Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. The Highland Consulting Group, Inc. et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 1/10/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SYNCRUDE CANADA LTD.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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THE HIGHLAND CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., et al.,

Civil Action No. RDB-12-00318

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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Syncrude Canada Ltd. (“Syncrude” or “Plaintiff”) has brought this action
pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Maryland
Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, §§ 10-701 et seq. (“the Recognition Act”) against
Defendants The Highland Consulting Group Inc. (“HCG”), High Energy Consultants, Inc.
(“HEC”), and The Highland Group International GmbH (“HGI”) (collectively “the
Highland Defendants”). Specifically, Syncrude seeks recognition of the October 18, 2011
default judgment in the amount of $1,343, 871.34 rendered by the Court of Queen’s Bench
of Alberta, Canada (“Canadian Judgment”) in the breach of contract action brought by
Syncrude against the Highland Defendants. This action is before this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) because complete diversity exists1 and the amount in controversy is greater
than $75,000.
Plaintiff Syncrude is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in Alberta, Canada. The
Highland Consulting Group Inc. and High Energy Consultants, Inc. are Delaware corporations with their

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Presently pending is the Highland Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8)
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also pending is Plaintiff
Syncrude’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) pursuant to Local Rule
105.2(c) and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The parties’ submissions have
been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the
reasons that follow, Defendants The Highland Consulting Group Inc., High Energy
Consultants, Inc., and The Highland Group International GmbH’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 8) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Specifically, the motion is DENIED as
to Defendants The Highland Consulting Group Inc. and High Energy Consultants, Inc.,
which have their principal places of business in Maryland and GRANTED by agreement of
the parties as to Defendant The Highland Group International GmbH, which has its
principal place of business in Switzerland.3 Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12) is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff Syncrude Canada Ltd. against Defendants
The Highland Consulting Group Inc. and High Energy Consultants, Inc.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Syncrude Canada Ltd. is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of
business in Alberta, Canada. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. The Highland Consulting Group
Inc. (“HCG”) and High Energy Consultants, Inc. (“HEC”) (collectively “Maryland
principal places of business in St. Michaels, Maryland. The Highland Group International GmbH is a Swiss
limited liability company with its principal place of business in Zug, Switzerland.
2 Plaintiff Syncrude has filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment because it contends that while the
Highland Defendants have styled their motion as a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it should
properly be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment as it requires consideration of matters outside the
pleadings.
3 Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss & in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 n.1, ECF No. 11.

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Defendants”) are Delaware corporations with principal places of business in St. Michaels,
Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The Highland Group International GmbH (“HGI”) is a Swiss limited
liability company with its principal place of business in Zug, Switzerland. Id. ¶ 4.
On November 1 2008, Syncrude entered into a contract with HCG for the provision
of consulting services “to improve overall maintenance contractor workforce productivity
(“the Contract”).” Statement of Claim ¶ 4, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Record at 4,
ECF No. 1-1; see also Jocelyne C. George Decl., Ex 1 (the Contract), ECF No. 11-1. Under
the Contract, the parties agreed that the law of the Province of Alberta would govern.
George Decl., Ex. 1 at 2. K. Todd Bittner (“Mr. Bittner”) in his capacity as “Corporate
Comptroller” executed the Contract on behalf of HCG. Id. at 1. Although the Contract was
executed by HCG, all three Highland Defendants each performed services for Syncrude
under the Contract and submitted separate invoices to Syncrude for those services. George
Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. 4-5 (Invoices). Additionally, Syncrude regularly communicated with Mr.
Bittner “regarding important aspects of the business relationship.” Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot
to Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 11; see also George Decl., Ex 6-7(Emails and Letters).
On July 26, 2011, Syncrude filed a breach of contract action against the Highland
Defendants in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Case Number 1103 1134 (“Canadian
Litigation”). Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. The Highland Defendants were served by
registered mail at their respective principal offices according to the Alberta Rules of Court
and the Alberta Business Corporation Act. Id. ¶¶ 9-13; see also Affs. of Serv., Court of
Queen’s Bench of Alberta Record at 8-16.
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Mr. Bittner signed the return receipts

acknowledging service for both Maryland Defendants on August 2, 2011. Id. at 10, 13. Raz
Walter signed a return receipt on behalf of Highland Group International GmbH on August
3, 2011. Id. at 16. At no time relevant to this action was Mr. Bittner specifically listed as a
resident agent, president, secretary or treasurer for the Maryland Defendants. Kerridge Aff.
¶ 2, ECF No. 8-2. According to the Maryland State Department of Assessments and
Taxation, James G. Kerridge was the listed Resident Agent for both Maryland Defendants.
Id. ¶ 3. Despite this notice, none of the Defendants filed responsive or opposition pleadings
in the Canadian Litigation. Default Judgment, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Record at
18. Accordingly, on October 18, 2011, the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta entered a
default judgment (“Canadian Judgment”) in favor of Syncrude against all three Highland
Defendants in the amount of $1,343,871.34. Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Record at 1,
18. Subsequently, in an effort to enforce the Canadian Judgment against the Highland
Defendants, Syncrude filed the present action before this Court pursuant to the Maryland
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial
Proceedings, §§ 10-701 et seq. (“the Recognition Act”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), consideration of matters outside
the pleadings converts Defendants’ Motion to one for summary judgment, rather than a
motion to dismiss. See Sec’y of State for Def. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th
Cir. 2007) (if “matters outside of the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the
court,” then “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”).
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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact
is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue over a material fact exists “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge’s function is limited to

determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to warrant
submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249.
When both parties file motions for summary judgment, as here, the court applies the
same standards of review. Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991);
ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,722 F.2d 42, 45 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The court is not
permitted to resolve genuine issues of material fact on a motion for summary judgment-even
where . . . both parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.”) (emphasis
omitted). The role of the court is to “rule on each party’s motion on an individual and
separate basis, determining, in each case, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance
with the Rule 56 standard.” Towne Mgmt. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 627 F. Supp.
170, 172 (D. Md. 1985). The court must therefore “evaluate each party’s motion on its own
merits, taking care to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
consideration.” Bd. of Educ. of Frederick Cnty. v. I.S., 325 F. Supp. 2d 565, 578 (D. Md. 2004)
(quoting Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). “[B]y
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the filing of a motion [for summary judgment] a party concedes that no issue of fact exists
under the theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so concede that no issues remain
in the event his adversary’s theory is adopted.” Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Appleman, 380 F.2d
323, 325 (10th Cir. 1967); see also McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 68 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“[N]either party waives the right to a full trial on the merits by filing its own motion.”).
However, when cross-motions for summary judgment demonstrate a basic agreement
concerning what legal theories and material facts are dispositive, they “may be probative of
the non-existence of a factual dispute.” Shook v. United States, 713 F.2d 662, 665 (11th Cir.
1983) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
According to Plaintiff Syncrude Canada Ltd. (“Syncrude”) and Defendants The
Highland Consulting Group Inc. (“HCG”), High Energy Consultants, Inc. (“HEC”), and
The Highland Group International GmbH (“HGI”) (collectively “the Highland
Defendants”), there are no disputes as to material facts in this case. Moreover, the parties
agree that this Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce a judgment issued by a Canadian court on a
Swiss defendant.4 See 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (enunciating the circumstances under which federal
courts have original jurisdiction over a case); see also Motors LLC v. General Motors Europe, 551
F.3d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because [d]iversity jurisdiction does not encompass foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign defendants, the presence of U.S. citizens on only one side of the
dispute does not preserve jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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See supra note 3.

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Thus,

Defendant the Highland Group International GmbH is dismissed from this action for lack
of jurisdiction.
The remaining Defendants, The Highland Consulting Group and High Energy
Consultants (collectively “Maryland Defendants”), contend that this action should be
dismissed for three reasons: (1) Syncrude failed to comply with the terms of the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”), T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 20 U.S.T. 361 (1965) as well
as federal law in effecting service on Todd Bittner in the Canadian Litigation; (2) the
Canadian Judgment is unenforceable under the Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Maryland
Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, §§ 10-701 et seq. (“the Recognition Act”) because the
Alberta Court lacked jurisdiction over these Defendants; and (3) the Canadian Judgment is
repugnant to Maryland public policy. Specifically, Defendants contend that their issue lies
not with Syncrude’s use of international registered mail, which they deem acceptable under
the Hague Convention, but rather with its improper service of Todd Bittner whom they
allege was not authorized under Maryland law to accept service of process on their behalf.
The Recognition Act “was intended to promote principles of international comity by
assuring foreign nations that their judgments would, under certain well-defined
circumstances, be given recognition” in Maryland courts. Wolff v. Wolff, 389 A.2d 413, 417
(Md. App. 1978) aff’d, 401 A.2d 479 (Md. 1979). It defines a foreign judgment as “any
judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. It does not
mean a judgment for taxes, fine, or penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or
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family matters.” MD. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-701(b). Under the Recognition Act, a
foreign judgment is enforceable where it “is final, conclusive, and enforceable where
rendered even though an appeal is pending or it is subject to appeal.” Id. § 10-702. “A
foreign judgment is not conclusive if . . . [t]he foreign court does not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. § 10-704(a)(2). As discussed above, the Maryland
Defendants’ main contention is that the default judgment issued against them by the Court
of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (“Canadian Judgment”) in Case Number 1103 1134 is
unenforceable under the Recognition Act because the Alberta Court lacked personal
jurisdiction over them due to Syncrude’s ineffective service of process. Specifically, the
Maryland Defendants argue that under the Hague Convention, the Alberta Rules of Court,
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2-124(d) of the Maryland Rules
of Civil Procedure service of process in the Canadian Litigation would only have been valid
if Syncrude had effected service on the corporations’ “resident agent, president, secretary, or
treasurer.” Md. R. 2-124(d).
Initially, this Court notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has not addressed the issue of registered mail under Article 10(a) of the Hague
Convention. However, there is a split of authority among other circuits concerning the
validity of this type of service under the Convention. The Hague Convention, ratified by the
United States in 1965, “was intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to
assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of
suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,
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486 U.S. 694, 698 (1988) (emphasis added). Where applicable, the Hague Convention’s
procedures must be adhered to “in all cases, in civil and commercial matters, where there is
occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” Hague
Convention, 20 U.S.T. 361, 362. Articles 2 through 5 of the Convention provide for service
through a receiving country’s “Central Authority.” 20 U.S.T. at 362-63. Article 8 allows
parties of a contracting state to effect service directly through “diplomatic or consular
agents.” 20 U.S.T. at 363. The provision of the Hague Convention at issue is Article 10(a)
which states that “[p]rovided the State of destination does not object,5 the present
Convention shall not interfere with–(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal
channels, directly to persons abroad . . .” Id. (emphasis added). “It has been suggested that
no single provision in the Hague Convention has received as much judicial attention as
Article 10(a).” Randolph v. Hendry, 50 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (citation
omitted).
United States courts “disagree[ ] about whether the phrase ‘the freedom to send
judicial documents’ . . . includes the meaning freedom to serve judicial documents.”
Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). On the one hand,
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that send is not equivalent
to service and only applies to the mailing by registered mail of documents following service

The United States has not objected to service by mail. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 803-04 (9th Cir.
2004); Ackermannn v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2nd Cir. 1986); Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 307-08 (4th
Cir. 1998); Practice Commentary, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4, 28 U.S.C. at C4-24 (“the United States . . . [has] not
objected to mail service. Hence a plaintiff in a foreign litigation who has from its own local procedural law
the right to make extraterritorial mail service, and has to do so upon a defendant in the United States, will
find no U.S. barrier to it.”).
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of process under other provisions of the Convention. See Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. Storman Asia
M/V, 310 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002); Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir.
1989). Accordingly, both courts have held that service of process by registered mail is not
permitted under the Hague Convention. See Nuovo Pignone, 310 F.3d at 385; Bankston, 889
F.2d at 174. On the other hand, as acknowledged by the Brockmeyer court, “[a] second line of
cases follows Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986), in which the Second
Circuit approved” service by registered mail under the Convention. Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at
802. However, while the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, the majority of
district courts in the Fourth Circuit have followed the Ackermann decision by holding that
service by registered mail is appropriate under Article 10(a) of the Convention. Compare U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Int’l Fiduciary Corp., S.A., Case No. 1:06-cv-1354, 2007 WL 7212109
(E.D. Va. March 29, 2007), and ePlus Technology, Inc.. v. Aboud, 155 F. Supp. 2d 692, 696-97
(E.D. Va. 2001), and Randolph, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 572, 578; and Hammond v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 128 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D.S.C. 1989), and Rich v. KIS California, Inc., C-87-801-WS, 1988
WL 47605 at *3 (M.D.N.C. April 25, 1988), with Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 60 F.
Supp. 2d 566, 570-73 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), and Fleming v. Yamaha Corp., USA, 774 F. Supp.
992, 996 (W.D. Va. 1991).
This view is also supported by a Handbook of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference6 explaining that permitting service of process by registered mail “seems to have
The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law prepares and organizes the
Plenary Sessions and Special Commissions of the Hague Conference. Hague Conference on Private
International Law, What is the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference?,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=faq.details&fid=30 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).

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been the implicit understanding of the delegates at the 1977 Special Commission meeting,
and indeed of the legal literature on the Convention and its predecessor treaties.” HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE
OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE
ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTERS 44 (1992). Additionally, the United States Department of State explicitly adopted
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Article 10(a) in Ackermann by specifically rejecting the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bankston. Letter from Alan J. Kreczco, U.S. Dep’t of State
Deputy Legal Adviser, to Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts. and Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (March 14,
1991), re-printed in part in United States Department of State Opinion Regarding the Bankston Case and
Service by Mail to Japan under the Hague Service Convention, 30 I.L.M. 260 (1991). Accordingly and
in light of the overwhelming precedent in favor of this position, this Court adopts the
Ackermann line of cases in holding that service of process by registered mail is permitted
under Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention.7
Having made this determination, this Court addresses the precise issue as to whether
Plaintiff Syncrude’s service of process on the Maryland Defendants was proper and
therefore subjected them to the Alberta Court’s jurisdiction.

Upon entering into the

Contract at issue in the Canadian Litigation, the parties specifically selected the law of the
Province of Alberta, Canada as the governing law. Jocelyne C. George Decl., Ex 1 (the

Notably, at least one Court in Maryland has long subscribed to this view. See Nicholson v. Yamaha Motor
Company Limited, 566 A.2d 135 (Md. App. 1989 (holding that no violation of the Hague Convention occurred
where the plaintiff used restricted delivery mail to effect service on a Japanese manufacturer).
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Contract), ECF No. 11-1. Accordingly, Alberta law governed service of process to the
extent that the method used was not prohibited by the United States. As the Maryland
Defendants did not maintain an office or agent in Alberta, Syncrude necessarily had to
transmit documents abroad to effect service, therefore triggering the application of the
Hague Convention. See Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700 (“If the internal law of the forum
state defines the applicable method of serving process as requiring transmittal of documents
abroad, then the Hague Service Convention applies.”).
Rule 11.26(1) of the Alberta Rules of Court with respect to service outside of Alberta
dictates:
Unless the Court otherwise orders, if a document may be served
outside Alberta under these rules, the document must be served:
(a) by a method provided by these rules for service of the document in
Alberta,
(b) in accordance with a method of service of documents under the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters that is allowed by the
jurisdiction in which the document is to be served, if the Convention applies, or
(c) in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the person to
be served is located.
Alberta Reg. 124/2010, Alberta Rules of Court § 11.26 (emphasis added). Under Alberta
law service of process on a corporation may be sent “by recorded mail, addressed to the
corporation, to the principal place of business or activity.” Id. § 11.9(1)(b). “Service is
effected . . . on the date of the acknowledgement of receipt is signed.” Id. § 11.9(2)(b).
In the United States, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
domestic or foreign corporation must be served either by “following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction . . .or by delivering a copy of
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the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
4(e)(1), 4(h). Maryland law states that “[s]ervice is made upon a corporation . . . by serving
its resident agent, president, secretary, or treasurer.” Md. R. 2-124(d). This Court has held
that failure to comply with the state’s rules concerning service of process is a violation of
due process. See Brown v. American Institute for Research, 487 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616-17 (D. Md.
2007) (involving several improper attempts at service by a Maryland plaintiff on a District of
Columbia defendant). Moreover, in Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087,
1089 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit held that the “requirements for the means of
effecting service of process may not be ignored.” However, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that “[w]hen the process gives the defendant actual notice of the pendency of the action, the
rules, in general, are entitled to a liberal construction.” Id. Therefore, this Court has
previously held that actual notice in some instances cures technical violations of Rule 4. Id.
See also Atkins v. Winchester Homes, CCB-06-278, 2007 WL 269083 at *5 (D. Md. Jan 17, 2007)
(“Here, because defendant had actual notice of the pendency of the action, the rules are
entitled to a liberal construction.”); Maryland Nat’l Bank v. M/V Tanicorp I, 796 F. Supp. 188,
190 (D. Md. 1992) (finding service of process valid where defendant maintained that service
was improper but never denied receiving actual notice.).
In this case, the Maryland Defendants make much of the fact that Syncrude’s service
of process was not addressed to a specific person at the corporations and that it was received
by an “unauthorized” person under Maryland Rule 2-124(d), namely Corporate Comptroller
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Todd Bittner (“Mr. Bittner”). However, the record reflects that Mr. Bittner was one of the
signatories to the Contract between the parties. He was also Syncrude’s main point of
contact to the Maryland Defendants throughout the business relationship. Because he
acknowledged receipt of Syncrude’s service of process, the Maryland Defendants had actual
notice of the pendency of an action against them in the Alberta Court. Moreover, nowhere
in the pleadings have the Maryland Defendants denied having received actual notice.
Accordingly, service of process in the Canadian Litigation was proper and authorized under
federal and state law.
Finally and alternatively, the Maryland Defendants further argue that the Canadian
Judgment should not be recognized under the Recognition Act because “[t]he cause of
action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the State.” MD.
CODE., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 10-704. This Court is hard-pressed to understand how a
default judgment issued in a case where the defendants had actual knowledge of the suit yet
refused to file any response is repugnant to federal or Maryland public policy. Additionally,
“[t]he increasing internationalization of commerce requires ‘that American courts recognize
and respect the judgments entered by foreign courts to the greatest extent consistent with
our own ideals of justice and fair play.’ ” Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 845 (2nd Cir.
1986) (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “It is intrinsically
awkward to confront foreign judgments with the potentially divergent law of fifty states and
federal courts, and recognition of foreign judgments at least touches concerns of foreign
relations in which the national government has paramount interests.” 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
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MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 at 743 (1981). Thus,
the Canadian Judgment is conclusive and enforceable under the Money-Judgment
Recognition Act, Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, §§ 10-701 et seq.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants The Highland Consulting Group Inc., High
Energy Consultants, Inc., and The Highland Group International GmbH’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Specifically, the motion
is DENIED as to Defendants The Highland Consulting Group Inc. and High Energy
Consultants, Inc., and GRANTED by agreement of the parties as to Defendant The
Highland Group International GmbH. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12) is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff Syncrude Canada Ltd. against Defendants
The Highland Consulting Group Inc. and High Energy Consultants, Inc.
A separate Order follows.
Dated:

January 10, 2013

/s/_________________________________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge

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