Williams v. Stewart et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 07/08/2014. (jb3, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOHN WILLIAMS, #348-025

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Plaintiff

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v

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K. STEWART, Hearing Officer, et al.
Defendants

Civil Action No. GLR-13-647

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff John Williams (“Williams”) filed the above-captioned Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Warden John Wolfe and Secretary of the Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services Gary D. Maynard, by their attorney, have filed a Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment.1 ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has responded.
ECF No. 20.

After review of the pleadings and applicable law, the Court determines that a

hearing is unwarranted. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow, the
Motion to Dismiss, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, will be granted.
Background
Williams, an inmate confined at the Jessup Correctional Institution, alleges that on March
11, 2012, he was placed on segregation pending an adjustment hearing for an alleged assault.
Williams was provided notice of inmate rule violation stating that Officer Adeolo observed him

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Hearing Officer K. Stewart has not been properly served with the Complaint. For the
reasons that follow, even if the Hearing Officer had been served, the Complaint against him
would be subject to dismissal.
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assault another inmate after reviewing institutional surveillance recordings. Williams alleges he
requested, but was denied, representation, witnesses, and other unspecified evidence at the
adjustment hearing, which deprived him of his right to due process in accordance with Bundy v.
Cannon, 538 F.Supp. 410 (D.Md. 1982). ECF No. 1.
On April 2, 2012, Williams was called for his adjustment hearing. He alleges he was
forced to proceed without his representative because the representative had been delayed.
Williams alleges the only evidence presented was a video tape, but he was prevented from
viewing the video. Williams contends he refused to answer questions about his presence at the
scene because he was prohibited from viewing the video and there could be no evidence of an
assault on the video because no assault occurred. Additionally, the victim testified he was not
assaulted and no medical evidence was produced corroborating an assault. Ultimately, Williams
was found guilty of the assault and his appeal of the adjustment decision was denied. Id.
As a result, Williams was sentenced to 250 days of segregation time, loss of 250 good
conduct credits, 60 days loss of visits, 250 days loss of phone privileges, and 250 days loss of
commissary privilege. Additionally, he indicates he lost his job assignment where he was
earning $1.25 per day and credit against his sentence. Id. Williams, however, alleges he was
deprived due process because he was denied representation, the hearing was not held within 96
hours, his refusal to testify was improperly held against him, and the hearing was not fair and
impartial. Id.
The uncontroverted record demonstrates that on March 12, 2012, Williams was served
with a notice of inmate rule infractions for violating rule #102 (assault or battery on another
inmate) after a video was reviewed which showed him assaulting another inmate in the shower

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area. Id., Ex. 2, p. 1. At the time of the adjustment hearing Williams’s representative was
unavailable, but Williams declined to postpone the matter and elected to proceed without
representation.2 Id., Ex. 2, p. 2.
Hearing Officer Stewart reviewed the video and noted that the victim, inmate Hale, could
be seen showering as Williams stood outside of the shower. Id. Ex. 2, p. 3. Stewart further
noted that the video showed Williams jumping quickly into the shower area and punching Hale,
who was then seen falling out of the shower. Id. During the hearing, Stewart asked Williams if
he had been standing outside the shower, but Williams was evasive in his response to her
questioning. Id. Hale was called to testify by Williams. During his testimony, Hale denied
being assaulted and claimed he merely slipped and fell. Id., Ex. 2, p. 3-4.
In summarizing the evidence, in addition to noting what she observed on the video,
Stewart noted several inconsistencies in Williams’s testimony. Specifically, Williams testified
that he was wearing all of his clothes at the time of the alleged assault and alternatively that he
had been showering for a long time. Id., Ex. 2, p. 4. Stewart found Williams’s testimony
untruthful and determined the state presented sufficient proof that Williams assaulted Hale. Id.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth “a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556. In considering a
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Plaintiff’s designated representative avers that he was in the facility on the date of the
hearing and available to represent Plaintiff but was not called for the hearing. ECF No. 20.
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and take the facts asserted therein as true. Mylan Labs.,
Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for
failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
12(b)(6) motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56.” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
(citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). Once a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a
genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
(1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (alteration in the original).
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A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a party’s case. Id. at 248; see
also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)). Whether a fact is considered to
be “material” is determined by the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265.
Here, because the Court will consider matters outside of the pleading, Defendants’
Motion will be construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Analysis
First, Williams’s Complaint against Wolfe and Maynard is based solely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior, which does not apply in ' 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v.
Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (“no respondeat superior liability under ' 1983”).
Supervisory officials may be held liable, however, in circumstances in which “indifference or
tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional
injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235
(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Supervisory liability must be supported with evidence that:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response
to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices [ ]; and (3) that there was an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

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Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994)).
Williams has pointed to no action or inaction on the part of Maynard or Wolfe that resulted in a
constitutional injury, and accordingly, his claims against them will be dismissed.
Next, even if Williams had properly served Hearing Officer K. Stewart with the
Complaint, his claim against Stewart would be subject to dismissal. In prison disciplinary
proceedings that bring the possible loss of good conduct credits, a prisoner is entitled to certain
due-process protections. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974). These include
advance written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call witnesses and
present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional
concerns, and a written decision. Id. at 564-571. Substantive due process is satisfied if the
disciplinary hearing decision was based upon "some evidence." Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Federal courts do not review the correctness of a disciplinary hearing officer’s findings of
fact. See Kelly v. Cooper, 502 F.Supp. 1371, 1376 (E.D.Va. 1980). The findings will only be
disturbed when unsupported by any evidence, or when wholly arbitrary and capricious. See Hill,
472 U.S. at 456; see also Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 933 (4th Cir. 1990). As long as there is
some evidence in the record to support a disciplinary committee’s factual findings, a federal
court will not review their accuracy.
Here, Williams received all the process he was due. He was given timely advance
written notice of the infraction, was permitted to attend the disciplinary hearing and to call
witnesses on his own behalf, and received the written findings of the hearing officer. Moreover,
the hearing officer’s determination of guilt was based upon some evidence, i.e. review of the
video tape, review of the notice of inmate rule infraction prepared under oath by the correctional
officer, consideration of the witnesses’ testimony, and observation of the witnesses’ credibility.
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The credibility determinations made by the hearing officer in conjunction with the notice of
inmate rule infraction prepared under the penalties of perjury constitutes “some evidence” to
support Williams’s adjustment conviction.3 Nothing more was constitutionally required.
Further, Williams was not entitled to counsel during his disciplinary hearing. Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976). Nevertheless, Williams’s contention that he was denied
representation is belied by the record, which demonstrates that he waived representation,
deciding to proceed without his representative rather than postpone the hearing. That Williams’s
designated representative indicates he was ready, willing, and able to assist Williams on the date
of the hearing is of no moment. Williams does nothing to refute Defendants’ contention that he
waived representation. Moreover, in prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate’s refusal to
testify may support an inference against him. Id. at 320. Williams admits he refused to answer
questions regarding his whereabouts during the incident. Thus, the Hearing Officer properly
considered Williams evasive and inconsistent answers in assessing his credibility.
Next, the Court finds the restrictions placed on Williams’s visits did not violate his
constitutional rights. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133-134 (2003).4

Curtailment of

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The Administrative Law Judge at the Inmate Grievance Office, in dismissing Plaintiff’s
appeal, also reviewed the video tape of the incident and noted that it was “clear from the video
that [Williams] and another inmate were waiting for a period of time outside of the shower,
where inmate Hale was showering. As Mr. Hale was drying off, the two inmates entered the
shower and a struggle ensued. Mr. Hale fell out of the shower into the hallway and reentered it.
Officers were quickly called and the inmates were separated and restrained.” ECF No. 15, Ex.
3, p. 7.
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In Overton, the United States Supreme Court held that a prison policy that “uses
withdrawal of visitation privileges for a limited period as a regular means of effecting prison
discipline” does not result in cruel and unusual punishment. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136–37 (2003)
(finding a two-year deprivation of visitation privileges did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
The Supreme Court explained as follows:
This is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of
confinement. Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison conditions, deprive
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visitation, recreation, and property privileges, which emphasizes the connection between an
inmate’s “choices and consequences,” is rationally related to providing a safer prison
environment. Id. at 133. Williams’s visitation was not permanently suspended. The events
which led to the suspension of visitation are well documented as is Williams’s disciplinary
history.

The loss of visits pending adjustment was not constitutionally violative as the

withdrawal of visitation privileges is a proper and “even necessary management technique to
induce compliance with the rules of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who
have few other privileges to lose.” Id. at 134. Although the suspension of Williams’s visitation
was restrictive, it was of brief duration.

Thus, his allegations do not present a claim of

constitutional magnitude for which relief can be granted.
Finally, Williams’s claim that he did not receive a disciplinary hearing within the time
agreed upon in Bundy is unavailing. As outlined above, Williams’s disciplinary proceedings
comported in all respects with the requirements of due process. To the extent that written
directives were not followed to the letter, the adoption of procedural guidelines does not give rise
to a liberty interest; thus, the failure to follow regulations does not, in and of itself, result in a
violation of due process.

See Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1987).5

Thus,

Williams’s allegations that state law and/or regulations were violated during his disciplinary

inmates of basic necessities, or fail to protect their health or safety. Nor does it
involve the infliction of pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it
might occur. If the withdrawal of all visitation privileges were permanent or for a
much longer period, or if it were applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular
inmate, the case would present different consideration.
Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
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Regardless of any alleged violations of internal regulations, the law is settled that the
failure to follow a prison directive or regulation does not give rise to a federal claim, if
constitutional minima are met. See Myers v. Kelvenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).
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hearing fail to state a due process claim.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants= Motion, construed as a Motion for
Summary Judgment, shall be granted.6 Plaintiff’s Complaint against Hearing Officer K. Stewart
is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order follows.

July 8, 2014

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/s/
__________________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

Having found no constitutional violation, the Court need not address Defendants’ claim
of qualified immunity.
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