Hall v. Fabrizio et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 7/13/12. (dass, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
ROSALIND ANNETTE HALL,
*
Plaintiff
*
v.
*
CIVIL No. JKB-12-754
OFFICER DOMINIC A. FABRIZIO, et al., *
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM
Rosalind Annette Hall (“Plaintiff”) brought this suit against Officer Dominic A. Fabrizio,
Police Commissioner Frederick Bealefeld, III, and the Baltimore Police Department
(“Defendants”), alleging violations of her rights under the United States Constitution, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now pending before the Court is a motion (ECF No. 8) by Commissioner
Bealefeld and the Baltimore Police Department to dismiss the claims against them. The issues
have been briefed and no oral argument is required.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the reasons
explained below, the motion will be GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on March 28, 2009, she was involved in a car accident to which
Defendant, Officer Fabrizio, responded. She alleges that at Fabrizio‟s request, she gave him her
driver‟s license, after which he walked away, presumably to check the license against a police
database. She alleges that when Fabrizio returned, he stated that he thought Plaintiff was not
really a woman, but a man dressed as a woman, and then placed her under arrest. Plaintiff
1
alleges that when she asked why she was being arrested, Fabrizio responded that he believed she
was a man named “Rosie” Hall, for whom he had located an outstanding arrest warrant. Plaintiff
alleges that she denied this, but that Fabrizio insisted she was a “transvestite” and that he
“question[ed] her as to where [her] male genitalia was „hidden‟,” at which point he and other
officers began to laugh and make jokes about not wanting to “pat her down” after the arrest.
(Compl. ¶¶ 24-25). Plaintiff alleges that she was then taken to Central Booking where she spent
8-10 hours in custody before the Department of Public Safety and Corrections further
investigated her identity and determined that she was, in fact, the woman identified on her
drivers‟ license and not the man, Rosie Hall.
On March 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer
Fabrizio and against the Baltimore Police Department and Police Commissioner Frederick
Bealefeld, III, alleging violation of her rights under the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution. On June 14, 2012 Commissioner Bealefeld and the Police
Department filed the instant motion to dismiss the claims against them. Plaintiff had until July 2
to file an opposition to the motion, but did not do so.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a test of the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
To pass this test, a complaint need only present enough factual content to render its claims
“plausible on [their] face” and enable the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
The plaintiff may not, however, rely on naked assertions, speculation, or legal conclusions. Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). In assessing the merits of a motion to
2
dismiss, the court must take all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th
Cir. 1997). If after viewing the complaint in this light the court cannot infer more than “the mere
possibility of misconduct,” then the motion should be granted and the complaint dismissed.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
III.
ANALYSIS
Counts II and IV of the Complaint attempt to state claims against the Baltimore Police
Department and against Commissioner Bealefeld, respectively, based on the allegedly inadequate
training of Baltimore police officers, for which they are responsible. Count III attempts to state a
claim against the Police Department based on its alleged failure to institute proper rules and
procedures for arrests and its alleged failure to investigate complaints of unlawful arrests and
discipline the offending officers. Defendants contend, however, that the complaint does not
allege the minimum facts necessary to establish these claims. The Court will address the claims
in turn.
A.
Counts II & IV: Inadequate Training
Counts II and IV contain identical allegations, the only difference being that Count IV
refers to Commissioner Bealefeld by name.
These counts allege that the BPD and the
Commissioner failed to train police officers to avoid constitutional violations during arrests, and
that this lack of training was a cause of the alleged violations of Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights
by Officer Fabrizio. While inadequacy of police training can serve as a basis for liability
under § 1983, this is so only where the failure to train is so flagrant that it amounts to “deliberate
indifference” on the part of the municipality with respect to “the rights of persons with whom the
police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (U.S. 1989);
3
accord Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000). Importantly, such a deliberate or
conscious choice by a municipality cannot be shown simply by proving a single instance of
police misconduct and without “submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal
policymaker.” Broderick, 225 F.3d at 456 (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.,
808, 821 (1985)). Even at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a failureto-train theory cannot rely on legal conclusions and speculations, but must allege at least some
facts showing: (1) the nature of the training; (2) that any failure to train was a deliberate or
conscious choice by the municipality; and (3) that any alleged constitutional violations were
actually caused by the failure to train. See Drewery v. Stevenson, Civil No. WDQ-09-2340, 2010
WL 93268 at *4 (D. Md., Jan. 6, 2010).
Here, Plaintiff recites each of above-listed elements in her complaint; but, as with
pleading any cause of action, merely reciting the elements of municipal liability does not state a
claim under § 1983. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint does not allege any facts
regarding the sort of training that Baltimore police officers actually receive or how that training
reflects the decision of any municipal policymaker.
Therefore, Counts II and IV must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B.
Count III: Improper Policy / Monell Claim
Count III claims that Plaintiff‟s allegedly unlawful arrest and detention were part of a
regular pattern of similar conduct that has resulted from the Baltimore Police Department‟s
failure to “establish effective procedures, rules, orders, guidelines, and practices to ensure that
such violations did not occur and to ensure that allegations of such violations will be thoroughly
investigated and appropriately punished ….” (Compl. ¶ 42). It does not, however, allege a
single instance of these alleged violations other than Plaintiff‟s own experience, and thus falls
4
well short of showing the sort of “widespread and permanent practice” that is required to show a
municipal “custom.”
See Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Greensboro Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted). It also fails to allege any facts regarding what the Police
Department‟s “procedures, rules, orders, guidelines, and practices” are, or any facts tending to
show a “deliberate indifference” on the part of any policymaker. Thus, Count III must be
dismissed as well.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, an order shall enter GRANTING Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
8).
Dated this 13th day of July, 2012
BY THE COURT:
/s/
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?