Youngbar v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 14 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 7/5/2012. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMES F. YOUNGBAR

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* Civil Action WMN-12-898
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v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A. et al.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff James Youngbar filed a
complaint in the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel
County against Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase)
and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
alleging that Defendants violated § 1641(g) of the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., because they
failed to provide the statutorily required notice when
Plaintiff’s mortgage loan was sold or assigned by Chase to
Freddie Mac.

1

ECF No. 2.

Court on March 23, 2012.

The complaint was removed to this
ECF No. 1.

Defendants answered the complaint on March 29, 2012, ECF
No. 9, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30,
2012.

ECF No. 11.

Defendants argued that they were entitled to

judgment on the TILA claim because it was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations.

1

To support this argument, Defendants

The Complaint also alleges that Defendants violated the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.

attached a letter dated December 30, 2010, which Plaintiff had
sent to Chase.

In the letter Plaintiff stated that “I have a

Freddie Mac owned home loan.”

ECF No. 11-2.

Defendants argued

that Plaintiff clearly knew he had a Freddie Mac loan before
December 30, 2010, so if he had not received the appropriate
statutory notice, he should have known at that time that he had
a cause of action.

Therefore, as the complaint was not filed

until March 1, 2012, they argued Plaintiff’s TILA claim was time
barred.
On May 8, 2012, the Court received correspondence from
Plaintiff’s counsel indicating that “after review of Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, I have no grounds to file an
opposition.”

ECF No. 12.

Upon receipt of this correspondence,

on May 9, 2012, the Court granted Defendants’ motion, entered
judgment in favor of Defendants, and closed the case.

See ECF

No. 13.
Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff filed the
currently pending Motion to Vacate Judgment, ECF No. 14,
requesting that, pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Court vacate its
May 9, 2012, judgment and allow Plaintiff fifteen days to
provide an affidavit to oppose the previously conceded Motion
for Summary Judgment.

In support of his motion, Plaintiff

argues that at the time he filed the letter stating he had no
grounds upon which to file an opposition he was unaware that the
2

Fourth Circuit had just days earlier published an opinion in
Gilbert v. Residential Funding, LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.
2012), which he characterizes as holding that “correspondence
sent . . . in a TILA-violation context delayed the running of
limitations.”

Mot. at ¶ 4.

Plaintiff also included as exhibits

several pieces of correspondence that he received from
Defendants on several dates in 2011.

This correspondence is

significant, Plaintiff argues, because it does not indicate that
Freddie Mac was the Secured Party until May 11, 2011, which
would mean his lawsuit was timely filed within the one-year TILA
statute of limitations.2
Defendants oppose the Motion to Vacate, arguing that
Plaintiff has not stated any grounds on which the Court may
grant the motion under Rule 59(e) because both the exhibits and
the Gilbert decision were available prior to the filing of
Plaintiff’s correspondence conceding summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) requires that “a
motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than
28 days after the entry of judgment.”

Although this rule does

not itself provide a standard, the Fourth Circuit has recognized
three grounds on which a court may alter or amend an earlier
judgment:
2

Plaintiff continues to concede that the FTCA claim is not
permitted under current law so does not move that judgment be
vacated on this count. See Mot. at ¶ 9.
3

(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct clear error of
law or prevent manifest injustice.
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th
Cir. 1998); EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Aero & Naval Sys.,
116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1997); Hutchinson v. Staton, 994
F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993).

Furthermore, “Rule 59(e)

motions may not be used . . . to raise arguments which could
have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may
they be used to argue a case under a novel legal theory that the
party had the ability to address in the first instance.”

Id.

The Fourth Circuit has also cautioned that "reconsideration of a
judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly." Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403.
The Court will heed the caution of the Fourth Circuit and
deny the Motion to Vacate because both the Gilbert decision and
the accompanying exhibits were available during the time
Plaintiff had to oppose the motion for summary judgment.

Though

the Gilbert decision was filed only five days before Plaintiff
filed his concession, this is no excuse.

Published opinions are

available the day they are released on the Fourth Circuit’s

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website,3 and are certainly available on commercial legal search
engines shortly thereafter.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not argued, and there is no reason
to believe, that the correspondence exhibits were not previously
available.

Presumably, Plaintiff would suggest that he did not

offer the exhibits because they would not have been relevant
without the holding of Gilbert, which he contends held that
receipt of correspondence from a lender could delay the running
of limitations.

If offered, however, this suggestion would fail

because (1) even without Gilbert this correspondence may have
been relevant if Plaintiff offered it to counter the December
30, 2010, letter that was relied on by Defendants, and (2) the
Gilbert holding does not speak to the type of TILA violation
that Plaintiff alleges.4

Plaintiff had the opportunity to oppose

the motion for summary judgment by presenting the Court with the
correspondence that he received from Defendant and which he now
contends provided “directly contrary information” with respect
to who he believed owned the mortgage loan.

See Mot. at ¶ 5.

3

See http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/opinion.htm (noting
that “The Court posts published and unpublished opinions and
selected orders daily beginning at 2:30 p.m.”) (last accessed:
July 2, 2012)
4

Gilbert holds that the statute of limitations for a TILA claim
regarding a lender’s refusal to honor the borrower’s right to
rescind was not triggered until the lender sent a letter
indicating that it would not rescind the loan transaction.
Gilbert, 378 F.3d at 278.
5

As these exhibits were not provided when Plaintiff had the
opportunity to oppose the summary judgment and Plaintiff has not
provided a reason for not presenting such evidence, the Court
will decline to vacate the judgment.5

See Robinson v. Wix

Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, n.9 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting
that before considering evidence not presented before judgment a
court must first determine whether the reasons for not providing
such evidence are justified); see also Garner v. Arvin
Industries, Inc., 77 F.3d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to
consider affidavits that plaintiff submitted with only her Rule
59(e) motion even though such affidavits were available when she
filed her opposition to defendant’s motion for summary
judgment).
Accordingly, it is this 5th day of July, 2012, by the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED:
1. That,

pursuant

to

Local

Rule

105.6,

no

hearing

is

necessary;

5

Plaintiff also argues, “In light of Gilbert, it is in the
interests of fairness and justice that this Court grant this
Motion.” Mot. at ¶ 8. Putting aside that Plaintiff does not
provide any further explanation with this argument, as noted
above, the Court is not convinced that such interests will be
betrayed by its decision to deny the motion because Gilbert does
not affect what type of evidence or argument Plaintiff could
have offered when he initially had the opportunity to oppose the
motion for summary judgment.
6

2. That Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Judgment, ECF No. 14,
is hereby DENIED; and
3. That the Clerk of the Court shall transmit a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to all counsel of record.

/s/
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

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