Davenport v. Colvin

Filing 19

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 10/29/13. (apls, Deputy Clerk)

UNIT ED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

October 29, 2013

LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:

Donna M. Davenport v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-739

Dear Counsel:
On March 9, 2013, the Plaintiff, Donna M. Davenport, petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Supplemental Security
Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 16). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on
other grounds). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s
motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Davenport filed her claims for benefits on September 1, 2009, alleging disability
beginning May 1, 2009.1 (Tr. 159-67). Her claims were denied initially on February 24, 2010,
and on reconsideration on July 30, 2010. (Tr. 49-53, 62-68). A hearing was held on January 31,
2012, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 8-27). Following the hearing, on
February 21, 2012, the ALJ determined that Ms. Davenport was not disabled during the relevant
time frame. (Tr. 32-48). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Davenport’s request for review (Tr.
1-6), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Davenport suffered from the severe impairments of: COPD,
asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, bipolar, alcohol abuse, degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine, and GERD. (Tr. 37). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms. Davenport
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except
the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; must
avoid concentrated exposure to cold, humidity, and lung irritants; can engage in
simple, routine, repetitive tasks; can have no interaction with the public; and no
high production quotas.
1

Ms. Davenport’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits alleged a disability onset date of April 28,
1999.

Donna M. Davenport v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-739
October 29, 2013
Page 2

(Tr. 38-39). The ALJ determined that Ms. Davenport was not able to perform her past relevant
work as a nurse’s aide. (Tr. 41). However, after considering the testimony of a vocational
expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Ms. Davenport was capable of performing other jobs
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 42).
Ms. Davenport presents four primary arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ improperly
formulated the RFC in respect to both her physical and mental impairments; (2) that the ALJ
erred in assigning weight to the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. William Miller; (3) that the
ALJ recited an improper hypothetical to the VE; and (4) that the ALJ erred in finding Ms.
Davenport not credible.2 Each argument lacks merit.
Ms. Davenport argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding pertaining to both her physical and
mental limitations was not supported by substantial evidence. She makes several sub-arguments
in challenging the RFC determination. First, she argues the ALJ failed to consider evidence
related to shoulder pain, sciatica, and congestive heart failure. (Pl. Mot. 4). However, an ALJ is
not required to address every piece of evidence in the record, so long as a reviewing court can
determine from the opinion “what the ALJ did and why [s]he did it.” Piney Mountain Coal Co.
v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 762 n.10 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 137 F.3d 799, 803 (4th Cir.1998)); see also Melgarejo v. Astrue, No.
JKS 08–3140, 2009 WL 5030706, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2009) (all holding that an ALJ's duty
to explain his findings and conclusions on all material issues of fact or law is satisfied when a
reviewing court can determine, from an ALJ's opinion and the evidence of record, how he
reached his conclusion). The ALJ did, in fact, consider treatment notes indicating that Ms.
Davenport experienced difficulty lifting her shoulder during a July, 2010 hospital visit, (Tr. 40,
469), but that she showed “significant improvements” after physical therapy, and she was
encouraged to control the shoulder pain with home exercise. (Tr. 40, 505). Moreover, in regards
to her lower back pain, the ALJ discussed a September, 2011 CT scan that showed that Ms.
Davenport had degenerative changes in the spine and mild degenerative changes in the hips. (Tr.
40, 628). The records Ms. Davenport cites in arguing that the ALJ failed to consider her sciatica
show that her complaints of back pain were treated conservatively with medication and a referral
to a pain management practice.3 (Tr. 455-56, 484). Ms. Davenport also argues that the ALJ
neglected to address her congestive heart failure diagnosis, and failed to account for the
functional limitation Dr. Danai imposed in noting that she should “[p]rop up legs when
possible.” (Tr. 579). . However, at the hearing, the ALJ questioned whether Ms. Davenport had
any objective medical evidence of congestive heart failure, or a formal diagnosis from Dr. Danai
or another doctor. (Tr. 19). Ms. Davenport’s counsel confirmed that there was no other
evidence beyond Dr. Danai’s “mention” of congestive heart failure. Id. I cannot find that the
2

3

I have reordered some of Ms. Davenport’s arguments for clarity.

The Commissioner correctly notes that the pain management doctor observed that Ms. Davenport had
“no loss of function” from her pain. (Tr. 468). In addition, Ms. Davenport cites to two Psychiatric
Progress Notes to show she complained of sciatica and pain. (Tr. 558-59). I am unable to decipher a
mention of either in the handwritten notes.

Donna M. Davenport v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-739
October 29, 2013
Page 3
ALJ erred where the record lacks evidence of more severe functional limitations stemming from
the physical impairments in question. In sum, I can trace the ALJ’s logic: The RFC accounted
for the moderate limitations caused by Ms. Davenport’s lower back and shoulder pain,
congestive heart failure, and other severe physical impairments by limiting her to never climbing
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and only occasionally performing other postural activities.
Next, Ms. Davenport challenges the ALJ’s analysis of her mental limitations. She makes
two sub-arguments: (1) that the ALJ did not discuss all of the medical records pertaining to her
agoraphobia and panic attacks, (Pl. Mot. 4, 8); and (2) that the ALJ did not properly analyze her
activities of daily living (ADLs), (Pl. Mot. 8). The ALJ, in fact, discussed a number of records
detailing treatment Ms. Davenport received for her anxiety and other psychiatric issues. (Tr. 40).
The ALJ accurately observed that over a period of years, Ms. Davenport was consistently
assessed as having a GAF scores in the 55 to 70 range,4 and that “[o]verall, the record indicates
moderate symptomology with a positive response to talk therapy and medical management.” Id.
The records Ms. Davenport cites do not contradict the ALJ’s analysis. The ALJ noted that Ms.
Davenport was hospitalized in July, 2010 after an adverse response to a change in her
medications. (Tr. 38, 40). However, as the ALJ noted, at discharge, she was assessed with a
GAF score of 55+. (Tr. 40, 467). The ALJ accounted for Ms. Davenport’s anxiety and moderate
social limitations in the RFC by limiting her to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks[,]” “no
interaction with the public[,]” and working in an environment without high production quotas.
(Tr. 39). Ms. Davenport does not argue that her agoraphobia and anxiety issues imposed more
restrictive limitations than those found by the ALJ, and my review of her treatment records does
not support imposing more restrictive limitations. For example, counselor John Brown noted that
her “panic/agoraphobia [were] persistent[,]” but still gave Ms. Davenport GAF scores ranging
from 55 to 65, indicating moderate symptoms.5 (Tr. 635-51). I can find no reason for remand in
the ALJ’s mental RFC analysis. In regards to her ADLs, the ALJ relied far more on the
psychiatric records than on ADL’s to support the RFC. (Tr. 40). Ms. Davenport argues that the
“ALJ did not set forth every symptom and limitation in every psychiatric diagnosis[,]” and did
not consider all of her symptoms, but offers no evidence that she had more severe limitations
than the mild restrictions found by the ALJ. Id. As discussed above, the ALJ does not have an
obligation to discuss every symptom and every limitation, only those that are material to his or
her decision. See Melgarejo, 2009 WL 5030706, at *4 (finding that “the ALJ is not required to
discuss every piece of evidence in the record”).

4

It is well established that GAF scores are not determinative of disability. See, e.g., Davis v. Astrue, Case
No. JKS-09-2545, 2010 WL 5237850, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2010). However, nothing prohibits an ALJ
from considering GAF scores as one component of a full analysis of the evidence of record. See, e.g.,
Kozel v. Astrue, No. JKS-10-2180, 2012 WL 2951554, at *10 (D. Md. July 18, 2012) (“[E]ven though a
GAF score is not determinative of whether a person is disabled under SSA regulations, it may inform an
ALJ’s judgment.”).
5

Mr. Brown gave her a GAF score of 45 on one occasion when Ms. Davenport had two ailing family
members living with her and had run out of money because of the associated extra expense. (Tr. 639).

Donna M. Davenport v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-739
October 29, 2013
Page 4
Second, Ms. Davenport challenges the ALJ’s assignment of “moderate weight” to Dr.
Miller’s opinion because he found that Ms. Davenport misrepresented her substance abuse
issues. (Tr. 40-41). Ms. Davenport believes that because Dr. Miller recognized that her claims
of sobriety were not true, the ALJ should not have discounted his opinion at all. As discussed
below, the ALJ found Ms. Davenport not credible and cited at least three other reports of recent
drinking beyond the one that Dr. Miller referenced. (Tr. 39-40). It is not clear which records Dr.
Miller had access to, and it is within the ALJ’s discretion to discount Dr. Miller’s opinion if the
ALJ believed Ms. Davenport was not candid during the psychological evaluation.
Third, Ms. Davenport argues the ALJ presented an improper hypothetical to the VE.
First, she alleges that the hypothetical should have included the “symptoms of panic disorder and
agoraphobia[.]” (Pl. Mot. 6). As discussed above, the ALJ properly included functional
limitations in the RFC to account for Ms. Davenport’s psychiatric problems. Ms. Davenport
next avers that the hypothetical should have included the moderate limitations Dr. Shapiro
checked off on the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. (Tr. 16-17). Ms.
Davenport is correct that Dr. Shapiro checked ten “moderate limitations” in Section I of the
opinion, and that the ALJ did not include all ten limitations in her RFC. (Tr. 406-07). However,
the relevant portion of Dr. Shapiro’s opinion is not Section I, which sets forth a series of “check
the box” rankings, but Section III, which provides a detailed narrative functional capacity
assessment. See Program Operations Manual System DI 24510.060B (Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment). Because Section I does not include the requisite level of
detail to inform the ALJ’s opinion, an ALJ need not address each of the Section I limitations.
See, e.g., Andrews v. Astrue, Civil No. SKG-09-3061, slip op. at *39 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2011)
(noting that “even if the ALJ had not explicitly addressed each of the mental function limitations
appearing on Section I of the mental RFCA, he was not required to do so.”). Section III of Dr.
Shapiro’s opinion comports with the ALJ’s findings of moderate limitations in social functioning
and concentration, persistence and pace. (Tr. 38, 408). There does seem to have been some
confusion at the hearing between the VE and the ALJ. (Tr. 21-25). The VE indicated that Ms.
Davenport was incapable of medium work with the limitations that he understood the ALJ
imposed. (Tr. 24). The VE then responded with light work level positions that Ms. Davenport
could perform taking into account all of her exertional and nonexertional limitations, including
an inspector (222.687-042 and 521.687-094) and sealer (726.687-042). Because the VE testified
that there existed a significant number of jobs in the local and national economies even at that
more restrictive RFC, I find any error in the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony ultimately
harmless. Remand is therefore unwarranted.
Finally, Ms. Davenport argues that the ALJ erred in finding her not credible. The Fourth
Circuit has developed a two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, such as
fatigue. Chater, 76 F.3d at 594. First, there must be objective medical evidence of a medical
impairment reasonably likely to cause the symptoms alleged by the claimant. Id. After the
claimant meets this threshold obligation, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s [symptoms], and the extent to which it affects [his] ability to work.” Id. at 595.
The ALJ followed that process in this case. (Tr. 39-40). First, the ALJ found Ms. Davenport’s
credibility diminished because medical records refuted her testimony at the hearing regarding the

Donna M. Davenport v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-739
October 29, 2013
Page 5
length of her sobriety. (Tr. 14, 39-40, 232, 336, 404, 452). Next, the ALJ correctly noted that
there was “no diagnostic evidence of shoulder pathology” in the record. (Tr. 40). Lastly, the
ALJ observed that she was not compliant with her doctors’ recommendations for managing her
sleep impairments and COPD. Id. Therefore, I find that the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding
was supported by substantial evidence.6
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.

An

Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

6

Ms. Davenport also argues that the ALJ should not have based his credibility finding on the lack of
school records to support her contention that she was in special education classes because the records
likely do not exist because of her age, and the ALJ had a duty to obtain the records. Because there was
sufficient alternative evidence on which to discount Ms. Davenport’s credibility, I find no reason for
remand based on this aspect of the ALJ’s discussion.