First Mariner Bank v. The Resolution Law Group, P.C.
Filing
303
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part 293 Motion of plaintiff for Default Judgment; the Court hereby awards Plaintiff, First Mariner Bank, legal fees of 318,597.50, and other costs of $20,387.34 for a total of $338,984.84. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 9/8/2015. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
FIRST MARINER BANK
Plaintiff
*
*
vs.
*
THE RESOLUTION LAW GROUP, P.C., *
et al.
*
Defendants
*
*
*
*
*
CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-12-1133
*
*
*
*
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: COSTS AND FEES
The Court has before it Plaintiff First Mariner Bank's
Statement Of Remedies Sought Against Defendant Robert Geoffrey
Broderick, Jr. [ECF No. 293], docketed as a Motion for Default
Judgment, and the materials submitted relating thereto.
The
Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary.
I.
BACKGROUND
In the Order Adopting Magistrate Judge's Recommendation
[ECF No. 282], the Court stated:
1.
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions [Document
238] is GRANTED.
2.
Judgment by Default shall be entered against
Defendants as to all counts of Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint [Document 31].
3.
By December 17, 2014, Plaintiff shall submit
a statement of the remedies sought,
including damages, costs, and fees with
supporting documentation.
1
Plaintiff, First Mariner Bank ("First Mariner"), has
submitted its statement of remedies sought against Defendant,
Robert Geoffrey Broderick, Jr. ("Broderick"), and Broderick has
filed a response.
II.
DISCUSSION
The Court has, as noted above, granted First Mariner
judgment by default on its claims against Broderick for false
advertising in violation of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)), unfair competition, and defamation.
A.
Injunction
The Court, has authority to "grant injunctions, according
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may
deem reasonable, to prevent . . . a violation under subsection
(a), (c), or (d) of section 1125 of this title."
15 U.S.C. §
1116.
First Mariner seeks an injunction prohibiting Broderick
from making false statements about First Mariner.
Broderick
does not oppose the granting of this relief.
The Court, finding injunctive relief appropriate and
unopposed, shall issue an injunction as sought by First Mariner.
2
B.
Damages
1.
Compensatory
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides, in pertinent
part:
When a violation of . . . section 1125
(a) . . . shall have been established in any
civil action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover
. . .
(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff .
. . .
First Mariner seeks compensatory damages of $105,000.00,
constituting the interest that it would have earned on a
specified mortgage refinancing loan.
First Mariner has not, however, established that it
sustained any actual financial damage because of its failure to
finance the specified loan.
Rather, First Mariner retained the
funds that it would have used for that transaction and has not
shown that it was unable to use those funds to generate
equivalent interest income in another transaction.
Therefore,
the Court shall not award First Mariner any compensatory
damages.
The Court is not finding that Broderick caused First
Mariner no damage at all. Indeed, his unwarranted actions caused
substantial reputational damage. Nevertheless, in the absence of
3
evidence permitting a quantification of the amount of damages,
there shall be no compensatory damages award.
2.
Punitive Damages
The Court finds that Broderick's conduct would warrant an
award of punitive damages.
However, in the absence of any award
of compensatory damages, the Court shall not award punitive
damages.
C.
Costs and Fees
1.
Costs
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides, in
pertinent part:
When a violation of . . . section 1125
(a) . . . shall have been established in any
civil action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover
. . .
(3) the costs of the action.
First Mariner has submitted a statement of costs (excluding
legal fees) totaling $20,387.34.
Broderick does not object to
specific costs but states, generally, that "much of what
plaintiff claims as costs, while taxable under Local Rule
Appendix B, 1, would not be taxable under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1920
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)."
Response 17, ECF No. 297.
4
Broderick further states, without specification:
Indeed, Local Rule Appendix B, 1 may be
prohibited by 28 U.S.C. sec. 1920. The
statute states that the court may include as
costs certain items. The statute does not
allow for the additional items permitted
under the Local Rule. The inconsistency must
be resolved in favor of the statute.
Id. at 18.
The Court finds Broderick's generalized
objections insufficient to raise genuine issues as to
the allowable costs and shall not reduce First
Mariner's requested cost award.
Broderick refers to the "great disparity between
the financial situations of plaintiff and defendant. .
. ."
Id.
The Court finds this matter immaterial.
2. Legal Fees
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides, in pertinent
part:
When a violation of . . . section 1125
(a) . . . shall have been established in any
civil action arising under this chapter . .
. . The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.
The Court finds the instant case to be an "exceptional
case" warranting a legal fee award.
5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has held that a prevailing plaintiff may be awarded attorney's
fees under the Lanham Act provision. See, e.g., Retail Servs.,
Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
The
term "exceptional" is not defined in the statute.
In Georgia-Pac. Consumer Products LP v. Von Drehle Corp.,
781 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 15, 2015), a
trademark infringement case,1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stated:
[W]e conclude that a district court may find
a case "exceptional" and therefore award
attorneys [sic] fees to the prevailing party
under § 1117(a) when it determines, in light
of the totality of the circumstances, that
(1) "there is an unusual discrepancy in the
merits of the positions taken by the
parties," based on the non-prevailing
party's position as either frivolous or
objectively unreasonable, (2) the nonprevailing party "has litigated the case in
an 'unreasonable manner,'"; or (3) there is
otherwise "the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence."
Id. at 721 (quoting Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 n.6,
and Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d
Cir. 2014)).
1
In Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., –––
U.S. ––––, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), a patent infringement case,
the Supreme Court lowered the burden for proving that a case was
exceptional under the Patent Act.
6
The Court finds that Broderick's position in the instant
case had no reasonable basis.
Moreover, Broderick's conduct of
the litigation was beneath any reasonable standard.
Accordingly, the Court hereby exercises its discretion and
determines, considering the totality of the circumstances, that
the instant case is "exceptional" as that term is used in 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a).
District courts have wide discretion to determine the
amount of legal fees upon a determination that a case is
exceptional.
See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 211
(4th Cir. 2005) ("We have made it clear that the determination
of a reasonable attorney's fee award is a decision for the
district court to make, and the district court has broad
discretion in that regard . . . ."); Carroll v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is for the
district court in the first instance to calculate an appropriate
award of attorney's fees.").
First Mariner seeks an award of $377,577.50 of legal fees
and Broderick objected to $58,980.002 of these.
In the absence
of a reply by First Mariner, the Court will accept all of
Broderick's objections, reducing First Mariner's fee award
request to $318,597.50.
2
Response 16, ECF No. 297.
7
The Court does not accept the argument that imposition of
the fee award would have a "chilling" effect on members of the
Bar who seek to present cases in a professional manner.
Broderick did not behave as such a member of the bar.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.
Plaintiff First Mariner
Remedies Sought Against
Broderick, Jr. [ECF No.
for Default Judgment is
Bank’s Statement Of
Defendant Robert Geoffrey
293] docketed as a Motion
GRANTED IN PART.
2.
The Court shall issue an injunction prohibiting
Broderick from making false statements about
First Mariner.
a. First Mariner shall submit a proposed
injunction by September 18, 2015.
b. Broderick shall file any objection by October
2, 2015.
3.
The Court hereby awards Plaintiff, First Mariner
Bank, legal fees of 318,597.50, and other costs
of $20,387.34 for a total of $338,984.84.
4.
Judgment shall be entered by separate Order.
SO ORDERED, on Tuesday, September 8, 2015.
/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?