Madison et al v. Harford County, Maryland et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 47 Motion of plaintiffs for Partial Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 8/23/13. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY MADISON, et al.

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Plaintiffs
vs.

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HARFORD COUNTY, et al.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-12-1120

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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Court has before it Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [Document 47] and the materials submitted by the
Plaintiff relating thereto. The Court finds that neither a
response nor a hearing is necessary.
As stated by Judge Ramsey in Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers
Co., Inc.:
A motion for reconsideration (or, to
alter or amend judgment) made pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) may be made for one of
three reasons: (1) an intervening change in
the
controlling
law
has
occurred,
(2)
evidence not previously available has become
available, or (3) it is necessary to correct
a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice
771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991) (citation omitted).

Such

a motion "cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and
should, have been made before [the determination to be
reconsidered was] issued."

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer,

781 F. 2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

Stated

differently, a "'motion to reconsider is not a license to
reargue the merits or present new evidence.'"

Gray-Hopkins v.

Prince George's Cnty., Md., 201 F. Supp. 2d 523, 524 (D. Md.
2002) (quoting Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Miles & Stockbridge,
P.C., 142 F. Supp. 2d 676, 677 n. 1 (D. Md. 2001)).
The instant motion meets none of the criteria upon which a
court may properly reconsider a prior determination.

Moreover,

to the extent there is anything in the instant motion beyond a
restatement of the basic arguments already presented1, it does
not persuade the Court to have all concerned engage in the
exercise of a re-enactment of the briefing and argument.
There can, no doubt, be endless rounds of quibbling about
non-determinative differences at the fringes of the case.
However, at the core, there was insufficient evidence to support
a finding that the single use of the taser, or any other action
of any Defendant was done in a sadistic manner or with any
intent to inflict injury upon Mr. Madison within the meaning of
1

For instance, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
contains quotations from deposition testimony that was quoted in
Plaintiffs' responses to the Defendants' summary judgment
motions. While not determinative, the Court notes that page 19
of Defendant Jones' deposition testimony quoted by Plaintiffs in
their response [Document 37] (and the instant motion) was not
attached as part of the exhibits to that response. The Court
also notes that the instant motion introduces portions of
Defendant Courtney's and Harper's deposition testimony that was
neither quoted nor attached to the Plaintiffs' summary judgment
responses [Documents 25, 37].
2

the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stands by its decision as reflected in the
Memorandum and Order Re: Summary Judgment/Dismissal [Document
44].
Finally, the Court must note that Plaintiffs' counsel's
attempt to justify another round of discovery by virtue of the
post-initial argument deposition of Mr. Wright is misplaced.

As

shown on the record of the May 21, 2013 hearing, the Court had
before it a transcript of an interview of Mr. Wright taken
within a day of the events at issue and a less than consistent
affidavit drafted by someone associated with Plaintiffs' counsel
and signed by Mr. Wright long after the events at issue.

At the

hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel represented that Mr. Wright would
testify that he felt coerced to make the recorded statements
which tended to support the Defendants.

Inasmuch as Mr. Wright

is the only non-Defendant witness, the Court permitted a
deposition of Mr. Wright so as to have the record reflect what
he would say if called as a trial witness. Plaintiffs' counsel
stated, on the record, that it was reasonable to permit the
deposition.2

After Mr. Wright's deposition transcript was filed,

the Court received and considered the parties' respective
comments related to the deposition before reaching its decision.
2

And argued that even without the Wright testimony, the
evidence was adequate for Plaintiffs to proceed past summary
judgment.
3

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [Document 47] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this Friday, August 23, 2013.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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