Williams v. Baltimore City Community College et al
Filing
54
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/23/14. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DIANE WILLIAMS,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. GLR-12-238
BALTIMORE CITY
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant, Baltimore
City Community College’s (“BCCC”) Motion for Summary Judgment.
(ECF No. 45).
Plaintiff Diane Williams brings this Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2012)
action against BCCC, her former employer.
Having reviewed the
pleadings and supporting documents, the Court finds no hearing
necessary.
outlined
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2014).
below,
BCCC’s
Motion
for
Summary
For the reasons
Judgment
will
be
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams
was
diagnosed
with
a
degenerative
called Keratoconus in the tenth-grade.
distortion in the shape of the eye.
vision,
increased
light
disease
Keratoconus causes a
Symptoms can include blurry
sensitivity,
halos
around
strain, headaches, eye pain, and eye irritation.
eye
light,
eye
It can require
treatments
that
reshape
the
cornea,
or,
in
Williams’s
case,
corneal transplant surgery.
BCCC hired Williams as Assistant Director of Housekeeping
in May 2007.
In 2008, as a result of complications from her
Keratoconus, Williams required surgery on her right cornea and a
left corneal transplant.
On June 2, 2008, Williams submitted a
request for medical leave, under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2012), from June 10, 2008
through December 10, 2008.
Williams underwent surgery on her right cornea on June 10,
2008.
On
June
24,
2008,
BCCC
informed
Williams
that
her
“request for intermittent leave under the FMLA [was] approved
from the requested period of June 10, 2008 through December 10,
2008.”1
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 6, ECF No. 45-8) (emphasis
added).
After the first surgery, Williams did not return to
work before undergoing a corneal transplant in her left eye on
August 12, 2008.
On August 27, 2008, BCCC sent Williams a letter informing
her
that
her
twelve-week
September 3, 2008.
10).
FMLA
benefit
would
expire
as
of
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 8, ECF No. 45-
Further, the letter stated that if Williams was unable to
1
While the parties’ understanding of the term “intermittent
leave” is unclear, the record is clear that Williams repeatedly
informed BCCC that she would be able to return to work on
December 10, 2008.
2
return to work on September 4, 2008, she was required to submit
a doctor’s note and appear for a Workability Examination by the
State Medical Director.
2008,
Williams
(Id.).
submitted
a
In response, on September 2,
note
from
her
treating
ophthalmologist indicating that she was still under his care and
recommending a return-to-work date of December 10, 2008.
Williams presented herself to the State Medical Doctor, Dr.
Lyons, for a workability evaluation on September 16, 2008.
In
his Workability Evaluation, dated September 23, 2008, Dr. Lyons
noted Williams’s symptoms as:
limited vision in her right eye and little to no
vision in her left eye. In the left eye, she is only
able to see light and shapes.
She complains of
photophobia in both eyes, and intense headaches[,] . .
. she cannot read printed material[,] . . . is unable
to tolerate looking at a computer monitor[, and] has
poor depth perception.
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 [“Workability Evaluation”] at 3,
ECF No. 45-3).
Dr. Lyons opined that Williams was unable to
return to work, and that her symptoms were “unlikely to improve
enough in the foreseeable future that would enable her to safely
and
reliably
perform
the
full
duties
of
[her]
position.”
(Workability Evaluation at 5).
By letter dated October 3, 2008, Human Resources Associate
Marcia J. Tisdale advised Williams that “Dr. Lyons came to the
determination that based on [her] condition; [her] return to
work date should remain as Wednesday December 10, 2008.”
3
(Pl.’s
Resp. in Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [“Opp’n”], Ex. 6, ECF No.
50-6).
On October 6, 2008, however, Ms. Tisdale sent a second
letter informing Williams that based on Dr. Lyons’s opinion that
her symptoms were “unlikely to improve enough in the foreseeable
future that would enable her to safely and reliably perform the
full duties of [her] position,” it had been determined that she
was
no
longer
physically
capable
of
performing
her
duties.
(Opp’n, Ex. 7 [“October 6, 2008 Letter”], ECF No. 50-7).
Ms.
Tisdale advised Williams to notify the College of her intentions
related to her continued employment.
(Id.).
By letter dated
October 17, 2008, Williams reiterated her intention to return to
work on December 10, 2008.2
(Opp’n, Ex. 8, ECF No. 50-8).
Also on October 17, 2008, Dr. Lyons clarified his prognosis
regarding his reference to the “foreseeable future” in a formal
Workability Evaluation Clarification that indicated he did not
believe Williams would be able to return to work by December 10,
2008, as stipulated by her treating ophthalmologist.
Ex. 9, ECF No. 50-9).
(Opp’n,
Finally, on November 3, 2008 Williams
received a letter from BCCC stating that she would be terminated
if she failed to return to work on October 31.
(Opp’n, Ex. 10,
2
The Court finds it significant to note that as of
September 23, 2008 Williams was approved to receive employee to
employee leave donations through the State Employee’s Leave
Donation Program.
(Opp’n, Ex. 14, ECF No. 50-14).
The record
before the Court indicates that Williams was being credited with
donated sick leave as early as July 30, 2008. (See October 6,
2008 Letter).
4
at 1, ECF No. 50-10).
The letter was dated October 28, 2008 and
the postmark on the envelope indicates it was mailed on October
30. (Id. at 3).
Williams failed to return to work and was
terminated on October 31, 2008.
Williams filed a charge of discrimination with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued its
right to sue letter on November 8, 2011.
She filed a three-
count Complaint on January 24, 2012, against BCCC, the President
and
Board
alleging
provide
of
Trustees
disability
reasonable
of
BCCC,
discrimination
accommodation
and
the
(Count
(Count
State
I),
II),
(Count III), all in violation of the ADA.
Motion for Summary Judgment on May 2, 2014.3
of
Maryland
the
failure
to
and
retaliation
BCCC filed this
(ECF No. 45).
Williams filed her Opposition on July 3, 2014 (ECF No. 50), and
BCCC filed its Reply on August 8, 2014 (ECF No. 53).
The Motion
is ripe for disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must
grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that
3
Docket entry number 45 reflects that the Motion for
Summary Judgment was made on behalf of all Defendants.
The
content of the Motion, however, reflects that the Motion was
made on behalf of BCCC only.
For the reasons discussed below,
Count II of the Complaint will be dismissed as to all
Defendants.
5
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
255
(1986)
(citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970)).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made
and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that
a genuine dispute exists.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
“[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat
an
otherwise
properly
supported
motion
for
summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
A “material fact” is a fact that might affect the outcome
of a party’s case.
Id. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v.
Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir.
2001)).
Whether
a
fact
is
considered
to
be
“material”
is
determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over
facts
that
governing
might
law
affect
will
the
properly
outcome
preclude
6
of
the
the
suit
entry
under
of
the
summary
judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera,
249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).
A “genuine” issue concerning a “material” fact arises when
the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return
a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.
248.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Rule 56(c) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the
pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex
Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477
U.S.
317,
324
(1986).
The
nonmoving party “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
another.”
Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 963 (4th Cir.
1984).
B.
Analysis
1.
Disability Discrimination (Count I)
The Court will deny BCCC’s Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect to Williams’s disability discrimination claim because
there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether
Williams was “regarded as” disabled by BCCC and whether she was
discharged under circumstances raising a reasonable inference of
discrimination.
7
To
establish
discrimination,
a
prima
Williams
facie
must
case
show
for
that:
(1)
disability
“she
was
a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was discharged;
(3) she was fulfilling her employer’s legitimate expectations at
the
time
of
discharge
discharge;
raise
a
and
(4)
the
reasonable
circumstances
inference
of
of
her
unlawful
discrimination.” Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d
266, 272 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Haulbrook v. Michelin N.
Am.,
Inc.,
252
F.3d
696,
quotation marks omitted).
702
(4th
Cir.
2001))
(internal
The parties dispute whether Williams
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
A person is disabled within the meaning of the ADA if she
has
“(A)
a
physical
or
mental
impairment
that
substantially
limits one or more major life activities . . . ; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
BCCC argues Williams is
not substantially limited in a major life activity due to her
Keratoconus
Under
and,
subsection
therefore,
(C),
is
however,
not
an
disabled
employee
under
is
the
“regarded
ADA.
as”
being disabled when the employer believes an individual has an
impairment
that
substantially
limits
one
or
more
major
life
activity, such as seeing, when, in fact, the impairment is not
so limiting.
Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., 513 F.3d
378, 385 (4th Cir. 2008).
8
Here,
Dr.
Lyons
ultimately
concluded
that
Williams’s
symptoms substantially limited her vision such that she could
not be expected to return to work on December 10, 2008.
Based
on Dr. Lyons’s prognosis, BCCC determined that Williams was no
longer qualified for her position and terminated her employment.
While Williams does not dispute that she was impaired at some
point after her surgeries, she and her treating ophthalmologist
maintained that she could have performed the essential functions
of the job without a reasonable accommodation beginning December
10, 2008.
BCCC’s reliance on Dr. Lyons’s opinion creates a reasonable
inference that BCCC’s perception that Williams was substantially
limited in her ability to see led it to discount her treating
doctor’s medical opinion.
See Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., 513
F.3d at 385 (finding defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled
where defendant ignored the opinion of the employee’s doctor in
favor of its own).
Thus, a reasonable juror could conclude
that BCCC regarded Williams as disabled because it mistakenly
believed that her nondisabling Keratoconus severely restricted
her ability to see.
Further, BCCC contends that even if Williams qualifies as
“disabled” under the ADA, the circumstances of her discharge do
not
raise
a
reasonable
inference
The Court disagrees.
9
of
unlawful
discrimination.
First, on October 3, 2008, BCCC took the position that
Williams’s return to work date should remain as December 10,
2008.
Without explanation, BCCC reversed itself only three days
later,
taking
the
position
that
because
her
symptoms
were
unlikely to improve by December 10, 2008, she was no longer
qualified
for
Workability
her
position.
Evaluation
Second,
Clarification
Dr.
is
Lyons’s
dated
formal
subsequent
to
BCCC’s notice to Williams that it determined she was no longer
physically capable of performing her duties.
unclear
why
employee
Williams
donated
was
leave
not
for
permitted
the
18
at
Employee’s
2,
ECF
Leave
No.
Donation
to
use
continuation
absence through December 10, 2008.
Ex.
Finally, it is
of
employee-toher
expected
(See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
45-20)
(indicating
Program
permits
that
the
employees
State
to
use
donated leave for a continuous period of up to sixteen months).
These facts create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning
whether
BCCC
discharged
Williams
based
upon
a
qualified
disability in violation of the ADA.
Further,
requiring
BCCC’s
Williams
to
October
28,
return
to
2008
work
termination
by
October
letter,
31,
was
postmarked on October 30, 2008.
Williams did not receive the
letter
(three
until
terminated).
November
The
3,
brief
2008
period
of
days
time
after
between
she
was
Williams’s
discharge date and the postmark date on the termination letter
10
raises a reasonable inference of pretext.4 Accordingly, BCCC’s
Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied with respect to Count
I.
2.
Failure to Accommodate (Count II)
The Court will grant BCCC’s Motion for Summary Judgment
with respect to Williams’s failure to accommodate claim because,
as
a
matter
of
law,
failing
to
provide
a
reasonable
accommodation to an employee whom an employer merely “regards
as” disabled does not constitute discrimination under the ADA.
Williams
contends
that
BCCC
wrongfully
failed
to
accommodate her by denying her extended leave until December 10,
2008.
To
establish
accommodate,
individual
Williams
who
had
a
a
prima
must
show
disability
facie
case
that:
within
(1)
the
for
failure
“‘[s]he
was
meaning
of
to
an
the
statute; (2) that the [employer] had notice of [her] disability;
(3) that with reasonable accommodation [she] could perform the
essential functions of the position . . .; and (4) that the
[employer]
refused
to
make
such
accommodations.’”
Wilson
v.
4
Under the proof scheme articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), BCCC can rebut the
presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case by
establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
termination of Williams. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285-86 (4th Cir. 2004).
If BCCC
succeeds in doing so, Williams must then “prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by [BCCC] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext
for discrimination.”
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
11
Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11 (4th
Cir. 2001) (alteration in the original).
The parties’ arguments primarily concern the first element—
whether Williams qualifies as disabled under the statute.
As
discussed above, the Court finds a genuine dispute of material
fact concerning whether Williams was “regarded as” disabled by
BCCC.
Ultimately, however, it is not necessary to resolve that
factual question under the failure to accommodate claim because
an employer is under no obligation to accommodate an employee
who is simply regarded as disabled.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(h)
(2012) (“A covered entity . . . need not provide a reasonable
accommodation
practices,
or
definition
of
or
a
reasonable
procedures
disability
to
in
modification
an
individual
section
solely under subparagraph (C)”).5
12102(1)
to
who
of
policies,
meets
this
the
title
Accordingly, BCCC’s Motion for
5
Prior to the 2008 ADA amendments, the circuit courts were
split on this question and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has not yet decided the issue. See Shin
v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 369 F. App’x 472, 479 n.15 (4th
Cir. 2010).
The 2008 ADA amendments, however, appear to adopt
the view of the circuit courts finding that the accommodation
provision of the ADA does not protect “regarded as disabled”
employees.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(h); cf. Brown v. Thompson,
374 F.3d 253, 259 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts regularly view
a
conflict
in
the
courts
with
regard
to
the
proper
interpretation of a statute . . . as an indication that Congress
passed a subsequent amendment to clarify rather than change
existing law.”).
12
Summary Judgment will be granted with respect to Count II as
against all Defendants.
3.
Retaliation (Count III)
The Court will deny BCCC’s Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect
to
Williams’s
genuine
dispute
of
retaliation
material
fact
claim
because
concerning
there
whether
is
a
Williams
request for leave until December 10, 2008 was causally connected
to her termination.
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation Williams
must show that: “(1) [s]he engaged in a protected activity; (2)
[BCCC]
acted
adversely
against
[her];
and
(3)
the
protected
activity was causally connected to the adverse action.”
Holland
v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007).
The
parties dispute whether the third element is satisfied.
As discussed above, BCCC’s change in position concerning
Williams’s
Workability
prognosis
return
to
work
Evaluation
of
Dr.
date,
the
Clarification,
Lyons
despite
the
timing
BCCC’s
of
the
reliance
opinion
of
formal
on
the
Williams’s
treating ophthalmologist, and its refusal to allow Williams to
participate
in
the
State
Employee’s
Leave
Donation
Program
create a reasonable inference that her request for leave until
December 10, 2008 was the but-for cause of her termination.
Accordingly, BCCC’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied
with respect to Count III.
13
III. CONCLUSION
For
the
reasons
given
above,
BCCC’s
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Count II and DENIED with
respect to Counts I and III.
Defendants.
Count II is DISMISSED as to all
A separate Order will follow.
Entered this 23rd day of September, 2014
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
14
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