Weddle v. Colvin
Filing
16
LETTER OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 5/9/2014. (aos, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-7780
Fax (410) 962-1812
May 9, 2014
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:
Ernest Weddle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-1588
Dear Counsel:
On May 31, 2013, the Plaintiff, Ernest Weddle, petitioned this Court to review the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 11, 15). I find that no hearing is
necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency
if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that
standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny the Plaintiff’s motion. This letter
explains my rationale.
Mr. Weddle filed claims for DIB and SSI on July 19, 2010, alleging in both a disability
onset of May 20, 2009. (Tr. 197–212). His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration.
(Tr. 61–84, 85–112). A hearing was held on March 15, 2012 before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 33–56). Following the hearing, on April 9, 2012, the ALJ determined that
Mr. Weddle was not disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 20–28). The Appeals Council
denied Mr. Weddle’s request for review (Tr. 1–6), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final,
reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Weddle suffered from the severe impairment of mood/bipolar
disorder. (Tr. 22). Despite this impairment, the ALJ determined that Mr. Weddle retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks; and
requires a low stress job, defined as having only occasional decision making and
occasional changes in the work setting. The claimant can have only occasional
direct interaction with the public, coworkers and supervisors.
(Tr. 24). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ernest Weddle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-1588
May 9, 2014
Page 2
Mr. Weddle could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
he was not therefore disabled. (Tr. 27–28).
Mr. Weddle principally challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment. As part of his argument,
he makes several sub-arguments. First, he contends that the ALJ erroneously analyzed the
opinion of a consultative examiner. Second, he argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate his
statements in two Function Reports. Third, Mr. Weddle raises several challenges to the ALJ’s
treatment of the opinion of Dr. Itskowitz, his treating psychiatrist. Fourth, Mr. Weddle argues
that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not consider limitations assessed by state agency physicians
in their respective mental RFC assessments. Each argument is meritless and is addressed in turn.
First, Mr. Weddle takes issue with the ALJ’s evaluation of a consultative examination
report by Dr. Mikhael Taller. Pl.’s Mot. 6–7. Specifically, Mr. Weddle argues that the ALJ
failed to consider the report in its entirety, and that the ALJ should not have considered his lack
of psychotic symptoms as a factor in the evaluation of his mental disorder.1 Id. at 6. I disagree
and find that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Taller’s report is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ assigned the report “great weight” and found that the report did “not assess any
significant work limitations and the examination failed to show any psychotic symptoms.” (Tr.
26). The ALJ further noted that, “[t]he claimant’s thought processes were goal directed and
logical.” Id. This depiction of Dr. Taller’s report is accurate. While Mr. Weddle highlights
several grim statements from the report, see Pl.’s Mot. 6, he fails to mention that these statements
were his own subjective complaints. Dr. Taller’s objective findings were unremarkable. Dr.
Taller noted that Mr. Weddle was “casually dressed and groomed,” “cooperative [with]...good
eye contact,” “[h]is affect was appropriate,” “[h]is thought processes were goal-directed and
coherent,” “he was alert and oriented to time, place, and himself,” and “[h]is insight and
judgment were fair.” (Tr. 347). Moreover, the ALJ did not find Mr. Weddle’s subjective
complaints entirely credible. See (Tr. 25). The ALJ’s statement that Mr. Weddle showed no
psychotic symptoms was merely an accurate reflection of the report, which found that Mr.
Weddle “denied auditory, visual hallucinations and no delusional ideations were revealed.” (Tr.
347).
Next, Mr. Weddle argues that the ALJ failed to consider his subjective complaints in two
Adult Function Reports. Pl.’s Mot. 7–8. In the reports, Mr. Weddle described his daily routine,
which involved “sometimes” eating breakfast, getting dressed, and visiting friends. (Tr. 251,
282). Mr. Weddle also reported few social activities and an inability to handle stress. (Tr. 255,
257, 286, 288). Although the ALJ did not discuss the Adult Function Reports, see (Tr. 25)
(citing the September, 2010 Function Report), that error is harmless because Mr. Weddle’s
hearing testimony adequately described his symptoms. See (Tr. 44–46) (describing his problems
1
Mr. Weddle also raises a perplexing argument that appears to fault the ALJ for accurately stating that
Dr. Taller did not assess any significant work limitations. (Tr. 26). Mr. Weddle argues that the ALJ
“mischaracterized” Dr. Taller’s report, yet he points to no harm or error resulting from the ALJ’s correct
statement that, “Dr. Taller’s report does not assess any significant work limitations...” Id. While I have
considered Mr. Weddle’s argument, it has no effect on my finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr.
Taller’s report is supported by substantial evidence.
Ernest Weddle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-1588
May 9, 2014
Page 3
being around people and difficulty concentrating). The ALJ properly applied the Fourth
Circuit’s two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints. The first prong of this
test requires a determination that there is objective medical evidence of a medical impairment
reasonably likely to cause the pain alleged by the claimant. Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. The second
prong requires the ALJ to consider “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the
extent to which it affects [his] ability to work.” Id. at 595. The ALJ deemed Mr. Weddle
“partially credible.” (Tr. 25). The ALJ reasoned that Mr. Weddle had no marked limitations in
his ability to interact with others, no issues with shopping or caring for his personal hygiene,
normal mental status examinations, no severe physical impairments, and a GAF score that
indicated symptoms consistent with competitive work. I find that the ALJ’s adverse credibility
analysis is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, an ALJ is not required to address every
piece of evidence in the record, so long as a reviewing court can determine from the opinion
“what the ALJ did and why he did it.” Piney Mountain Coal Co. v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 762
n.10 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
137 F.3d 799, 803 (4th Cir.1998)); see also Melgarejo v. Astrue, No. JKS 08–3140, 2009 WL
5030706, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2009) (all holding that an ALJ’s duty to explain his findings
and conclusions on all material issues of fact or law is satisfied when a reviewing court can
determine, from an ALJ’s opinion and the evidence of record, how he reached his conclusion).
Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this argument.
Third, Mr. Weddle disagrees with the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion of his treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Itskowitz. Pl.’s Mot. 8–14. Mr. Weddle contends that the ALJ failed to abide
by Social Security regulations when she accorded the opinion only “little weight.” (Tr. 26). The
ALJ must generally give more weight to a treating source’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). However, where a treating source’s opinion is not supported by
clinical evidence or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded
significantly less weight. Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. The ALJ is not required to give controlling
weight to a treating source’s opinion on the ultimate issue of disability. SSR 96–5p, 1996 WL
374193, at *5 (July 2, 1986). If the ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling
weight, the ALJ will assign weight after applying several factors, such as, the length and nature
of the treatment relationship, the degree to which the opinion is supported by the record as a
whole, and any other factors that support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)(6); 416.927(c)(1)-(6). Pursuant to Social Security regulations, the ALJ is required to “give good
reasons” for the weight assigned to a treating source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2);
416.927(c)(2).
Although Mr. Weddle argues that the ALJ failed to adequately explain how Dr.
Itskowitz’s opinion was unsupported by the medical evidence of record, I find that the ALJ’s
evaluation of the opinion was more than sufficient. The ALJ provided several reasons for her
assignment of weight. She noted that Dr. Itskowitz’s finding that Mr. Weddle had marked
limitations in three functional areas was inconsistent with the medical evidence. (Tr. 26). She
also noted that Mr. Weddle’s GAF score of 60 indicated only mild, moderate symptoms, and that
there was a lack of medical support for the report in general. Id. I agree. As noted above, Mr.
Weddle’s own Function Reports are contrary to a finding of “marked” limitations in activities of
Ernest Weddle v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-1588
May 9, 2014
Page 4
daily living. Mr. Weddle has no problem with personal care, he prepares his own meals, drives a
car, goes shopping, pays bills, watches television, and visits friends on occasion. See (Tr. 251–
58, 282–89). Furthermore, the treatment notes of Dr. Itskowitz indicate that Mr. Weddle’s
mental status examinations were largely positive. See (Tr. 333–40, 504–510) (consistently
noting that Mr. Weddle was “well groomed” and “cooperative” with “goal directed” thought
processes and “alert and oriented” cognition). Mr. Weddle also argues that the ALJ failed to
appreciate the regulatory definition of “marked” limitations, and that the ALJ failed to note that
Dr. Itskowitz’s opinion was consistent with his own subjective complaints. Pl.’s Mot. 10–11.
However, as discussed above, the ALJ found that Dr. Itskowitz’s findings of “marked”
limitations in three functional areas were not supported by the medical evidence of record. Also,
as noted above, the ALJ properly applied the two-part test for assessing a claimant’s credibility,
and the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore,
remand is not appropriate.
Finally, Mr. Weddle argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by
substantial evidence because it fails to include limitations assessed by state agency physicians.
Pl.’s Mot. 14. At the initial and reconsideration levels, state agency physicians assessed Mr.
Weddle’s mental RFC. See (Tr. 63–73, 87–99). The state agency physicians found “moderate
limitations” in categories of sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, and
adaptation. Id. Significantly, both opinions concluded that Mr. Weddle was capable of
performing work, and not therefore disabled. Louis Perrott, Ph.D., opined that Mr. Weddle
retained the capacity to “perform simple, routine, non-stressful work requiring minimal social
interaction.” (Tr. 70). At the reconsideration level, Dr. Amos stated that Mr. Weddle also
retained the capacity to engage in “nonstressful tasks at SGA levels.” (Tr. 96). The ALJ’s RFC
assessment comported with the opinions of state agency physicians. The ALJ limited Mr.
Weddle’s interactions with the public, and coworkers, and limited Mr. Weddle to a low-stress
environment with simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 24). Accordingly, Mr. Weddle’s
argument is without merit and remand is unnecessary.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 11)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge
An
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