Turner et al v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 1/18/13. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SHERRI A. TURNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

v.

:
Civil Action No. GLR-12-2895

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
et al.,

:
:

Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’, JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), Howard N. Bierman, Jacob Geesing,
Carrie

M.

Ward,

and

Ralph

Dipietro

(collectively

“Substitute

Trustees”), Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’, Sherri A. Turner and
Michelle Turner-Goldsmith, Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(ECF Nos. 7, 10).

In

their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek monetary relief for the damages
they

suffered

as

a

result

of

Defendants’

alleged

wrongful

eviction of Plaintiffs from their residence.
The issues have been fully briefed and the Motions are ripe
for disposition.

No hearing is necessary pursuant to Local Rule

105.6 (D.Md. 2011).

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss will be granted.

BACKGROUND1

I.

In June 2008, Plaintiffs resided at 1033 Dulaney Mill Drive
in

Frederick,

Maryland

(the

“Property”).

At

that

time,

Plaintiffs were the tenants of then-owners Amarjeet and Benjaree
Talwar

(the

“Talwars”).

The

Talwars

borrowed

$380,000

from

Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (“WaMu”) to purchase the property,
but later defaulted on their obligation.

On October 10, 2007,

WaMu, by and through the Defendant Substitute Trustees, filed a
foreclosure proceeding against the Property in the Circuit Court
for Frederick County (“Circuit Court”).
After successfully acquiring the Property at a foreclosure
sale, WaMu, by and through its counsel The Fisher Law Group,
PLLC, filed a motion for judgment of possession of the Property
on January 24, 2008.

The Circuit Court granted the motion on

February 5, 2008, but, due to various motions contesting the
Circuit Court’s ruling, Plaintiffs were not evicted from the
Property

until

concerned

June

whether

WaMu

possession motion.
Appeals

of

12,

Maryland

2008.

The

properly

crux

served

of

the

Plaintiffs

controversy
with

the

On August 25, 2009, the Court of Special
(“Court

of

1

Special

Appeals”)

issued

an

Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section are
taken from the Complaint, and the unreported Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland opinion attached to the Complaint as Exhibit
1. (See ECF No. 2). The facts of the Complaint are accepted as
true for the purpose of these Motions.
2

opinion deeming the Plaintiffs’ eviction unlawful.

(See Compl.

Ex. 1).
On

August

Defendants2

in

23,
the

2012,

Circuit

Plaintiffs
Court

filed

requesting

suit

against

compensatory

punitive damages resulting from the June 2008 eviction.

and

Chase

removed the action to this Court on September 28, 2012, based
upon diversity jurisdiction.

Chase and the Substitute Trustees

filed their Motions to Dismiss on October 4, and October 11,
2012, respectively.
Motion

to

Remand

On October 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a
and

a

Motion

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

to

Stay

Consideration

(See ECF Nos. 15-16).

of
The

Court granted the Motion to Stay on October 23, 2012, and, on
December

4,

2012,

Motion to Remand.

issued

a

Letter

Order

(See ECF Nos. 19, 24).

denying

Plaintiffs’

In that Letter Order,

the Court found that the Substitute Trustees were fraudulently
joined

and

instructed

Plaintiffs

to

respond

to

the

pending

Motions to Dismiss within fourteen days of the Order.
Chase’s Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed, but Plaintiffs
did not file a response to the Substitute Trustees’ Motion in
light of the Court’s ruling that Plaintiffs had no possibility

2

On September 25, 2008, Chase purchased certain WaMu assets
after the Office of Thrift Supervision closed WaMu and the FDIC
was appointed receiver. (See Def. Chase’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2,
ECF No. 2-1).
As a result, Plaintiffs identify Chase as the
proper defendant in this matter because, according to them,
Chase is “the successor in interest to [WaMu].” (Compl. ¶ 5).
3

of recovery against them.

(See Pls.’ Opp’n to Def. Chase’s Mot.

to Dismiss at 1 n.1, ECF No. 25).

As a result, this Memorandum

Opinion will focus primarily on Chase’s Motion to Dismiss.3
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
To

survive

a

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6)

motion, the complaint must allege facts that, when accepted as
true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009)

(quoting

Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

A claim is plausible on its face when

“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice and
are

not

entitled

to

the

assumption

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

of

truth.

Id.

(citing

Thus, the Court “must determine

whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the
complaint

are

enough

speculative level.”

to

raise

a

right

to

relief

above

the

Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d

380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261,
266 (4th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3

The Substitute Trustees’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10)
will be granted based upon the Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’
Motion to Remand.
4

In determining whether to dismiss, the Court must examine
the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in
the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Lambeth v. Bd. of

Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005);
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994).
B.

Analysis
Chase propounds three arguments in support of its Motion to

Dismiss:
statute

(1) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the three-year
of

limitations;

(2)

Chase,

as

the

purchaser

of

a

corporation’s assets, is not liable for WaMu’s liabilities; and
(3) Plaintiffs failed to present facts that establish a claim
against Chase.

Because the Motion will be granted on statute of

limitations grounds, the Court will not address the remaining
arguments.
Under Maryland law, “[a] civil action at law shall be filed
within three years from the date it accrues,” unless another
section of the Code provides otherwise.
Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (West 2012).

Md. Code Ann., Cts. &

Neither party disputes the fact

that the applicable statute of limitations in this matter is
three years.

The parties do dispute, however, when the cause of

action accrued.
Chase avers that the action accrued when Plaintiffs gained
knowledge of the facts needed to support their wrongful eviction
5

claim.

Therefore, according to Chase, Plaintiffs gained the

requisite

knowledge

on

the

June

12,

2008

eviction

date.

Plaintiffs, relying upon James v. Weisheit, 367 A.2d 482 (Md.
1977), counter that the action did not accrue until they knew
that

the

eviction

was

wrongful.

Namely,

when

the

Special Appeals issued its August 25, 2009 opinion.

Court

of

The Court

finds that Plaintiffs’ wrongful eviction action accrued on the
date of their eviction.
The question of accrual is a judicial determination that
may

be

based

on

fact,

law,

or

a

combination

of

the

Poffenberger v. Risser, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (Md. 1981).

two.

Maryland

courts have adopted the discovery rule as a means of determining
when a claim begins to accrue for purposes of the statute of
limitations.

The

discovery

rule

“tolls

the

accrual

of

the

limitations period until the time the plaintiff discovers, or
through the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered,
the injury.”

Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 756

A.2d 963, 973 (Md. 2000).

In other words, “limitations begin to

run when a plaintiff gains knowledge sufficient to prompt a
reasonable

person

to

inquire

further.”

Pennwalt

Corp.

v.

Nasios, 550 A.2d 1155, 1163 (Md. 1988).
As Chase correctly notes, in determining the accrual date,
Maryland courts question whether plaintiffs gained knowledge of
the facts necessary to support all elements of their claim.
6

See

Kumar v. Dhanda, 43 A.3d 1029, 1034 (Md. 2012) (stating the law
is concerned “with accrual in the sense of testing whether all
of the elements of a cause of action have occurred so that it is
complete.”); Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Halle Dev., Inc., 971 A.2d
214, 229 (Md. 2009) (“We agree that notice of facts, and not the
law,

is

the

period.”).

trigger

for

Moreover,

commencement

even

the

case

of

the

limitations

Plaintiff

relies

upon

conducts an inquiry into whether the plaintiff had knowledge of
the facts necessary to prove all elements of a deceit claim.
See

James,

367

A.2d

at

484.

Therefore,

the

statute

of

limitations began to accrue when Plaintiffs gained knowledge of
all the facts necessary to prove their wrongful eviction claim.
In Maryland, a wrongful eviction “occurs when the person
recovering the property had no right to dispossess the other
party

from

the

property.”

BTR

Hampstead,

LLC

v.

Source

Interlink Distribution, LLC, 5 A.3d 142, 152 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.
2010).
support

Plaintiffs
a

eviction.

wrongful

had

knowledge

eviction

claim

of

all

upon

facts

their

necessary

June

12,

to

2008

Specifically, at the time of eviction, Plaintiffs

knew, and/or believed, that WaMu had no right to dispossess them
of the rental property.

This finding is supported by the fact

that Plaintiffs immediately sought legal action to reverse the
Circuit Court’s grant of WaMu’s possession motion.
Plaintiffs

concede

in

their

Opposition
7

to

Chase’s

Moreover,
Motion

to

Dismiss that they had a belief, and asserted in court, that the
eviction was wrongful.4

(See Pls.’ Opp’n to Def. Chase’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 2).
Plaintiffs filed their wrongful eviction action on August
23, 2012.

The three-year statute of limitations on Plaintiffs’

claim began to accrue on June 12, 2008; the date Plaintiffs
gained knowledge of the eviction and believed it to be unlawful.
Consequently,

Plaintiffs

had

until

June

2011

to

file

their

claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

stated

above,

Dismiss (ECF Nos. 7, 10) are GRANTED.
hereby DISMISSED as time barred.
this case.

Defendants’

Motions

to

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is

The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE

A separate Order follows.

Entered this 18th day of January, 2013

__________/s/_______________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

4

Plaintiffs’ contention that they could have been penalized
for filing a “frivolous lawsuit in contempt of the ruling by the
Circuit Court for Frederick County” (Id.) is contradicted by the
successful appeal of the Circuit Court’s ruling.
8