In the Matter of v. Dominguez
Filing
6
OPINION from Court of Appeal of Maryland stating reasons for disbarment. (sls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 47
September Term, 2011
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
DENESE DOMINGUEZ
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
11.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: July 3, 2012
~
Denese Dominguez, Respondent, was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 17,
2008. On October 24,2011, the Attorney Grievance Commission ("Bar Counsel"), acting
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751 (a), I filed a "Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action"
against Dominguez, which incorporated three complaints. The first complaint was filed by
Ms. Antonia
K. Fasanelli
regarding Dominguez's
Representation Project ("Project").
~ork
at the Homeless
Persons
The second and third complaints were related to
Dominguez's representation of Wanda Suter in a wrongful termination action against her
former employer, A.L. Goodies General Store.
With respect to the complaint regarding Dominguez's work at the Project, Bar Counsel
alleged that Dominguez violated Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1
(Competence),
2
.~
Rule 16-751 (a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1)
Upon approval or direction of Commission. Upon approval or
direction of the [Attorney Grievance] Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the
Court of Appeals.
2
Rule 1.1 provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
The relevant language of the Rules of Professional Conduct quoted throughout this opinion
remains unchanged since 2009, when the actions in this case began to take place.
------------------------------
1.3 (Diligence),3 1.4 (Communication),4 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation),5
8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters),
3
6
Rule 1.3 provides:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.
4
Rule 1.4 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined
in Rule I.O(t), is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
and
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
Rule 1.16 provides, in relevant part:
(d) Upon termination of representation, a la\;vyershall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property
to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.
The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.
6
Rule 8.1 states, in pertinent part:
(continued ...)
2
and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconductf by failing to complete and file expungement petitions
on behalf of clients assigned to her, failing to terminate her representation of those clients and
to return their records to the Project, failing to communicate with those clients, and by
attempting to mislead Bar Counsel by stating that she had not been assigned a client, when,
in fact, she knew that the client had been assigned to her. With respect to Dominguez's
representation of Ms. Suter, Bar Counsel alleged that Dominguez violated Maryland Lawyers'
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(a) and (d) by failing to respond properly
to discovery requests in an employment suit she initiated on Ms. Suter's behalf, even after
6(... continued)
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
***
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the'matter, or knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an
admissions or disciplinary authority', except that this Rule does
not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
7
Rule 8.4 provides, in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct ... or do so through the acts of another;
***
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice(.]
3
,
repeated orders from the Circuit Court, which resulted in an award of attorneys' fees against
Ms. Suter; incorrectly informing Ms. Suter that she need not attend a hearing, which resulted
in a Show Cause Order requiring Ms. Suter to show cause as to why her case should not have
been dismissed with prejudice for Dominguez's failure to appear in court; and failing to
appear in court on behalf of Ms. Suter at a subsequent hearing. In an Order dated November
2, 2011, this Court referred the three complaints, which had been consolidated into one
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action by Bar Counsel, to Judge Paul A. Hackner of the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for a hearing, pursuant to Rule 16-757.8
8
Rule 16-757 provides:
(a) Generally. The hearing of a disciplinary or remedial action
is governed by the rules of evidence and procedure applicable to
a court trial in a civil action tried in a circuit court. Unless
extended by the Court of Appeals, the hearing shall be
completed within 120 days after service on the respondent of the
order designating ajudge. Before the conclusion of the hearing,
the judge may permit any complainant to testify, subject to
cross-examination,
regarding the effect of the alleged
misconduct. A respondent attorney may offer, or the judge may
inquire regarding, evidence otherwise admissible of any
remedial action undertaken relevant to the allegations. Bar
Counsel may respond to any evidence of remedial action.
(b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving
the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.
A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of
mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense
or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
(continued ...)
4
Dominguez was personally served with a Petition for Disciplinary
as well as this Court's
Documents,
Order, Writ of Summons, Interrogatories,
and a Request for Admission
or Remedial Action,
Request for Production
of Facts and Genuineness
of Documents.
of
She did
not file an Answer within fifteen days. An order of default was entered against her. A notice
of the default order was mailed to her, as well as a notice of an evidentiary hearing to be held
on February
28,2012.
Dominguez
did not move to vacate the default order and failed to
appear at the February 28 hearing.
Dominguez
failed to appear at oral argument before this court. Immediately
after oral
argument, a Per Curiam Order disbarring Dominguez was entered on May 8, 2012. The Order
stated:
F or reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it
is this 8th day May, 2012,
ORD ERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the
respondent, Denese Dominguez, be, and she is hereby, disbarred,
effective immediately, from the further practice of law in the
State of Maryland; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall strike the
8(... continued)
statement shall be promptly transcribed.
Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the writte~ or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
(d) Transcript. The petitioner shall cause a transcript of the
hearing to be prepared and included in the record.
(e) Transmittal of record. Unless a different time is ordered by
the Court of Appeals, the clerk shall transmit the record to the
Court of Appeals within 15 days after the statement of findings
and conclusions is filed.
5
name of Denese Dominguez from the register of attorneys, and
pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-760( e), shall certify that fact to the
Trustees of the Client Protection Fund and the clerks of all
judicial tribunals in the State; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent shall pay all costs as taxed by
the Clerk of this Court, including the costs of all transcripts,
.pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-761 (b), for which sum judgment
is entered in favor of the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland against Denese Dominguez.
We shall now explain the reasons for Dominguez's disbarment.
After hearing-evidence presented by Bar Counsel, Judge Hackner issued the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:9
Findings of Fact
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 17,
2008. Respondent maintained a virtual office at 400 East Pratt
Street, Suite 800 Baltimore, MD 21211 until sometime in 2011,
when she no longer utilized the facility. Respondent most
recently maintained a law office in her home located at 8552
o 'Keefe Drive Severn, Maryland ,21144.
Respondent's Misconduct Related to the Homeless Persons
Representation Project
Sometime in June 2006, Respondent began to serve as a
volunteer attorney for the Homeless Persons Representation
Project, (HPRP). HPRP staff members assigned the Respondent
the duty of completing expungement petitions pro bono on behalf
of several homeless persons. The expungement filings were time
sensitive matters since homeless persons commonly encounter
law enforcement officials during their daily routines.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain a typographical error
in which Rule 16-736(d), relating to the approval ofa Conditional Diversion Agreement
by the Attorney Grievance Commission, is referred to as Rule 16-731 (d), which governs
the length of time of Bar Counsel has to complete its investigations.
9
6
At the November 2009 HPRP attorneys' meeting,
Respondent appeared without her clients' files and requested
permission to send her prepared expungement petitions to HPRP
prior to the December 2009 attorneys' meeting.
By December 2009, HPRP had not received the completed
expungement petitions that Respondent had promised to submit
at the November attorneys' meeting.
On December 15, 2009, Respondent and HPRP client,
George A. Lee, both signed an HPRP retainer agreement and Mr.
Lee's expungement petition.
On June 29, 2010, Antonia Fasanelli, HPRP Executive
Director filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance
Commission. On August 12, 2010, Respondent provided a
response to Ms. Fasanelli's complaint and denied that George
Lee was her client. On October 6, 2010, Sterling Fletcher,
Commission Investigator, retrieved Respondent's HPRP files,
including Mr. Lee's file, during Mr. Fletcher's interview with
Respondent. On' January 24, 2011, the Respondent entered into
a Conditional Diversion Agreement with the supervision of a law
practice monitor.
Shortly after the Conditional Diversion
Agreement was signed, Respondent failed to communicate with
both her law practice monitor and Bar Counsel.
Revocation of Respondent's Conditional Diversion Agreement
On January 24, 2011, the Attorney Grievance Commission
approved a Conditional Diversion Agreement between Bar
Counsel and Respondent, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-731 (d).
By signing the Agreement, Respondent acknowledged engaging
in professional misconduct that violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a),
1.16(d), and 8A(d) of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct in relation to her representation.
In the Conditional Diversion Agreement, the Respondent
acknowledges that she failed to act with reasonable diligence in
representing clients at HPRP where the Respondent served as a
volunteer attorney. Respondent also failed to respond to Ms.
Fasanelli's requests for client files, and to communicate with her
clients or terminate her relationship with her HPRP clients.
Under the Conditional Diversion Agreement, Respondent
agreed to a course of remedial action that required her
compliance with the terms of the Agreement, including the
7
•
monitoring of her practice by a law practice monitor, expressly
conditioned on Respondent ~ot engaging in any further conduct
that would constitute professional misconduct.
During the pendency of the Conditional Diversion
Agreement, Bar Counsel received two (2) related grievance
complaints alleging additional misconduct by Respondent in
connection with her representation of Wanda Suter.
The Respondent failed in a material way to comply with
the conditions of the Conditional Diversion Agreement.
On or about June 2, 2011, Bar Counsel filed a Petition to
Revoke Conditional Diversion Agreement pursuant to Maryland
Rule 16-736(f)(2). The respondent did not file a written response
to the petition.
On July 28, 2011, Bar Counsel received notice that the
Attorney Grievance Commission, having concluded that
Respondent was in material default of the Conditional Diversion
Agreement, revoked the Agreement pursuant to Rule 16736(f)(3).
The Commission's notice further directed Bar
Counsel to proceed in accordance with Rule 16-751.
Respondent's Misconduct Related to Her Representation of
Wanda Suter
On or about October 11, 2009, Respondent was retained
by Wanda M. Suter to represent Suter in an employment matter
related to wrongful termination on a contingency fee basis. On
January 4, 2010, Respondent filed suit on behalf of Suter in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against Suter's former
employer's property management company, HP Properties
Management ("HP Management").
On May 18, 2010, HP
Management filed a Motion for Sanctions and/or a Motion to
Compel after the Respondent failed to respond to discovery that
had been served upon her on April 15, 2010. On June 23, 2010,
the Court ordered the Respondent to answer HP Management's
discovery within thirty days of the aforementioned order.
On July 19, 2010, Respondent filed an answer to HP
Management's discovery. On July 26,2010, Respondent filed
the Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witness. On August 13,
2010, HP Management moved to strike Plaintiff s Designation of
Expert Witness. On September 9,2010, HP Management filed
a "Motion for Sanctions or, in the Alternative, An Order
8
Compelling Discovery and a Request for Award of Attorney's
Fees."
On October 12, 2010, the Court denied HP
Management's Motion to Strike and ordered the Respondent to
answer all interrogatories related to Suter's expert witness within
fifteen (15) days.
On October 26, 2010, the Court ordered Suter to pay
$250.00 in attorney's fees to HP Management within fifteen (15)
days of the date of the order and produce full and complete
responses to HP Management's discovery request due to the
Respondent's inability to respond to discovery.
On November 16, 2010, HP Management filed a third
Motion for Sanctions and a second Motion to Strike Suter's
Designation of Expert Witness. On January 13, 2011, Suter sent
a text message to Respondent's cellular telephone which asked
her to contact Ronald Grossman, a case worker with PBJ
Consultants assisting Suter with health matters. Sometime in late
January 20 11, Respondent informed Mr. Grossman, "that she had
gotten in over her head with Suter's case and could not handle it
any more." Respondent failed to terminate her representation.
In late January 20 11, Respondent incorrectly informed her
client that she did not need to appear in court on February 1,
2011 for a hearing. Respondent did not appear either.
On February 1, 2011, the Court issued a Show Cause
Order for Respondent's Failure to Appear and ordered that both
parties appear in Court for a March 23, 2011 hearing. The Court
also issued an Order precluding Suter from introducing her
expert witness testimony.
On March 23, 2011, Respondent failed to appear or show
cause in Court on behalf of Suter. The Honorable Arthur M.
Ahalt issued an Order assessing fees against Respondent in the
amount of $1,200.00 for Robert Kostecka, HP Management's
counsel, and Suter's former employer, Michael Blonder, in the
amount of $280.00. In addition, Judge Ahalt ordered that "this
matter be referred to the Maryland Attorney Grievance
Commission for appropriate investigation." On March 24,2011,
Michele L. Houston, Civil Case Coordinator for the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County, sent Bar Counsel a copy of Judge
Ahalt's Order which cited Respondent's failure to appear.
On April 10, 2011, Suter also filed a complaint with the
Commission against Respondent. On April 26, 2011, Leslie
Pladna, Esquire, Suter's subsequent counsel, filed a "Plaintiff s
9
Ex Parte Emergency Motion to Dismiss Action Without
Prejudice" with the Court. On May 25,2011, Suter's Motion to
Dismiss was granted without prejudice by the Court.
Conclusions of Law
This court fmds that there was clear and convincing
evidence presented to establish the allegations of the
Commission's Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action
against Respondent and that such evidence supports each
violation of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct charged in the Petition.
Respondent's Misconduct Related to the Revocation of
Respondent's CDA And the Homeless Persons Representation
Project
Based upon Respondent's acknowledgment of misconduct
contained within the paragraph 2 of the Conditional Diversion
Agreement that she voluntarily signed, this court concludes that
Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct in connection with her representation of
seven (7) Project clients as described in the matter docketed as
BC Docket No. 2011-015-02-16, which was a complaint filed by
Antonia Fasanelli:
Rule 1.1
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
Rule 1.4. Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall:
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
10
Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation.
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests,
such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property
to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment
of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The
lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
permitted by other law.
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
By violating the aforementioned Rules of Professional
Conduct, it follows that Respondent committed professional
misconduct in violation of Rule 8.4(a).
In addition, on August 12, 2010, Respondent wrote a
response to Bar Counsel to Ms. Fasanelli's complaint denying
that she had ever been retained by Mr. Lee. Respondent's denial
of being retained by Mr. Lee constitutes a misrepresentation to
Bar Counsel and therefore is a violation of 8.4(c).
Finally, this court concludes that Respondent's failure to
comply with the remedial terms and conditions of the Conditional
Diversion Agreement, including but not limited to her failure to
provide the law practice monitor designated to report to Bar
Counsel with access to information he needed to fulfill his
reporting obligations, constituted conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. By engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice, Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).
Additionally, Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) by failing
to respond to Bar Counsel's lawful demands for information.
Respondent's Misconduct Related to Her Representation of
Wanda Suter
Respondent failed to resp'ond to discovery served by
opposing counsel Mr. Kostecka on March 30, 2010. Although
the Circuit Court repeatedly ordered Respondent to answer HP
Management's
discovery and finally issued sanctions,
11
Respondent failed to do so. In addition, Respondent advised
Suter that she did not need to appear in court on February 1,20 II
for a heciring. On February 1, 2011, the Court issued a Show
Cause Order for Respondent's Failure to Appear and ordered that
both parties appear in court for a March 23, 2011 hearing.
Respondent's failure to respond to discovery on behalf of Suter
and appear in court violates Rule 1.1 and 1.3,Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 395, 784 A.2d 516, 527
(2001) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Tinsky, 377 Md.
646, 835 A.2d 542 (2003). Respondent's instruction to her client
not to appear at her February 1, 20 II hearing and her own failure
to appear on that date further constitute violations of Rule 1.1.
Respondent's failure to pursue Suter's case once Judge
Ahalt issued the Show Cause
order violated Rule 1.3.
Respondent's non-responsiveness to Suter also violated Rule
IA(a)2 and IA(a)3 in that she failed to respond to Suter's
repeated attempts to reach the respondent beginning in January
2011.
Respondent's numerous violations of the Maryland
Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct as set forth above
constitute a violation of Rule 8A(a), which provides that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to
violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent's continuous disregard for her client's
interests and failure to withdraw her appearance in Suter's case
constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Respondent's failure to respond to discovery resulted in
attorney's fees being assessed to Suter. Respondent's failure to
appear for a court hearing and her abandonment of her client
further demonstrate a clear violation of Rule 8A(d). 4ttorney
Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 83, 753 A.2d 17,31 (2000).
For these reasons, this court concludes that Respondent,
Denese Dominguez, Esquire violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, lA, 1.16(d),
8.1(b), and 8A(a), 8A(c) and (d) of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules
of Professional Conduct.
.
Essentially, Judge Hackner found that, while Dominguez was working on behalf of
clients assigned to her by the Homeless Persons Representation Project, she failed to act with
diligence in representing her clients, failed to respond to the Executive Director's requests to
12
have the client files returned to the Project, failed to communicate with her clients, failed to
effectively terminate her representation, and represented to Bar Counsel that a Mr. Lee was
not her client when she knew that he had been assigned to her and had entered into a pro bono
retainer agreement with him. Moreover, Judge Hackner found that Dominguez admitted that
these actions violated the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct when she entered
into the Conditional Diversion Agreement with Bar Counsel in an attempt to avoid formal
disciplinary proceedings, an agreement that she subsequently violated.1O
The Agreement
provided, in pertinent part:
Respondent acknowledges that she failed to act with
reasonable diligence in representing five (5) clients at the
Homeless Persons Representation Project ("HPRP") where the
Respondent served as a volunteer attorney filing Petitions for
Expungement.
Respondent failed to file Petitions for
Expungement, failed to communicate with her clients and
terminated her representation with her HPRP clients without their
knowledge. Respondent failed to respond to Complainant's
request for client files so new counsel could be assigned to the
cases. Such conduct violated rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16(d) and
8A( d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
With respect to her representation of Ms. Suter, Judge Hackner found that Dominguez
failed to respond to multiple discovery requests from opposing counsel during the course of
litigation. This failure led to a court order compelling Dominguez to respond appropriately
to the discovery requests, to which Dominguez did not respond. Because Dominguez did not
The Conditional Diversion Agreement referred to five Project clients that
Dominguez represented, while the hearing Judge referenced seven. The difference is
without significance to our decision in this matter.
13
10
abide by the court order, Ms. Suter was assessed $250 in attorneys' fees incurred by her
opponent.
Judge Hackner also found that, subsequently, Ms. Suter directed Dominguez to speak
with Ms. Suter's case worker, who was helping her with health issues. In speaking with him,
Dominguez stated "that she had gotten in over her head with Suter's case and could not handle
it any more," but she did not terminate her representation. Judge Hackner found that, shortly
thereafter, Dominguez incorrectly informed Ms. Suter that Ms. Suter did not need to be
present at an upcoming hearing, which neither of them attended, resulting in a Show Cause
Order requiring both Dominguez and Ms. Suter to attend a hearing on why they failed to
appear.
Finally, Judge Hackner found that Dominguez failed to attend the Show Cause
Hearing, during which the judge assessed fees against Dominguez in the amount of $1 ,480
and ordered that Dominguez be referred to the Attorney Grievance Commission.
Because neither party filed any exceptions, we accept Judge Hackner' s findings offact
as established by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-759(b )(2)(A),
and tum now to reviewing his conclusions of law. Attorney Grievance v. Tinsky, 377 Md.
646,653, 835 A.2d 542,546 (2003).
We agree with Judge Hackner's conclusion that Dominguez violated Rules 1.1, 1.3,
1.4(a), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d) based not only on his specific findings, but also upon Dominguez's
admissions of misconduct and violations of the specified Rules contained in the Conditional
DiversionAgreement.
See A ttorney Grievancev. Brown,_Md._,_A.3d_(2012)(noting
that a revoked Conditional Diversion Agreement is evidence of misconduct against a
14
/
respondent in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding). The Rules violations also constitute a
violation of Rule 8.4(a), because "it is well established that various rule violations, of
themselves, are sufficient to support a violation" of Rule 8A(a). Attorney Grievance v.
Seltzer, 424 Md. 94, 114, 34 A.3d 498, 510 (2011).
With respect to the 8.1 violation, Rule 8.1(b) prohibits knowingly failing to respond
to a lawful demand for information from Bar Counsel. Dominguez violated this. Rule by
failing to respond to Bar Counsel's demands for information for her progress with respect to
the Conditional Diversion Agreement as well as after its revocation.
In this regard, we
reiterated recently in Attorney Grievance v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 40 A.3d 1039 (2012), that,
"repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel's investigative requests can be violative of Rule
8.1." Id. at 362, 40 A.3d at 1049.
Dominguez also violated Rules 8A( c) and (d), prohibiting conduct that is dishonest and
prejudicial to the administration of justice, respectively, based on her denial to Bar Counsel
. of representing Mr. Lee, one of her clients through the Project, even though she signed a
retainer agreement with Mr. Lee. This was clearly a false statement and is, therefore, a
violation of Rules 8A( c) and (d) under the principle espoused in Attorney Grievance v. Payer,
425 Md. 78,38 A.3d 378 (2012), in which we concluded that false statements made to Bar
Counsel during an investigation of Payer violated Rules 8A(c) and (d).
With respect to the complaints regarding Dominguez's representation of Ms. Suter, we
agree with Judge Hackner that Dominguez violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, I A(a)(2), I A(a)(3), 8A(a),
and 8A(d).
15
Rule 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent representation on behalf of her
clients. In this case, Dominguez failed to respond to repeated discovery requests, even after
a court order to do so, resulting in sanctions against Ms. Suter. Moreover, Dominguez
advised her client not to attend a hearing and did not appear herself. Finally, Dominguez did
not attend the Show Cause Hearing. Her failure to respond to discovery requests and to
appear for required hearings are actions that violate Rule 1.1. See Attorney Grievance v.
Brady, 422 Md. 441, 457, 30 A.3d 902,911 (2011) (holding that failing to attend scheduled
conferences and to respond to legal filings are violations of this Rule).
Dominguez also violated Rule 1.3, which requires an attorney to act with reasonable
diligence and promptness when handling client matters, because she failed to respond to
opposing counsel's discovery requests after having been ordered to do so by the Circuit Court.
See Attorney Grievance v. Tinsky, 377 Md. at 651, 835 A.2d at 544-545 (finding a violation
of Rule 1.3 when Tinsky failed to file materials in a bankruptcy proceeding despite having
been requested to do so by the Court).
Rules 1.4(a)(2) and (a)(3) require an attorney to keep a client reasonably informed as
to the status ofthe client's matter and to promptly respond to client requests for information
about the client's case.
Dominguez failed to respond to Suter's repeated requests for
information over a period of four months. In Attorney Grievance v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344,40
A.3d 1039, we were confronted with a similar situation involving an attorney who did not
respond to his client's attempts to contact him telephonically.
We concluded that Nelson
violated both Rules 1.4(a)(2) and (a)(3) by failing to respond. Likewise, Dominguez failed
16
to respond to Ms. Suter's repeated attempts to communicate with her regarding the status of
Suter's case, and, therefore, violated Rules 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(a)(3).
Finally, we agree with Judge Hackner that Dominguez violated Rules 8.4(a) and (d).
The violation of Rule 8.4(d) is based on Dominguez's failure to attend hearings on behalf of
Ms. Suter and Dominguez's failure to withdraw her representation in a timely manner. In
Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 83, 753 A.2d 17, 31 (2000), we held that an
attorney's willful failure to attend a hearing on behalf of his client was a violation of Rule
8.4(d), because it prevents the Court from conducting its business and adversely impacts his
clients. Here, Dominguez failed to appear at various hearings, although ordered to do so,
which is evidence of a clear violation of Rule 8.4( d) under Attorney Grievance v. Mooney.
The Rule 8.4(a) violation is premised on Dominguez's violation of the aforementioned Rules
in connection with her representation of Ms. Suter .. Again, violations of other Rules of
Professional Conduct constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(a). Attorney Grievance v. Seltzer,
424 Md. at 114,34 A.3d at 510.
Bar Counsel recommended disbarment for Dominguez's "pattern ofinattention to her
clients' cases" and her failure to protect her clients' interests and argued that four aggravating
factors contained in the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
to which we have often looked for guidance, apply in this case. Section 9.22 of the American
Bar Association Standards provides that aggravating factors can include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
17
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency;
. (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
,
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
U) indifference to making restitution.
Attorney Grievance v. Seltzer, 424 Md. at 116-17,34 A.3d at 511-12. Bar Counsel argued
that factors (c),(e),(f),and (h) apply in this case. We agree.
With respect to factor (c), Dominguez neglected the welfare of at least five clients at
the Project and also neglected Ms. Suter's suit.
Dominguez's
acts of neglect involved
multiple clients over a period sixteen months, thereby implicating a "pattern of misconduct."
See Attorney Grievance v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370,406,19
A.3d431, 453 (2011) (applying
this factor when an attorney engaged in misconduct involving "a series of acts over a number
of days").
Dominguez provided false information to Bar Counsel during the initial investigation
of the Project's claims and failed to respond to lawful requests from Bar Counsel during the
investigation following Ms. Suter's complaint. Dominguez's false statement to Bar Counsel
clearly implicates factor (f), and her failure to respond to subsequent, repeated requests for
documents implicates factor (e). Attorney Grievance v. Nelson, 425 Md. at 364, 40 A.3d at
1050 ("Given Respondent's repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel, aggravating factor
(e) is applicable.").
18
Finally, factor (h) is implicated with respect to Dominguez's representation of her
homeless clients, who are clearly victims, because the homeless lack the resources and the
capability to safeguard their own interests. See In re Allen, 949 P.2d 710, 721 (Or. 1997)
(applying the aggravating factor of "vulnerability of the victim" to an attorney's misconduct
involving a homeless criminal defendant); see also Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md.
240,263,950
A.2d 798,812 (2008) (applying this factor to representation ofa disabled adult
who could not protect his interests); Attorney Grievance v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 331, 786
A.2d 763, 773 (2001) (applying this factor to representation a child).
We often have stated that the purpose of imposing sanctions for violations of the Rules
of Professional Conduct is to protect the public. Attorney Grievance v. Seltzer, 424 Md. at
116, 34 A.3d at 511. In Attorney Grievance v. Fox, 417 Md. 504, II A.3d 762 (20 I 0) we
considered the issue of an appropriate sanction for an attorney who had violated Rules 1.1,
1.3, lA, 1.16, 8.I(b), and 8A(a), (c), and (d) -those Rules that Dominguez also has violated.
In that case, Fox was found to have effectively abandoned his representation of two clients
involved in an automobile tort suit, to have made a false statement to his clients about that
suit, to have failed to keep his clients informed ofthe status of their cases, and to have failed
to respond timely to Bar Counsel's lawful demands for information, as well as other
misconduct. We held that the appropriate sanction in that case was disbarment, because "[tJhe
combination
of Respondent's
violations - in particular, abandonment
of his clients,
misrepresentation, and failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel's investigation - convinces us
that Respondent is unfit to practice law .... " Id. at 544-45, 11 A.3d at 785. Just as Fox was
19
unfit to practice law, so too is Dominguez.
Accordingly, we have disbarred the Respondent, Denese Dominguez.
20
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