintiff was

unavailable on her cell phone during the weekends, even though
her position requires her to be reachable by phone at all times.
Id.
On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff drafted a letter2 outlining
her concerns entitled “Discrimination (gender), hostile work
environment, bullying, intimidation.”

ECF No. 4-1 at 82-85.

She complained that she has been harassed, bullied, ridiculed,
verbally abused, and discriminated against by her supervisor,
Katherine Taylor.

Specifically, she stated that she had been

administrative discrimination charge is integral to a subsequent
discrimination complaint”). The Court’s consideration of these
documents does not convert this into a motion for summary
judgment. Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 566.
2

The letter does not include a salutation or addressee, but
presumably it was sent to someone in the New York headquarters
of 1199.
3

excluded from conference calls and meetings that she should have
attended, was written up unjustly on several occasions, received
a leased car that was infested by mice, and was not permitted to
use personal or vacation days.
Plaintiff filed her first EEOC charge on September 13,
2010.

The charge alleged that she had been discriminated

against based on her sex from June 16, 2008, the date of her
hiring,3 to June 19, 2010.

Specifically, she alleged that:

Since the beginning of my employment I have been subjected
to unequal terms and conditions of employment, discipline,
harassment, and intimidation by Katherine Taylor, Vice
President. Ms. Taylor subjects the females in the office
to similar treatment with the exception of Lisa Wallace who
fills in for Ms. Taylor in her absence. Ms. Taylor does
not subject the male employees to the disparate treatment.
Ms. Taylor sabotages my work, hollers, yells, and has
disciplined me for things that I am not guilty of. The
work environment is so hostile that it has caused medical
problems for me. I was hospitalized on June 19, 2010, and
have been on medical leave since that time.
ECF No. 4-1 at 1.

Plaintiff further alleges that she was not

given any reasons for the treatment alleged above and that when
Ms. Taylor provides a reason, “she is very condescending about
it.” Id.

Plaintiff received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights

from the EEOC dated September 27, 2011.4

See ECF No. 4-1 at 1.

3

The Form Complaint alleges that the discrimination for which
Plaintiff is suing began in February 2009.
4

Plaintiff notes that she picked up the letter from the EEOC
office on October 19, 2011, because it was mailed to the wrong
address.
4

On July 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second charge of
discrimination, again alleging discrimination based on race and
adding a claim for retaliation.

ECF No. 9-3 at 3.

She alleged

that since filing an EEOC charge on August 26, 2010,5 she had
continued to be disparately treated by Lisa Wallace, who denied
her time off, cancelled her vacation time, gave her additional
assignments without her knowledge, and wrote her up because she
took time off that was not approved.

Plaintiff elaborates this

last point, noting that the staff was told that no one was
allowed to take vacation time during the month of May, but a
male employee and another female employee were allowed to take
vacation.

She also charged that she was next in line to go to a

training conference in Los Angeles, but a male co-worker was
selected to go instead.

Finally she alleges that she was given

more work assignments than other staff members.
On August 10, 2011, Plaintiff received a one-day suspension
because she was a “no call, no show.”

ECF No. 1-4 at 28.

She

failed to attend a Saturday morning phone bank and had not
previously notified her supervisor.

Plaintiff disputed the

suspension and explained that she did not know she was supposed
to be at the phone bank.

ECF No. 1-4 at 29.

5

This suspension

The Court has not been provided with a copy of an EEOC Charge
dated August 26, 2010, nor did 1199 receive notice of such a
charge. See Mot. at n.3. The Court assumes that Plaintiff is
referring to the charge she filed on September 13, 2010.
5

was upheld after a grievance hearing was held on December 13,
2011.

ECF No. 4-1 at 53.
On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff made a request to Lisa

Wallace that she be permitted to take a personal day because her
ceiling was leaking.

ECF No. 4-1 at 46-47.

Ms. Wallace denied

the request, stating that a personal day must be requested seven
days in advance.
day.

Plaintiff then asked to instead use a vacation

This request was also denied, as it too needed to be made

in advance.
Then, on August 22, 2011, Plaintiff received a three day
suspension for a second “no call, no show” incident.
4 at 23.

ECF No. 1-

Lisa Wallace explained that Plaintiff had not shown up

for work as scheduled and did not contact Ms. Wallace until 3:48
p.m., when Plaintiff advised that she was out sick.

This

suspension, however, was rescinded after Plaintiff’s grievance
was upheld on December 13, 2011.

ECF No. 4-1 at 54.

Testimony

at the hearing indicated that Ms. Wallace had a missed call from
Plaintiff in the morning and had received a text message
indicating that Plaintiff was taking a sick day.

Ms. Wallace

responded to Plaintiff’s text message by stating text message
was not the appropriate means to give notice when taking a sick
day, and did not return Plaintiff’s call.
1-4 at 26.

6

Id.; see also ECF No.

On October 1, 2011, Plaintiff sent an email to George
Gresham, outlining the wrongs that she had experienced during
her employment and requesting a meeting.

ECF No. 1-4 at 30.

She states that she was unfairly denied tuition reimbursement
because Mr. Reid and Ms. Wallace both refused to sign a form
approving such reimbursement.

She also notes that Ms. Wallace

suspended her without pay for four days and that Mr. Reid
refused to talk to Plaintiff about the suspensions.

Plaintiff

also states that she was refused time off when she requested
leave to be with her 19-year-old daughter who had emergency
brain surgery. Finally, she notes that she has continuously been
“targeted, discriminated against, harassed and retaliated
against,” has suffered mental and physical defects because of
the stress this treatment has caused her, and that she will go
public with her allegations if Mr. Gresham does not take her
seriously and address her concerns.
On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated
after she was a “no call, no show” at a mandatory “MLK Keep the
Dream Alive Rally,” which took place on Saturday, October 15.
ECF No. 4-1 at 9.

Plaintiff had advised Lisa Wallace the

preceding Friday that she would not be attending the rally
because she did not believe she had received any justice at her
job.

Plaintiff signed the termination memo but noted that she

would be filing a grievance because she had advised both Lisa
7

Wallace and John Reid that she would not be attending “due to
the moral and ethical obligation to my beliefs that the
injustices that have been done to me would compromise what this
Rally MLK stands for. . .”

Id.

The next day, on October 18, 2011, John Reid drafted a
letter confirming that Plaintiff was terminated from her
position for insubordination when Plaintiff failed to attend a
mandatory work event from which she had not been excused.
No. 4-1 at 43.

ECF

Plaintiff grieved the termination of her

employment.

After a hearing on December 13, 2011, her grievance

was denied.

ECF No. 4-1 at 55.

Plaintiff filed an amended charge with the EEOC on November
7, 2011, adding a charge of age discrimination to her July 2011
charges of sex discrimination and retaliation.
3.

ECF No. 9-4 at

To support this additional charge, Plaintiff stated that she

found out two older employees were given light duty after
Plaintiff had requested light duty and been told it did not
exist.

Plaintiff also noted that her employment had been

terminated.

EEOC sent a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter

concerning this amended charge to Plaintiff on March 29, 2012.
ECF No. 14-1 at 1.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim
8

to relief that is plausible on its face.'"

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)).

"A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Iqbal, 556

A court need not

accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, as
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."

Id.

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are "to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers."

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(citations omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must at
least meet a minimal threshold of plausibility.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Claims against Individual Supervisors
Plaintiff has named as Defendants in her suit Mr. Gresham, Mr.
Reid, Ms. Taylor and Ms. Wallace, individuals who served as
Plaintiff’s supervisor or were members of the upper management
at 1199.

Both Title VII and the ADEA provide that it is

unlawful for an “employer” to engage in certain discriminatory
practices or conduct.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII); 29
9

U.S.C. § 623 (ADEA).

The statutes similarly define an

“employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce” who employs more than a certain number of employees
“and any agent of such a person.”

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)

(fifteen or more employees); 29 U.S.C. § 630 (twenty or more
employees).

The Fourth Circuit has interpreted both of these

statutes and held that the term “employer” does not include
individual defendants.

See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern Food

Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998) (interpreting
Title VII); Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511
(4th Cir. 1994) (interpreting ADEA).

Consequently, Plaintiff’s

claims plead against the aforementioned individually named
Defendants fail as a matter of law.

Therefore, the Complaint

against Mr. Gresham, Mr. Reid, Ms. Taylor and Ms. Wallace will
be dismissed with prejudice.
B. ADEA Claims
In her Form Complaint Plaintiff checked off the box to
bring an action under the ADEA, and briefly alleges that
vacation and personal days were denied when she requested them
but given to older workers at their request.

In her November

2011 EEOC Charge, Plaintiff also alleged that two older
employees were given “light duty,” which Plaintiff had been
previously told did not exist.

Plaintiff has not alleged any

10

facts to suggest that she was treated less favorably than
younger employees.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the purpose of
the ADEA is to “protect a relatively old worker from
discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively
young.”

General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.

581, 591 (2004).

Plaintiff appears to concede that this is the

current state of the law, but urges this Court to set a new
precedent and apply the ADEA to the reverse-age discrimination
that she has alleged.

Opp’n at 3.

The Court, however, is bound

by the prudential doctrine of stare decisis, which directs a
court to adhere to the legal decisions of other courts made in
similar cases.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).

A

court may depart from precedent, however, “when governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned.”

Smith v.

Allwright, 321 U.S. 49, 665 (1944).
In Cline, the Supreme Court considered the precise issue of
whether discrimination against the relatively young in favor of
those older is protected by the ADEA and held that it was not
protected.

Cline, 540 U.S. at 593-594.

In reaching this

decision, the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed the legislative
history of the ADEA and also considered the “virtually unanimous
accord [among the Courts of Appeals and District Courts] in
understanding the ADEA to forbid only discrimination preferring
11

young to old.”

Id.

Plaintiff has not provided any reasons why

the governing decision is unworkable or badly reasoned, and the
Court cannot conjure any itself.

Therefore, the Court is bound

by Cline and, as such, will dismiss Plaintiff’s ADEA claim.
C. Title VII Claims6
a. Disparate Treatment
To establish a prima facie case for discriminatory
disparate treatment under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to plausibly show that (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) her job performance was satisfactory; (3)
adverse employment action was taken against her; and (4)
similarly situated employees outside the protected class were
6

In addition to arguing that Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims lack
sufficient factual support, Defendants also argue that any of
Plaintiff’s claims related to alleged conduct that occurred
prior to November 17, 2009, are time-barred because they
occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s
first EEOC Charge on September 13, 2010. See ECF No. 9-1 at 11
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and VanSlyke v. Northrop
Grumman Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (D. Md. 2000)). The
Court agrees, and will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in so far as
they rely on conduct that occurred prior to November 17, 2009.
Defendants also argue that the sex discrimination claims
raised in Plaintiff’s July 2011 charge and November 2011 amended
charge must be dismissed because, at the time she filed her
suit, Plaintiff had not received a right to sue letter and thus
had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court
notes, however, that Plaintiff received a right to sue letter
related to these charges on March 29, 2012. In light of
Plaintiff’s pro se status and because these claims will be
dismissed under 12(b)(6), the Court will not require Plaintiff
to go through the formality of amending her complaint, and deems
the jurisdictional requirement of administrative exhaustion
satisfied for all claims.
12

treated differently.

See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626

F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
It is undisputed that Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts
to meet elements 1 and 3, as she is a member of a protected
class (female) and suffered adverse employment action, at the
least, in the form of suspensions and termination from her
employment.

Notwithstanding, Plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient facts to plausibly establish that similarly situated
employees outside the protected class, i.e. male employees, were
treated differently.

In the over one hundred pages of

documentation that Plaintiff has submitted, the only references
to discrimination based on her gender are in the Form Complaint
and the EEOC Charges, in which she checked the box for “sex” and
made a conclusory allegation that male employees are not subject
to the disparate treatment.

See ECF No. 4-1 at 1.

In these few

pages, she mentioned one male employee who was chosen to go to a
training conference instead of her, and mentioned this same male
along with a female employee as examples of co-workers who were
permitted to take vacation when it was denied to Plaintiff.
Comp. at 2; ECF No. 9-3 at 3.

See

She does not allege that any male

employees were similarly situated to her in terms of position or
work duties, nor does she allege that male employees were
permitted to engage in similar conduct, such as missing

13

mandatory work events and not being available by phone, without
penalty.
The bulk of the documentation submitted by Plaintiff
includes blanket allegations that she was harassed, bullied,
intimidated, ridiculed, etcetera, but she does not ever allege
facts to suggest that she was singled out for this mistreatment
because she was a female.

As “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice,” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
Plaintiff’s Title VII claim for disparate treatment will be
dismissed.
b. Hostile Work Environment
To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work
environment, Plaintiff must allege facts so that the Court may
plausibly infer that (1) 1199 subjected her to unwelcome
harassment; (2) that the harassment was based on her gender; (3)
that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive so as
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment; and (4) that there is some basis for
imposing liability on 1199.

See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369,

385 (4th Cir. 2011); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d
179, 183-184 (4th Cir. 2001).

“An employee is harassed or

otherwise discriminated against ‘because of’ his or her sex if,
‘but-for’ the employee's sex, he or she would not have been the
14

victim of the discrimination.”

Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of

America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996).
As discussed supra, Plaintiff has not provided any factual
allegations to support her contention that any harassment she
may have suffered was connected in any way to her gender, which
is required to satisfy element 2.

Moreover, the two alleged

harassers, Ms. Taylor and Ms. Wallace, are both members of the
same protected class, making the nexus between the alleged
harassment and Plaintiff’s gender even weaker.

See Bess v. Cty.

Of Cumberland, N.C., No. 5:11-CV-388-BR, 2011 WL 4809879
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 11, 2011).

Though Plaintiff has certainly

alleged facts that indicate that she did not have the most
comfortable work environment and may have been unfairly treated
by her supervisors, this unfortunate situation is not protected
under Title VII.

As emphatically stated by the Fourth Circuit,

“only harassment that occurs because of the victim’s gender is
actionable.”

Hartsell v. Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d 766,

772 (4th Cir. 1997).

As this Court cannot plausibly infer that,

but-for Plaintiff being a female, she would not have been the
victim of discrimination, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim based on a hostile work environment.
D. Retaliation
To make a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that
15

(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) 1199 took an
adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the
asserted adverse action.

See Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190; Thompson

v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 2002).
Both filing a formal charge with the EEOC and complaining to an
employer “in an orderly and nondisruptive manner” are protected
activities.

Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544,

551 (4th Cir. 1999).

Additionally, to show that an employer

“acted adversely,” a plaintiff must only show that the action
“might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Burlington N. & Santa

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

The plaintiff need not establish

that she was a victim of discrimination in order to maintain a
successful retaliation claim.

Id.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in protected
activities, both when she filed charges with the EEOC and when
she complained directly to 1199 about her discriminatory
treatment.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has adequately alleged

several employer actions that could be considered adverse under
the Burlington Northern standard.

16

Obviously suspension without

pay7 would potentially dissuade a reasonable worker from
reporting discrimination, as would termination of employment.
Some of the other complained of conduct, including refusal to
give time-off, could also potentially be considered adverse,
depending on the circumstances.
Finally, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts so that the
Court may plausibly infer that 1199 suspended and eventually
terminated her employment because she engaged in protected
activities.

See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke

Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998).

The Court can infer

that 1199 knew that Plaintiff had engaged in the protected
activity because EEOC sent notice of the September 2010 charge
to 1199 on November 15, 2010, see ECF No. 9-2 at 1, and sent
notice of the July 2011 charge on August 8, 2011, see ECF No. 93 at 1.

Moreover, Plaintiff sent an email directly to George

Gresham, on which she copied John Reid and Lisa Wallace, on
7

Although Defendants concede that the August 10, 2011,
suspension is an adverse action, they argue that the August 22,
2011, suspension “cannot constitute an adverse action because it
was rescinded, and Plaintiff therefore did not suffer any harm
as a result of that action,” ECF No. 9-1. at 20 (quoting
Burlington Northern). This argument misconstrues Burlington
Northern. The suspension was not rescinded until December 14,
2011, nearly four months later and at which time Plaintiff’s
employment had already been terminated. For four months
Plaintiff did not know whether her suspension would be rescinded
or whether she would receive backpay, so it is reasonable that
the suspension could have deterred a reasonable employee from
continuing to pursue his or her charge. See Burlington N., 548
U.S. at 72-73.
17

October 1, 2011, in which she complained about the alleged
discrimination and harassment.

ECF No. 1-4 at 30.

Due to the short amount of time that elapsed between 1199
becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged
retaliatory actions, the Court can infer that there is a causal
connection.

See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452,

457 (4th Cir. 1989) (closeness in time between protected
activity and retaliatory conduct sufficient to make a prima
facie case of causality).

EEOC sent notice of the July 2011

charge on August 8, 2011, and two days later, on August 10,
Plaintiff received a one-day suspension.

Two days after that,

on August 12, Ms. Wallace refused to allow Plaintiff to use a
personal day or vacation day to deal with an emergency situation
at home.

Ten days later, on August 22, Plaintiff received

another suspension, this time for three days.

All of these

retaliatory actions occurred shortly after 1199 presumably
became aware of Plaintiff’s July 2011 EEOC Charge.
Furthermore, the termination of Plaintiff’s employment on
October 17, 2011, occurred approximately two weeks after
Plaintiff sent a complaint email directly to Mr. Gresham, 1199’s
President.

Again, the proximity in time between these two

events is sufficient to establish causation at this stage of the
proceedings.

See Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (prima

facie causation established where employer takes adverse
18

employment action “shortly after” learning of protected
activity).
As the Court is able to infer from a liberal construction
of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint that she has established a prima
facie case of retaliation, the Motion to Dismiss the Title VII
claim for retaliation will be denied.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied
in part.

All claims against the individual supervisors will be

dismissed, and the ADEA claim and claims brought under Title VII
for Disparate Treatment and Hostile Work Environment against
1199 will be dismissed, leaving the Title VII Retaliation claim
against 1199 as the only pending claim.

The Court will issue a

separate Order.

/s/
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge
July 17, 2012

19