Crudup v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 5/2/13. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM FLOYD CRUDUP

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Petitioner,

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v.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Respondent.
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Civil Action No. RDB-12-191

Criminal Action No. RDB-06-387

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The pro se Petitioner William Floyd Crudup (“Crudup”) filed a Motion for Reduction
of Sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (ECF No. 61). Crudup was
originally sentenced to a prison term of 132 months, with three years of supervised release,
for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (ECF No. 60). In his Motion for Reduction of Sentence, Crudup argues that he was
improperly considered a career offender for sentencing purposes, and that his sentence
should be reconsidered in light of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.1
Because Crudup’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence challenges the validity of his
sentence, this Court issued an Order on June 13, 2012, explaining its intent to recharacterize
the Motion as a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(ECF No. 62). In Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), the Supreme Court held that a
district court may recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion as a first § 2255 motion so long as

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, amended the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to address the disparity between powder and crack cocaine offenses.

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the court notifies the litigant of its intent to recharacterize the pleading, “warn[s] the litigant
that this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the
restrictions on ‘second or successive’ motions, and provide[s] the litigant an opportunity to
withdraw the motion or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he
has.” Id. at 383. The Court in Castro acknowledged that recharacterization of a pleading may
be appropriate to “create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s
claim and its underlying legal basis.” Id. at 381-82.
In this case, recharacterization of Crudup’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence is
proper, because the substance of Crudup’s claim is the type of legal challenge meant for a
Motion to Vacate. See Order, ECF No. 62. Accordingly, this Court, in its Order of June 13,
2012, notified Crudup of its intent to recharacterize his Motion, warned him of the
implications of the recharacterization, and gave him thirty days to show cause why this Court
should not proceed on that basis. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 383. Crudup did not respond to
this show cause order.

For these reasons, this Court now construes his Motion for

Reduction of Sentence (ECF No. 61) as a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In the June 13, 2012, Order, this Court also acknowledged that Crudup’s Motion, if
construed as a Motion to Vacate, would be time-barred.2 Crudup was granted thirty days to
show cause why his Motion to Vacate should be considered timely or, in the alternative, why

Crudup was sentenced on April 3, 2008. Because no appeal was taken, his judgment became final
ten days after its entry. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b); Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir.)
(holding that where there is no appeal of a federal conviction, the conviction becomes final for
purposes of § 2255 upon expiration of the ten-day period for filing a direct appeal); accord Kapral v.
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus Crudup’s one-year limitation period for filing a
writ of habeas corpus expired on or about April 13, 2009. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). His Motion
to Vacate was not filed until January 13, 2012. See Mot., ECF No. 61.
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principles of equitable tolling should apply. See Order, ECF No. 62. Crudup did not
respond to this show cause order. Because Crudup offers no reason to consider his Motion
to Vacate timely, this Court DENIES the Motion as untimely. See note 2 supra.
It is worth noting, however, that Crudup has already received relief from his original
sentence.

For good cause shown, this Court granted Crudup’s Motion for Sentence

Reduction, based on the application of the Fair Sentencing Act.

See Order Reducing

Sentence, ECF No. 71. Crudup’s sentence of imprisonment was thereby reduced to time
served on August 15, 2012, and he is currently serving three years of supervised release in
accordance with his original judgment. See id. As a result, Crudup has received the relief
under the Fair Sentencing Act that he sought in his Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 61).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 61) is DENIED.
A certificate of appealability shall not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2) (2000). A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that an assessment of the constitutional
claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural ruling dismissing such claims is
likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d
676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). Because reasonable jurists would not find Petitioner’s claims
debatable, a certificate of appealability is DENIED as to him.
A separate order follows.
Dated: May 2, 2013

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Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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