Streiff v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 47 Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Catherine C. Blake on 1/20/2015. (dass, Deputy Clerk)

fIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ADRIANE STREIFF

v.

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION

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Civil No. CCB-13-845

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Adriane Streiff sues her former employer, the Anne Arundel County Board of Education
(“Board”), alleging retaliation for asserting her daughter’s entitlements under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
790–794f. This court previously granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on those
claims, granting judgment in favor of the Board. (See ECF No. 45.) Streiff now moves to
amend or alter that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
There are “three grounds for amending an earlier judgment: (1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or
(3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Sloas v. CSX Transp., Inc., 616
F.3d 380, 385 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir.
1993)). Because Streiff points to no change in the law or new evidence, her motion rises and
falls on the third of these categories. That motion will be denied, on the ground that “[a] Rule
59(e) motion ‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 5 F.
Supp. 3d 745, 770 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d

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396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Streiff first objects that the court’s disposition of her case failed to recognize that
the Board did not proffer any explanation for Streiff’s termination from her position as
lunchroom/recess monitor. Streiff advanced that argument in her opposition to summary
judgment, (see Mem. Opp. Summ. J. 12, ECF No. 37-1), and the court rejected it as
inconsistent with the record. In both her affidavit and her deposition, Teresa Sacchetti
explained that Streiff was terminated from her lunchroom/recess monitor position for the
same reason she was rendered ineligible to continue substituting at Benfield Elementary
School. Indeed, this court’s previous memorandum quoted Sacchetti, who stated under
oath that Streiff’s recent encounter with Susan Linthicum, combined with a past incident
with another teacher, convinced Sachetti that that “it would be best with the hostile
environment and the concerns of staff that [Streiff] not sub at Benfield and she not return
as a monitor.” (See Memorandum 10, ECF No. 44 (quoting Opp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 6,
Sacchetti Dep. 154, ECF No. 37-7 (emphasis added)).)
Streiff next argues that the court previously failed to recognize that the Board had placed
Streiff on a list of available substitutes for another school before terminating her eligibility to
continue substituting at Benfield. Although Streiff’s opposition to summary judgment noted that
fact, (see Opp. Mot. Summ. J. 5), her opposition never argued that the timing of her inclusion on
that separate list was probative of pretext. Streiff’s failure to assert that argument before
precludes her from doing so now. Even were it otherwise, the Board’s decision to offer Streiff
additional opportunities to substitute—even if she had not requested those opportunities—does
not support an inference of pretext.

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Streiff also faults the court for failing to acknowledge that Sacchetti neither mediated nor
investigated Streiff’s conflicts with her co-workers prior to her termination. Streiff previously
highlighted that fact in her opposition to summary judgment. (See Opp. Mot. Summ. J. 14.) As
the court previously noted, however, Streiff was a temporary employee not entitled to the
procedural protections afforded many of her co-workers. (Memorandum 12.) Sacchetti’s failure
to grant Streiff such protections, the court previously concluded, does not suggest pretext.
Last, Streiff argues that “an employer’s alleged legitimate basis for its employment
decision does not provide it with a complete defense to retaliation.” For support, she cites
Ainsworth v. Loudon County School Board, 851 F. Supp. 2d 963, 977–78 (E.D. Va. 2012), which
discussed an employer’s defenses to proscriptive retaliation claims under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”). That argument, and the case that putatively supports it, never appeared in
Streiff’s opposition to summary judgment and thus cannot be the basis for reconsideration now.
Further, and in the alternative, Ainsworth was decided on a motion to dismiss. At the summary
judgment stage, in this case, Streiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence to find that “unlawful
considerations . . . played a determinative role in [the] employment decision.” Id. at 978.
For the reasons described above, Streiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, (ECF
No. 47), is DENIED.

January 20, 2015
Date

/S/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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