Gadsden v. Koppel et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 5/16/13. (c/m 5/17/13 apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAREN KAREEN GADSDEN,

:

Petitioner

:

v.

:

Civil

No. ELH-13-671

WARDEN ROBERT KOPPEL, et al.,

(Related Criminal No. WDQ-11-302)
:

Respondents

:
.....................
MEMORANDUM

Pending is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pro se by Daren
Kareem Gadsden, a federal detainee awaiting trial.

See United States v. Daughtry, et al.

Criminal Action No. WDQ-11-302 (D. Md). Gadsden alleges that he is being unlawfully
detained pending a re-trial necessitated by a mistrial at his first trial.

He claims that the

indictment filed against him was based on “false business records and testimony.” Moreover, he
alleges that false statements were made against him during his detention hearing and at trial
before the Honorable William D. Quarles, Jr., which ended in a mistrial. And, he complains that
his re-trial is not set to begin until July 2013, in violation of his right to a speedy trial. ECF No.
1. Gadsden is represented by counsel in his pending criminal case.
“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the
regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of a trial.” Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918). Federal habeas courts will
not interfere in pending federal criminal prosecutions where a defendant has available an
adequate forum for his claims. “Prudential concerns, such as . . . the orderly administration of

criminal justice, may require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “As
a general rule, in the absence of exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy
afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent, courts require exhaustion of alternative
remedies before a prisoner can seek federal habeas relief.” Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 530-31
(4th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
No exceptional circumstances are presented here. Moreover, in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1 (1951), the Supreme Court applied the rule of exhaustion in rejecting a petitioner’s habeas
corpus challenge to a district court’s bail decision as violative of the Eighth Amendment. The
Court held that district courts “should withhold relief in [a] collateral habeas corpus action where
an adequate remedy available in the criminal proceeding has not been exhausted.” Id. at 6-7.
Gadsden may raise his defenses in the context of his criminal trial. See e.g. In re Williams, 306
Fed Appx. 818 (4th Cir. 2009). Further, as to his claims, petitioner has yet to exhaust other
available avenues of relief under the Bail Review Act. See United States v. Pipito, 861 F.2d
1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987); Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, the petition shall be dismissed. In light of the foregoing, Gadsden’s motion
to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3) and motion for immediate release (ECF No. 10) shall be denied.
A separate Order follows.

Date: May 16, 2013

/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge

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