Jones v. USA-2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 3/14/13. (c/m 3/14/13 apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

LARRY JONES

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v.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL ACTION NO. CCB-13-656
CRIMINAL NO. CCB-11-390

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MEMORANDUM

Procedural History
On March 15, 2012, Larry Jones (“Jones”) was sentenced to a 37-month term of
incarceration as to one count of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Judgment was entered on March 16, 2012. See United States v. Jones, Criminal No.
CCB-11-0390, ECF No. 34.1 No appeal was filed. At the time of sentencing Jones was serving an
18-month term for violating his state probation, which commenced on May 3, 2011. ECF No. 31.
On February 28, 2013, the court received Jones’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the motion, dated February 24, 2013, Jones claims that
his “anti-shuttling” rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) were violated when
he was transported from state custody for arraignment to federal court in Baltimore, Maryland and
then brought back to state prison prior to federal trial. See ECF No. 37, at 4. He seemingly contends
that it was the federal government’s obligation to complete trial before returning him to serve his
state sentence. Jones further argues that his counsel was ineffective for the failure to raise the
violation of the “anti-shuttling act” at sentencing or on appeal. He concludes that this violation of
the IAD mandates the dismissal of his federal indictment.

The court entered a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on December 22, 2011, to secure
Jones’s appearance at re-arraignment.

He was rearraigned and entered a plea before the

undersigned on January 17, 2012. On February 16, 2012, a writ ad prosequendum was entered to
obtain Jones’s appearance at sentencing. Pursuant to that writ, Jones was brought before this court
on March 15, 2012. He was sentenced to 37 months with three years supervised release and ordered
to pay a special assessment of $100.
Jones contends that the court violated the anti-shuttling provisions of Article IV(e) of the
IAD, 18 U.S.C., app. 2 § 2. He argues that the language of the IAD mandates dismissal of his
federal indictment because he was “shuttled” between state and federal custody during the pendency
of his criminal case. Additionally, Jones alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
this issue with the court at sentencing and on appeal. Under the facts of this case, the court finds no
merit to Jones’s claims and shall dismiss the § 2255 motion.
Analysis
The IAD is a compact among 48 states, the United States, and the District of Columbia. Its
purpose is
to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and
determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried
indictments, informations, or complaints. The party States also find that proceedings
with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another
jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is
the further purposes of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, Art. I.
To effectuate these purposes, the IAD provides for two methods of disposing of “untried
indictments, informations, or complaints” and their related detainers. The first method, invoked by
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All record references are to the captioned criminal docket No. 11-390.

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the prisoner, is a request for final disposition under Article III. The second method, invoked by a
party state, is a request for temporary custody or availability under Article IV.
In this case, the United States, as a party to the IAD, brought a request under Article IV(a),
which states:
The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment,
information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against
whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any
party State made available in accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation
of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate
authorities of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated.
18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, Art. IV(a). Jones argues that the government’s actions violate Article
IV(e) of the IAD, which provides:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby
prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant
to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
18 U.S.C. app. 2, § 2, Art. IV(e).
Jones cannot obtain relief under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 for a violation of the anti-shuttling
provisions of the IAD. “Only those statutory rights of a fundamental nature closely related to
constitutionally secured rights to fair prosecution and adjudication should be subject to vindication
by collateral review of criminal convictions.” Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402, 409 (4th Cir. 1981).
The anti-shuttling provisions or “trial before return” provisions of the IAD do not involve a
“fundamental right historically considered critical to the protection of the criminal accused against
unfair prosecution and trial by the state.” Id. Thus, violations of these provisions are not remediable
on habeas review. See also Pethtel v. Ballard, 617 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2010).

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Moreover, even assuming Jones was returned to his out-of-state sentence after rearraignment, plea, and sentencing, the actions of the government do not violate the IAD, because
“trial” as used in the anti-shuttling provisions of the IAD does not include sentencing. See United
States v. Coleman, 905 F.2d 330, 331-32 (10th Cir. 1990)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, Jones must show (1) that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s unreasonable errors had a prejudicial effect on his defense.
Id. at 687-88. Both prongs must be met to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687.
The court need not reach Jones’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it is based solely
upon Jones’s counsel’s failure to raise the alleged IAD violation.
An inmate who files a motion to vacate has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district
court’s denial of his motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “A certificate of appealability may issue . .
. only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at §
2253(c)(2). The defendant “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Jones has not made the required showing and the court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability. His motion to vacate will be dismissed with prejudice. A separate Order shall be
entered reflecting the opinion set out herein.

Date: March 14, 2013

___________/s/__________
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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