Matthews v. Colvin

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/16/14. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 6/16/14-das)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KIRK B. MATTHEWS

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v.
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Civil Case No. ELH-13-1720
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COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
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MEMORANDUM
On June 18, 2013, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Stephanie Gallagher for a
Report and Recommendations as to any dispositive motions. ECF 6. After the Commissioner
filed a motion for summary judgment, ECF 16, Judge Gallagher issued her Report and
Recommendations on April 11, 2014. ECF 18. Plaintiff, Kirk B. Matthews, who is selfrepresented, did not file any objections to the Report and Recommendations within fourteen
days. Therefore, on April 29, 2014, I entered an Order adopting Judge Gallagher’s Report and
Recommendations and granting the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. ECF 19.1
Mr. Matthews subsequently filed a “Motion to Reopen Case,” in which he alleged that he
had been provided incorrect information about the procedure for filing objections. ECF 20. On
May 21, 2014, I issued an Order permitting Mr. Matthews to submit specific written objections
to my Order of April 29, 2014. ECF 21. Mr. Matthews filed his specific written objections on
May 27, 2014, ECF 22, which will be considered as a Motion for Reconsideration.

The

Commissioner filed a response to his objections on June 2, 2014. ECF 23. For the reasons set
forth herein, Mr. Matthews’s Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
Mr. Matthews objects to Judge Gallagher’s Report and Recommendations on two
grounds. First, he argues that Judge Gallagher failed to consider the medical evidence from his

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16).

Mr. Matthews did not oppose the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF

doctors at Owensville Primary Care, Inc. ECF 22. Second, he contends that Judge Gallagher
failed to consider vocational expert testimony in which, in response to certain of the
hypotheticals posed by the ALJ, the vocational expert opined that the hypothetical individual
would be unable to work. Id.
Where a party objects to a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendations as to a
dispositive motion, the district judge must “determine de novo any part of the Magistrate Judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also Chavis v.
Smith, 834 F. Supp. 153, 154 (D. Md. 1993) (noting that the Court “need only conduct a de novo
review of those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation to which
objection is made”). As to those portions of the report for which there is no objection, the
district court “must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310,
315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee notes).
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), I have reviewed the record and have made a de
novo determination of the issues to which the Report and Recommendation relates, including the
objections lodged by Mr. Matthews. I remain completely persuaded that Judge Gallagher’s
recommended rulings are correct and reasonable.
Mr. Matthews’s records from Owensville Primary Care were expressly considered both
by the ALJ (see ECF 12, Tr. 15-16) and by Judge Gallagher. ECF 18 at 3-4. The relevant
records in the file from Owensville Primary Care do not reflect many of the medical conditions
Mr. Matthews lists in his Motion for Reconsideration. See Tr. 330-47, 360-63, 374-76. There is
one record in the file from Owensville Primary Care, dated September 11, 2012, reflecting that
Mr. Matthews was reporting fatigue and night sweats. Tr. 390-91. However, that appointment
significantly post-dates the ALJ’s opinion of May 25, 2012, and is therefore not relevant for
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consideration. Tr. 8-22. I find that the ALJ and Judge Gallagher considered the relevant medical
evidence in the file before reaching their conclusions.
Mr. Matthews’s other argument is that certain aspects of the vocational expert’s
testimony were not properly addressed. However, Judge Gallagher expressly noted that the ALJ
had posed “a series of hypotheticals to the VE [i.e., vocational expert] to determine whether a
person with each set of hypothetical criteria would be able to find work,” and that, ultimately, the
ALJ determined that Mr. Matthews’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment matched
the hypothetical that the vocational expert had testified would permit certain types of work. ECF
18 at 4-5. The ALJ is afforded “great latitude in posing hypothetical questions and is free to
accept or reject suggested restrictions so long as there is substantial evidence to support the
ultimate question.” Koonce v. Apfel, 166 F.3d 1209, 1999 WL 7864, at *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 11,
1999) (citing Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986)). The ALJ is free to pose as
many different hypotheticals to the vocational expert as he wishes, and by doing so, is not
binding himself to accept each hypothetical upon his full consideration of the entire record.
Ultimately, in Mr. Matthews’s case, the ALJ selected a hypothetical that matched the RFC
assessment which, for the reasons addressed in Judge Gallagher’s Report and Recommendations,
was supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, I find that all of Judge Gallagher’s proposed rulings, as reflected in her thorough
and careful analysis, are correct and reasonable in every respect. Therefore, I find no reason to
disturb my Order adopting Judge Gallagher’s Report and Recommendations as my own opinion,
and I deny Mr. Matthews’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 22). A separate Order follows.

Dated: June 16, 2014

/s/
Ellen Lipton Hollander
United States District Judge
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