Wilson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 9/18/13. (c/m 9/18/13 mps, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CHARLES G. WILSON,

:

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. GLR-13-1176

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC,

:

Defendant.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s, Charles G.
Wilson

(“Wilson”),

Motion

to

Compel

Local

Rule

103(5)(c)

Disclosures (ECF No. 33), and Motion to Strike and/or Disregard
(ECF

No.

37),

and

Defendant’s,

Ocwen

Loan

Servicing

LLC

(“Ocwen”), Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13).
The

questions

before

the

Court

are

whether

(1)

the

disclosure statement filed by Ocwen on April 22, 2013, complied
with the requirements of Local Rule 103(5)(c) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 7.1; (2) Ocwen made prejudicial accusations
in its Opposition to Wilson’s Motion to Compel; and (3) genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether (a) Ocwen or its
agents made misrepresentations that misled Wilson into signing
an Occupancy Termination Agreement (“OTA”); and (b) Wilson was
under duress when he executed the OTA.
fully briefed and no hearing is necessary.
1

The issues have been
See Local Rule 105.6

(D.Md. 2011).

For the reasons given below, Wilson’s Motion to

Compel Local Rule 103(5)(c) Disclosures will be denied as moot,
Wilson’s Motion to Strike and/or Disregard will be denied, and
Ocwen’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND1

I.

Wilson occupied the second floor front room of the property
located

at

124

W.

Lafayette

Ave.,

Baltimore,

(“Premises”), but was not a “bona fide” tenant.
Premises.

In

July

2011,

Ocwen

retained

Maryland

Ocwen owned the

Atlas

Realty,

Inc.

(“Atlas”) to manage local activities and remove any occupant
from the Premises.

Ocwen authorized Atlas to negotiate with

Wilson about the terms of an OTA, pursuant to which Ocwen would
pay Wilson $12,000 in exchange for him vacating the Premises and
leaving

it

in

broom

clean

condition

with

all

debris

and

furniture removed.
Wilson alleges that during pre-contractual negotiations he
informed Ocwen that the previous owner, who had also resided in
the Premises, and other former tenants had left items in various
areas of the house.

Wilson alleges that he asked Ocwen if he

was responsible for removing items of the former owner and her
tenants and cleaning the areas they occupied, but was assured
that

he

would

not

be

responsible

for

removing

said

items.

1

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the Complaint and Ocwen’s Motion for Summary Judgment and are
viewed in the light most favorable to Wilson.
2

Moreover, Wilson alleges that Ocwen assured him he would be paid
the $12,000 regardless of items left behind in areas of the
house that he did not occupy.

Based on these assurances, Wilson

executed the OTA on October 7, 2011.

(Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 2).

In the OTA, Wilson agreed to vacate the Premises by October
18,

2011,

materials”

by

removing

except

carpeting.

fixtures

(Id. ¶ 1).

Premises

in

interior

and

destruction,

“broom

was

exterior

personal

such

as

belongings

appliances,

and

lighting,

condition,

free

of

any

exterior

debris

and

free

from

reasonable

wear

and

tear

debris

have

any

and

all
or

(“Required

The OTA does not specify in what manner

his

removed

and

damage

excepted”

to

other

Wilson further agreed to leave the

clean”

Condition”). (Id. ¶ 2).
Wilson

“all

personal
from

the

attain broom clean condition.

belongings
Premises

or

or

interior

how

he

(See generally id.).

was

or
to

Wilson

agreed to allow an Ocwen agent to inspect “ALL areas of the
Premises.”
determined

(Id. ¶ 3) (emphasis in original).
that

the

Premises

Wislon would receive payment.

was

in

the

If the agent

Required

(Id. ¶ 4, 14).

Condition,

If Wilson failed

to vacate the Premises as agreed, Ocwen was entitled to proceed
with eviction proceedings (id. ¶ 13), and Wilson would not be
entitled to payment (id. ¶ 4, 14).
On October 18, 2011, Atlas contract worker Peter Mugisha
(“Mugisha”) inspected the Premises.
3

At the time of inspection

there was furniture and other debris in areas of the Premises
Wilson states he did not occupy.
Aff. ¶ 10, ECF No. 13).

(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Mugisha

Ocwen alleges that upon completion of

the inspection, Mugisha refused to pay Wilson the $12,000 but
offered to return to the Premises at a later time to give Wilson
the opportunity to meet the Required Condition.
Wilson

alleges

that

upon

request

for

(Id. ¶ 13, 16).
payment

of

the

$12,000, Mugisha refused to turn over payment unless Wilson paid
him

$200

to

clean

the

areas

previous owner and tenants.

that

had

been

occupied

by

the

Mugisha states that as a result of

Wilson’s statement that he was unable to remove the furniture
and debris because of his physical disabilities, Mugisha located
a

third-party

Condition
agreed

to

for

willing
a

pay

to

$200

fee.

Mugisha

threatened him.

put

the

Wilson

$200,

he

Premises

in

alleges

that

did

so

Mugisha

Required

although

after

he

Mugisha

Additionally, Wilson states that he believed

Mugisha was extorting money from him.
that

only

the

called

him

approximately

Wilson further alleges
one

hour

after

the

inspection and threatened to stop payment on the check if he did
not pay an additional $300.

As a result, Wilson alleges that he

then offered to return the check or its equivalent to Ocwen if
it allowed him to reoccupy the Premises.

Wilson further alleges

that he repeatedly attempted to rescind the contract with Ocwen
and its agents, but to no avail.
4

Wilson initiated this action against Ocwen in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, Maryland on June 28, 2012.

He seeks

recission of the OTA with Ocwen, $200 in restitution, and an
order granting him the right to re-occupy the premises at 124 W.
Lafayette Ave., Baltimore, Maryland.
On

March

Judgment.

19,

2013,

Ocwen

(See Compl. at 5).

filed

to

Motion

for

Summary

Wilson filed an Opposition on April 2, 2013, and

Ocwen filed a Reply on April 16, 2013.
case

a

this

Court,

invoking

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2

Ocwen then removed this

federal

(ECF No. 1).

diversity

jurisdiction

Thereafter, Wilson filed

a Motion to Compel Local Rule 103(5)(c) Disclosures on July 11,
2013.

Ocwen filed an Opposition on July 11, 2013, and Wilson

filed a Reply on July 29, 2013.

On August 6, 2013, Wilson filed

a Motion to Strike and/or Disregard.

Ocwen filed an Opposition

on August 14, 2013, and no reply was filed.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Disclosure Statement by Ocwen
Because

Ocwen

subsequently

filed

its

Local

Rule

103.3

disclosures on April 22, 2013 (ECF No. 24) in compliance with

2

Wilson did not specifically indicate the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000 until he served Ocwen with his
April 17, 2013 Pre-Trial Memorandum. All prior documents in the
record either showed that the amount in controversy was less
than $75,000 or made no precise demand for financial damages.
Ocwen did not know the case was removable until April 19, 2013,
when it discovered the amount in controversy was enough to
confer jurisdiction in this Court. (See ECF No. 32).
5

the requirements of Local Rule 103(5)(c) and Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 7.1, Wilson’s Motion to Compel will be denied as
moot.
Rule 7.1 states that “[a] nongovernmental corporate party
must

file

two

identifies

any

copies

of

parent

a

disclosure

corporation

statement

and

any

that:

publicly

(1)
held

corporation owning 10% or more of its stock; or (2) states that
there

is

no

such

corporation.”

Fed.R.Civ.P.

7.1(a).

The

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 7.1 indicate that the Rule
“does

not

addition

prohibit

to

those

local

rules

required

by

that
Rule

require
7.1.”

disclosures

Fed.R.Civ.P.

in
7.1

advisory committee’s note.
Local Rule 103.3 requires a party to disclose:
the identity of any parent or other affiliate of a
corporate party and the description of the relationship
between the party and such affiliates, [and] the identity
of any corporation, unincorporated association, partnership
or other business entity, not a party to the case, which
may have any financial interest whatsoever in the outcome
of the litigation and the nature of its financial interest.
Loc. R. 103.3.

When Ocwen filed its Notice of Removal from the

Circuit

for

Court

Baltimore

City

on

April

22,

2013,

it

simultaneously filed its Disclosure Statement pursuant to Local
Rule 103.3.

(ECF No. 24).

Wilson filed a Motion to Compel

Ocwen to file a Rule 103.3 disclosure, representing to the Court
that Ocwen had not filed the disclosure.

(ECF No. 33).

Ocwen

opposed the Motion, pointing out that it had timely filed the
6

disclosure.

(ECF No. 34).

In reply, Wilson indicates that

although the disclosure had in fact been filed, it was deficient
because it did not comply with the requirements of Local Rule
103(5)(c) and Rule 7.1.
Ocwen’s Disclosure Statement identifies itself as “a nongovernmental
Ocwen

limited

Financial

Statement).

liability

company,

Corporation.”

(Loc.

whose
R.

sole

103.3

member

is

Disclosure

Wilson does not suggest that he is aware of any

other business entity that may have a financial interest in the
litigation.

As such, the Court finds that Ocwen’s Disclosure

Statement complies with the requirements of Local Rule 103 and
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

7.1.

Accordingly,

Wilson’s

Motion to Compel Local Rule 103(5)(c) Disclosures (ECF No. 33)
will be denied as moot.
B.

Motion to Strike and/or Disregard
None

of

the

grounds

offered

by

Wilson

support

Rule

11

sanctions in this case.
While Wilson’s Motion to Strike and/or Disregard is based
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), he requests that the
Court

order

Ocwen’s

accusation

that

he

is

trying

to

“unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation” be stricken from
Ocwen’s opposition and the record.
No. 37).

(Pl.’s Mot. Strike at 3, ECF

Impertinent or “scandalous matter” may be stricken

from papers filed with the Court under Rule 12(f).
7

A motion

under

Rule

12(f),

however,

must

responding to the pleading.
filed

his

Opposition.
12(f).

Motion

to

be

made

by

a

party

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).

Strike

after

before

Here, Wilson

responding

to

Ocwen’s

Wilson’s Motion to Strike was untimely under Rule

Thus, the Court will consider Wilson’s Motion under Rule

11(b).
Sanctions may be imposed against an attorney, law firm, or
party when it appears that a pleading, written motion, or other
paper,

has

been

presented

for

any

improper

purpose,

claims,

defenses, or other legal contentions within are warranted upon a
frivolous

argument,

the

factual

contentions

do

not

have

evidentiary support, or the denials of factual contentions are
not warranted on the evidence.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a)-(b).

Wilson asserts three grounds upon which sanctions could be
imposed: (1) improper purpose; (2) frivolous legal contention;
and (3) legal contention in the absence of evidentiary support.
(Pl.’s Mot. Strike).

In its Opposition to Wilson’s Motion to

Compel Disclosures, Ocwen contends that Wilson was trying to
“unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation.”

Wilson argues

that this is a legal contention not supported by evidence and
designed to prejudice the Court against his Motion to Compel
thus modifying existing law requiring Ocwen to file disclosures.
There is neither a factual nor legal basis for concluding
that Ocwen’s Opposition to Wilson’s Motion to Compel is for an
8

improper purpose or attempts to modify existing law.

It is well

within Ocwen’s purview to file a response to Wilson’s Motion
designed to convince the Court that Wilson is not entitled to
the

relief

Moreover,

that

concluding

sought.

contention

“unnecessarily
contention.

the

increase

the

there

is

that

cost

of

no

Wilson

legal

basis

for

was

trying

to

litigation”

is

a

legal

The Court finds Ocwen statement to be a factual

contention offered in support of Ocwen’s opposition to Wilson’s
Motion.

Accordingly, Wilson’s Motion to Strike and/or Disregard

(ECF No. 37) will be denied.
C.

Summary Judgment
1.

Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must
grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the
moving

party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Anderson
(citation

v.

Liberty

omitted).

Lobby,
Once

Inc.,
a

477

motion

U.S.

for

242,

summary

255

(1986)

judgment

is

properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden
of showing that a genuine dispute exists.

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
9

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the

parties

will

not

defeat

an

otherwise

properly

supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.

A “material fact” is a fact that might affect the outcome
of a party’s case.

Id. at 248; JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports

Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
fact

is

considered

substantive

law,

and

to

be

“material”

“[o]nly

is

disputes

over

Whether a

determined
facts

by

that

the

might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th
Cir. 2001).
A “genuine” issue concerning a “material” fact arises when
the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return
a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.
248.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

Rule 56(c) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the

pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett,

477

U.S.

317,

324

(1986).

The

nonmoving party “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
another.”

Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
10

Because

this

case

arises

under

the

Court's

diversity

jurisdiction, the substantive law to be considered is that of
the state in which the action arose. Estrin v. Natural Answers,
Inc., 103 F.App'x 702, 704 (4th Cir. 2004).

In this case,

Maryland law applies.
2.

Analysis
a. Misrepresentation of a Future Act

Wilson asserts that Ocwen was negligent in misrepresenting
that the payment of $12,000 would not be delayed or stopped
because of furniture and debris left by the former owner and
tenants in other areas of the Premises.

Ocwen urges that the

representations about which Wilson complains are not actionable
because they relate to future conduct.
This Court has previously found “an action for fraud will
lie only for misrepresentation of past or existing facts, and
that breach of a promise to render a performance in the future
is

redressable

only

by

an

action

in

contract.”

200

North

Gilmor, LLC v. Capital One, Nat’l Ass'n, 863 F.Supp.2d 480, 492
(D.Md. 2012) (citing Learning Works, Inc. v. Learning Annex,
Inc., 830 F.2d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 1987)).

A representation

made, however, “with an existing intention not to perform is
actionable for fraud.”

Id.

But, because a party must know, at

the time it makes the representation that the representation is
false,

the

misrepresentation

is
11

fraudulent

and

the

negligent

misrepresentation claim is converted into a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation. Id.; see alson Heritage Oldsmobile-Imports v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 282, 291 (D.Md. 2003)
(“If the party knows the representation to be false at the time
it

is

made,

then

the

claim

is

one

for

fraudulent

misrepresentation.”); Orteck Int'l Inc. v. TransPacific Tire &
Wheel, Inc., No. DKC 2005-2882, 2006 WL 2572474, at *20 (D.Md.
Sept.

5,

2006)

(“To

the

extent

that

a

party

making

the

representation about its future conduct knows at the time the
statement is made that it is false, the claim converts to one of
fraudulent misrepresentation.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Wilson asserts that Ocwen made a representation of a
future intention not to hold him responsible for removing the
belongings of the former owner and tenants and cleaning the
areas they occupied, but then withheld payment under the OTA
until he agreed to pay for the same.

These assertions sound in

fraud rather than negligence.
The
false

elements

of

representation;

fraudulent
(2)

made

misrepresentation
with

the

are:

knowledge

(1)
of

a

its

falsity, or in reckless indifference to the truth; (3) with the
intent of defrauding the person claiming to be injured; (4)
justifiable reliance by that person; and (5) damages caused as a
result of the fraudulent statement.

Heritage, 264 F.Supp.2d at

291

survive

(citation

omitted).

Thus,
12

to

summary

judgment,

Wilson

must

demonstrate

that

he

justifiably

relied

on

the

Ocwen’s alleged misrepresentation.
“Ordinarily, the matter of reasonableness of reliance is an
issue reserved for the finder of fact.”
at

491.

There

may

be

instances,

Gilmor, 863 F.Supp.2d

however,

when

a

party’s

reliance on an oral promise may be “unreasonable as a matter of
law.”

Id.

In D & G Flooring, LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,

346 F.Supp.2d 818, 824 (D.Md. 2004), for example, the district
court, applying Maryland law, determined where the express terms
of the contract contradicted the alleged oral promise, it was
“unfathomable” that a sophisticated business entity would not
require the promise to be expressed in writing.

Id.

Here, Wilson contends that the term “Premises” as used in
the OTA refers solely to the second floor area he occupied.

In

support of this claim, Wilson indicates that prior to signing
the OTA he informed Ocwen of the existence of furniture and
debris left behind by the former landlord and tenants; he made
Ocwen aware of the fact that he only occupied the second floor
front room of the Premises; and he was ensured that he would not
be responsible for removing the furniture and debris left behind
by former occupants.

Ocwen contends that the plain language of

the OTA defines “Premises” as 124 W. Lafayette Ave., Baltimore,
Maryland and does not specify a specific area, room, or unit
within the Premises to which the Required Condition applies.
13

Contract interpretation is a matter of law, not fact.

Sy-

Lene of Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC, 829 A.2d
540, 544 (Md. 2003).
from

attempting

to

The parol evidence rule precludes parties
contradict

written

terms

of

an

agreement 

through the use of prior oral or written declarations.

Sagent

Tech., Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 464, 468 (D.Md.
2003).
the

Parol evidence “is only admissible after the court finds

contract

to

be

ambiguous.”

Sy-Lene,

829

at

544.

“In

determining whether a writing is ambiguous, Maryland has long
adhered

to

contracts.”

the

law

of

Calomiris

(citations omitted).

the

v.

objective

Woods,

353

interpretation

Md.

425,

435

of

(1999)

Under the objective view, a contract is

only ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one meaning
by a “reasonably prudent person.”
unambiguous,
parties

its

thought

executed it.

terms
or

Id. at 436.

will

not

be

intended

the

contract

If a contract is

overridden
to

by

mean

what
when

the
they

Id.

[W]hen the language of the contract is plain and
unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court
must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In
these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not
what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but
what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought it meant. Consequently, the clear and
unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away to
what the parties thought that the agreement meant or
intended it to mean.

14

Id. (quoting Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md.
254,

260

(1985)).

Thus,

evidence

of

the

intentions and negotiations are not admissible.

parties’

prior

Id.

The OTA’s language is plain and unambiguous. “Premises” is
defined as 124 W. Lafayette Ave., Baltimore, Maryland.
Ex. A).
to

(Compl.

The definition does not limit the meaning of “Premises”

include

Lafayette

a

specific

Ave.,

area,

Baltimore,

room,

or

unit

Maryland.

(See

within

124

generally

W.

id.).

Thus, regardless of what Wilson thought or intended the term to
mean during the negotiations and when he executed the OTA, the
Court must assume the parties meant “Premises” to include the
entire property, not just a particular floor, room, or unit.
Here,

as

in

D

&

G

Flooring,

the

express

terms

of

the

contract (i.e., the Required Condition) directly contradict the
alleged oral promise that Wilson would not be held responsible
for cleaning the areas of the former owner and tenants.

While

the Court is by no means suggesting that Wilson should be held
to the same negotiating standards as the sophisticated business
entities in D & G Flooring, it does find that it is objectively
unreasonable for a party to rely on representations made during
pre-contractual
contract
Wilson’s

negotiations

directly
reliance

contradict
on

where

the

those

Ocwen’s

express

terms

representations.

alleged

oral

of

the

Because

promise

was

objectively unreasonable, the Court finds no genuine issues of
15

material

fact

exist

misrepresentations

as

that

to

whether

misled

Ocwen

Wilson

or

into

its

agents

signing

the

made
OTA.

Accordingly, Ocwen is entitled to summary judgment on the issue
of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation.3
b. Duress
Wilson also argues that he is entitled to recission of the
OTA based on duress.
duress

after

being

He alleges that he paid Mugisha $200 under
improperly

threatened

that

he

would

not

receive the $12,000 and he would be evicted if he did not pay to
remove the remaining furniture and debris.
“In order to establish duress, there must be a wrongful act
which deprives an individual of the exercise of his free will.”
Eckstein v. Eckstein, 379 A.2d 757, 761 (1978) (citing Cent.
Bank of Frederick v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305 (1862)).

There are

generally two type of cases in which Maryland courts have found
an

agreement

was

improper threat.

made

under

duress,

physical

inducement

and

Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Bond, No. HAR-90-

1139, 1991 WL 8431, at *2 (D.Md. Jan. 25, 1991).

An improper

threat is found where the threat “leaves the victim with no
reasonable

alternative

other

than

to

execute

the

agreement.”

3

Ocwen’s
arguments
based
on
Wilson’s
negligent
misrepresentation claim do not need to be addressed because
justifiable reliance is an element of both claims.
Thus,
Wilson’s claim fails on either ground.
16

Id.

“This form of duress most often arises . . . in the form of

economic duress.”

Id.

To obtain the $12,000 payment under the OTA Wilson was
required

to

vacate

(Compl. Ex. A ¶ 2).

the

Premises

in

the

Required

Condition.

In the event that Wilson did not vacate the

Premises as set forth in the OTA, he was subject to eviction.
(Id. ¶ 11).
obtain

the

The OTA is silent on the means by which Wilson may
Required

Condition.

(See

generally

id.).

The

undisputed evidence indicates that the Premises was not in the
Required Condition at the time of inspection.

There were a

number of options available to Wilson in obtaining the Required
Condition, including removing the furniture and debris on his
own, asking a friend to assist him, or finding and hiring a
third-party to complete the task for him.

Notwithstanding these

options,

have

Wilson

voluntarily

agreed

to

a

third-party,

recommended by Mugish, clean the Premises for a fee of $200.
Presumably Wilson chose this option because he believed that
doing so was in his best interest at the time.

Mugisha did not

make an improper threat, but rather was enforcing the plain
language of the OTA.

Thus, the Court finds no genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether Wilson was under duress when
he executed the OTA.

Accordingly, Ocwen is entitled to summary

judgment on the issue of duress.

17

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will, by separate
Order,

DENY

103(5)(c)

AS

MOOT

Disclosures

Wilson’s

Motion

(ECF

33);

No.

to

DENY

Compel
Wilson’s

Local

Rule

Motion

to

Strike and/or Disregard (ECF No. 37); and GRANT Ocwen’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13).
Entered this 18th day of September, 2013

/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

18