Henderson v. Simpkins

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 7/24/14. (c/m apls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KENNETH L. HENDERSON #409-972
v.
SGT. MARVIN SIMPKINS

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CIVIL ACTION NO. CCB-13-1421

MEMORANDUM
Pending is Simpkins’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 30.) Henderson was advised of his right to file an opposition response to
Simpkins’ motion and of the consequences of failing to do so, (ECF No. 31), but has failed to
oppose the motion.1 The court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md. 2014). For the reasons stated below, Simpkins’ motion, construed as a motion for
summary judgment, will be granted.
Background
Henderson, currently incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Training Center
(“MCTC”), seeks $7 million in damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Henderson states that on
the morning of April 26, 2013, while housed at the Metropolitan Transition Center (“MTC”), he
was assaulted and choked by Simpkins while his hands were cuffed behind his back. After the
incident he was taken to the medical department where he was seen by a nurse. Henderson
indicates a medical report was written and photographs were taken of his injuries. He complains

1

Henderson instead seeks to supplement his complaint to add the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (“DPSCS”) and the Warden at Maryland Reception Diagnostic Classification Center
(“MRDCC”) as defendants, claiming they failed to relocate prisoners from the facility by April 15, 2013, as required
by court order. (Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF No. 18, at 2-3; Supp. to Compl., ECF No. 38.) The exhibits attached
to ECF No. 38 do not demonstrate administrative exhaustion regarding plaintiff’s alleged exposure to asbestos while
housed at MRDCC; thus, the claim against the Secretary and Warden would be subject to dismissal for failure to
exhaust. Accordingly, supplementation is denied pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2).

that he received a notice of infraction for the incident and that his request that copies of the
photographs and the medical report be considered at his adjustment hearing was denied.
Henderson also claims he was exposed to asbestos, which fell from the ceiling, walls, and
pipes, during the month he was housed at MTC and that he and others were housed there even
though the facility had been condemned.

He contends that he attempted to exhaust

administrative remedies concerning his conditions of confinement claim but was forced to
withdraw an Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) complaint concerning exposure to
asbestos. (Compl., ECF No. 12; Supp. To Compl. Ex. 4, ECF No. 4-4, at 1.)
Simpkins has submitted a declaration detailing a different version of the April 26, 2013,
incident. He states that at approximately 8:00 a.m., Sgt. Angela Ellis sent a radio transmission to
meet her at D-Dorm, Bed D-27B. When he arrived, Simpkins saw Henderson refusing to be
handcuffed while cursing at Sgt. Ellis, yelling, “Fuck you! You ain’t cuffing me! None of y’all
better not touch me!” (Simpkins Decl., ECF No. 30-2, ¶ 3.) Several times, Ellis ordered
Henderson to turn around to be handcuffed, but he refused to comply. (Id.) When Simpkins also
ordered Henderson to turn around to be handcuffed, Henderson stated “Hey Sarge! Don’t touch
me! If any of y’all touch me these inmates in the dorm will help me! You think I’m playing?”
(Id. ¶ 4.) Simpkins again ordered Henderson to turn around and he complied with that order but
continued to be disrespectful to Simpkins and Ellis. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) He also attempted to jerk
himself away and called the officers “bitches and whores” as they escorted him to the lower level
to be seen by a supervisor. (Id. ¶ 5.)
When Simpkins attempted to place Henderson in the segregation booth, Henderson
resisted and yelled “I’ma kill you bitch! I’m Big Kenny from Poplar Grove bitch! You’re a dead

2

Henderson states under penalty of perjury that the facts set forth in his complaint are true. (Compl. at 3.)

2

man! I’m telling you, I’ma kill you! You think it’s a game?” (Id. ¶ 6.) Lt. Carroll Washington
placed plaintiff in the segregation booth without further incident. Id.
Simpkins wrote an infraction against Henderson charging him with violations of several
rules barring involvement in a disruptive activity, use of threatening language, interference with
or resisting the duties of staff, disobeying a direct lawful order, and exhibitions, demonstrations,
or conveyances of insolence, disrespect, or vulgar language. (Id. ¶ 7.) Ellis also issued an
infraction against Henderson for the same rule violations. (Id.; see also Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2, ECF
No. 30-3, at 10, 13.) At the adjustment hearing held on May 10, 2013, Henderson was found
guilty of violating the rules except for that barring disruptive activity, as the hearing officer
determined there was no evidence to support a guilty finding. (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 3-5.) He
received 65 days of disciplinary segregation for violating the rule barring the use of threatening
language and fifteen days concurrent for the remaining violations. (Id. at 6.) The decision and
sanctions were approved by the warden on June 12, 2013. (Id. at 1.)
An investigation into the incident by the Internal Investigative Unit (IIU) was convened
on April 26, 2013, after Captain Nicole Aikens reported that Henderson threatened the lives of
Simpkins and Ellis.

(IIU Case Report, ECF No. 30-4, at 2.3)

Aikens also reported that

Henderson claimed he had been choked by Simpkins. (Id. at 7.)
Ellis was interviewed by IIU Detective Johnnathan Wright at MTC on July 22, 2013.
(Id.) She reported that on the morning of April 26, 2013, she was called to respond to the scene
by officers who were conducting a search of Henderson’s property after he became angry. (Id.)
When she arrived, she noticed that Henderson appeared to be “high” and asked if he had been
smoking and he responded “yes...T-bags”. (Id.) He then stated: “I can’t get my stuff, so I had
3

Simpkins notes that the memorandum has been redacted to omit the name of another inmate.

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been smoking T-bags all night.” (Id.) Henderson assured Ellis he was fine. She told him to put
his shoes on so they could take a walk, but Henderson continued to interfere in the search and
started to get other inmates involved. (Id.) Ellis reported that the officers found contraband, but
she did not recall what it was. (Id.) Ellis stated that she continued to attempt to get Henderson to
comply with her orders for approximately fifteen minutes at which point Henderson stated “I not
going no fucking there,” so she called for another sergeant and Simpkins responded to the scene.
(Id.) At one point, Henderson stated “I’m going to kill you two.” (Id.) Ellis believed that
Henderson was finally handcuffed in the lobby. (Id.) During the escort Henderson attempted to
stop and talk to Security Chief Rory Jones. (Id.) Ellis told Jones that Henderson was smoking
tea bags, and Jones told her and Simpkins to take him to the medical unit. (Id.)
Ellis reported that the only time Henderson and Simpkins ever left her sight during the
escort from the dorm to the holding cell was on the landing when she was talking to Security
Chief Jones and Simpkins took Henderson to the holding cell. (Id. at 8.) Ellis stated that she did
not witness any officer assault Henderson and that he threatened her and Simpkins several times.
(Id.) Ellis advised that when Simpkins first arrived in the dorm and told Henderson to stand, he
was trying to hold onto Henderson’s arm, but Henderson pulled away. (Id.)
Henderson was also interviewed, on July 31, 2013, and stated that he did not know the
reason Ellis and Simpkins arrived on the scene during the search of his property. (Id.) He stated
that officers conducting the search were throwing his property around and that they broke his flat
screen television. (Id.) He verified that “T-bags” are, literally, tea bags. (Id.) He stated that he
told Ellis he was not going anywhere without his socks and shoes. (Id.) After Simpkins arrived,
he allowed Henderson to put his shoes and socks on, had him stand up, and put handcuffs on
him. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he did not know the reason that he was being handcuffed. (Id.)

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He alleged that Simpkins was pulling him down the stairs while he and the whole dorm of
inmates were singing the following song: “My shoe box got gold in it, coke, weed and blow in
it.” (Id.) He asserted that when Simpkins tried to slam him into a wall, he said, “Brother, I’m
fifty-six years old,” and Simpkins responded “I don’t give a fuck how old you are.” (Id.)
Henderson stated that, while Ellis and Simpkins were walking him in the yard, Simpkins was
lifting up on the handcuffs, so plaintiff stated “[t]ake the handcuffs and the badge off and let’s
deal with it like a man.” (Id.) Henderson alleged that when they saw Security Chief Jones,
Simpkins put a choke hold on him while looking Jones in the eyes. (Id.) Henderson claimed that
when Simpkins released him, he blacked out. (Id.) He stated that, at that point, he called
Simpkins a “bitch” and threatened to kill him. (Id.) Henderson claimed that he was placed in the
holding cell and, while there, told his side of the story to Lt. Latonya Bell and Sgt. Stan
Emmanuel. (Id.) He maintained that he was then taken to the hospital where photographs were
taken of his neck and wrists, and medical staff told him that he had bruises on his neck. (Id.) He
also asserted that his neck was red. (Id.) Henderson stated that he requested pictures and
reports, but no documents could be located. (Id.)
Henderson told Detective Wright that Jones, Bell, and Captain Nicole Aikens witnessed
Simpkins assault him. He claimed that there were no prior incidents between him and any MTC
officers. (Id. at 9.) He repeated that officers had broken his television during the search, but
admitted that he had no paperwork for it and indicated that his cell buddy left it for him. (Id.)
He told Wright that he wanted to press charges.4 (Id.)

4

The IIU report indicates that on November 18, 2013, Wright was unable to locate a report pertaining to the
incident of April 26, 2013. (IIU Report at 9.) It was later confirmed by Captain Cheryl-Lynne Addison that no
Serious Incident Report (SIR) or Use of Force (UOF) Report was prepared regarding the incident. (Id. at 9, 12.)

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The same day of the incident, Henderson was transferred from MTC to the Maryland
Reception, Diagnostic & Classification Center (MRDCC). An Intra System Transfer Summary
was prepared by Sandra Nwugo, RN. (Id. at 14-15.) Henderson was examined at MRDCC the
following day by JoAnne Hartung, RN, who wrote “no” next to “[s]igns of abuse/trauma” in his
medical record. (Id. at 17.) There is no evidence Henderson reported being assaulted or “choked
out” by an officer at MTC the previous day. (See id. at 17-19.) On April 29, 2013, Henderson
reported that he had been experiencing chest congestion accompanied with a cough for four
days. (Id. at 20-21.) A chest x-ray that had been ordered on April 26, 2013, was read on May
28, 2013, and showed that the left lung was clear, but that there was opacity present in the right
lower lobe with associated volume loss suggestive of atelectasis.5

Someone noted in

Henderson’s record that the opacity may have been due to an old infection. (Id. at 16.)
Ultimately finding there were no reports, witnesses, or video to support Henderson’s
allegations against Simpkins, Detective Wright eventually determined that criminal charges were
not warranted. (Id. at 10.)
Standard of Review
As noted, defendant has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
“‘The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.’”
McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A Rule 12(b)(6)
motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts that plaintiff alleges are
true, the complaint fails, as a matter of law, “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must “‘accept[ ] as true the well-pled facts in the complaint and view[ ] them in the light
5

Atelectasis is the collapse of part or all of a lung. See “Atelectasis” Definition, Mayo Clinic, available at
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/atelectasis/basics/definition/con-20034847 (last visited July 22, 2014).

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most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Ordinarily, a court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual
disputes when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450
(4th Cir. 2007). If the court does consider matters outside the pleadings, “the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d); see also Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997
(4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot
be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by
indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous
materials.”).
“There are two requirements for a proper Rule 12(d) conversion.” Greater Baltimore
Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 281
(4th Cir. 2013). First, all parties must “be given some indication by the court that it is treating the
12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment,” which can be satisfied when a party is
“aware that material outside the pleadings is before the court.” Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177
(4th Cir. 1985); see also Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th
Cir. 1998) (commenting that a court has no obligation “to notify parties of the obvious”). “[T]he
second requirement for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is that the parties first ‘be
afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery.’” Greater Baltimore, 712 F.3d at 281.
Henderson had adequate notice that Simpkins’ motion might be treated as one for
summary judgment. The motion’s alternative caption and attached materials are in themselves

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sufficient indicia. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 260-61. Further, Henderson has not pointed to any
additional evidence, that exists, that would be helpful to the disposition of this case. He did seek
photos of his alleged injury after the incident and reports, but the record demonstrates they do
not exist. (See IIU Case Report at 8; Supp. to Compl., ECF No. 4, at 2-3.) He did have access,
however, to the affidavits and the record of his adjustment hearing, along with the other evidence
presented in this case.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion shall be treated as a motion for

summary judgment.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the “court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Supreme
Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. “By
its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all
reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’
credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). At
the same time, the court also must abide by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to

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prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d
at 526 (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Plaintiff’s claims of
excessive use of force, a lack of due process regarding his adjustment hearing, and his claim of
exposure to asbestos shall be examined in light of this standard of review.
Analysis
Simpkins moves to dismiss Henderson’s claims, arguing that Henderson has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”) provides, in
pertinent part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
As a prisoner, Henderson is subject to the strict requirements of the exhaustion
provisions. A claim which has not been exhausted may not be considered by this court. See
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220-21 (2007). It is of no consequence that Henderson is aggrieved
by a single occurrence, as opposed to general conditions of confinement. See Porter v. Nussle,
534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (holding the § 1997e exhaustion requirement applied equally to suits
alleging unconstitutional prison conditions and suits alleging unconstitutional conduct by prison
officials in excessive force claims). Exhaustion is also required even though the relief sought is
not attainable through resort to the administrative remedy procedure. Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
Administrative remedies must, however, be available to the prisoner and this court is
“obligated to ensure that any defects in exhaustion were not procured from the action or inaction
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of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007). The
Fourth Circuit has addressed the meaning of “available” remedies:
[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner,
through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.
Conversely, a prisoner does not exhaust all available remedies simply by failing
to follow the required steps so that remedies that once were available to him no
longer are. Rather, to be entitled to bring suit in federal court, a prisoner must
have utilized all available remedies “in accordance with the applicable procedural
rules,” so that prison officials have been given an opportunity to address the
claims administratively. Having done that, a prisoner has exhausted his available
remedies, even if prison employees do not respond.
Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, Henderson’s claims must be dismissed, “unless he can show that he has satisfied
the administrative exhaustion requirement under the PLRA or that [Simpkins has] forfeited [his]
right to raise non-exhaustion as a defense.” Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Md.
2003).
It does not appear that Henderson exhausted any administrative claim concerning the
alleged assault by Simpkins. This showing may not be dispositive, however, as it appears that a
formal investigation was made into the incident. The court is aware that within Maryland’s
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, once the Internal Investigation Unit
initiates an investigation, the matter no longer is subject to the ARP process. See Mot. to Dismiss
Ex. 4 at 23, Bogues v. McAlpine, Civil Action No. CCB-11-463 (D. Md. July 14, 2011), ECF No.
23-5; Mem. at 7-8, Oliver v. Harbough, Civil Action No. ELH-11-996 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2011),
ECF No. 31. While there is a process to appeal an adjustment conviction, that process is separate
and apart from the ARP process raised by Simpkins as an affirmative defense to suit. In any
event, it appears that Henderson did grieve the outcome of his adjustment hearing through the

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Inmate Grievance Office, and his grievance was denied by an Administrative Law Judge who
issued a decision and order on November 14, 2013. (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 4, ECF 30-5, ¶ 3(a).)
Conditions of confinement claims are subject to an ARP exhaustion requirement as well.
In Maryland, filing a request for administrative remedy with the Warden of the prison in which
one is incarcerated within thirty calendar days of the incident (or of the date the prisoner first
gained knowledge of the incident or injury) is the first of three steps in the ARP process provided
by the Division of Correction to its prisoners. If this request is denied, the prisoner has thirty
calendar days to file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction. If this appeal is denied, the
prisoner has thirty days in which to file an appeal to the Executive Director of the IGO. See
Division of Correction Directive 185-002.VI.L-N; see also Md. Code Ann. Corr. Serv. §§ 10201-10-209.
Henderson attaches an ARP form dated April 17, 2013, and an ARP form with case
number MRDCC #0609-13 dated April 27, 2013, regarding alleged exposure to asbestos, which
Henderson asserts that he was forced to withdraw on May 24, 2013. (Supp. to Compl. Exs. 3, 4,
ECF Nos. 4-3, 4-4; Supp. to Compl. Exs. 1, 2, ECF Nos. 38-1, 38-2.) The record contains no
facts, however, supporting his claim that he was forced to withdraw his complaint. The claim of
asbestos exposure during a one-month period is thus subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust.6
Henderson’s claim that he was denied due process at his adjustment hearing fails. In
prison disciplinary proceedings which bring the possible loss of good conduct credits, a prisoner
is entitled to certain due process protections. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
These include advance written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call
witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and
6

In the withdrawn ARP, Henderson states his “lungs are full of infectious” and he has “headaches and breathing
problems.” (Supp. to Compl. Ex. 4, ECF 4-4, at 1.) These allegations are not borne out by the medical record
following his transfer to MRDCC, nor by the April 26, 2013 x-ray which revealed findings consistent with an old
infection.

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correctional concerns, and a written decision. Id. at 564-572. Substantive due process is
satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon “some evidence.” Superintendent,
Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Henderson received all the process he was due. He was given timely advance written
notice of the infractions and was permitted to attend the disciplinary hearing, testify, and call
witnesses, none of whom supported his version of the incident. He claims he was denied an
opportunity to submit medical documentation and pictures to show injuries consistent with
having been “choked out” by Simpkins; however, the record does not suggest that any injuries
were found by medical staff, or that any pictures were taken. No good conduct credits were
revoked as a result of the disciplinary infractions. Moreover, the hearing officer’s determination
of guilt was based upon some evidence, including testimony, for which the hearing officer based
was able to judge credibility and demeanor.7
In examining Henderson’s final allegation of excessive use of force, this court must look
at the need for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force
applied; the extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates
as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). The absence of significant injury alone is
not dispositive of a claim of excessive force. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010).

In

the instant case the initial application of force—handcuffing and removing Henderson from his
cell during a search after he became verbally angry—passes constitutional muster. Further, there
is no evidence that the use of force was allowed to linger long after the need for it expired. See
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (holding the force is excessive if inflicted
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”). Simpkins has provided a declaration in which he
7

The court notes that the hearing officer found Henderson “not guilty” of one rule violation because the officer
determined there was no evidence to support the charge.

12

attests that he helped escort Henderson from his cell. The declaration does not suggest that any
additional amount of force—other than walking Henderson to the segregation booth while he
was handcuffed—was applied. Simpkins’ version of events is supported by other officers’
reports noted in the IIU investigation report.8
Henderson, the non-moving party, must establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact by presenting evidence on which a fact-finder reasonably could find in his favor.
He has failed to submit any evidence to support his claim of excessive force beyond his own
allegations. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.”). The evidence demonstrates Simpkins was responding to
another officer’s request for assistance because Henderson was resisting a lawful cell search; the
force Simpkins used to gain Henderson’s compliance in leaving his cell was tempered; and
Henderson had no objective injuries. There is simply no evidence that Simpkins was acting
maliciously or sadistically to cause harm to Henderson.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in Simpkins’ favor and Henderson’s
motion for leave to supplement his complaint will be denied. A separate order follows.

July 24, 2014
Date

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/s/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

Henderson’s claim to the contrary, no medical evidence suggests that he was injured in any way on April 26, 2013.

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