Greene v. Tower Federal Credit Union
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Timothy J. Sullivan on 9/29/14. (dass, Deputy Clerk)(c/m to plaintiff at address of record and to 336 Palladium Court, Owings Mills, MD 21133 per chambers 9/29/14-das)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MDD_TJSchambers@mdd.uscourts.gov
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-4560
Fax (410) 962-3630
September 29, 2014
LETTER TO PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL
RE:
Greene v. Tower Federal Credit Union
Civil No. WDQ-13-1883
Dear Mr. Greene and Counsel:
This case has been referred to me for the resolution of discovery disputes and related
scheduling matters. ECF No. 15. In a letter opinion dated August 18, 2014 (ECF No. 16), I
granted Defendant Tower Federal Credit Union’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Compel Responses to
Document Requests (ECF No. 14-3). Having granted the Motion to Compel, I went on to find
that the circumstances outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) does not apply to preclude an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs. See ECF No. 16 at 5. I directed Defendant to submit an
affidavit in support of its fees and costs in connection with the Motion to Compel, and further
directed that Plaintiff could submit its position on the matter on or before September 12, 2014.
Defendant filed an affidavit in support of its request for attorneys’ fees, but Plaintiff did not
submit its position on an award of fees, and the time for doing so has passed.
Defendant requests that the Court require Plaintiff to pay the attorneys’ fees Defendant
incurred pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).1 Under this rule, where a motion to compel is
granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent
whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in
making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). To determine what
constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Court calculates the lodestar amount (the product of
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly
rate) and then determines whether an adjustment is warranted by considering the factors
enunciated in Brodziak v. Runyon, 145 F.3d 194, 196 (4th Cir. 1998). These factors are:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4)
the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the
litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in
1
Defendant does not request an award of costs.
similar cases.
Id. The party seeking attorneys’ fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
amount sought.
The affidavit (ECF No. 18) submitted by Defendant is signed by defense counsel Charles
R. Bacharach. Mr. Bacharach states that he has “been a practicing attorney specializing in
employment law for over 25 years and has been counsel in over 90 cases before this Court.” ECF
No. 18 at 1. In this case, Mr. Bacharach’s hourly billing rate is $495, less a 15% “courtesy
discount.” Id. This amounts to an hourly billing rate of about $420.75, which I note falls within
the presumptively reasonable range in this district for attorneys with comparable experience, as
set forth in Appendix B to this Court’s Local Rules (“Rules and Guidelines for Determining
Attorneys’ Fees in Certain Cases”).
Mr. Bacharach has attached to the affidavit an invoice to the Defendant that includes 5.5
hours of time he billed in relation to the Motion to Compel. This time was spent communicating with
Plaintiff about the discovery issues, reviewing Plaintiff’s insufficient discovery responses, drafting
the Motion to Compel and conducting legal research related to it. I find that the time Mr. Bacharach
spent on the Motion to Compel is reasonable, and accept $2,314.12 as the lodestar. I do not find that
any of the factors set forth in Brodziak v. Runyon, 145 F.3d at 196, warrant an adjustment to the
lodestar amount. Accordingly, I award Defendant attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,314.12.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion. An
implementing Order follows.2
Very truly yours,
/s/
Timothy J. Sullivan
United States Magistrate Judge
2
The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this letter opinion and accompanying order to
Plaintiff at the address on file with the Court, as well as the following address: Dwight C.
Greene, 9803 Kerrigan Court, Randallstown, MD 21133.
2
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