Sammarco v. Prince George Public Schools

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 9/16/13. (c/m apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CONSTANCE JEANNE SAMMARCO

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY

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Civil No. CCB-13-1079

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Constance Jeanne Sammarco, a former employee of defendant Prince George’s
County Public Schools, representing herself, filed this action alleging hostile work environment,
retaliation, and discriminatory treatment based on race and age in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”). The school board has moved to dismiss Ms. Sammarco’s complaint for failure to
state a claim. For the reasons stated below, the board’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Sammarco, a 62-year-old white female, taught high school English at Fairmont
Heights High School in Prince George’s County from 2003 to 2012. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 12). It appears that Nakia Nicholson became principal of Fairmont Heights in 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10).
In 2010, Ms. Sammarco began receiving negative performance evaluations from Ms. Nicholson,
which are attached to the school board’s motion to dismiss.1 (Id. ¶¶ 10-11; Def.’s Mot., ECF No.

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“[W]hen a defendant attaches a document to its motion to dismiss, ‘a court may consider it in
determining whether to dismiss the complaint [if] it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the
complaint and [if] the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity.’” Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v.
Trigon Healthcare Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l Inc., 190
F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir.1999)). Though she disagrees with their substance, (Compl. ¶ 5), Ms.
Sammarco refers to the negative evaluations in her complaint as support for her discrimination
allegations and does not dispute their authenticity, (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 11, 13, 14, 17, 64).
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8, Exs. 2, 4, 7-8). In her complaint, Ms. Sammarco details her dissatisfaction with the way in
which Ms. Nicholson managed the school, conducted observations and evaluations of Ms.
Sammarco, and provided feedback. She alleges that Ms. Nicholson focused on hiring younger
teachers, and that she treated younger teachers and black teachers more favorably. (Compl. ¶¶
15-39). Ms. Sammarco makes similar allegations about her assistant principals, Donna Daniel
and Michael Austin, alleging, for example, that they unreasonably observed her teaching and
made false statements about her. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 46). Ms. Sammarco also alleges that her
department head, Eleanor Conwell, Corporal Sharon Gay, a school employee, and the mentor
teacher assigned to help her improve her teaching, Jonathan Wemple, made false statements
about her, negatively evaluated her, and failed to follow school policies in their dealings with
her. (Id. ¶¶ 49-60).
After two years of negative formal evaluations and, according to these evaluations, the
failure of Ms. Sammarco to improve, Ms. Nicholson recommended that Ms. Sammarco be
terminated. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8, Ex. 9 (“Termination Letter”)). The findings in these
evaluations were apparently mirrored by negative observations and reprimands Ms. Sammarco
received from both of her assistant principals, her department head, and her mentor teacher. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 41-43, 46-47, 50, 59).
Ms. Sammarco subsequently was placed on administrative leave by Superintendent
William Hite on August 17, 2012, pending a final resolution of the termination process. Ms.
Sammarco appealed the termination recommendation, and the hearing examiner affirmed Dr.
Hite’s recommendation on June 18, 2013. (See Correspondence, ECF No. 15). In her complaint,
Ms. Sammarco alleges that five Prince George’s County schools employees involved in her

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administrative appeal also treated her unfairly and/or made false statements about her. (Compl.
¶¶ 61-70).
Ms. Sammarco appears to have begun alleging that she was being treated unfairly at the
high school based on race and age in letters she wrote to various entities sometime in the spring
of 2012, as well as by filing suit under Title VII and the ADEA on April 26, 2012. (Id. ¶ 7). Her
suit initially was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but she received a
right to sue letter from the EEOC in February 2013, (ECF No. 1-1), and she filed this action in
April 2013.
ANALYSIS
When ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept the well-pled
allegations of the complaint as true,” and “construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474
(4th Cir. 1997). “Even though the requirements for pleading a proper complaint are substantially
aimed at assuring that the defendant be given adequate notice of the nature of a claim being
made against him, they also provide criteria for defining issues for trial and for early disposition
of inappropriate complaints.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). “The
mere recital of elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is not
sufficient to survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d
435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and alterations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’

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evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. . . . However, the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to establish those elements.” Walters, 684 F.3d at 439 (quotations and citation
omitted). “Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to
relief is ‘probable,’ the complaint must advance the plaintiff’s claim ‘across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Construing her complaint liberally, Ms. Sammarco appears to be alleging disparate
treatment based on race and age, hostile work environment, and retaliation for protected activity.
The school board argues that Ms. Sammarco failed to properly serve the defendants, that her
claims are not ripe, and that she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Because, as explained below, Ms. Sammarco has not plausibly alleged any cognizable claim
under Title VII or the ADEA,2 the court will assume, without deciding, that service was effective
and that her complaint is timely.
I. Disparate Treatment
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). In order to state a prima facie claim of
discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: “(1) membership in a protected
class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different
treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Court
of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). “A similar analysis is conducted for [a plaintiff’s]

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Because Ms. Sammarco fails to allege any information to support a plausible claim for relief,
discovery is unnecessary. See Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Thus,
her motion for discovery rights, (ECF No. 12), will be denied.
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claim of age discrimination, except that the fourth element is satisfied with proof of replacement
by a substantially younger worker—not proof of replacement by someone entirely outside the
ADEA's protected class.” Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 2002).
Ms. Sammarco has failed to state a prima facie claim of disparate treatment under Title
VII and the ADEA because she has not plausibly alleged that she was satisfactorily performing
her duties, nor that similarly situated employees of a different race or age received more
favorable treatment. All of the grievances Ms. Sammarco levels at her principal and ten other
Prince George’s county employees revolve around her unhappiness with the teacher evaluation
process and the administrative appeals process. She obviously feels that the school district has
treated her unfairly, and she vigorously disagrees with the negative evaluations, reprimands,
training, and advice she received during her tenure. The evaluations with which she disagreed,
however, are consistent in their negative findings; according to her complaint, she was
negatively observed and reprimanded by her two assistant principals, her department head, and
her mentor teacher, in addition to her principal; and she was given opportunities to improve over
the course of two years. All of these facts, as alleged, preclude an inference that Ms. Sammarco
was meeting the legitimate expectations of the school district. See Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
435 F.3d 510, 516-18 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming that plaintiff did not meet performance prong of
a prima facie claim under Title VII because he received reprimands “based on concrete, specific
observations and [his employer] accompanied its reprimands with explicit instructions on how to
improve”); Hart v. Broadway Services, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (D. Md. 2012) (finding
plaintiff failed to show he was performing his duties at a level meeting his employer’s
“legitimate expectations,” even though he had “three positive performance evaluations” in his

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file, because “[i]n the final two years before [he] was terminated, his performance was decidedly
poor.”).
Furthermore, Ms. Sammarco has not shown that younger individuals or teachers of other
races were treated more favorably than her. See Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th
Cir. 2010) (“Such a showing would include evidence that the employees ‘dealt with the same
supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and . . . engaged in the same conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer's treatment of them for it.’”) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th
Cir. 1992)).3 She has also not pled any other circumstance which would give “rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.” Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers, Inc., 333 F.3d
536, 545 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not plausible that
the entire cadre of administrators and fellow educators that Ms. Sammarco alleges participated in
her observation, evaluation, termination, and appeals process and made false statements about
her performance were collectively discriminating against her based on race or age. Ms.
Sammarco was negatively evaluated by both white and black employees. (E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 9-10,
56, 59). Her complaint contains only conclusory allegations that younger teachers or teachers of
different races were treated more favorably. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-31, 35, 40). In fact, there is no
indication that her principal and the other employees involved in her evaluations or termination
process treated any other employee any differently—any difference in treatment, based on Ms.
Sammarco’s own allegations, appears to turn on differences in performance, not differences in
race or age. Accordingly, her Title VII and ADEA disparate treatment claims must be dismissed.

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Unpublished cases are cited only for the soundness of their reasoning, not for any precedential
value.
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II. Hostile Work Environment
To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class under Title VII or the ADEA; (2) she
was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her protected status;
(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment;
and (5) some factual basis exists to impute liability for the harassment to the employer. See
Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting out the elements
of a racially hostile work environment claim); Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 745–46, 746 n.14
(4th Cir. 2006) (assuming without deciding that a hostile work environment claim is cognizable
under the ADEA). To prove a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show not only
that she subjectively believed her workplace environment was hostile, but also that a reasonable
person could perceive it to be objectively hostile. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm'n v. Sunbelt
Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008). To determine whether a reasonable person
would perceive workplace conduct to be severe and pervasive, the court considers a number of
factors, such as “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
787–88 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To support her hostile work environment claim, Ms. Sammarco makes a variety of
generalized statements about the way eleven different Prince George’s county employees treated
her in every step of the observation, evaluation, termination, and appeals process. She alleges,
for example, that her mentor’s presence in her classroom “interrupted and slowed the progress of
[her] Advanced Placement class and her teaching ability,” and that her assistant principal, Donna

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Daniel, “harassingly observed [her] at unreasonable times.” (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 58). These incidents
do not constitute harassment based on her protected status. Ms. Sammarco makes no factual
allegations that her supervisors threatened or humiliated her, beyond conclusory statements that
she was mistreated and unfairly criticized for her performance. Ms. Sammarco, in her complaint,
does not point to any situation in which her supervisors or colleagues made offensive utterances
regarding her race or age.4 For harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive, the workplace
must be “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]solated
personnel decisions,” such as those Ms. Sammarco cites, simply do not rise to the level of a
hostile work environment. Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 566 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Lewis
v. Dist. of Columbia., 653 F. Supp. 2d 64, 80 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that in hostile work
environment claims, it is important to “exclude from consideration personnel decisions that lack
a linkage of correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination. Otherwise, the federal courts
will become a court of personnel appeals.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, the incidents Ms. Sammarco points to as evidence of a hostile work environment are
almost entirely related to the formal and informal feedback she received about her performance.
Her claims that younger employees and employees of other races were treated better than she
was treated is supported by no factual allegations such that the court can infer her treatment was

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In her opposition to the school board’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Sammarco alleges for the first
time that Ms. Nicholson stated, “How old are you anyhow? I would never be working at your
age,” and, another time, “Oh, you white women are so weak.” (Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 13, at 22).
Even if the court were to accept these allegations as true and incorporate them into the
complaint, Ms. Sammarco has not alleged a severe or pervasive pattern of discriminatory
conduct. The extensive additional allegations made in her opposition memorandum, consistent
with the allegations in her complaint, focus on Ms. Sammarco’s unhappiness with the
mentorship, observation, and evaluation process that led to her termination, and with Ms.
Nicholson’s general management style.
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based on race or age. See, e.g., Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801–02 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the plaintiff had failed to establish a hostile work environment claim where there were no
allegations of derogatory comments and only conclusory allegations that he was treated less
favorably than younger or black employees). Because Ms. Sammarco’s complaint, at the very
least, fails to make factual allegations of harassment based on her race or age that could plausibly
be considered severe or pervasive, her hostile work environment claim also must be dismissed.
III. Retaliation
Finally, to establish a claim of retaliation, Ms. Sammarco must allege “(1) engagement in
a protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected
activity and the employment action.” Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th
Cir. 2010). Although she does not directly state as much, the complaint appears to allege Ms.
Sammarco engaged in protected activity by writing letters to the ACLU, the Maryland State
Department of Education, and the Prince George’s County Educators Association related to
alleged discriminatory treatment, and by filing a lawsuit alleging race and age discrimination in
April 2012. (Compl. ¶ 7). She subsequently filed an EEOC charge and received a right-to-sue
letter, (ECF No. 1-1), but this appears to have occurred after she received her final negative
evaluation from Ms. Nicholson. More importantly, the only direct allegations of retaliation in her
complaint appear to relate to her ongoing grievances regarding the evaluation, observation, and
mentoring process. (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 49; see also, e.g., Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 13, at 23 (alleging she
was retaliated against for filing a “20-page rebuttal” to a negative evaluation with which she
disagreed)). Ms. Sammarco appears to allege that both Ms. Nicholson and Ms. Conwell, her

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department head, retaliated against her for these complaints,5 but complaining about employment
problems unrelated to discrimination is not a protected activity under Title VII. See Laughlin v.
Metro Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1998) (defining protected activity to
include either “opposing discriminatory practices in the workplace” or “participating in an
ongoing investigation or proceeding under Title VII”). Even if her complaint could be read to
include a retaliation claim based on alleged protected activity, Ms. Sammarco began receiving
negative evaluations in 2010, long before any such activity, and there is no plausible basis in her
complaint to infer that any decisionmaker knew of or reacted to her alleged complaints of
discrimination. See Causey, 162 F.3d at 803; Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke
Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998). Ms. Sammarco’s evaluations are generally consistent
in their negative findings between 2010 and the end of the 2012 school year, when Ms.
Nicholson recommended Ms. Sammarco be terminated, and the negative evaluations were
corroborated by negative observations and reprimands she received from her assistant principals,
her department head, and her mentor teacher. No plausible link between her protected activity
and her ultimate termination exists. Accordingly, Ms. Sammarco’s complaint does not state any
plausible claim of retaliation, and her retaliation claim also will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the school board’s motion to dismiss will be granted and
Ms. Sammarco’s complaint will be dismissed.

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To the extent Ms. Sammarco wishes to hold Ms. Nicholson, Ms. Conwell, or other employees
of Prince George’s County schools, liable in their personal capacities for violating Title VII or
the ADEA, such claims are not cognizable. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that “supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII
violations” and noting the same for ADEA violations). Accordingly, her motion to amend her
summons and list each employee as a defendant, (ECF No. 11), will be denied.
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A separate Order follows.

September 16, 2013
Date

/s/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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