Jackson v. Experian Financial Services

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 2/26/2014. (c/s 2/26/2014 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 

QUINTEN L. JACKSON,

* 

Plaintiff,

* 

v.

*

Civil Action No. RDB-13-1758 

*

EXPERIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES,

Defendant.
*

*

*

*

* 
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

* 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 
The Plaintiff Quinten L. Jackson, proceeding pro se, asserts claims against the
Defendant Experian Financial Services (“Defendant” or “Experian”), a credit reporting
agency, for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and for defamation. Pending before this Court is Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF No. 5). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no
hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that
follow, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND 
Jackson’s Complaint consists of a one-page statement of facts1 with a rambling,
unintelligible twelve-page attachment. See ECF No. 1-1. His allegations boil down to a
claim that Experian reported a tax lien of $1,198.12 that he had already paid, causing his

1

The form used for Jackson’s Complaint is for claims made by prisoners pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. No allegations in any of Jackson’s filings support a § 1983 claim.

application for a credit card to be refused. Jackson claims that these circumstances entitle
him to relief from Experian in the form of damages totaling $550,000.00.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and
each allegation therein must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1).
In general, a pleading must provide the defendant and the court with “fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Additionally, a complaint
must allege sufficient facts to advance a plaintiff’s claim “across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  
As this Court has held, “‘the proper length and level of clarity for a pleading cannot
be defined with any great precision and is largely a matter for the discretion of the trial
court.’” Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999) (quoting Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, 5 Federal Practice & Procedure § 1217 (2d ed. 1990)). Although a pro se
plaintiff is generally given more leeway than a party represented by counsel, this Court “has
not hesitated to require even pro se litigants to state their claims in an understandable and
efficient manner.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, 130 F.R.D. 616, 617 (D.
Md. 1989), aff’d, 900 F.2d 249, 1990 WL 41120 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table decision)).
To that end, a district court “is not obliged to ferret through a [c]omplaint, searching for
2

viable claims.” Wynn-Bey v. Talley, No. RWT-12-3121, 2012 WL 5986967, at *2 (D. Md. Nov.
28, 2012). Rather, a court “may dismiss a complaint that is so confused, ambiguous, vague
or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. (quoting
Salhuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)).  
ANALYSIS
The Complaint in this case is a one-page summary, followed by a twelve-page
attachment. It is not a “short and plain statement, nor is it concise and direct.” Wynn-Bey,
2012 WL 5986967, at *2. The Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss does not address any of the legal arguments raised by Experian and states only in
conclusory fashion that dismissal is improper and that he is entitled to judgment in his favor.
Thus the Plaintiff “places an unjustifiable burden on [the Defendant] to determine the
nature of the claims against [it] and to speculate on what [its] defenses might be,” and
unfairly burdens this Court “to sort out the factual basis of any claims fairly raised.” Id.
(citing Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 123 (D Md. 1981)); Stone, 184 F.R.D. at 555 (“The
Complaint presents a tangled web of conclusory accusations that frequently fail to
correspond with any supporting facts. As such, it places an unfair burden on the defendants
and this Court to attempt to determine which claims have merit and which [do not].”).
To the extent that the Plaintiff’s filings contain any facts relating to the reporting of a
satisfied tax lien on his credit report, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. First, this Court construes Jackson’s Complaint as asserting claims that Experian
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 US.C. §§ 1681e(a) and 1681i(a), by
improperly reporting that he had paid a tax lien to the State of Maryland. To state a claim
3

under these provisions of the FCRA, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that his credit
report contains inaccurate information. See, e.g., Brooks v. Midland Crdit Mgmt., Inc., No.
WDQ-12-1296, 2013 WL 1010455, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013) (citing DeAndrade v.
TransUnion LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2008)). The information allegedly reported by
Experian is accurate based on the documentation attached to Jackson’s Complaint. See
Release of Maryland Tax Lien, ECF No. 1-1 at 13 (reflecting that Quinten L. Jackson
satisfied a tax lien of $1,198.12). Because the Plaintiff has not alleged an element of a claim
pursuant to the FCRA, the Defendant’s Motion will be granted.
Similarly, a false statement is an element of a defamation claim under Maryland law.
Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 n.28 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Piscatelli v. Van
Smith, 35 A.3d 1140, 1147 (Md. 2012)). Because, as noted above, Jackson has not alleged a
false statement by Experian, his defamation claim also fails.
Finally, Jackson wholly fails to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”). The FDCPA applies only to actions taken by debt collectors in connection
with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692; Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, No.
RDB-13-0219, 2014 WL 334814, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2014). Jackson does not allege that
Experian is a debt collector that is covered by the FDCPA or that Experian took any action
to collect a debt. Rather, Jackson simply states that Experian reported that the tax lien had
been paid. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not apply in this case, and Jackson’s
third claim is accordingly dismissed.  
In sum, despite his pro se status, Jackson must still state his claims in “an
understandable and efficient manner,” Stone, 184 F.R.D. at 555, and he must plausibly show
4

that he is entitled to relief from the Defendant. Iqbal, 556 at 680 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). His unintelligible and factually unsupported Complaint fails to meet these
standards. Accordingly, his case is subject to dismissal.2

CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) is
GRANTED without prejudice.  
A separate Order follows.

Dated: February 26, 2014

/s/
Richard D. Bennett 
United States District Judge 

2

Without deciding whether process or service of process was defective in this case, because
numerous other grounds for dismissal exist, this Court declines to dismiss on the basis of lack of
personal jurisdiction because of any violation of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5