Becker v. Liss et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Benson Everett Legg on 4/6/12. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STEPHEN BECKER
*
Plaintiff pro se
v.
*
*
MARVIN LISS
JUDGE TONI E. CLARKE
CIVIL ACTION NO. L-12-865
*
*
Defendants
******
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Stephen Becker brings this self-represented action against Marvin Liss,1 a private
attorney, and Judge Toni E. Clarke of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. He asserts
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Becker complains that Judge Clarke entered an ex parte
order against him, drafted by Liss, concerning child support. Becker details his efforts to have the
order vacated and his child support order modified. He indicates that his driver’s license was
suspended for nonpayment of support. He claims that unnamed employees of the Prince George’s
County Circuit Court, the Attorney Grievance Commission, and the State Commission on Judicial
Disabilities have failed to investigate his complaints regarding the ex parte order. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) which shall
be granted. Upon review of the Complaint, the Court concludes that it shall be dismissed under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); see also Denton
1
Plaintiff describes Liss as a Maryland resident with four offices, three in Maryland, the fourth in
the District of Columbia. All of the acts complained of occurred in Maryland. In the absence of any federal claim,
this Court would have jurisdiction only where there is diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendant. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because all of the parties are Maryland residents, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction.
1
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996); Nasim v.
Warden, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995).
The defense of absolute immunity extends to “officials whose special functions or
constitutional status requires complete protection from suit.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
807 (1982). Judges, whether presiding at the state or federal level, are clearly among those officials
who are entitled to such immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Because it is a
benefit to the public at large, “whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their
functions with independence and without fear of consequences,” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967), absolute immunity is necessary so that judges can perform their functions without
harassment or intimidation. “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion,
‘it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)). Moreover, the
law is well-settled that the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable to actions filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
In determining whether a particular judge is immune, inquiry must be made into whether the
challenged action was “judicial,” and whether at the time the challenged action was taken, the judge
had subject matter jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Unless it can be shown that a judge
acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” absolute immunity exists even when the alleged
conduct is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of judicial authority. Id. at 356-57.
A review of Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Clarke does not compel the conclusion that
2
the judge acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is exactly the type of
action that the Pierson Court recognized as necessitating the doctrine of judicial immunity. In
apparent disagreement with the decisions reached at the state court level, Mr. Becker has turned to
this Court to assert allegations of unconstitutional acts against a state court judge. Because judicial
immunity precludes the Plaintiff’s recovery against Judge Clarke, sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against the judge is appropriate.
Plaintiff’s claims against Marvin Liss are also subject to dismissal. Two elements are
essential to sustain an action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) he suffered a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States; and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Because there is
no allegation that Defendant Liss was acting under color of law, the claims against him shall be
dismissed. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154 (4th
Cir. 1980) (holding that there is no state action in the conduct of public defenders and attorneys
appointed by the State of Maryland.)
Additionally, the claims raised in the Complaint plainly involve issues relating to family law
matters litigated in the state court which may not proceed in this Court. See Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Such issues traditionally have been reserved to the state or municipal court
systems with their expertise and professional support staff. Under the domestic relations exception
to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not have the power to intervene with regard to divorce, child
custody, or alimony decrees. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701–05 (1992).
Additionally, the action is based upon the history of prior state court child support proceedings.
3
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,2 a federal court does not have jurisdiction to overturn a state
court judgment, even when the federal complaint raises allegations that the state court judgment
violates a claimant’s constitutional or federal statutory rights. In creating this jurisdictional bar, the
Supreme Court reasoned that because federal district courts have only original jurisdiction, they lack
appellate jurisdiction to review state court judgments.3 In effect, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes federal court actions “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005).
A separate Order shall be entered reflecting the ruling set forth herein.
April 6, 2012
/s/
_____________________________
Benson Everett Legg
United States District Judge
2
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983).
3
The Court explained that only the Supreme Court has federal court appellate jurisdiction over
state court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1257.
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?