Calhoun-El v. Shearin et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 5/16/14. (c/m apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

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JAMES CALHOUN-EL, 160-083
Calhoun-El,
v

Civil Action No. RDB-I3-692

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WARDEN BOBBY P. SHEARIN, et al

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Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending is self-represented
under 42 U.S.c.

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and Joshua Pritts,

Plaintiff James Calhoun-El's

("Calhoun-El")

Complaint'

1983. (ECF No. I). Defendants, Bobby Shearin, David Wade, Keith Arnold,
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by their counsel, have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) with verified exhibits in reply to which Calhoun-El has filed
an opposition with his declaration. (ECF No. 28). No hearing is needed to resolve the issues
presented. See Local Rule 106.5 (D. Md. 2011).

Defendants' pleading (ECF No. 22) will be

treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTED for reasons to follow.2
BACKGROUND
A. PLAINTIFF'S

CLAIMS

Calhoun-El claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment

when he was an inmate at North Branch Correctional

Institution

1 At the time Calhoun-EI filed the Complaint Bobby Shearin was Warden, David Wade was Assistant Warden, Keith
Arnold was Chief of Security, and Joshua Pritts was a correctional officer at North Branch Correctional Institution.
Calhoun-EI is suing Shearin, Wade, and Arnold in their official capacities. (Complaint, ECF at 4).

2 Accordingly, Calhoun-E)'s

Motion for Trial by Jury (ECF No. 28) will be denied as moot.

("NBCI,,).3

He alleges that on January 31 and February 3, 2012, Officer Pritts "used the cell

door to slam Plaintiff between cell door [sic], causing a gash in Plaintiffs
(Complaint, ECF No. I at 8).

back shoulder area."

He also asserts, apparently as background information, that he
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was slammed by a cell door by unnamed corrections personnel on or about September 2009.
Additionally,

Calhoun-EI claims his due process rights were violated because Defendants

deprived him of the opportunity to "grieve" his conditions of confinement. Id. He is requesting
unspecified declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
B. DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS
Defendants' verified exhibits and declarations are undisputed and summarized as follows.
On August 9, 2009,

Calhoun-EI filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP") request

claiming that, two days prior, he was slammed into a wall by a sliding sally port cell door while
leaving the multi-purpose

building at NBC!. (Def. Exhibit I, Dec!. of Randy Durst at 7)5

Calhoun-EI alleged the unnamed operator of the door had used it as a weapon. Id. at 8.
Lt. Manuel was assigned to investigate the ARP. Id. at 9. The investigation included
interviews with Calhoun-EI, correctional officers, and medical staff. Id. at pp. 9-10. Calhoun-EI,
who was interviewed twice, claimed during his first interview that he had placed a sick call
request and told the medical providers that the sliding cell door injured his hand. !d. Manuel
thereafter spoke with medical staff and reviewed Calhoun-EI's

medical records. Id. Manuel

Calhoun-EI is presently confined at Western Correctional Institution. See http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/.
inmate/search .do?search Type=detail&id=77 455

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Although the Complaint references the 2009 cell door incident, it does not appear to be the basis of Calhoun's
claims. As Defendants note, the 2009 m'atter was considered by an administrative law judge who dismissed it
stating, "as a matter of law, [Calhoun-Ell has failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury as a result of [..
.J negligence or other improper act." See infra p. 3. Further, a claim based on the 2009 incident is likely barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. Because no federal statute of limitations governs, federal courts routinely
measure the timeliness of federal civil rights suits by state law. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 49 (1984);
Chardon v. Fumero SOlO, 462 U.S. 650, 655-656 (1983). Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations for
civil actions is most applicable here. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., S 5-101.

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, All exhibits referenced

herein were filed by Defendants and docketed at ECF No. 22 unless otherwise indicated.

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determined that Calhoun-EI had provided false information during their first interview and had
not been seen by medical staff for injury from a sliding cell door. Id. Further, the correctional
officers that were responsible for the operation of the cell door at issue both. stated that they had
no knowledge of Calhoun-EI being hit by a cell door. Id. During his second interview, CahounEI claimed that he told medical staff that the cell door injured this back, and not his hand. !d.
On October 16, 2009, Manuel recommended dismissal of the ARP because Calhoun-EI
had provided false information and there was no evidence that he had been hit by a cell door. !d.
The Warden accepted the recommendation and dismissed the ARP.ld. at 7.
On October 21, 2009, Calhoun-EI filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office
("IGO") appealing the dismissal of his August 9, 2009 ARP. Id. at II. On March 3, 2010, a
hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").!d.

15-19. On April 28, 2010 the

ALJ dismissed the grievance because "as a matter of law,. [Calhoun-EI] has failed to prove that
he suffered a compensable injury as a result of [... ] negligence or other improper act .... " Id at
18.
On January 31, 2012, Calhoun-EI submitted a sick call.request

form complaining of

"neck, shoulder, and back injuries after being slammed between [a] cell door." !d. at 16. He told
medical providers

on February 3, 2012, that he had "a large scar on [his] back from when [he]

got slammed in the cell door." Id. at 17. Examination revealed a "small scratch/abrasion"
Calhoun-El's

left shoulder that "appeared[ed]

to be well healing."

Id.

on

The abrasion was

diagnosed as "superficial" and Calhoun-EI was instructed to submit another sick call slip if his
condition did not improve. Id. The attending nurse noted on the medical record that the abrasion
appeared "self-inflicted."

Id. Calhoun was questioned

about the incident and "could not

remember when [the] alleged injury occurred." Id. The medical chart notes "Inmate was seen on

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1/27; twic [sic] pm 1/26/ 1/20 by RN and 1/20 for chronic care clinic by MD with no mention of
alleged incident."

Calhouri- EI submitted no additional

sick calls requests concerning

the

abrasion. He has not filed any request for administrative review of his claims that Pritts injured
him with the cell door on January 31 or February 3, 2013. (Declaration of Jared Zais, Exhibit 3,
with attachments, at '\[5; see also, Declaration of Scott Oakley, Exhibit 4: '\[3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court "shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking
summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of
its motions
interrogatories,

and identifying

those

portions

of the pleadings,

depositions,

answers

to

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celolex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S.
317,323

(1986) (quotations omitted).

A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
genuine issue over a material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. When considering

a motion for summary

judgment, a judge's function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a
claimed factual dispute to warrant submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. See id.
at 249.
In undertaking

this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See ScalI v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). This Court also has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims

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and defenses from going to trial. See Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993).
When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the nonmoving party

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must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment must be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

A "party

cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation of
inferences." Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D. Md. 2001) (citations omitted). Mindful
that Calhoun-El is proceeding pro se, this Court must liberally construe his pleadings. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(pleadings filed by a pro se litigant are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor based on Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and raise failure to state a claim and respondeat superior as affirmative defenses.

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Additionally, they aver Defendant Pritts is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
I.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
A. DEFENDANTS SHEARIN, WADE, AND ARNOLD

Defendants

Shearin, Wade, and Arnold assert the claims against them in their official

capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Regarding the claims against them in their

Defendants also assert failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense. Calhoun-EI counters that he sent
"grievances" to Shearin and Arnold, and neither responded. (Plaintiff's Reply, ECF No 29 at 9; see also Calhoun-EI
Declaration, ECF No. 29 Exhibit 1). For reasons stated herein, even if properly administratively exhausted, the
claims provide no grounds for relief. Similarly, this Court need not reach Defendants' qualified immunity defense in
light of these determinations.

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individual capacities, they assert Calhoun-EI fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
1. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state official in his official capacity where,
as here, the suit is essentially to recover money from the state. In such cases, state officials may
invoke Eleventh Amendment

immunity because the state is the real party in interest. The

Supreme Court has said: "A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from
a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71(1989); see
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).

Thus, states and their officers, sued in their

official capacities, are not "persons" subject to suit for money damages under

S

1983. Will, 491

U.S. at 71.
Absent consent, the Eleventh Amendment precludes suit in federal court against a state
by its own citizens. See Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S, 356
(200 I). Although the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of
cases brought in State courts, see Md. Code (2009 Repl. Vol.), State Gov't Article,

S

12-202(a),

it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court with
respect to claims under

S

1983. Accordingly; Calhoun-El's claims for money damages against

Defendants Shearin, Wade, and Arnold in their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh
Amendment.
2. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Shearin, Wade, and Arnold challenge the claims against them in their individual
capacities, arguing that Calhoun has failed to allege any facts to support liability. They note

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accurately that the Complaint is completely devoid of any specific factual allegations against
them, and fails to assert any theory of liability under which they could be found responsible for
Calhoun-EI's alleged damages.
Calhoun-EI does not allege facts to demonstrate personal wrongdoing by Shearin, Wade
or Arnold.

Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in

S

1983 claims. See

Monell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Love-Lane
F.3d 766,782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under

S 1983).

v. Martin, 355

Instead, individual

liability must be based on personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violate constitutional
norms. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850
(4th Cir. 1985).
To establish supervisory liability against a warden or others under

S

1983, a plaintiff

must show: "(I) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was engaged in conduct that posed 'a pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintift";(2)

that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate

as to show 'deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices';
and (3) that there was an 'affirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the
particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff." Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Calhoun-El does
not allege facts or provide evidence to suggest that Defendants Shearin, Wade, or Arnold are
subject to liability on this basis. Consequently,

Shearin, Wade and Arnold are entitled to

summary judgment in their favor.
B. CLAIMS AGAINST OFFICER PRITTS
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause of the Eighth Amendment,

inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.'

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" 'protects

"See lko v. Shreve, 535

F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Eighth Amendment

analysis requires inquiry as to' whether prison personnel "acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered
or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component)."

Williams, 77

F.3d at 761.
The objective component focuses not on the severity of any injuries inflicted, but rather
on "the nature of the force," which must be "nontrivial."

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39

(20 I0). Absence of significant injury is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force. ld. The
objective component can be met by "the pain itself," even if the prisoner has no "enduring
injury." Williams, 77 F.3d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding the subjective
component, the key question is "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
Aside from Calhoun-EI's claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment on
January 31 and February 3, 2012, when Pritts allegedly slammed him with a cell door, no
exhibits support his claim of injury. Calhoun-El's medical records indicate that he was unable to
tell his medical providers when the alleged incidences occurred, there is suggestion his abrasion
was self-inflicted, and the abrasion was diagnosed as superficial. Mostly importantly, even if
Calhoun-EI had been struck by Officer Pritts with a cell door on either January 31 or February 3,
2012, Plaintiff sets forth no allegation to satisfY the objective component

of his Eighth

Amendment claim; i. e. to show Officer Pritts acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind to
inflict injury maliciously or sadistically. Thus, when the facts are viewed in the light most

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favorable to Calhoun-EI, no genuine issue of material fact is presented and Pritts is entitled to
summary judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

II.

DUE PROCESS CLAIM
Lastly, Calhoun-El summarily claims Defendants deprived him of "an opportunity to

aggrieve the conditions of his confinement." (Complaint, ECF No. I at 12). Inmates do not have
a constitutional right to the establishment of an administrative remedy or other grievance process
or to participate in one that has been voluntarily established by the state. See Adams v. Rice, 40
F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Calhoun-El not only fails to particularize

his claim, but his

prodigious record of more than 150 ARP requests filed since 2008, belies his claim of
deprivation. (Dec!. of Jared Zais, Exhibit 3 at ~ 5).7

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court will grant Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff by separate order
to follow.

f)..R:I

&4jP..b~

i~, 0/ y
..>,

Date

RICHARD D. BENNETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7 The claims contained in a number of these ARPs were later raised in S 1983 claims considered by this Court. See
e.g. Calhoun-EI v. Walson. el aI., Civil Action No. RDB-12-2384; Calhoun-EI v Mavnard. el al., Civil Action No.
RDB-12-2814; Calhoun-EI v Slouffer, el al., Civil Action No. RDB-12-3390.

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