Janjua v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 7/17/13. (apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

KHURRAM JANJUA
Plaintiff
v.
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER
COMPANY, et al.
Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff
v.
ABDUL RAHMAN, et al.
Third-Party Defendants

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil Action No. WMN-12-2652

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Third-Party Plaintiff’s Complaint.
motion is ripe.

ECF No. 31.

The

Upon a review of the pleadings and the

applicable law, the Court determines that no hearing is
necessary, Local Rule 105.6, and that the motion will be denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Khurram Janjua, filed suit against Cooper Tire &
Rubber Company (Cooper Tire) bringing claims for product
liability, breach of warranty, and breach of implied warranty of

merchantability.1

ECF No. 2.

The action arises from an

automobile accident that occurred on August 25, 2009, which
Plaintiff alleges caused him to suffer serious injuries.

At the

time of the accident, Plaintiff was traveling in Illinois with
Abdul Rahman.

Rahman was driving a Dodge Caravan that was owned

by his sister-in-law, Bushra Rana, who resides in Virginia.
Plaintiff alleges that the tread from the left rear tire
separated from the rest of the tire causing the vehicle to
crash.

Compl. ¶ 6.

The tire is alleged to have been

manufactured by Defendant Cooper Tire.
On January 9, 2013, Cooper Tire filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Rahman and Rana (collectively “Third-Party
Defendants”) for indemnity and contribution in the event that
Cooper Tire is found liable to Plaintiff.

ECF No. 20.

Cooper

Tire argues that if judgment is rendered in favor of Plaintiff,
then its liability was proximately caused by Rahman’s negligence
in operating the vehicle and/or Bushra’s negligence in
maintaining and servicing the vehicle.

On March 28, 2013,

Third-Party Defendants filed an Answer to the Third-Party
Complaint in which they denied liability.

ECF No. 28.

They now

move to dismiss the Third Party Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

ECF No. 31.

1

The Complaint was filed on August 7, 2012, in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, Maryland. The case was removed to this Court on September 5,
2012, based on diversity jurisdiction.

2

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to
assert the defense for lack of personal jurisdiction in the
responsive pleading, if one is required, or by motion.

“When

personal jurisdiction is properly challenged under Rule
12(b)(2), the jurisdictional question is to be resolved by the
judge, with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove
grounds for jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334
F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).

If the trial court, however,

decides the issue without an evidentiary hearing, then “the
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction.”

Id.

“In deciding whether the plaintiff has

proved a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the district
court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the
proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in the plaintiff’s
favor.”

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th

Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
“A federal court sitting in diversity has personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if (1) an applicable
state ‘long-arm’ statute confers jurisdiction and (2) the
assertion of that jurisdiction comports with the constitutional
requirement of due process.”

Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991
3

F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1993).

The Court of Appeals of

Maryland has consistently held that Maryland’s long arm statute2
is “coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set by
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.”

Beyond

Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 878 A.2d 567,
576 (Md. 2005).
merges into one.

Thus, the statutory and constitutional inquiry
Carefirst of Md., 334 F.3d at 396.

Personal

jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause to protect
“individual liberty interest” and thus, as an individual right,
this defense can be waived.

Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. V.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).

2

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(b) states a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by
an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or
service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured
products in the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by act or omission in
the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State
by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly
does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent
course of conduct in the State or derives substantial
revenue from goods, food, services or manufactured produces
used or consumed in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possess real property in the
State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any
person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or agreement
located, executed, or to be performed within the State at
the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise
provide in writing.

4

In their Motion to Dismiss, Third-Party Defendants argue
that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them because
Rahman and Rana do not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Maryland.

See Kortobi v. Kass, 978 A.2d 247, 257 (Md. 2009)

(holding that “the defendant must maintain sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction
meets the ‘general test of essential fairness’”) (citing
Miserandino v. Resort Props., Inc., 691 A.2d 208, 211 (1997)).
In opposition to the motion, Cooper Tire argues that Rahman and
Rana have waived this defense by failing to raise it in their
original answer to the complaint.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1)(B), personal
jurisdiction is waived when a party fails to include this
defense in an earlier motion according to Rule 12(g)(2) or fails
to “include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment
allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.”

Third-Party

Defendants, however, filed an Amended Answer on April 12, 2013,
asserting their personal jurisdiction defense, which was served
within 21 days of the Original Answer.

ECF No. 29, at 3.

Accordingly, the Amended Answer complied with Rule 15(a)(1)
which provides “a party may amend its pleading once as a matter
of course within 21 days after serving it.”

Thus, Third-Party

Defendants have not waived their personal jurisdiction defense
under Rule 12(h)(1)(B).
5

Cooper Tire also argues that Rahman has waived his
objection to personal jurisdiction by his involvement in a
previous suit before this Court, where he was a defendant in an
action brought by Janjua.
2272.

Janjua v. Rahman, Civ. No. WMN-11-

In an attempt to support its argument, Cooper Tire relies

on a Fourth Circuit case, Maybin v. Northside Corr. Ctr., which
held that when a party appears before the court and presents a
meritorious defense, but fails to object to lack of personal
jurisdiction, then the defense is waived. 891 F.2d 72, 74-75
(4th Cir. 1989).

Notwithstanding the factual differences of

this case and Maybin, the Fourth Circuit did not hold that a
party may waive his personal jurisdiction defense by appearing
in a previous suit that was before the same court as the current
action.

Id.

Furthermore, Rahman did not appear in the previous

action that Cooper Tire references because the action was
voluntarily dismissed by Janjua before Rahman filed an answer or
otherwise responded to the complaint.

Civ. No. WMN-11-2272, ECF

No. 5.
In addition to these waiver arguments, Cooper Tire suggests
that it is entitled to some discovery before the Court resolves
the jurisdictional issue.

In support of their motion, Third-

Party Defendants present affidavits, which state that neither
Rahman nor Rana reside in Maryland.

Cooper Tire, however,

argues that these affidavits do not address Rahman or Rana’s
6

relationship with Janjua during the time of the automobile
accident and Third-Party Defendants may have been in a
“mutually-beneficial joint venture” with Janjua at the time of
the incident. ECF No. 32 at 5.

Thus, Cooper Tire requests that

the Court reserve on its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss to
allow them an opportunity to conduct discovery.3

Third-Party

Defendants did not reply to the opposition and thus, have not
opposed Cooper Tire’s request for discovery.
“The federal courts in construing their discovery rules
have consistently held that when a defendant moves to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, either party should be allowed
discovery on the factual issues raised by that motion before any
ruling is made on the motion.”
A.2d 574, 576 (Md. 1991).

Androutsos v. Fairfax Hosp., 594

A court may grant jurisdictional

discovery to a party when the pleadings present factual
allegations that could establish the requisite contacts with
Maryland.

Mylan, 2 F.3d at 64; see also Vogel v. Boddie-Noell

Enters., Inc., No. 11-0515, 2011 WL 3665022, at *3 (D. Md. Aug.
18, 2011) (reserving on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction in order to allow the parties to
conduct discovery).

When the record is incomplete but the

3

Cooper Tire notes in its Opposition Response that Third-Party
Defendants responded to its interrogatory and production
requests on the date that its response was due.

7

pleadings contain allegations demonstrating the possibility that
a defendant may satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, the
trial court should allow the plaintiff an opportunity for
discovery before deciding the motion.

Vogel at *3.

District

courts have broad discretion in deciding discovery matters and
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is “freely
permitted.”

Mylan, 2 F.3d at 64.

Accordingly, the Court will

allow discovery to determine whether Third-Party Defendants are
subject to personal jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court will deny the
Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice, and will allow the parties
an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

A separate

order will issue.

____________/s/___________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

DATED: July 17, 2013

8