Pearsall v. Newton et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 10/1/12.(c/m af 10/2/12) (amf, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DANNY K. PEARSALL #292-835
Plaintiff
v.

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BARBARA NEWTON
LOIS CUTTER, R.N.
CORIZON, INC.
Defendants

Civil Action No. GLR-12-948

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MEMORANDUM

Danny K. Pearsall (“Pearsall”), a Maryland Division of Correction (“DOC”) prisoner
housed at Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”), filed a civil rights Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Corizon Medical Services (“Corizon”), Barbara Newton, an agency
contract operations manager for Corizon, and Corizon employee Lois Cutter (“Cutter”), a
registered nurse. Pearsall, who is self-represented, seeks money damages and alleges he was
denied prompt and appropriate medical care by Cutter regarding injuries received following an
altercation with other prisoners. Defendants’ previously-filed Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 7) was granted in part as to Defendants Newton and Corizon, Inc., and denied as to
Defendant Cutter, and supplemental jurisdiction was denied as to Pearsall’s state tort negligence
claim, which was dismissed without prejudice. ECF Nos. 11 and 12. Now pending is a
supplemental Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, filed on behalf of
Cutter (ECF Nos. 7 and 13) and Pearsall’s opposition thereto. ECF No. 15. A hearing is not
necessary to resolve the pending dispositive motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).

Background
Pearsall states that around 9:00 p.m. on February 1, 2011, he was assaulted by fellow
prisoners. He was taken to the WCI medical unit and reported to Cutter that he believed his jaw
was broken, he was in severe pain, constantly spitting out blood, and unable to talk, eat or stop
the bleeding. He states Cutter performed an examination, then released him back to his cell
without pain medication and without contacting the on-call physician to request emergency
treatment at an area hospital. The next day, corrections staff escorted him back to the medical
unit where Dr. Joubert authorized his immediate transportation to University of Maryland
Medical Center (“UMMC”). There, Pearsall underwent surgery to repair a broken jaw and
fractured teeth. Pearsall claims, both in his unverified Complaint and opposition responses, that
Cutter’s inaction amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 1
at 4-6; see also ECF Nos.10 and 15. Pearsall provides an Administrative Remedy Procedure
(“ARP”) response from WCI’s Warden finding that Cutter violated protocol by failing to contact
the on-call physician or dentist “to describe her findings and obtain guidance in how to proceed
in the immediate post-fight period.” The Warden noted that Cutter “has been counseled by
CMS. The dental vendor provided training to CMS nursing staff as a direct result of your case.”
ECF No. 1 at 9.
Counsel provides a February 1, 2011, Nurse Sick Call report prepared by Cutter
indicating she provided Pearsall with 200 mg Motrin for pain, applied a cold compress to his
jaw, provided saline to rinse his mouth, and issued a referral for dental evaluation and treatment
at a later date. ECF No. 7, Ex. B at 1. Counsel also provides additional medical records
concerning subsequent treatment provided by other Corizon staff as well as UMMC medical
personnel. Id., Exs. C and D. Cutter has submitted an affidavit indicating that Pearsall was

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brought to the medical unit at 10:36 p.m. Pearsall was alert and oriented and had some bleeding
from the mouth and several loose teeth. Cutter indicates Pearsall stated it did not hurt very
much, but she assumed that he was still “pumped up from the fight” and might experience more
pain later. Cutter found Pearsall’s jaw line in alignment and felt no movement of the bones. At
that time, Pearsall was able to open his mouth without difficulty and could talk appropriately.
Cutter cleansed his mouth with saline and gauze and gave him two 200 mg tablets of Motrin plus
supplies of saline, gauze, an ice pack for swelling, and several additional tablets of 200 mg
Motrin to take as needed. Cutter told Pearsall to call medical at any time that evening if he had
any problems, and placed a consultation request so the dentist could see him as soon as possible
the next day. Cutter avers that she did not call or page the doctor on call because her clinical
assessment led her to conclude Pearsall had no other problems besides the loosened teeth. ECF
No. 13, Ex. B, Affidavit of Lois Cutter, R.N.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to...the nonmovant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
A.

Eighth Amendment Standard
The Eighth Amendment prohibits Aunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain@ by virtue

of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, Pearsall must

demonstrate that Cutter’s actions (or her failure to act) amounted to deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, Pearsall was suffering from a serious
medical need and that, subjectively, Cutter was aware of the need for medical attention but failed
to either provide it or ensure the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994).
As noted above, the medical condition at issue must be serious.

See Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (no expectation that prisoners will be provided with unqualified
access to health care). Proof of an objectively serious medical condition, however, does not end
the inquiry. The second component of proof requires Asubjective recklessness@ in the face of the

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serious medical condition. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839B 40. ATrue subjective recklessness requires
knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk.@ Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1997). AActual knowledge or awareness
on the part of the alleged inflicter . . . becomes essential to proof of deliberate indifference
>because prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted
punishment.=@ Brice v. Virginia Beach Correctional Center, 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995),
quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. If the requisite subjective knowledge is established, an official
may avoid liability Aif [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately
averted.@ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Reasonableness of the actions taken must be judged in light
of the risk the defendant actually knew at the time. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir.
2001), citing Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) (focus must be on precautions
actually taken in light of suicide risk, not those that could have been taken).

Further,

disagreements between a prisoner and health care staff over the prisoner's proper care do not
state a ' 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. See Wright v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
It appears from the uncontroverted record and Cutter’s affidavit that neither she nor
Pearsall realized at the time the severity of Pearsall’s injuries. Cutter was not deliberately
indifferent to Pearsall’s medical needs; she simply failed to realize that emergency care beyond
referral to the dental department was needed. Nothing suggests that Pearsall reported back to the
medical unit during the rest of Cutter’s shift or during the early morning hours following his
injury. By morning, Pearsall could not open his mouth, he was experiencing severe pain, and the
full extent of Pearsall’s injuries was apparent. An x-ray confirmed that his jaw was broken, and

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Pearsall was transported to the hospital the following day, where his jaw was surgically wired
on February 4, 2011.1 ECF No. 7, Ex. B.
Defendant Cutter provided basic medical services based on her assessment that Pearsall’s
injuries involved minor cuts and loosened teeth. She was not deliberately indifferent to his need
for medical attention; she simply did not realize the amount of damage later revealed. An Eighth
Amendment violation is not found on the facts set forth in this case. See e.g. Johnson v.
Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (negligence in misdiagnosis of pituitary tumor not
sufficient for Eight Amendment claim). Accordingly, Cutter shall be granted summary judgment
by way of a separate Order.
October 1, 2012

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/s/
________________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

Clearly Pearsall’s injuries were not so threatening that emergency surgery was immediately required.

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