HARMON et al v. MARYLAND DEPT. OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 3/7/13. (c/m)(hmls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WILLIAM CLINTON HARMON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE
and THE ORPHANS’ COURT FOR
CECIL COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Civil Action No. ELH-13-605
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
William Clinton Harmon, the self-represented plaintiff, has sued the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) and the Orphans’ Court for Cecil County,
Maryland (the “Orphans’ Court”), defendants.1 The case was recently transferred to this Court
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on the basis of
improper venue in that court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) & 1406(a); see also ECF 6 (order to
1
It is not entirely clear what specific entity or entities Mr. Harmon intended to sue, aside
from DHMH. Mr. Harmon’s Complaint (ECF 5) was submitted using a form complaint that the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania apparently makes available as a convenience for selfrepresented litigants. In the Complaint, the “Orphan’s [sic] Court for Cecil County, Maryland”
was listed as the second defendant in the caption of the case. Complaint at 1. However, the form
Complaint also contained a section for the plaintiff to list the names and addresses of all
defendants and, in that section, Mr. Harmon identified the second defendant as “The Office of
Register of Wills for Cecil County.” Complaint at 2.
Under Maryland law, the Orphans’ Court and the Register of Wills for a given county are
distinct (albeit related) entities. See MD. CONST., Art. IV, § 40 (establishing an Orphans’ Court
in Baltimore City and in each county other than Harford and Montgomery Counties); id. § 41
(establishing a Register of Wills in each county and Baltimore City); Md. Code (2011 Repl. Vol.,
2012 Supp.), § 2-101 of the Estates & Trusts Article (“E.T.”) (defining “orphans’ court”); E.T.
§ 2-201 (defining “register of wills”). The registers of wills “are in effect clerks of the orphans’
courts.” Miller v. Mencken, 124 Md. 573, 93 A.2d 219, 221 (1915). The distinction between the
Orphans’ Court and the Register of Wills is not material in this case because, as I will explain,
the same general principles control the outcome, regardless of which entity or entities plaintiff
intended to sue.
transfer venue). Apparently, Mr. Harmon filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
because he resides in Philadelphia.
The precise nature of Mr. Harmon’s grievance is not clear from his Complaint. In
general, he complains of unspecified “violation[s] of [his] civil rights on a constitutional level,”
apparently arising out of proceedings in the Orphans’ Court for the administration of the estate of
Mr. Harmon’s late uncle, Edward V. Harmon (“Edward”). Mr. Harmon served as the personal
representative of Edward’s estate. From plaintiff’s Complaint and other documents submitted
with it, it appears that Edward passed away after a lengthy period of nursing care at a Veterans
Administration hospital in Perry Point, Maryland. After Edward’s death, DHMH filed a claim
against Edward’s estate, seeking to recover amounts that it alleged it had paid for Edward’s care.
The Orphans’ Court evidently approved DHMH’s claim against the estate, and it appears that
plaintiff sues for harm sustained as a result of that decision.
Plaintiff seeks $150,000 in
damages.
In addition to suing on his own behalf, plaintiff named his mother (Edward’s sister),
Clindora Harmon (“Clindora”),2 as an additional plaintiff. However, by an Order entered on
Feburary 5, 2013 (ECF 2), the district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed
Clindora as a party because she had not signed the Complaint.3 In the same Order, the district
court denied Mr. Harmon’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, because the court
2
I will refer to Clindora and Edward Harmon by their first names to avoid confusion with
plaintiff, who has the same surname.
3
This district’s Local Rule 101.1(a) states: “Individuals who are parties in civil cases
may only represent themselves.” Local Rule 102.1(a)(ii) provides that, “[w]hen a party is
appearing without counsel, the Clerk will accept for filing only documents signed by that party.”
Presumably, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adheres to similar rules. Indeed, such rules are
virtually ubiquitous precautions against the practice of law by persons who are not licensed as
attorneys-at-law, who attempt to represent others in judicial proceedings.
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determined that he had sufficient assets to afford the filing fee. Mr. Harmon subsequently paid
the filing fee and filed a “Request for Appointment of Attorney” (ECF 3).
On February 25, 2013, Mr. Harmon filed a “Motion” (ECF 4) asking the Pennsylvania
district court to “reconsider” its decision to dismiss Clindora as a plaintiff. Mr. Harmon stated
that Clindora is 91 years old and suffers from dementia, among other serious health issues. He
also attached copies of a “Durable Power of Attorney” and a “Durable Medical Power of
Attorney/Advance Medical Directive,” by which Clindora apparently appointed Mr. Harmon as
well as two of his siblings as her attorneys-in-fact for certain purposes.4 See ECF 4 at 3-9.
Notably, plaintiff asserted: “I represent my mother.” Id. at 2.
In an Order entered on February 25, 2013 (ECF 6), the Pennsylvania district court
declined to rule on the pending request for appointment of counsel or the other “Motion,” which
the court construed as a request by Mr. Harmon “to represent his mother as her ‘next friend’
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c).” Instead, the court ruled that the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania was an improper venue for the suit, and ordered the transfer of the case
to this district.
I decline to rule as to appointment of counsel for Mr. Harmon or as to the propriety of
Mr. Harmon’s desire to litigate this suit on behalf of his mother as her next friend. This is
because it is clear that plaintiff’s suit is not cognizable in a federal district court. Therefore, as I
explain below, I must dismiss the Complaint, without prejudice.
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “may not exercise jurisdiction
absent a statutory basis.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552
(2005). Moreover, a federal court has “an independent obligation to determine whether subject4
The copy of the Durable General Power of Attorney that Mr. Harmon submitted appears
to be missing one or more pages, including the signature page.
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matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
___, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010). Indeed, “[n]o court can ignore” a jurisdictional defect, once
it is discovered; “rather a court, noticing the defect, must raise the matter on its own.” Wis. Dept.
of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998).
As a self-represented litigant, Mr. Harmon is entitled to a liberal construction of his
pleadings. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U .S. 89, 94 (2007). But, liberal construction
cannot save a complaint where subject matter jurisdiction is plainly lacking. When “even a
solicitous examination of the allegations” does not reveal anything “on which federal subject
matter jurisdiction may be based,” a self-represented litigant’s complaint must be dismissed.
Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, although the precise contours of plaintiff’s claim are not entirely clear, what is clear
is that Mr. Harmon seeks to challenge the judgment of the Orphans’ Court in the proceedings
concerning the administration of Edward’s estate. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this
Court from exercising jurisdiction over such a challenge to a state court judgment.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that prohibits a federal district court
from hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005).5 In other words, “the doctrine forbids claims that ‘seek [ ] redress for an
injury caused by the state-court decision itself’ because they ‘ask[ ] the federal district court to
conduct an appellate review of the state-court decision.’” Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006))
5
The name of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from the two leading Supreme Court
cases in which it has been articulated and applied: D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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(alterations in Adkins); accord Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir.
2003). The doctrine derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, a federal statute that vests the United States
Supreme Court—and only the United States Supreme Court—with jurisdiction to hear appeals
from state court decisions in cases raising questions of federal law. See Adkins, 464 F.3d at 46364. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “lower federal courts . . . from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). As a
jurisdictional rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may be raised by a district court on its own
initiative. See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 197 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997).
Ordinarily, a party to a state court proceeding is able to raise objections on the basis of
applicable federal law or federal constitutional provisions in the state proceeding. “‘Under our
system of dual sovereignty, . . . state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.’”
Bullock v.
Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly,
494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990)) (emphasis omitted). Maryland law provides for appellate review, in
Maryland state courts, of decisions of an orphans’ court. See Md. Code (2006 Repl. Vol., 2012
Supp.), §§ 12-501 & 12-502 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (permitting appeal of
an orphans’ court decision to a circuit court or to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals). 6 The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal district court from short-circuiting that process and
directly reviewing the judgment of a state court. See Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319 (“[T]he RookerFeldman doctrine . . . by elevating substance over form, preserves the independence of state
6
It is not clear from the limited materials presented by Mr. Harmon whether a final
appealable judgment has been entered in the Orphans’ Court, whether Mr. Harmon availed
himself of the right to appeal from the Orphans’ Court’s decision under state law, or whether
such an appeal would be timely. Moreover, I express no opinion as to whether Mr. Harmon
would have any viable ground to appeal the state court decision—indeed, even if it were proper
for this Court to express such a view, it is not possible to make any determination regarding the
basis of the Orphans’ Court’s decision on the basis of the material plaintiff has presented.
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courts as well as congressional intent that an appeal from a state court decision must proceed
through that state’s system of appellate review rather than inferior federal courts.”).
Accordingly, this Court has no authority to exercise jurisdiction in this case, and must dismiss
plaintiff’s Complaint.
Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar plaintiff’s suit, it is barred for other
reasons as well. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which preserves
the sovereign immunity of the states, precludes a private individual from suing an unconsenting
state or its agencies for monetary damages in federal court, absent waiver or a valid
Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56-58 (1996); Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). In this case, all of the defendants are
agencies of the State of Maryland that are entitled to sovereign immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, ___ U.S. ___, 132
S. Ct. 1327, 1333 (2012) (holding that Maryland state court was entitled to sovereign immunity
under Eleventh Amendment); Bright v. McClure, 865 F.2d 623, 626 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
suit against court clerk in official capacity, akin to Register of Wills, was barred by Eleventh
Amendment); Wimbush v. Booth-Moulden, Civ. Nos. JKB-12-106 & JKB-12-655, 2012 WL
2575497, at *7 (D. Md. June 28, 2012) (holding that DHMH was entitled to sovereign immunity
under Eleventh Amendment).
“While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of
cases brought in State courts, see Md. Code, Ann., State Gov’t, § 12-101, et seq, it has not
waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court.”
Dixon v.
Baltimore City Police Dept., 345 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 (D. Md. 2003). Moreover, plaintiff has
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not expressly identified any federal statute under which he claims relief, as to which Congress
has abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity.
And, affording the Complaint a liberal
construction, I cannot identify any basis for plaintiff’s claims in such a statute. Therefore, this
suit must be dismissed for the additional reason that all of the defendants are entitled to
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.
Finally, plaintiff has not expressly indicated that he wishes to sue the judge who presided
over the litigation in the Orphans’ Court in his or her individual capacity, or that he seeks to sue
the Register of Wills in his or her individual capacity. But, even if he did so, a suit against the
judge would be barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, and a suit against the
Register of Wills would be barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The defense of absolute
immunity extends to “officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete
protection from suit.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
Judges, whether
presiding at the state or federal level, fall squarely within the category of officials who are
entitled to such immunity from suits for money damages in their individual capacities. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). Because the doctrine provides a benefit to the public at
large, “whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences,” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967),
absolute immunity is necessary so that judges can perform their functions without harassment or
intimidation. “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10
(1991) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)).
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Whether a judge is entitled to judicial immunity for a given act turns on whether the
challenged action was “judicial,” and whether, at the time the challenged action was taken, the
judge had subject matter jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Unless it can be shown that a
judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” absolute judicial immunity exists even
when the alleged conduct is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of judicial authority. Id. at 35657.
Here, plaintiff appears to challenge a duly-entered judgment of the Orphans’ Court
concerning a matter within its jurisdiction as to a decedent’s estate.
See E.T. § 2-102(a)
(establishing jurisdiction of orphans’ courts over decedents’ estates, and providing that an
orphans court “may conduct judicial probate, direct the conduct of a personal representative, and
pass orders which may be required in the course of the administration of an estate of a
decedent”). Such an act is quintessentially a “judicial” act as to which a judge is entitled to
absolute judicial immunity from individual liability for damages.
Similarly, the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity insulates court personnel, such
as the Register of Wills, from individual liability for damages, under certain circumstances.
Absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to non-judicial officers “performing tasks so integral
or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial
officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Affording non-judicial officials absolute immunity guards against the “danger that disappointed
litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly [would]
vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.” Sindram v. Suda, 986
F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889
F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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Courts have extended absolute immunity to protect clerks of court as well as others who
enforce court orders. See, e.g., Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
that clerk of court was absolutely immune for issuing erroneous warrant pursuant to order of
court). But see McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that clerk of court was
not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for failure to file papers submitted by litigant,
because the clerk’s duty properly to file court papers, “although associated with the court system,
is not quasi-judicial (meaning entailing a discretion similar to that exercised by a judge)”; rather,
“in respect to filing papers, the clerk has no discretion that merits insulation by a grant of
absolute immunity; . . . the act of filing papers with the court is as ministerial and inflexibly
mandatory as any of the clerk’s responsibilities”).
Here, plaintiff’s Complaint gives no
indication that his grievance, if any, with the Register of Wills arises from anything other than
the performance of duties directed by the Orphans’ Court. As such, absolute quasi-official
immunity bars a claim against the Register of Wills individually.
In sum, even if this action were not jurisdictionally barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, it appears certain that plaintiff’s Complaint would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of absolute immunity. A “district court may sua sponte [i.e., on its
own initiative] dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim.” Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440
F.3d 648, 655 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006). Indeed, “[w]here the face of a complaint plainly fails to state
a claim for relief, a district court has ‘no discretion’ but to dismiss it.” Id. (citing 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990)).
Accordingly, this action will be dismissed by the accompanying Order.
Date: March 7, 2013
/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge
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