Younger v. Spruill et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 7/1/13. (c/m apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEVIN J. YOUNGER,
Plaintiff

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v.

Civil Action No. ELH-13-1191
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ODESSA SPRUILL, et al.,
Defendants

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MEMORANDUM

In this action instituted under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, plaintiff Kevin Younger, who is selfrepresented, alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by defendant Odessa Spruill, a private
citizen and plaintiff’s aunt, who allegedly improperly identified him as the perpetrator of an armed
robbery in Baltimore County. Plaintiff further claims that Baltimore County Detective K. Marsteller
and prosecutors John Magee and Gerald Collins improperly filed charges against him when Spruill’s
identification was not certain. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is awaiting trial on the charges.1 He seeks
dismissal of the charges and a monetary award. Because he appears indigent, plaintiff=s motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) shall be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(a).
But, for the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that dismissal of the case is appropriate.
Maryland’s States Attorneys are quasi-judicial officers who enjoy absolute immunity when
performing prosecutorial functions, as opposed to investigative or administrative functions. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Absolute immunity is designed to protect the judicial
process. Thus, the inquiry is whether a prosecutor's actions are closely associated with the judicial
process. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). The decision as to "whether and when to
prosecute" is "quasi-judicial." Therefore, defendants Magee and Collins enjoy absolute immunity.

See Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372 (4th Cir. 1996). As such, plaintiff’s complaint against them cannot
proceed.
Plaintiff’s claim against Detective Marsteller is premature. Plaintiff alleges that Marsteller
acted improperly in bringing charges against him. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 487 (1994),
the Supreme Court held that claims challenging the legality of a conviction are not cognizable in a 42
U.S.C. ' 1983 action unless and until the conviction is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or
impugned, and complaints containing such claims must therefore be dismissed, without prejudice.
Put another way, plaintiff=s claims for damages cannot be entertained by this court until his state
criminal trial has concluded. In the event that the state courts agree with plaintiff’s assessment of the
events surrounding his arrest and, as a result, he is acquitted of the charges against him, or in the
event of conviction he is able to successful overturn his conviction, he may re-file his constitutional
claim for damages at that time. Accordingly, the complaint against Detective Marsteller will be
dismissed, without prejudice.
In order to assert successfully a claim of violation of constitutional rights, the defendant must
be a state actor. Specifically, the persons charged with the civil rights violation must be a state
official; someone who has acted with a state official; someone who has obtained significant aid from
a state official; or someone whose conduct is somehow attributable to the state. Odessa Spruill is not
a state official, nor does the conduct described by plaintiff have the imprimatur of official conduct.
In limited circumstances, however, seemingly private conduct can be the subject of a '1983
suit. The Fourth Circuit has A recognized four exclusive circumstances under which a private party
can be deemed to be a state actor: (1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act
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See http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquirySearch.jis
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that would be unconstitutional if done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to evade a clear
constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor; (3) when the state has delegated a
traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor; or (4) when the state has committed
an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.@ DeBauche v. Trani,
191 F. 3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999). None of the acts or conduct alleged by plaintiff in his complaint
fall within these four categories of conduct. AIf the conduct does not fall into one of these four
categories, then the private conduct is not an action of the state.@ Andrews v. Federal Home Loan
Bank of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir.1993). Accordingly, plaintiff’s civil rights claims
against Spruill must be dismissed.
To the extent plaintiff’s pleading is construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C §2254, the petition is premature. Under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(a), federal courts
have jurisdiction to entertain applications for habeas corpus only if the petitioner is Ain custody@
pursuant to a state court judgment in violation of laws, treaties, or the Constitution of the United
States. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Petitioner, challenging his pretrial
detention, is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment and as such is not entitled to relief
under ' 2254.
Moreover, under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982), before a petitioner may file a
petition seeking habeas relief in federal court, he must exhaust each claim presented to the federal
court through remedies available in state court. This exhaustion requirement is satisfied by seeking
review of the claim in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider the claim. See 28 U.S.C. '
2254(b) and (c). This may be accomplished by proceeding either on direct appeal and/or in a postconviction petition.
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Given that petitioner has not yet been tried, petitioner has not exhausted all of his available
state court remedies. Since petitioner=s claims have not yet been exhausted in the state courts, his
petition for habeas corpus relief shall be dismissed, without prejudice, in order to allow petitioner to
continue to pursue his state court remedies. Both comity and judicial efficiency make it appropriate
for this court to insist on complete exhaustion before it addresses the issues raised by the petitioner.
See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987).
To the extent that petitioner seeks this Court’s immediate intervention in his state court
criminal proceedings, the Court declines to act. Federal courts do not interfere in ongoing state
criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances
not shown here. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F. 3d 881, 903
(4th Cir. 1996); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc., v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989)
(district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings if the
federal claims have been or could have been presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding). This
rule requires abstention when i) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; ii) the state
proceedings involve important state interests; and iii) the state proceedings afford adequate
opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden
State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Federal injunctive relief may not be used to test the
validity of an arrest or the admissibility of evidence in a state proceeding. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 83085 (1971).
In light of the foregoing, this case shall be dismissed. A separate Order follows.
July 1, 2013
Date

/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge
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