Stevenson v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/10/13. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHAKOOR STEVENSON

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Civil No. – JFM-12-3797
Criminal No. JFM-08-036

MEMORANDUM

Shakoor Stevenson has filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Government has
filed a response. Stevenson has not filed a reply.
The petition will be denied. The reasons for the denial can be set forth summarily.
1. Claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The record belies any claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness in several respects. First, the
superseding indictment and the criminal information filed after the original indictment contain
charges that stemmed from events that occurred on a date different from the charges in the
original indictment. Second, there is no evidence in the record that the Government filed the
new charges because of a successful appeal by Stevenson on a different charge. See United
States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 306, 314 (4th Cir. 2001). Third, the lack of any vindictiveness is
established by the fact that the Government permitted defendant to plead guilty to the charge
contained in the criminal information (which exposed him to less time than the charge contained
in the superseding indictment. Moreover, the record reveals that Stevenson was permitted to
appeal (unsuccessfully) the sentence imposed by this court.

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2. Claim of violation of speedy trial rights.
Likewise, there was no violation of Stevenson’s speedy trial rights. Although there was a
two-year delay between the time that Stevenson was arraigned on the original indictment and the
return of the superseding indictment, this delay was explained entirely by the fact that plea
negotiations were underway pursuant to which Stevenson was attempting to obtain as favorable a
disposition as possible. Furthermore, Stevenson suffered no prejudice because he received
concurrent sentences on the charges to which he pled guilty and these charges stemmed from
separate incidents. Thus, even if the original indictment had been dismissed on speedy trial
grounds, Stevenson could have been prosecuted on the charge to which he pled guilty made in
the criminal information. Accordingly, it is clear that he suffered no prejudice. See generally
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).1

Date: April 10, 2013

/s/
J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge

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To the extent that Stevenson claims that his counsel was ineffective in not raising any speedy
trial issue, the facts that Stevenson’s counsel successfully negotiated a plea under which
Stevenson received concurrent sentences and that, as explained in the text, no speedy trial issue
was presented, demonstrate that his counsel clearly was not ineffective.
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