Brown v. Johnson

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM filed. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 10/5/2012. (c/m 10/5/2012)(ko, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DONALD RAY BROWN, # 403179
Plaintiff
v.

*

BETTY JOHNSON, WARDEN
Defendant

*

* CIVIL ACTION NO. CCB-12-2055

***
MEMORANDUM
Donald Ray Brown (“Brown”), a state inmate confined at the Brockbridge Correctional
Facility (“BBCF”), filed an action on July 9, 2012, seeking release from confinement and the
provision of proper medical care. He claimed that he has major multiple health care problems,
including atrial fibrillation, dizziness, chronic kidney disease, aortic aneurisms, cataracts, severe
gum disease, and prostate complications that have not been addressed due to the failure to afford
him follow-up appointments and care. Brown further contended that his grievances have not
been responded to by authorities and his efforts to file this lawsuit were impeded by the refusal
to provide him photocopies and/or the name of the Warden. ECF No. 1.
The lawsuit was construed as a civil rights action for injunctive relief challenging
Brown’s medical care in a state prison facility. On July 11, 2012, counsel for the Maryland
Division of Corrections was ordered to file a response. On August 7, 2012, a show cause
response was filed, accompanied by more than forty pages of Brown’s medical records from
state and county facilities. ECF No. 6. On August 13, 2012, Brown filed a court-ordered motion
to proceed in forma pauperis and complaint supplement. ECF No. 8 & 9. He argued that a
physician ordered that he receive an MRI of the brain because of dizziness/balance issues and his
failure to perform adequately on other tests. ECF No. 8. Brown further claimed that he has not

received the MRI and examinations for his numerous medical problems (cardiac, dental,
prostate, gastrointestinal, and eye) as needed. (Id.). On September 4, 2012, the show cause
response was treated as a motion for summary judgment. Brown was given notice of the court’s
re-characterization of the document and the opportunity to file an opposition. ECF Nos. 12 &
13. He has done so. ECF No. 14. The case is ready for review and may be decided without oral
hearing. See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons to follow, the Warden’s court
construed motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a):
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for
granting or denying the motion.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and draw all
reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’
credibility. Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). The
court must, however, also abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.
1993)).
The record shows that Brown is a sixty-three year-old male with a complicated medical
history of chronic hypertension, hyperlipidemia, aortic aneurysm, kidney disease, and bi-polar
disorder. ECF No. 6, Ex. 1. In December 2011, while confined at the Talbot County Detention
Center, he received several blood tests, an EKG, and a CT scan of the brain. All test results were
within normal limits.

In April of 2012 he was transferred to BBCF from the Maryland

Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center (“MRDCC”). Id. at Ex. 2. He was seen by health
care personnel several times at MRDCC in April 2012, and his vital signs were normal in all
respects. Id. at Ex 1. Brown complained of blood in his urine (hematuria) and pain and swelling
of the left foot. The hematuria evaluation continued into June 2012, when it was noted that the
condition had resolved. As of July 12, 2012, when seen in the Chronic Care Clinic (“CCC”),
Brown was found to be stable and was continued on his medications. Dr. Obsu ordered various
blood and urine tests and Brown was scheduled to be seen in the CCC for follow-up care in three
months.

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Under Supreme Court law, the party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate:
(1) by a “clear showing” that, he is likely to success on the merits at trial; (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor;
and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.1 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 22-24 (2008).
The court has reviewed the aforementioned pleadings and concludes that the granting of
injunctive relief (release from confinement) is not warranted in this case.

The required

irreparable harm must be "neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent." Tucker
Anthony Realty Corp v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
Brown seeks release from confinement due to the alleged failure to provide him follow-up
testing and medical care. The court finds that he has not met his burden of establishing that he
will be irreparably harmed if such relief is not granted. The record, which Brown opines has
been filed in an incomplete manner, shows that he is subject to periodic examination in the CCC
and been prescribed medications for his conditions. The court further observes that given the
record evidence, there is no substantial likelihood that Brown could succeed on the merits of his
civil rights claims. There is no showing that he has been subjected to physical injury,2 and there

1

The previous Fourth Circuit balance-of-hardship test set out in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550
F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1997) no longer governs the grant or denial of preliminary injunctions. Rather, the standard
articulated in Winter governs the issuance of such emergency relief in this circuit. See Real Truth About Obama,
Inc. v. Federal Election Com’n, 575 F. 3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct.
2371 (2010) and reinstated in relevant part on remand, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
2
In his supplemental complaint Brown also seeks money damages. In the absence of showing physical injury, his
claim for damages may not proceed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that "[n]o federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). It is settled law that a prior
physical injury is required for a prisoner to recover damages for any emotional and mental injury. See Siglar v.
Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997).

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is no showing that BBCF Warden Johnson has been deliberately indifferent to, much less
involved in, the delivery of medical care to Brown. The wrong party has been named. No
constitutional violation has been demonstrated as to the named defendant and there is no
suggestion that others unnamed have denied Brown adequate medical care.
For these reasons, the court shall dismiss the complaint and grant the defendant’s courtconstrued motion for summary judgment. A separate Order follows.

October 5, 2012
Date

___________/s/_______
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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