Prosperity Mortgage Company v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 7/15/13. (dass, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
PROSPERITY MORTGAGE COMPANY,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. GLR-12-2004
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S, LONDON, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending
Insurance
before
the
Company’s
Court
(“Aspen”)
are
Defendant
Motions
Aspen
for
an
Specialty
Order
of
Interpleader (ECF No. 35) and for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
No. 48).
Also pending are Plaintiff Prosperity Mortgage Company
(“Prosperity”)
and
Third-Party
Defendant
Michelle
Mathews’1
(“Mathews”) Motions to Permit Discovery from a Related Case or
For Partial Consolidation.
reviewed
the
pleadings
hearing necessary.
(ECF Nos. 56-57).
and
supporting
The Court, having
documents,
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2011).
finds
no
For the
reasons that follow, the Court will (1) grant Aspen’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) deny as moot Aspen’s Motion for
an Order of Interpleader, and (3) grant the Motions to Permit
Discovery from a Related Case or For Partial Consolidation.
1
The Court notes that the correct spelling of Michelle’s
last name is Mathews, not Matthews.
BACKGROUND2
I.
Prosperity consists of a partnership between Walker Jackson
Mortgage
Corporation
business
as
and
Prosperity
Wells
Mortgage
Fargo
Ventures,
Company.
From
LLC,
July
doing
through
September 2006, Brett and Hope Ripkin (“the Ripkins”) utilized
Prosperity’s services for a home equity line of credit and/or
mortgage for a new home.
Approximately two years later, on July
10,
represented
2008,
the
Ripkins,
by
G.
Russell
Donaldson
(“Attorney Donaldson”), filed suit against Prosperity and others
seeking
damages
for
alleged
faulty
appraisals
and
high
loan
values (“Ripkin Litigation”).
During
2010,
settlement
Attorney
negotiations
Donaldson
informed
with
the
Prosperity
Ripkins
and
in
the
late
other
defendants that his new clients, Frank and Catherine Larocca
(“the Laroccas”), also had claims related to the purchase and
sale of their existing and new homes.
The Laroccas utilized
Prosperity’s services from April through July 2006.
Donaldson
suggested
that
Prosperity
and
the
other
Attorney
defendants
enter into a settlement agreement with the Laroccas although
they
had
not
filed
a
lawsuit.
Upon
consideration
of
the
proffer, Prosperity’s counsel and representative consulted with
counsel for Defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London
2
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from
Prosperity’s Complaint and accepted as true.
See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
2
(“Lloyd’s”),
Prosperity’s
Laroccas’ claims.
with
the
insurer
the
time,
about
the
Prosperity ultimately decided not to settle
Laroccas,
but
with
Ripkins
agreement
at
the
did
reach
in
a
confidential
December
2010.
settlement
The
Ripkin
Litigation was dismissed with prejudice on March 21, 2011.
The
Laroccas had no further contact with Prosperity.
On
or
about
October
12,
2011,
Prosperity
completed
and
submitted to Aspen a Mortgage Bankers Professional Liability,
Mortgagee’s
E&O
and/or
Mortgage
Bankers
Fidelity
Bond
Application (“the Application”).
(Aspen’s Countercl. ¶ 13, ECF
No.
Application
18).
Question
63
of
the
asked
Prosperity
whether it had “knowledge or information of any act, error or
omission which might reasonably be expected to give rise to a
claim(s),
suit(s),
investigation(s)
Answer Ex. A, at 48,3 ECF No. 18-1).
negative.
(Id.)
claim(s),
or
action(s).”
(Aspen’s
Prosperity answered in the
Question 68 asked Prosperity to identify “any
suit(s),
demands
for
arbitration,
or
administrative/regulatory actions” that were pending at the time
of, or prior to, the Application.
(Id. at 49).
Prosperity
identified three actions in response to this question, but did
not include the Laroccas’ settlement attempts.
Based
upon
Prosperity’s
responses,
3
Aspen
All citations to court documents
Opinion refer to CM-ECF pagination.
3
in
(Id. at 49-50).
accepted
this
the
Memorandum
Application
Mortgage
and
Banker
“Policy”)
as
issued
Prosperity
Professional
well
as
a
a
Mortgage
Liability
Mortgage
Bankers
and
Insurance
Policy
(the
Bankers
Fidelity
Bond
(the
“Bond”) (collectively, the “Policies”) for the period between
December 2011 and December 2012.
14).
Aspen
mailed
Virginia address.
the
(Aspen’s Countercl. ¶¶ 2-3,
Policies
to
Prosperity’s
Chantilly,
(Id. ¶ 16).
On December 9, 2011,4 Attorney Donaldson filed a putative
class
action
additional
law
suit
defendants,
against
including
Prosperity
as
well
Prosperity’s
loan
as
some
officer
Mathews, on behalf of the Laroccas and two additional couples–
Mehdi Nafisi and Forough Iranpour (“the Nafisi/Iranpours”), and
Kenneth and Angela Pfeifer (“the Pfeifers”) (“the Howard County
Litigation”).
According to Prosperity, the claims and theories
asserted in the Howard County Litigation differ from those set
forth in the Ripkin Litigation.
On July 5, 2012, Prosperity filed suit against Aspen and
Lloyd’s seeking declaratory relief and damages for the insurers’
failure to defend and indemnify Prosperity against the claims
raised
in
December
the
26,
Howard
2012,
County
Aspen
Litigation.
filed
4
its
(ECF
Answer
and
No.
1).
On
Counterclaim
The Complaint alleges that this date is December 8, 2011.
(See Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1).
The case citation Prosperity
provides, however, indicates that the correct date is December
9, 2011. (See id.)
4
seeking, inter alia, rescission of the Policies and declaratory
relief against Prosperity.
(ECF No. 18).
The same day, Aspen
also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Mathews.
19).
(ECF No.
Prosperity filed its Answer to Aspen’s Counterclaim on
January 16, 2013, and Mathews filed the same on February 22,
2013.
(ECF Nos. 29, 37).
On February 21, 2013, Aspen filed the
pending Motion for an Order of Interpleader (ECF No. 35), and,
on April 1, 2013, filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings
(ECF
No.
48).
Prosperity
and
Mathews
filed
the
pending Motions to Permit Discovery from a Related Case or For
Partial Consolidation (“Consolidation Motions”) on June 18 and
19, 2013, respectively.
(ECF Nos. 56-57).
II.
A.
DISCUSSION
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Standard of Review
Aspen
moves
for
judgment
on
the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
pleadings
pursuant
to
Under Rule 12(c), a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings any time after the
pleadings are closed, as long as it is early enough not to delay
trial.
A Rule 12(c) motion is governed by the same standard as
motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Walker v. Kelly, 589
F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009)(citation omitted).
Thus, “the
factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, but
those of the answer are taken as true only where and to the
5
extent they have not been denied or do not conflict with the
complaint.”
Dorothea
Pledger v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Dix
Hosp.,
(citation omitted).
pleading
is
a
7
F.Supp.2d
705,
707
(E.D.N.C.
1998)
Any document attached as an “exhibit to a
part
of
the
pleading
for
all
purposes.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
Finally, “[j]udgment should be entered when the pleadings,
construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, fail to state any cognizable claim for relief, and
the matter can, therefore, be decided as a matter of law.”
Rock
for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 594 F.Supp.2d 598, 605 (D.Md. 2009)
(citation omitted).
2. Analysis
The Court holds that Aspen is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because, under Virginia law, Prosperity’s failure
to identify the Laroccas’ claims in the Application constitutes
a
material
misrepresentation,
omission,
or
concealment
that
renders the Policies void.
a.
Choice of Law
Of particular import to the Court’s analysis of Aspen’s
Motion is a determination regarding the substantive state law
the Court must apply.
Both the Policy and Bond at the center of
this litigation fail to provide a choice of law provision.
In
light of the Policies’ omission of a definitive provision and
6
the application of Maryland choice of law rules, the Court finds
that Virginia law applies.
It is axiomatic that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction over a matter “apply the choice of law rules of the
forum state . . . .”
CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In Maryland, the doctrine of lex loci contractus applies when
interpreting
insurance
contracts.
See
Hart, 611 A.2d 100, 101 (Md. 1992).
court
applies
the
substantive
law
Allstate
Ins.
Co.
v.
Under this doctrine, the
of
the
state
where
the
contract was made to determine its validity and construction.
Id.
to
Normally, a contract is “made where the last act necessary
make
the
contract
binding
occurs.”
Millennium
Inorganic
Chems. Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts., Pa., 893
F.Supp.2d 715, 725 (D.Md. 2012) (citation omitted).
In the
insurance context, “delivery of the policy and payment of the
premium
are
ordinarily
the
insurance policy binding.”
insurance
policy
provides
last
acts
necessary
to
Id. (citation omitted).
an
express
provision
make
an
Where an
regarding
the
necessity of a countersignature, however, that countersignature
becomes the “last act necessary to effectuate the policy.”
Id.
at 725-26 (citations omitted).
Aspen avers that Virginia law applies because it delivered
the
policy
to
Prosperity’s
office
7
in
Chantilly,
Virginia.
Conversely, Prosperity avers that Maryland law applies under the
renvoi exception because the countersignatures constitute the
final
binding
act.
According
to
Prosperity,
the
countersignatures were either executed in Aspen’s Illinois or
New
York
offices,
provisions
upon
not
which
Virginia.
Prosperity
Neither
rely,
of
the
however,
policy
contain
an
express countersignature provision.
The
Policy
contains
representative.
the
signature
of
Aspen’s
authorized
The statement above that signature reads:
“IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the insurer has caused this policy to be signed
on the Declarations by its duly authorized representative or
countersigned in states where applicable.”
A, at 3, ECF No. 18-1).
signature
on
Underwriters
the
has
Declarations page.”
Bond
caused
(Aspen’s Answer Ex.
Similarly, the statement above the
states:
this
“In
Bond
to
witness
be
whereof,
executed
(Id. Ex. B, at 38, ECF No. 18-2).
on
the
the
Neither
statement expressly provides that a countersignature is required
for the policies to be valid.5
In fact, the statements differ from those in other cases
where
Maryland
courts
have
found
an
express
countersignature
provision in the policy. See, e.g., Millennium, 893 F.Supp.2d at
5
Moreover, the reference to a countersignature in the
Policy is conditioned upon the act occurring in an “applicable”
state.
There’s no indication whether that applies to the
Policy.
8
726 (“this policy shall not be valid unless signed at the time
of issuance by an authorized representative . . . .”); Rouse Co.
v. Federal Ins. Co., 991 F.Supp. 460, 463 (D.Md. 1998) (“[T]he
policy
‘shall
not
be
valid
unless
also
signed
by
a
duly
authorized representative of the Company.’”); Eastern Stainless
Corp. v. Am. Protection Ins. Co., 829 F.Supp. 797, 799 (D.Md.
1993) (“[T]his Policy shall not be valid unless countersigned by
the duly authorized Agent of the Company.”).
Contrary to the
aforementioned cases, there is nothing in the Policy language
that intimates a countersignature bears on its validity.
The
Court finds that, absent this express language, the final act
binding the contract was Aspen’s delivery of the Policies to
Prosperity’s Virginia location.
As a result, the Court will
apply Virginia law to this Motion unless the limited renvoi
exception requires otherwise.
When the lex loci contractus doctrine requires the court to
apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction, Maryland courts can
utilize the limited renvoi exception to determine whether the
foreign jurisdiction would apply Maryland law.
Am. Motorists
Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1304 (Md. 1995).6
6
Under this limited exception,
Maryland courts should apply the Maryland substantive
law to contracts entered into in foreign states’
jurisdictions in spite of the doctrine of lex loci
contractus when: (1) Maryland has the most significant
9
In such cases, the court is at liberty to apply Maryland law
notwithstanding the doctrine of lex loci contractus.
The renvoi
exception does not warrant an application of Maryland law to
this
matter,
however,
substantive law.
because
Virginia
would
apply
her
own
See, e.g., Black v. Powers, 628 S.E.2d 546,
554 (Va.Ct.App. 2006) (“It is a long-standing rule in Virginia
that the nature, validity and interpretation of contracts are
governed by the law of the place where the contract was made.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As a result,
Virginia law governs this coverage dispute.
b. The Policies Are Void
The
Court
grants
Aspen’s
Motion
for
Judgment
on
the
Pleadings because it is entitled to rescission of the Policy and
Bond.
Specifically,
Laroccas’
claims
in
Prosperity’s
the
failure
Application
to
identify
constitutes
a
the
material
misrepresentation, omission, or concealment that renders both
documents void.
In Virginia, “an insurer can rescind an insurance contract
for
misrepresentation
of
a
material
fact
in
applying
relationship, or, at least, a substantial relationship
with respect to the contract issue presented; and (2)
The state where the contract was entered into would
not apply its own substantive law, but instead would
apply Maryland substantive law to the issue before the
court.
Id.
10
for
insurance.”
723,
727
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Graham & Schewe, 339 F.Supp.2d
(E.D.Va.
2004)
(citation
omitted).
An
insurance
carrier who seeks to void a policy on the basis of an insured’s
alleged material omissions or misrepresentations must show by
clear
proof
“(1)
that
the
statement
or
omission
on
the
application was untrue; and (2) that the insurance company’s
reliance on the false statement or omission was material to the
company’s decision to undertake the risk and issue the policy.”
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Riddle, 587 S.E.2d 513, 515 (Va.
2003).
Moreover, in illustrating materiality, the insurer must
show that it relied upon the omission or misrepresentation when
deciding to issue the policy.
Id.
Merely offering the language
of the policy itself to support an inference of materiality is
insufficient.
Cont’l
Cas.,
339
F.Supp.2d
at
728-29
(citing
Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hunt & Calderone, P.C., 540
S.E.2d 491, 493 (Va. 2001)).
The Court holds that, as a matter
of law, Prosperity had knowledge of acts that could reasonably
be
expected
to
be
the
basis
of
a
claim
against
it
when
Prosperity completed the Application.
Aspen identifies two questions in the application to which
Prosperity
should
Questions 63 and 68.
have
identified
the
Laroccas’
The questions read as follows:
Question 63 - Does any person or entity proposed
to be insured have knowledge or information of
any
act,
error
or
omission
which
might
11
claims;
reasonably be expected to give rise to a
claim(s), suit(s), investigation(s) or action(s)
under
a
Professional
Liability
Policy,
Mortgagee’s E&O Policy and/or Fidelity Bond
Policy?
Question 68 - Have there been or are there now
pending, any claim(s), suit(s), demands for
arbitration,
or
administrative/regulatory
actions(s) [sic] (including, but not limited to,
any investigation) against any past or present
person or entity proposed for insurance under
the proposed coverage forms in connection with
mortgage
lending
products,
practices
or
activities?
(Aspen’s Answer Ex. A, at 48-49, ECF No. 18-1).
As a preliminary matter, Prosperity avers that the Policy
definitions of “claim” and “suit” do not require disclosure of
the Laroccas’ 2010 activity in response to Question 68.
Aspen,
focusing solely on the term “claim,” counters that the Policy
definition
does
Application,
not
Aspen
apply
had
not
because,
yet
at
issued
the
the
time
of
the
Policy7
and
the
Application does not state that its terms are the same as those
issued in the Policy.
Because
“claim”
is
not
defined
in
the
Application,
Court applies its ordinary and customary meaning.8
the
See Graphic
Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.W. Warthen Co., 397 S.E.2d 876, 877 (Va.
1990).
Under
this
standard,
7
a
“claim”
is
a
“demand
for
This contradicts Prosperity’s contention that it consulted
the Policy definitions when completing the Application.
(See
Prosperity’s Opp’n at 21, ECF No. 51).
8
The Court focuses solely on “claim” because it is the only
term that is in dispute.
12
something as rightful or due.”
The American Heritage Dictionary
340 (5th ed. 2011); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 281-82 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining “claim” as a “demand for money, property, or
a legal remedy to which one asserts a right”).
This plain
meaning is similar to the definition provided in the Policy.
(See Aspen’s Answer Ex. A, at 7-8).9
It
is
undisputed
participation
in
that
the
at
the
Ripkins’
time
the
settlement
Laroccas
sought
negotiations,
Laroccas had not yet filed suit against Prosperity.
the
Therefore,
the Laroccas’ attempt to engage in settlement negotiations with
Prosperity would have to be construed as a “demand” to require
Aspen’s disclosure of the activity on the Application.
interpretation
Laroccas’
is
not
settlement
determinative,
attempts
are
however,
responsive
This
because
Question
to
the
63,
which requires Prosperity to disclose “knowledge or information
of any act, error or omission which might reasonably be expected
to
give
rise
action(s).”
a
claim(s),
suit(s),
investigation(s)
or
(See Aspen’s Answer Ex. A, at 48) (emphasis added).
Virginia
prior
to
applies
knowledge,
an
“asking
objective
whether
standard
a
to
an
reasonable
insured’s
person
in
possession of the facts known to the insured, would have had a
9
In fact, the only portion of the Policy definition that
does not include the term “claim” are the first two prongs,
which define “claim” as “(1) a written demand for money or
services . . . [and] (2) a suit.” (Id.)
13
reasonable basis to know that a claim might be made.”10
Cas.,
339
F.Supp.2d
at
727
(citation
omitted).
Cont’l
Prior
to
completing the Application for insurance coverage, Prosperity
had knowledge of activity that might reasonably give rise to a
claim.
Around December 2010, Attorney Donaldson, counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Ripkin Litigation, informed Prosperity that he
acquired the Laroccas as clients and attempted to include them
in the Ripkins’ settlement discussions.
Although
Prosperity
ultimately
declined
(Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14).
to
enter
into
a
settlement agreement with the Laroccas (see Compl. ¶ 16; Aspen’s
Answer Ex. H, at 2, ECF No. 18-8), Prosperity acknowledges that
it
“first
became
aware
that
the
Laroccas
had
unspecified
mortgage-related claims against Prosperity in December 2010.”
(Aspen’s
Answer
Ex.
H,
at
3).
Therefore,
when
Prosperity
completed the Application in 2011, it not only knew that the
Laroccas alleged claims against it, but also that those claims
were unresolved.
Ergo, as a matter of law, Prosperity was aware
10
Aspen’s averment regarding the intentions of Glen
Phillips when he completed the Application is irrelevant under
this standard. This standard does not evaluate the applicant’s
intent to misstate the facts.
Conversely, courts apply a
subjective standard when the application asks that the question
be answered to the best of the applicant’s knowledge and belief.
See, e.g., Parkerson v. Fed. Home Life Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp.
1308, 1315-17 (E.D.Va. 1992) (“[W]here state of mind is at
issue, the non-moving party’s subjective state of mind must be
reasonable in light of the objective facts.”).
14
of facts that could reasonably be expected to give rise to a
claim against it.
Contrary to Prosperity’s averments, it is of no consequence
that Prosperity was unaware of the specific claims the Laroccas
had
against
related.”
it
because
it
knew
the
claims
were
“mortgage-
Moreover, Prosperity’s decision not to include the
Laroccas in the Ripkins’ settlement discussions and its belief
that the Laroccas had unsubstantiated claims are not dispositive
under the objective standard.
The only question is whether
Prosperity had possession of facts that gave it a “reasonable
basis to know that a claim might be made.”
F.Supp.2d at 727 (citation omitted).
Cont’l Cas., 339
The Court finds that, at
the time of the Application, Prosperity had a reasonable basis
to know that the Laroccas might continue to pursue their claims
despite Prosperity’s view of their validity.
Aspen’s
ability
to
void
the
Policy
and
Bond
due
to
Prosperity’s failure to identify the Laroccas’ claims in the
Application,
material
however,
to
Aspen’s
depends
upon
decision
whether
to
the
issue
omission
the
was
Policies.
Prosperity’s omission is “material” if “truthful answers would
have
reasonably
policy.”
influenced
[Aspen’s]
decision
to
issue
the
Montgomery Mut., 587 S.E.2d at 515.
Although Aspen avers that the plain language of the Policy
explicitly
makes
Prosperity’s
omission
15
and
misrepresentations
material,11
this
evidence
alone
Cas., 339 F.Supp.2d at 728-29.
Aspen
alleges
that
“had
is
insufficient.
See
Cont’l
In its Counterclaim, however,
Aspen
Specialty
known
about
the
Laroccas’ claims . . . it would not have agreed to issue the
Aspen Specialty Policy, or would not have issued the Policy on
the same terms and conditions, or for the same premium.”
Countercl. ¶ 68; see also id. ¶ 82).
answers
influenced
Aspen’s
decision
(Aspen
Therefore, Prosperity’s
to
issue
the
Policy
and
Bond.
Prosperity avers that it is not seeking coverage for the
Laroccas’ claims because it already sought coverage from Lloyd’s
in 2010.
(Prosperity’s Opp’n at 17).
indication
of
such
division
in
the
There is, however, no
pleadings.
Prosperity’s
Complaint consistently references the Laroccas’ claims with that
of the Nafisi/Iranpours and the Pfeifers.12
¶¶ 1, 34-35, 39, 43, & 54).
“each
Defendant”
is
litigation costs.
correspondence
(See, e.g., Compl.
The Complaint also alleges that
responsible
for
Prosperity’s
(See id. ¶¶ 25-26, 31-32).
between
consolidate the claims.
Aspen
and
defense
Moreover, the
Prosperity
repeatedly
(See Aspen’s Answer Exs. E-H).
11
and
Even if
The Policy states, in relevant part: “All the statements
and representations in the application are deemed to be material
to the risk assumed by the insurer, form the basis of this
policy, and are incorporated into and have become a part of this
policy.” (Aspen’s Answer Ex. A, at 30) (bold in the original).
12
Indeed, the very nature of a putative class action
lawsuit requires the claims to be interrelated.
16
the pleadings did support Prosperity’s assertion, the argument
would
still
provides
for
fail
because
rescission
the
upon
plain
the
misrepresentation or omission.
language
discovery
of
the
of
a
Policy
material
(See Aspen’s Answer Ex. A, at
30) (“Any misrepresentation, omission, concealment or incorrect
statement of a material fact, in the application or otherwise,
shall render this policy void in its entirety.”) (bold in the
original).
Accordingly, Aspen is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law
because
claims
in
Prosperity’s
the
misrepresentation,
failure
Application
omission,
or
to
identify
the
Laroccas’
a
material
constitutes
concealment
that
renders
the
Policy and Bond void.13
B.
Consolidation Motions
Also pending before the Court are Prosperity and Michelle
Mathews’ Motions to Permit Discovery from a Related Case or For
Partial Consolidation.
(ECF Nos. 56-57).
Upon consideration
of the pleadings and Aspen’s recent disposition in this case,
the Court GRANTS the Motions.
Specifically, the Court permits
Prosperity to use the discovery obtained in Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s, London v. Wells Fargo Ventures, LLC, et al., Case
No. 1:13-cv-00080-GLR, in this matter.
13
As a result, Aspen’s Motion for an Order of Interpleader
(ECF No. 35) will be denied as moot.
17
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Aspen’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 48), and DENIES AS
MOOT Aspen’s Motion for an Order of Interpleader (ECF No. 35).
Furthermore, Prosperity and Michelle Mathews’ Motions to Permit
Discovery from a Related Case or For Partial Consolidation (ECF
Nos. 56-57) are GRANTED.
A separate Order follows.
Entered this 15th day of July, 2013.
________/s/_________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
18
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?