Stanley v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 10/31/12. (C/M 10/31/12 apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JAMES A. STANLEY, #370643
Plaintiff
v.

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KATHLEEN GREEN, Warden, et al.
Defendants

Civil Action No. GLR-12-932

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MEMORANDUM

Self-represented Plaintiff James A. Stanley (“Stanley”), an inmate confined to Poplar Hill
Pre-Release Unit (“PHPRU”), filed the above-captioned civil rights Complaint regarding
medical care for his chronic illness. ECF Nos. 1, 4. Defendants Sarah Brown, Jessica Cecil,
Jason Clem, and Paul Matera (“Medical Defendants”) move to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No.
18. Defendant Gary Mumford also moves to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 19. Defendant
Kathleen Green moves to dismiss or for summary judgment. ECF No. 23. Stanley opposes the
Motions. 1 ECF Nos. 24, 25, 29.
Background
Stanley claims he suffers from Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”). He states he was diagnosed
with the disease in Weld County, Colorado, where he was held as a pre-trial detainee. Stanley
alleges that during his time in Colorado, he experienced uncontrolled seizure activity,
degenerative arthritis, loss of vision, and heaviness in his limbs. Stanley was not permitted to
have a medical brace in the Colorado jail and was not taken to see a neurologist by the Colorado

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In addition, Stanley moves to require the prison library to comply with his requests for copies of cases within five
working days. ECF No. 26. The motion shall be denied.

Sheriff and the medical contractor, Correctional Medical Services (“CMS”). An action for
contempt was filed in a Colorado court, resulting in an order requiring Stanley to be seen by his
Neurologist, Dr. Hayes.

Dr. Hayes’ office called Stanley’s home to advise him of the

appointment, and Stanley’s wife in turn called the jail to confirm that Stanley had the
appointment with Dr. Hayes; however, jail officials canceled the appointment because they
believed Stanley’s knowledge of the time and date of the appointment posed a security risk.
ECF No. 1 at 3 - 4.
Stanley was then transferred from Weld County Jail to Jefferson County, Colorado Jail
where he was given his medical brace. Nothing further regarding a neurology appointment
occurred until jail officials were threatened by the Colorado court.

Stanley states that in

November 2010, he was taken to Exempla Lutheran Hospital in Wheatridge, Colorado, where he
was given an MRI. Doctors compared the 2010 MRI with five previous MRIs taken in Maryland
and diagnosed Stanley with MS. Doctors prescribed Stanley the steroid Prednisone for the issues
related to his eye and prescribed pain medication for his MS.
Stanley alleges that follow-up for his MS was consistent until he was released to a
Maryland detainer on February 12, 2011. Stanley claims that while in custody in Jefferson
County, he suffered three episodes or exacerbations2 involving loss of vision in the right eye and
heaviness or temporary loss of the use of a limb. In each case, Stanley states he was given heavy
doses of Prednisone, which restored his sight as well as functionality to his limb. ECF No. 1 at
4 – 5.

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An MS exacerbation is an attack of symptoms or relapses that occur in the most common form of the disease
known as relapsing-remitting MS. ECF No. 29 at Ex. B.

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Stanley claims his extradition from Colorado to Maryland involved his transportation by
private extradition service3 for 12 days and through 38 States. Stanley alleges he was given no
medication during the trip, causing him to have several seizures.4 He further alleges he was not
given medical treatment during the trip, and the pain associated with his MS worsened. ECF No.
1 at 5.
Within six months of arriving in Worcester County, Maryland, Dr. Jason Clem examined
Stanley and prescribed the same medications prescribed by his Colorado doctor. Stanley claims
Dr. Clem said he could not send him to see a neurologist, even though, according to Stanley, he
had a serious need for the appointment. While confined in the Worcester County Detention
Center, Dr. Clem increased Stanley’s pain medications and prescribed steroids.5 ECF No. 1 at
5.
On September 9, 2011, Stanley was transferred to Maryland Reception Diagnostic
Classification Center (“MRDCC”), where he was put on chronic care lists for both his seizure
disorder and MS. Officials then transferred him to Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”),
where he arrived on September 14, 2011. Upon arrival to the facility, staff performed a physical
examination, and listed him to be seen in the chronic care clinics6 for MS and a seizure disorder.
Stanley alleges his inmate identification card (“ID”) was changed, adding both seizure disorder
and MS to the back of the ID. ECF No. 1 at 5 – 6.

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Stanley does not describe the vehicle in which he was transported.

4

During one seizure Stanley’s eye glasses were shattered. ECF No. 1 at 5.

5

Stanley claims Dr. Clem transferred to the Eastern Correctional Institution. ECF No. 1 at 5.

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Chronic Care Clinics consist of regular, routine appointments with medical care providers for purposes of
monitoring chronic illnesses. See DCD 130 Medical Manuals, Office of Treatment Services: Chronic Disease
Management Manual (Division of Correction Directives, October 2009).

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In October of 2011, Stanley alleges he had another exacerbation. He was seen by the first
available medical staff, Physician’s Assistant (“PA”) Bruce Ford. Stanley claims Ford admitted
he knew nothing about MS and even confused the disease with Muscular Dystrophy, asking
Stanley if the Labor Day Jerry Lewis Telethon might find a cure for him. After Stanley
complained, he alleges Corizon decided he probably should not see Ford anymore and assigned
him to be seen exclusively by Dr. Paul Matera (“Matera”).
Stanley states that Matera prescribed eight medications, which Stanley kept on his
person, and pain medicine available through the Nurse’s pill call in the evenings. Stanley also
alleges that if he experienced an exacerbation, he also had steroid medication available to take.
He alleges medical staff refused to examine him when his symptoms worsened. The staff
allegedly explained Stanley would know more about his needs, and the staff would determine if
his symptoms worsened through his prescription refill requests. ECF No. 1 at 6 – 7.
In January 2012, Stanley again experienced loss of eyesight and was prescribed steroids.
Despite six days of heavy administration of steroids, his eye sight did not return. Subsequently
PA Jessica Cecil, arranged for him to receive 10 more days of steroid treatment with doses
tapering down. She advised him to return in 14 days. Stanley claims that Cecil and Matera
opined, based on a 2007 CT Scan, that he did not have MS and no further steroids should be
prescribed.

Finally, Stanley alleges a request for Administrative Remedy filed by him

complaining that his MS diagnosis was changed and treatment was stopped, went unanswered.
ECF No. 1 at 7 - 8.
On February 21, 2012, Stanley again lost his eyesight. Stanley was initially refused
treatment because of a court filing in Somerset County, Maryland challenging the medical staff.
Stanley filed another request for Administrative Remedy on February 15, 2011 and, as a result,

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was scheduled to be seen by PA Ford on March 19, 2011. Doctors prescribed steroids for
Stanley, who claims the order was issued against the wishes of the medical administration. ECF
No. 1 at 8.
Stanley states that according to the MS Society only an MRI can detect the lesions
indicative of MS; CT Scans cannot detect the lesions. He claims he has all six of his previous
MRIs that show the lesions leading to his diagnosis. He has provided a release to Corizon so the
films could be obtained by staff for review, but they have not executed the releases. ECF No. 1
at 8.
In summary, Stanley claims that Worcester County Jail extradited him from Colorado to
Maryland despite advanced notice of his medical conditions. He alleges he was denied medical
treatment during the drive across the country, which he describes as non-stop. Additionally, he
claims Worcester County Jail improperly denied neurological treatment for his seizures and MS
for seven months. Stanley alleges he has been denied medical treatment while confined at ECI,
waiting eight weeks to see medical staff for a complaint related to the loss of his eyesight. He
also complains ECI medical staff reversed the diagnosis for MS based on inadequate
information. He further claims that Corizon has refused to provide treatment to him despite the
contempt rulings issued by the Colorado court. He states Dr. Matera was supposed to set up a
neurological consult in January 2012, but the consultation has not yet occurred. ECF No. 1 at 8.
Standard of Review
Motion to Dismiss
In reviewing a complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

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Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005); Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a Ashort and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int=l Inc.,
248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court of the United States explained a Aplaintiff=s obligation to provide the
>grounds= of his >entitlement to relief= requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.@ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need Adetailed
factual allegations@ to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, Aonce a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.@ Id. at 563. Thus, a complaint need only state Aenough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.@ Id. at 566.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

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AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw
all inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Analysis
The Eighth Amendment prohibits Aunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain@ by virtue
of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976). AScrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized
by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment.@ De=Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).

In order to state an Eighth

Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the
defendants, or their failure to act, amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical
need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention but
failed to either provide it or ensure the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

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U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Objectively, the medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with
unqualified access to health care). Proof of an objectively serious medical condition, however,
does not end the inquiry.
The subjective component requires Asubjective recklessness@ in the face of the serious
medical condition. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839B 40. ATrue subjective recklessness requires
knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk.@ Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1997). AActual knowledge or awareness
on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference
>because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted
punishment.=@ Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).

If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an

official may avoid liability Aif [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not
ultimately averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged
in light of the risk the defendant actually knew at the time. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383,
390 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (focus must be on
precautions actually taken in light of suicide risk, not those that could have been taken)).
Medical Defendants seek dismissal of the complaint. Defendant Cecil alleges the claim
against her is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. ECF No. 18 at Memorandum, 8. Where
there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; an identity of the cause of action in
both the earlier and the later suit; and an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits, res
judicata is established. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Beverley, 404 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir.
2005). The doctrine of res judicata precludes the assertion of a claim after a judgment on the

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merits in a prior suit by the same parties on the same cause of action. See Meekins v. United
Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991). In addition, “[n]ot only does res judicata
bar claims that were raised and fully litigated, it prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses
to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were
asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Id., (quoting Peugeot Motors of America, Inc.
v. Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1989)).
Stanley filed an action in the District Court for Somerset County, Maryland naming as
Defendants Jessica Cecil, Dr. Paul Matera, and the Warden of ECI. His allegations against Cecil
in that case were that she was denying he has MS, refusing treatment, and ignoring Colorado
court orders. ECF No. 18 at Ex. 1. A settlement agreement reached in that case included
Stanley’s agreement to dismiss the claims against Cecil with prejudice. Id. at Ex. 2.
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Stanley simply asserts that the instant case was
filed before the state case. ECF No. 25 at 3. He adds that Cecil no longer works for Corizon and
“there has been significant objection to disclosing her work performance.” Id. He further states
that the state claim was dismissed because Corizon was supposed to push for an evaluation and
treatment of Stanley by Dr. Clem. Id. The claim raised against Cecil in the instant case is
virtually identical to the claim in state court. Cecil is entitled to be dismissed from this case
under the principles of res judicata.
Defendants Matera, Clem, and Brown seek dismissal because the complaint fails to state
a claim against them. The only mention of Matera’s involvement in Stanley’s care is that he
provided eight prescriptions for Stanley to keep with him and one pain medication accessible
through pill call; that Matera agreed with Cecil that Stanley did not have MS; and that Matera
failed to set up a neurological consultation for Stanley.

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ECF No. 18 at 10.

Dr. Clem’s

involvement is less clear, as Stanley only mentions him in the context of his initial physical
examination at Worcester County Jail. Additionally, Stanley claims he is not allowed to see
Clem because Clem agrees with Stanley’s opinions regarding his diagnosis. Id.

Thus it is

unclear why Dr. Clem is accused of wrongdoing in the context of Stanley’s medical treatment
after leaving Worcester County Jail.
Defendant Sarah Brown is not alleged to have done anything in terms of denying Stanley
medical care; (she is simply named as a defendant in the amended complaint, with no
explanation as to why she should be held liable.) Id. at 11.
Stanley alleges in his opposition that Defendants Green, Corizon, Clem, Matera, Cecil
and Brown “have colluded to hide discovery subpoenaed, hidden actual diagnosis and refused
continued treatment.” ECF No. 25 at 2. He alleges that MRI depictions, which establish he has
MS, have been confiscated and held because Defendants do not want to have to pay for Stanley’s
treatment by a neurologist. He states they have improperly maintained he does not have MS
despite the fact that he has qualified for Social Security Disability upon his release. With respect
to Defendant Brown, Stanley claims she is liable because she maintains the provider schedule
and provides access to Corizon doctors and physician’s assistants.

He asserts Brown has

“provided extensive roadblocks to the treatment and access for [MS] and maintained a
relationship with P.A. Cecil that continued in a detrimental manner for treatment of the
Plaintiff.” ECF No. 25 at 3.
Viewed in a light most favorable to Stanley, the complaint alleges that he has been
provided treatment in the form of prescribed steroids and pain medication, albeit reluctantly.
The main focus of his grievance is that his diagnosis was questioned and he disagrees with the
methodology utilized to revisit his diagnosis. There is no demonstration that all treatment has

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been withdrawn for malicious reasons, or that Stanley has suffered harm as a result of the alleged
decision to question his diagnosis. The court is sympathetic with Stanley’s frustration regarding
the quality of care received and the timeliness of providing needed consultations with neurology
specialists. Notwithstanding that frustration, however, the complaint does not support a finding
that the care provided by Medical Defendants has amounted to an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.7 Therefore the claims against Medical Defendants fail to state a claim and will
be dismissed.
Defendant Gary Mumford, Warden of Worcester County Jail, also seeks dismissal of the
complaint against him because there are no allegations raised against him indicating that he
contributed in any way to a failure to provide adequate medical care to Stanley. ECF No. 19.
Defendant Warden Kathleen Green seeks dismissal from the case on a similar ground and adds
that Stanley has received constitutionally adequate medical care. ECF No. 23.
The law in the Fourth Circuit is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply in ' 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004)
(no respondeat superior liability under ' 1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th
Cir. 2001) (no respondeat superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials
Ais not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on >a
recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates= misconduct may
be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.=@
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368,
372 (4th Cir. 1984)). Supervisory liability under ' 1983 must be supported with evidence that:
(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in
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This Court notes that a continued pattern of delays in providing Stanley with appropriate consultations with
specialists to monitor and address his serious medical conditions may state a claim against those responsible if
supported by appropriate evidence.

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conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the
plaintiff; (2) the supervisor=s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor=s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
With respect to Warden Mumford, Stanley claims that as Warden of the Worcester
County Jail, he “is always responsible in all acts of the local facility.” ECF No. 24 at 1. He
states that Mumford made it clear to him that the County did not have the funds to pay for
treatment of his conditions; and that Stanley’s transfer to State custody would result in treatment
because information regarding his diagnosis would be sent with Stanley. Id. at 2. Stanley admits
that information regarding his diagnosis was forwarded to the Maryland Division of Correction
and that while he was in the County facility he was provided with prednisone for treatment of his
symptoms. Id. Stanley’s claim against Mumford is based on a theory of respondeat superior.
Mumford’s knowledge of Stanley’s medical condition and his alleged statements regarding costs
are insufficient to establish supervisory liability. Mumford’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
With respect to Warden Green, Stanley’s claim is similarly based on respondeat superior.
See ECF No. 29 at 2 (stating that Green is responsible for making sure all inmates in the facility
are medically evaluated and treated). Stanley adds claims against Green in his Opposition,
claiming his legal mail was opened in violation of directives governing the handling of inmate
legal mail; and that Green has failed to respond to Stanley’s administrative remedy requests;
ordered security staff to obtain all copies of Stanley’s MRI films in order to “keep the diagnosis
quiet;” and retaliated against Stanley for the instant lawsuit by delaying his transfer to a lower

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security prison. Id. at 3 – 4. There is no allegation that Warden Green interfered with medical
treatment prescribed for Stanley, nor is there a claim that she has facilitated improper treatment.
Assuming Stanley’s allegations regarding his legal mail, administrative remedy requests,
and MRI films are true, they fail to state a cognizable claim. To the extent the allegations imply
that Warden Green has denied Stanley his constitutional right of access to the courts, he has
failed to allege an injury. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (prisoners have a
constitutionally protected right of access to the courts). AThe requirement that an inmate alleging
a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a
constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the
political branches.@ Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
Stanley’s retaliation claim also fails. The alleged retaliatory act in the instant case was a
delay in his transfer to a pre-release unit, where he is now confined. A delay in a transfer is not
an adversity sufficient to support a prima facie case of retaliation. See Burton v. Livingston, 791
F.2d 97, 100-101 (8th Cir. 1986) (Acomplaint that a prison guard, without provocation, and for
the apparent purpose of retaliating against the prisoner's exercise of his rights in petitioning a
federal court for redress, terrorized him with threats of death@ sufficient to state claim). A>A
complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the
pleading alone.=@ Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Flaherty v.
Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)). Thus, the claims against Warden Green will also be
dismissed. A separate Order follows.
October 31, 2012

/s/
________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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