Anderson v. Astrue

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/18/13. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

September 18, 2013
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

David Anderson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-12-3423

Dear Counsel:
On November 21, 2012, the Plaintiff, David Anderson, petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for supplemental security
income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment. (ECF Nos. 15, 19). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by substantial
evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
Under that standard, I will deny both motions and remand this case for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. This letter explains my rationale.
Mr. Anderson filed his claim for SSI on September 28, 2009, alleging disability
beginning September 17, 2009. (Tr. 123–30). His claim was denied initially on January 14,
2010 and on reconsideration on June 17, 2010. (Tr. 67–69, 71–72). A hearing was held on
March 2, 2011 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 25–62). The ALJ concluded
that Mr. Anderson was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 8–24).
The Appeals Council denied Mr. Anderson’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision
the final, reviewable decision of the agency. (Tr. 1–5).
The ALJ found that Mr. Anderson suffered from severe impairments including
hypertension, degenerative disc and joint disease, obesity, unspecified leg pain, substance abuse,
mood disorder not otherwise specific, and histories of sagittal sinus thrombosis, deep vein
thrombosis, and pulmonary emboli. (Tr. 13). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined
that Mr. Anderson retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform light unskilled work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except that the
claimant should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and only occasionally
engage in other postural activities, and should not be exposed to hazards.
(Tr. 15). The ALJ considered the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) and determined that
Mr. Anderson is capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy, and that therefore, he is not disabled. (Tr. 18–19).
On appeal, Mr. Anderson argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the evaluation of
a psychologist, Dr. Anderson, who concluded that Mr. Anderson’s mental impairments were
disabling. As part of his argument, Mr. Anderson takes issue with several steps in the ALJ’s

David Anderson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-12-3423
September 18, 2013
Page 2

reasoning. Mr. Anderson argues that the ALJ’s reasoning was internally inconsistent because he
rejected Dr. Anderson’s findings “based on the supposition that Anderson was doing skilled
work up to 2009, [y]et the ALJ also found that Anderson was limited to unskilled work.” Pl’s.
Mot. 6. Mr. Anderson also contends that the ALJ’s assessment of his mental impairments was
“uncertain” because the ALJ found that he suffered moderate difficulties in social functioning,
but only included a limitation to unskilled work in the RFC finding. (Tr. 54–55); Pl.’s Mot. 5. I
find that the ALJ properly weighed Dr. Anderson’s psychological evaluation. However, the ALJ
did not adequately explain his rationale in evaluating Mr. Anderson’s mental impairments. As a
result, the case will be remanded for further proceedings.
The only opinion in the record devoted solely to the subject of Mr. Anderson’s alleged
mental impairments is the psychological evaluation of Dr. Anderson. Dr. Anderson diagnosed
mood disorder, vascular dementia, and an extremely low level of intellectual functioning, based
upon Mr. Anderson’s performance on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. (Tr. 476–81). Mr.
Anderson also scored 40 on the Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”). However, the ALJ
did not find Mr. Anderson’s claim of significant cognitive decline to be credible, thus he
afforded little weight to Dr. Anderson’s evaluation.
First, the ALJ noted that Mr. Anderson had performed skilled work as a bartender and
roofer from 2004-2009, despite Mr. Anderson’s alleged cognitive impairments beginning in
2002. The ALJ also determined that the results of Mr. Anderson’s intellectual functioning tests
showed poor performance across the board, indicating that there was no particular decline in one
area. (Tr. 14). Mr. Anderson also failed to seek treatment for his alleged mood disorder, thus,
there was insufficient medical evidence supporting mental limitations of a chronic nature. (Tr.
14). The ALJ also gave “little weight” to Mr. Anderson’s GAF score, finding that it represented
only a “snapshot of the claimant’s functioning rather than a longitudinal assessment.” (Tr. 14–
15). Moreover, “a GAF score is not determinative of whether a person is disabled. Rather, the
Social Security Administration does not endorse the use of the GAF in Social Security and SSI
disability programs, and it does not directly correlate to the severity requirements in the mental
disorders listings.” Melgarejo v. Astrue, No. JKS-08-3140, 2009 WL 5030706, at *2 (D. Md.
Dec. 15, 2009) (citing Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic
Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764–65 (Aug. 21, 2000)).
The ALJ also noted several inconsistencies between Mr. Anderson’s representations to
Dr. Anderson and the agency during his pursuit of benefits, and Mr. Anderson’s representations
to other doctors when seeking medical treatment. (Tr. 15). Dr. Anderson reported that Mr.
Anderson did not smoke, use drugs, or drink more than socially. (Tr. 478). Indeed, in Mr.
Anderson’s hearing before the ALJ, he denied ever smoking or using drugs, but did admit to
drinking about twice a week. (Tr. 41–42). In several of Mr. Anderson’s medical records,
however, he reported marijuana use, illegal purchase of Percocets, and heavy drinking. (Tr. 212,
250, 266, 269, 340, 354, 361, 453). Dr. Anderson diagnosed Mr. Anderson with mood disorder;
however, Mr. Anderson testified before the ALJ that he enjoys bartending because he likes
“talking to people.” (Tr. 46).

David Anderson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-12-3423
September 18, 2013
Page 3

Considering the factors for evaluating medical opinions provided in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c), I find that the ALJ afforded Dr. Anderson’s medical opinion proper weight. Dr.
Anderson evaluated Mr. Anderson only once, and the ALJ had concerns about Mr. Anderson’s
credibility in that evaluation, noting that Mr. Anderson’s reporting to Dr. Anderson was “far
more pessimistic about mental health and less than fully accurate.” (Tr. 15). I also disagree with
Mr. Anderson’s contention that the ALJ’s decision was internally inconsistent. The mere fact
that the ALJ determined that Mr. Anderson’s prior work as a bartender and roofer required skill
does not preclude him from finding that Mr. Anderson is capable of only unskilled work since
September 28, 2009.
However, the ALJ failed in his duty of explanation with respect to the RFC, which
contains no mental restriction other than “unskilled work.” In making a mental impairment
assessment, the ALJ is required to rate the degree of functional limitation in four areas: activities
of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of
decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c). These ratings are performed on a five-point scale of:
none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. Id. In conclusory fashion, the ALJ determined that
Mr. Anderson had: (1) mild restriction in activities of daily living; (2) mild difficulties in
concentration, persistence, or pace; (3) moderate difficulties in social functioning; and (4) no
episodes of decompensation of an extended duration. (Tr. 15). However, the ALJ failed to cite
to any specific evidence, medical or otherwise, to support his conclusions. Specifically, it is not
clear from the ALJ’s opinion what medical evidence the ALJ relied on to reach a finding of
moderate difficulty in social functioning. Without knowing the basis of the moderate difficulty
finding, I cannot evaluate whether or not a limitation pertaining to social functioning was
required in the RFC. In addition to the lack of explanation in the application of the special
technique, the ALJ provided no express reasoning relating to social functioning in his RFC
determination. This Court will not speculate as to the ALJ’s reasoning. Remand is appropriate
so that the ALJ can provide substantial evidence to support his conclusions. In so finding, I
express no opinion as to whether the ALJ’s ultimate determination that Mr. Anderson is not
entitled to benefits is correct or incorrect.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15)
and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) will be DENIED. The
ALJ’s opinion will be VACATED and the case will be REMANDED for further proceedings.
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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