Williams v. 1199 SEIU Healthcare Workers et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 4/18/13. (c/m 4/18/13 apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
TERRIE M. WILLIAMS

v.
1199 SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS EAST

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Civil Action No. WMN-12-72

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MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East
(1199).

ECF No. 30.

The motion is fully briefed.

Upon

consideration of the papers, facts, and applicable law, the
Court determines that (1) no hearing is necessary, Local Rule
105.6, and (2) Defendant’s motion will be granted.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORDY
Defendant is a labor union that represents healthcare

workers in several East Coast areas, including the Maryland/D.C.
region.

Plaintiff began working as an Administrative Organizer

for Defendant on June 16, 2008.

Throughout Plaintiff’s

employment, the following people were employed by the Defendant:
George Gresham, President; John Reid, Executive Vice President
and Plaintiff’s second-line supervisor; Katherine Taylor, who
was initially Vice President and Plaintiff’s immediate
supervisor, but was later named Interim Executive Vice
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President; and Lisa Wallace, Vice President and Plaintiff’s
immediate supervisor after Ms. Taylor was named to her interim
position.
Plaintiff’s allegations arise from a general discontentment
in the way she was treated during her employment at 1199.
Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s present motion did not
contain any statement of disputed facts or otherwise suggest
that there are any disputes of fact.1

She did, however, submit

documents revealing her correspondence with Defendant’s
officials.

The Court has reviewed those documents as well as

Plaintiff’s other submissions throughout this case and, based on
that review, concludes that the following facts are undisputed.
In September 2010, Plaintiff filed an EEOC claim alleging
sex discrimination and hostile work environment.
dismissed that charge on September 27, 2011.

The EEOC

On May 13, 2011,

while Plaintiff’s charge was pending, Plaintiff emailed Reid,
Taylor, and Wallace regarding her request for scheduling
accommodations in order to attend school, stating that she felt
“harassed, intimated [sic] and discriminated against.”
32-3 at 2.

ECF No.

Later that month, Plaintiff received a written

warning for taking a vacation day without proper authorization
because she submitted her vacation request after business hours
1

Plaintiff’s contention here is that there is “a genuine dispute
with respect to retaliation as a matter of law.” ECF No. 32 at
1.
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on a Friday for the following Monday.

Plaintiff was then on

medical leave from June 8, 2011, until August 3, 2011.
On July 8, 2011, while on medical leave, Plaintiff filed a
second EEOC claim for sex discrimination and retaliation.
Defendant’s staff did not learn about this claim until September
15, 2011.
After her return from medical leave, Plaintiff received a
one day suspension for failing to come in to work on August 6,
2011, a Saturday.

Plaintiff disputed the suspension stating

that she did not know she was supposed to work on that day.

The

suspension was upheld following an internal grievance
proceeding.
On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff was denied approval to use a
personal vacation day because she failed to follow the correct
procedure for requesting leave.

Plaintiff’s later subsequent

request that she be allowed to take a vacation day was also
denied on the same grounds.

Also in August 2011, Plaintiff

received a three-day suspension for missing work without
following the call-in policy.

Plaintiff texted and left a voice

mail rather than speaking to her supervisor.

This suspension

was later overturned following an internal grievance proceeding,
however, because Plaintiff’s supervisor had not returned her
call.

In addition, Plaintiff was denied tuition reimbursement

in August 2011, after failing to obtain pre-approval for her
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desired course.

Plaintiff alleges that she was informed at the

time she enrolled in the course that obtaining pre-approval was
unnecessary.
In September 2011, Plaintiff’s request to use vacation days
was denied because three other employees had already requested
vacation for the same days and Defendant would not have been
able to cover the necessary business without the Plaintiff being
present.
Plaintiff emailed George Gresham at Defendant’s New York
headquarters on October 1, 2011, outlining the alleged wrongs
that she had experienced during her employment and requesting a
meeting.

On October 15, 2011, Plaintiff refused to attend

Defendant’s “MLK Keep the Dream Alive Rally,” despite being told
that her participation was mandatory.

Plaintiff told her

supervisor the day before the rally that she would not be
attending because she did not believe she had received any
justice at her job.

Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment

on October 17, 2011, for failure to attend the rally.
On January 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed her pro se Form
Complaint, ECF No. 1, alleging that Defendants violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
(Title VII), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA).

The Court granted

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, in part, on July 17, 2012, and
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dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against individuals employed by
Defendant, her ADEA claims, and her Title VII claims of
disparate treatment and hostile work environment.

The Court

denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss as it related to
Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims.
II.

ECF No. 16.

LEGAL STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 provides that summary judgment is

appropriate if the moving party shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”

A dispute of fact is genuine

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
In making this

determination, all justifiable inferences from the evidence must
be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, id. at 255, but “the
mere existence of a ‘scintilla of evidence’ is not enough to
frustrate a motion for summary judgment.”

Champ v. Baltimore

County, 884 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 252), aff’d, 91 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
dispute must also be over a material fact.
at 247-48.

The

Anderson, 477 U.S.

A material fact is one that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the controlling substantive law; “factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary” will not be
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considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Id. at

248.
Where a plaintiff is pro se, the Court may be obligated to
construe a plaintiff’s papers liberally.

See generally Carter

v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1986).

It may not,

however, bend the substantive requirements necessary to defeat
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony

Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003).

Specifically, the

plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations or speculation;
as outlined above, she must offer evidence to show that there is
a genuine dispute over material facts.
III. DISCUSSION
In a Title VII case such as this one, the Court’s role is
not to substitute its judgment for that of the Defendant’s.
DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.2d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir.
1998).

Rather, at the summary judgment stage, the Court’s

inquiry is limited to whether the Plaintiff can proceed by
presenting either direct evidence of retaliation, or indirect
evidence under the burden shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

See Medlock v.

Rumsfeld, 336 F. Supp. 2d 452, 465-55 (D. Md. 2002).

As

detailed below, Plaintiff has not met the burden required to
survive summary judgment.

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Plaintiff did not argue, and the Court has not found, that
there is any direct evidence of retaliation.2

Plaintiff is

therefore restricted to proving her case under the burden
shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas.
McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to first establish a
prima facie case of retaliation by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149

F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1998).

Once the plaintiff establishes

her prima facie case, there is a presumption of retaliation and
the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a nonretaliatory reason for its conduct.

Id.

The defendant’s burden

at this stage is not to persuade the trier of fact that its
proffered reason was the actual motivation for the challenged
decision.

Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2004).

Rather, the defendant “must merely articulate a justification
that is ‘legally sufficient to justify a judgment’ in his
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The Fourth Circuit has held that “direct evidence” is “evidence
that the employer ‘announced, admitted, or otherwise
unmistakably indicated that [the forbidden consideration] was a
determining factor’” in the challenged conduct. Stover v.
Lincon Pub., Inc., 73 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Cline v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982)); see
also Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir.
2006). “Direct evidence of retaliation is evidence that
demonstrates a specific link between a materially adverse action
and the protected conduct, sufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable fact finder that the harmful adverse action was in
retaliation for the protected conduct.” Young-Losee v. Graphic
Packaging Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 68
(2006).
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favor.”

Id. (quoting Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).

If the defendant meets its burden of

production, the presumption of retaliation is displaced and the
plaintiff must persuade the fact finder that the defendant’s
proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at

334; E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th
Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s claim fails because for certain of the

alleged retaliatory acts she cannot establish a prima facie
case, while for another, her termination, she has offered no
proof that Defendant’s non-retaliatory justification for its
conduct was pretextual.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that she engaged in
protected activity, (2) that an adverse employment action was
taken against her, and (3) that there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 258; Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77
F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996).

There is no dispute that

Plaintiff’s complaints to the EEOC or to Defendant’s President
were protected activity.
With regard to Plaintiff’s 2010 EEOC complaint, Defendant
challenges Plaintiff’s ability to establish the third element of
her prima facie case.

The causal link element can be satisfied

when an employee is subjected to a materially adverse employment
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action shortly after engaging in a protected activity.

See

e.g., Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994).

The

time between the two events, however, must be “very close.”
Clark Cnty. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(citing Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir.
1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967
F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (4-month period
insufficient)).

Here, Plaintiff engaged in activity protected

by Title VII’s anti-retaliation clause when she filed a
complaint with the EEOC for sex discrimination and hostile work
environment in September 2010.

The first adverse action

Defendant took against Plaintiff after this activity was on May
16, 2011, eight months after her EEOC claim.

Given this delay,

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for retaliation.
A prima facie case of retaliation will also fail where an
employer has no knowledge of the plaintiff engaging in a
protected activity.

See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.

“[B]y

definition, an employer cannot take action because of a factor
of which it is unaware...”
claim on July 19, 2011.

Id.

Plaintiff filed her second EEOC

ECF No. 30-3 at 8.

The EEOC mailed a

copy of the claim to Mr. Gresham, Defendant’s President, on
August 8, 2011.

ECF No. 30-2 at 6.

Mr. Gresham followed

standard office procedure and delivered the EEOC claim to the
Defendant’s Staff Support Department on August 19, 2011.
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ECF

No. 30-3 at 3.

Sandra Joseph, the employee responsible for

contacting Defendant’s General Counsel and managers regarding
EEOC charges, was not in the office between August 12, 2011 and
September 14, 2011.

ECF No. 30-3 at 4.

Thus, Joseph first

became aware of the EEOC charge when she returned to the office
on September 15, 2011, at which point Reid and Wallace were
notified.

ECF No. 30-3 at 4; ECF No. 30-2 at 12.

Because

Plaintiff’s supervisors did not know about the July 2011 EEOC
charges until September 15, 2011, none of their alleged adverse
actions before then could have been caused by Plaintiff’s
protected activity.
The only adverse action taken against Plaintiff after her
supervisors became aware of Plaintiff’s July EEOC claim was
Plaintiff’s termination on October 17, 2011.3

Plaintiff was

terminated approximately one-month after Defendant’s staff
became aware that she had filed an EEOC claim in July 2011.

The

Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that the
causation element of Plaintiff’s prima facie retaliation claim
is satisfied.

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Plaintiff also emailed George Gresham outlining several
complaints about the way she was being treated, another
protected act on October 1, 2011. Because her termination was
the only adverse action after her email to Mr. Gresham, her
retaliation claim fails for the same reasons outlined for the
July 2011 EEOC complaint.
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Plaintiff’s claim fails, however, because she has not
produced any evidence that Defendant’s legitimate, nonretaliatory, reason was pretextual.

Plaintiff was terminated

for failing to attend Defendant’s “MLK Keep the Dream Alive
Rally,” despite being told that participation was mandatory.
Her failure to attend the rally constitutes insubordination,
which is a legitimate reason for an employee’s termination.

See

Church v. Maryland, 180 F. Supp. 2d 708, 746 (D. Md. 2002);
White v. Ameritel Corp., No. DKC 10-0929, 2011 WL 6837644 at *7
(D. Md Dec. 28, 2011).

Plaintiff’s claim that her failure to

attend was excusable based on her “moral and ethical
obligations,” and because she claimed she was not receiving “any
justice on this job,” see ECF. No. 1 at 1-4; ECF 30-1 at 35, has
no bearing on whether Defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason was pretextual.

The Court will, therefore, grant

Defendant’s motion.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted.

A separate order will issue.

_______________/s/_________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

April 18, 2013
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