Janjua v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 6/19/14. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KHURRAM JANJUA
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Plaintiff
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v.
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COOPER TIRE & RUBBER
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COMPANY, et al.
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Defendant/Third-Party
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Civil Action No. WMN-12-2652
Plaintiff
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v.
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ABDUL RAHMAN, et al.
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Third-Party Defendants
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MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a Renewed Motion to Dismiss Third-Party
Plaintiff’s Complaint, brought by Third-Party Defendants, Abdul
Rahman and Bushra Rana.
ECF No. 44.
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (“Cooper Tire”), has opposed the
motion.
ECF No. 46.
This Court previously denied a motion to
dismiss by Third-Party Defendants in favor of Cooper Tire in
order to permit complete jurisdictional discovery.
Upon
consideration and review of the pleadings, facts, and applicable
law, the Court concludes that no hearing is necessary, Local
Rule 105.6, and Third-Party Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2012, Plaintiff Khurrum Janjua sued Cooper Tire for its
alleged role in an accident that occurred in Illinois in 2009.1
Plaintiff was one of several passengers traveling east from
Illinois in a Dodge Caravan driven by Third-Party Defendant
Abdul Rahman when the van flipped over, resulting in serious
injuries to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff advances that the accident
occurred as the result of the separation of the tread of one of
the van’s tires.
Compl. ¶ 6.
Rahman had borrowed the car from
his relative, Third-Party Defendant Bushra Rana, who had
purchased, maintained, and serviced the car in Virginia prior to
the incident.
Plaintiff claims that Cooper Tire is responsible
for manufacturing the allegedly defective tire that caused the
accident.
Compl. ¶ 6.
Cooper Tire filed a Third-Party Complaint against Rahman
and Rana (collectively referred to as “Third-Party Defendants”)
for indemnity and contribution in the event that Cooper Tire is
held liable to Plaintiff.
ECF No. 20.
Cooper Tire denies all
liability and asserts that if judgment is rendered in favor of
Plaintiff, then the accident was proximately caused by Rahman’s
negligence in operating and inspecting the vehicle and/or Rana’s
1
The Complaint was filed on August 7, 2012, in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, Maryland. The case was removed to this
Court on September 5, 2012, based on diversity jurisdiction.
2
negligence in maintaining and servicing the vehicle.
Id.
In
response, Third-Party Defendants filed an answer, ECF No. 28,
and a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
No. 31.
ECF
On July 17, 2013, the motion was denied to permit
jurisdictional discovery.
ECF Nos. 38, 39.
Following full
jurisdictional discovery, Third-Party Defendants now move again
to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
II.
ECF No. 44.
Legal Standard
A party may include a defense of improper personal
jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, as permitted under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
Once a personal
jurisdiction defense is made, it is “resolved by the judge, with
the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove grounds for
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Carefirst of
Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctr., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396
(4th Cir. 2003).
If the trial court decides the issue without
an evidentiary hearing, however, then “the plaintiff need only
make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.”
Id.
“In
deciding whether the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of
personal jurisdiction, the district court must draw all
reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all
factual disputes, in the plaintiff’s favor.”
v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993).
3
Mylan Labs., Inc.
III. Discussion
A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who is not a resident based on diversity
grounds when “(1) an applicable state long-arm statute confers
jurisdiction and (2) the assertion of that jurisdiction is
consistent with constitutional due process.”
Nichols v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1999 (4th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, a
personal jurisdiction inquiry requires both a statutory and
constitutional assessment.
Maryland’s long-arm statute provides that a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
who, directly or by agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character
of work or service in the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or
manufactured products in the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or
omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of
the State if he regularly does or solicits business,
engages in any other persistent course of conduct in
the State or derives substantial revenue from goods,
food, services, or manufactured products used or
consumed in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real
property in the State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as a surety for, or
on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation
or agreement located, executed, or to be performed
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within the State at the time the contract is made,
unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(b).
Maryland courts
have consistently indicated that Maryland’s long arm statute is
coterminous with the due process limitation on personal
jurisdiction because “it was the intent of the Legislature in
enacting the long-arm statute to expand the personal
jurisdiction of the courts to the extent permitted by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
(Md. 1977).
Mohamed v. Michael, 370 A.2d 551, 553
Thus, the statutory and constitutional inquiries
merge into one. Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396.
In order to ensure due process, an exercise of jurisdiction
must be premised on “‘minimum contacts’ with the forum, such
that to require the defendant to defend its interests in that
state ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”
Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397 (quoting
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction.
Courts
General
jurisdiction may exist over a non-resident defendant when the
contacts with the state are unrelated to the cause of action
only if the contacts are “continuous and systematic.”
Id.
For
specific jurisdiction, if the contacts with the state form the
basis of the underlying lawsuit, the court must “consider (1)
the extent to which the defendant has purposefully availed
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itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state;
(2) whether the plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities
directed at the state; and (3) whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”
Id.
(quoting ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293
F.3d 707, 711–12 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Here, Cooper Tire asserts that Third-Party Defendants are
subject to this Court’s jurisdiction under subsections (b)(2)
and (b)(4) of the Maryland long-arm statute.
It is unclear
whether Cooper Tire intends to allege specific jurisdiction
only, or also general jurisdiction.
See generally Congressional
Bank v. Potomac Educ. Foundation, Inc., No. PWG-13-889, 2014 WL
347632, at *5 & n.5 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2014) (noting that some
judges have found subsection (b)(4) to “have the attributes of
general jurisdiction” and compiling cases).
Compare
Mycosafe
Diagnostics GMBH v. Life Techs. Corp., No. DKC-12-2842, 2013 WL
145893, at *4-5 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2013) (noting that
“[s]ubsection (b)(4) has been construed by the Maryland courts
as a general jurisdiction statute”) with Metro. Reg’l Inf. Sys.
V. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 691, 698 (D.
Md. 2012) (“Establishing a ‘persistent course of conduct’ under
section 6-103(b)(4) is ‘not tantamount to establishing general
jurisdiction . . . .’” (quotations omitted)).
Regardless of the
type of jurisdiction asserted, however, the Court nonetheless
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finds Third-Party Defendants’ contacts with the state of
Maryland insufficient to warrant exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
See Kortobi v. Kass, 978 A.2d 247, 257 (Md. 2009)
(noting that “the defendant must maintain sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction
meets the ‘general test of essential fairness’”) (citing
Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props., LP, 895 A.2d 1005,
1022 (Md. 2006)).
A. Third-Party Defendant Abdul Rahman Does Not Have Sufficient
Minimum Contacts with Maryland
Third-Party Defendant Rahman is a resident of California.
Prior to the accident he resided in New York, Illinois, and the
island of St. Kitts.
There is nothing in the record to suggest
that Rahman lived in Maryland prior to the accident.
Dep. 6:15-10:11, Oct. 24, 2013, ECF No. 44.
Rahman
Following the
accident, Rahman traveled a great deal in order to obtain work.
In fact, he lived in a friend’s apartment in Rockville, Maryland
for approximately six months from late 2009 to 2010, and applied
for employment in Maryland during that time.
Id.
Following the
initiation of this action, Rahman settled with Plaintiff Janjua
in a release tendered in Maryland, relinquishing him of any
liability in exchange for a settlement.
2012, ECF No. 46-6.
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Janjua Release, Feb. 7,
Cooper Tire argues that jurisdiction is permitted over
Rahman under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(b)(4).
Section 6-103(b)(4) provides that a state may exercise specific
jurisdiction over a person who commits an out-of-state act
causing tortious injury if he “regularly does or solicits
business, [or] engages in any other persistent course of conduct
in the State . . . .”
In support, Cooper Tire cites Rahman’s
temporary stay in Maryland following the accident, noting that
he purchased groceries, applied to one job, and “conduct[ed]
day-to-day business in Maryland” during that time.
at 7.
ECF No. 46
Additionally, Cooper Tire argues that Rahman’s settlement
agreement initiated with Plaintiff in Maryland adds to his
persistent course of conduct in the State.
Id.
As a preliminary matter, “[w]hether general or specific
jurisdiction is sought, a defendant's ‘contacts’ with a forum
state are measured as of the time the claim arose.”
Duquesne Univ., 897 F. Supp. 920, 923 (D. Md. 1995).
Hardnett v.
See also
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d
911, 913 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Only contacts occurring prior to the
event causing the litigation may be considered.”).
Here, it is
undisputed that the accident occurred in Illinois on August 25,
2009.
Therefore, it is irrelevant to the minimum contacts
analysis that Rahman later resided in Maryland.
Cooper Tire
also cites the release executed by Plaintiff dropping all claims
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against both Rahman and Rana.
Although the settlement required
court appearances and resulted in a contract implemented in
Maryland, because the release was negotiated and signed on
February 7, 2012 — over two years after the accident — the
settlement cannot serve as a contact for jurisdictional
purposes.
See Janjua Release, ECF No. 46-6.
While Rahman may have committed an out-of-state act by
driving the van and participating in the accident, there is no
basis to conclude that he even occasionally conducted or
solicited business, or engaged in any course of conduct in
Maryland at the time the accident occurred.
Before the
accident, Rahman had never worked, engaged in business, or
traveled in Maryland.
vehicle there.
He neither owned real property nor a
Rahman Dep. 61:2-63:7.
Cooper Tire does not
point to anything else in the record to support its argument
that Rahman has minimum contacts with the State.
Thus, the
record confirms that there is no basis for jurisdiction under
Subsection (b)(4) of Maryland’s long arm-statute.
Alternatively, Cooper Tire argues this Court may exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6103(b)(2), which permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who “contracts to supply goods, services, or
manufactured products in the state.”
Cooper Tire proposes that
Rahman was participating in a joint venture with the Plaintiff
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to transport him to Maryland in exchange for payment in the form
of gas money, and as such Rahman contracted to perform a service
in the state of Maryland.
Both Rahman and the Plaintiff deny
that any exchange of money occurred and contend the agreement
was not a venture, but rather a travel plan resulting from an
informal conversation amongst friends.
43:1-3, Aug. 21, 2013, ECF No. 46;
Khurrum Janjua Dep.
Rahman Dep. 34:21-23.
The Fourth Circuit has held that mere arrangement of
transportation is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant.
O’Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co.,
537 F.2d 1266, 1268 (4th Cir. 1976).
In O’Neal, the plaintiff
attempted to bring a personal injury lawsuit against a brokerage
company, Hicks, in South Carolina.
The suit arose from a
trucking accident that took place in North Carolina between
O’Neal and a truck hired by Hicks to transport cotton.
maintained a principal place of business in Mississippi.
Hicks
Id.
The plaintiff argued that the transactions conducted in
Mississippi by Hicks that ordered the transportation of goods in
South Carolina were sufficient to establish minimum contacts
with South Carolina.
Id.
The court disagreed, ruling that no
personal jurisdiction existed in South Carolina because “Hicks
has never operated or established its presence in South
Carolina.”
Id.
It noted that the “sole thread linking Hicks to
South Carolina [was] arranging for the transportation of cotton
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to South Carolina” and thus, the contacts were too attenuated.
Id.
Likewise here, the only thing connecting Rahman to Maryland
is the alleged one time agreement to transport Janjua to
Maryland.
Rahman is not a Maryland resident and the accident
occurred in Illinois.
Something more is required to permit a
state to reach out to a non-resident defendant.
The supposed
venture is too tenuous to permit this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over Rahman.
B. Third-Party Defendant Bushra Rana Does Not Have Sufficient
Minimum Contacts
Bushra Rana, the owner of the vehicle, has been a resident
of Virginia for over a decade, “which includes the entire time
that [she] owned the van that was involved in the underlying
accident in Illinois.”
Rana Aff. 1., May 10, 2013, ECF No. 44.
She works as a medical physicist consultant for Team Net Medical
LLC, which maintains a principal place of business in Virginia.
The company provides services to local hospitals and has never
done any business in Maryland.
2013, ECF No. 44.
Rana Dep. 13:20-16:8, Aug. 20,
Rana has never owned property, solicited
business, or vacationed in Maryland.
Rana Dep. 86:15-88:8.
Prior to the accident, Rana estimates that she drove through
Maryland to travel to New York roughly twice a year.
81:19-82:1.
Rana Dep.
Beginning in 2010, she engaged in more frequent
travel to New York through Maryland, but never conducted any
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routine travel through Maryland before that time.
79:17-81:19.
Rana Dep.
Following the accident, she received a series of
medical treatments from Johns Hopkins medical facility in
Baltimore, Maryland beginning in 2012.
Rana Dep. 83:13-86:11.
Additionally in 2012, she entered into a release agreement with
Plaintiff executed in Maryland.
ECF No. 46.
Finally, she
visited Third-Party Defendant Rahman once during the time he was
residing in Maryland following the accident.
Rana Dep. 82:10-
17.
Cooper Tire contends that Third-Party Defendant Rana’s
contacts with Maryland satisfy Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 6-103(b)(4) because her contacts constitute a regular or
persistent course of conduct or business in Maryland.
As noted
supra, the Court may only consider contacts existing at the time
of the accident.
See Hardnett v. Duquesne Univ., 897 F. Supp.
820, 923 (D. Md. 1995).
Therefore, as stated above, Rana’s
participation with Abdul Rahman in the settlement agreement with
the Plaintiff in Maryland is irrelevant.
Similarly, her
numerous visits to obtain medical treatment from Johns Hopkins
cannot be considered.
Rana did not receive her first of the
series of approximately a dozen treatments until the fall of
2012.
Similarly, the Court cannot consider travel through
Maryland that occurred after the accident in 2009.
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The only contacts Cooper Tire cites that occurred prior to
the accident are Rana’s infrequent trips passing through
Maryland on her way to New York.
It is well-established that
driving through a state cannot constitute minimum contacts to
permit personal jurisdiction.
4A C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure 3D § 1069.5, pp. 205 (1977) (citing Witt
v. Scully, 539 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Spasmodic trips to
Pennsylvania by the defendant nonresident... do not constitute
‘doing business’ with Pennsylvania for the purposes of the
Pennsylvania long-arm statute so as to confer jurisdiction.”).
As such, Rana’s proximity to Baltimore and occasional trips on
the interstate through Maryland are insufficient to allow this
Court to exert jurisdiction over her.
IV.
Conclusion
It is well established that “it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.”
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
The
Third-Party Defendants’ actions in this case do not amount to
adequate, purposeful acts to enjoy the benefits provided by the
state of Maryland.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the
Court cannot find that the Third-Party Defendants have created
minimum contacts with the state of Maryland so as to permit the
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exercise of personal jurisdiction.
As a result, because the
contacts in this case are too attenuated to establish
jurisdiction, “the fairness required by due process would be
abrogated” if the Court permitted jurisdiction in this case.
O’Neal, 537 F.2d at 1268.
For the above stated reasons, the Court will grant the
Renewed Motion to Dismiss.
A separate Order shall issue.
______________/s/__________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge
DATED: June 19, 2014
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