DeGiacoma v. State of Maryland

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge James K. Bredar on 7/23/12. (jmk, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 7/25/12)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ANTHONY R. DeGIACOMA

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Plaintiff

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v

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STATE OF MARYLAND and
CORIZON, INC.

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Civil Action No. JKB-12-1263

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Defendants
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MEMORANDUM
On May 1, 2012, this court issued an order to show cause why plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief should not be granted. ECF No. 2. In addition, plaintiff was granted 28 days to
supplement the complaint.

Upon receipt of defendants’ response, the court construed the

response as a motion for summary judgment and advised plaintiff of his right to respond. ECF
Nos. 3 and 5. Plaintiff has not filed anything further in this case.
Background
Plaintiff, an inmate confined to Eastern Correctional Institution (ECI), alleged on April
15, 2012, he showed a Registered Nurse a “serious infection” that was spreading from his thumb
to his hand. He states that between April 17, 2012 and April 21, 2012, he repeatedly complained
about the numbness he felt in his hand and showed medical staff his hand which was turning a
pale green color. He claims the nurses brushed off the issue and said there was nothing they
could do. ECF No. 1 at p. 1.
Plaintiff states the infection in his hand and arm caused severe pain as well as numbness
in all five fingers of his right hand. On April 22, 2012, plaintiff showed a nurse the infection on
his thumb with swelling to his hand and told the nurse he was experiencing chest pains. He was

given antacid tablets, although his heart rate was above normal. He claims the nurse looked at
his hand and said it was very infected, but did nothing more. In addition he claims on various
occasions he was told there was nothing that could be done and to “stop being a cry baby.” Id. at
p. 2.
In the response to show cause, defendant Corizon asserts that plaintiff reported an
infection to his right thumb, known as “whitlow.”1 On April 13 and 15, 2012, treatment for
plaintiff’s thumb was not provided because of time constraints with the institutional count and
because of a fight. On April 22, 2012, plaintiff complained of chest pain which was consistent
with heartburn and he was given antacid tablets. The infection to plaintiff’s thumb was noted
and he was scheduled to be seen at a later date. On April 27, 2012, plaintiff was seen by
Physician’s Assistant Bruce Ford who prescribed the antibiotic Keflex as well as daily Epsom
salt soaks. Ford noted that the wound to plaintiff’s thumb had spontaneously opened and was
beginning to drain and improve. ECF No. 3 at Ex. A, p. 2.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
1

Whitlow is an infection at the tip of the finger just before the nail and located on the middle portion. ECF No. 3 at
Ex. A, p. 2.

2

AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Analysis
The Eighth Amendment prohibits Aunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain@ by virtue
of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976). AScrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited to those punishments authorized
by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment.@ De=Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630, 633 (4th
Cir. 2003) citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.294, 297 (1991).

In order to state an Eighth

Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the
defendants or their failure to act amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical
need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention but
failed to either provide it or ensure the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

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U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Objectively, the medical condition at issue must be serious. See Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (there is no expectation that prisoners will be provided with
unqualified access to health care).
The undisputed evidence establishes that plaintiff is not suffering from a serious medical
condition. To the extent there was a delay in providing care for plaintiff’s infection, the delay
did not exacerbate the infection nor is it evidence of a callous disregard for plaintiff’s pain and
suffering. The care prescribed, and now being provided to plaintiff, is constitutionally adequate.
Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
A separate order follows.

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

/s/
James K. Bredar
United States District Judge

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