Brooks v. Astrue et al
Filing
17
OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 9/9/14. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-7780
Fax (410) 962-1812
September 9, 2014
LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:
Georganna Brooks v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2218
Dear Counsel:
On July 30, 2013, the Plaintiff, Georganna Brooks, petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. ECF No. 1. I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 12, 16. I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will
grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny the Plaintiff’s motion. This letter explains my
rationale.
Ms. Brooks filed her claims on May 21, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of June 30,
2009. (Tr. 196–208). Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 113–18,
123–36). A hearing was held on May 9, 2012 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. 43–56). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Brooks was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 12–26). The
Appeals Council denied Ms. Brooks’s request for review, (Tr. 1–5), so the ALJ’s decision
constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Brooks suffered from the severe impairments of bilateral knee
osteoarthritis status post replacements, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 17).
Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms. Brooks retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
with limited pushing/pulling with the bilateral lower extremities, no crawling or
climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolds, only occasional performance of other
postural activities, an avoidance of even moderate exposure to workplace hazards,
and an avoidance of concentrated exposure to both extreme temperatures and
vibration. She is capable of completing simple tasks, following simple directions /
assisting in simple work tasks to completion, everyday social interactions,
adjusting to ordinary changes, following work rules, and maintaining safety. The
Georganna Brooks v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2218
September 9, 2014
Page 2
claimant retains the capacity to perform simple, routine, nonstressful work in a
competitive environment involving little-to-no contact with the public or
coworkers.
(Tr. 19). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Brooks could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, and that
she was not therefore disabled. (Tr. 25–26).
Ms. Brooks’s primary challenge on appeal is that the ALJ made an erroneous RFC
assessment. She argues that the medical evidence establishes that she is capable of performing
only sedentary work. As part of her argument, she first contends that the ALJ did not assign
proper weight to her GAF scores, or to the opinions of a registered nurse. Second, she disagrees
with the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. Finally, she argues that, but for the ALJ’s
combination of errors, she would have been deemed disabled pursuant to the Medical Vocational
Guidelines. Each argument lacks merit and is addressed sequentially.
Ms. Brooks first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her GAF scores. Pl.’s Mot. 1415. The ALJ stated that he considered Ms. Brooks’s GAF scores and assigned them “appropriate
weight to the extent they are consistent with the credible evidence of record and the above
residual functional capacity.” (Tr. 24). While the assignment of “appropriate weight” fails to
convey the precise weight accorded to the GAF scores, see Lewis v. Colvin, CBD-11-1423, 2013
WL 6839505, at *5–6 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2013), such error is harmless here because GAF scores
are not determinative of disability. See, e.g., Davis v. Astrue, Case No. JKS–09–2545, 2010 WL
5237850, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2010) (noting that the SSA does not endorse the use of GAF
scores, and, further, that GAF scores do not correlate to the severity requirements in the mental
disorder listings). However, nothing prohibits an ALJ from considering GAF scores as one
component of a full analysis of the evidence of record. See, e.g., Kozel v. Astrue, No. JKS–10–
2180, 2012 WL 2951554, at *10 (D. Md. July 18, 2012) (“[E]ven though a GAF score is not
determinative of whether a person is disabled under SSA regulations, it may inform an ALJ’s
judgment.”). The ALJ clearly considered Ms. Brooks’s GAF scores together with the other
medical evidence of record in determining her RFC assessment. See (Tr. 21–24). The ALJ
noted that three of Ms. Brooks’s GAF scores — 43, 45, and 50 — indicated serious to moderate
symptoms, see (Tr. 22–23), however, the scores were of limited value because they offered only
a snapshot of her functioning on a given day and did not provide a longitudinal indication of
overall functioning. (Tr. 24). Given that GAF scores are not outcome determinative, and that
the ALJ appropriately considered the GAF scores as part of his overall assessment, remand on
this argument is unnecessary.
Ms. Brooks next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Betty Clark, a
registered nurse. The ALJ afforded RN Clark’s opinions “little-to-no weight” in part because
RN Clark is not considered an acceptable medical source. Ms. Brooks agrees that RN Clark is
not an acceptable medical source; however, she argues that because RN Clark submitted the two
Mental RFC Questionnaires from a treating physician’s office, her opinions should be viewed as
those of treating physician Dr. Callis. Pl.’s Mot. 15–16. In the alternative, Ms. Brooks argues
Georganna Brooks v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2218
September 9, 2014
Page 3
that remand is warranted because the ALJ failed to apply the proper factors for evaluating
opinion evidence. Id. at 17–19. Both arguments lack merit. First, this Court will not presume
that the Mental RFC Questionnaires reflect the opinions of Dr. Callis merely because the forms
were submitted from his office, and are addressed to both him and RN Clark. See (Tr. 522–26,
566–70). RN Clark completed, printed, and signed her name on both forms. There is no
evidence indicating that authorship of the opinions is shared by anyone other than RN Clark.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to evaluate the Mental RFC Questionnaires as
treating source opinions.
Second, the ALJ articulated several reasons why he afforded RN Clark’s opinions “littleto-no-weight,” all of which are supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 24). The ALJ noted the
brief treatment history between RN Clark and Ms. Brooks, and the inconsistency between RN
Clark’s opinions and the other medical evidence of record. Id. Specifically, the ALJ pointed out
that RN Clark’s opinions were inconsistent with the treatment notes of Dr. Callis, who observed
in June, August, September, and December, 2011 that Ms. Brooks was “stable with her present
medications.” See (Tr. 548, 550, 551, 553); see also (Tr. 509) (April, 2011 treatment note
indicating that Ms. Brooks is “eating well and sleeping well” and “is in a very good mood”); (Tr.
510–11) (February, 2011 mental status exam demonstrating normal speech and psychomotor
activity, intact thought flow and content, and depressed affect and mood); (Tr. 515) (January,
2011 GCHMC diagnostic evaluation noting anxious mood, appropriate affect, intact flow and
content of thought, normal cognitive orientation). The ALJ also noted that Ms. Brooks was
taking college courses at the time of her evaluations with RN Clark, which further undermined
RN Clark’s opinions. (Tr. 24). Ms. Brooks is correct that SSR 06-03p explains the factors
applicable to an evaluation of opinion evidence from sources deemed “not acceptable medical
sources,” such as registered nurses. See 2006 WL 2329939, at * 4–5.
However, when
evaluating opinion evidence from these sources, the factors are discretionary. See Id. at *4
(“Although the factors in 20 CFR 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d) explicitly apply only to the
evaluation of medical opinions from ‘acceptable medical sources,’ these same factors can be
applied to opinion evidence from ‘other sources.’”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, SSR 06-03p
clearly states that, “[n]ot every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case.”
Id. at *5. Thus, while the ALJ expressly considered the length of the treatment relationship and
the consistency of RN Clark’s opinions with other evidence, the ALJ was not required to recite
each factor. Accordingly, remand on this argument is not appropriate.
Next, Ms. Brooks argues that the ALJ erroneously evaluated her credibility. Pl.’s Mot.
19. She contends that the ALJ erred in the second prong of the two-part test for evaluating a
claimant’s subjective complaints, set forth in Craig, 76 F.3d at 594- 95. I disagree. The first
prong requires a showing of objective medical evidence of a medical impairment reasonably
likely to cause the symptoms alleged by the claimant. Id. at 594. After the claimant meets this
threshold obligation, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s
[symptoms], and the extent to which it affects her ability to work.” Id. at 595. The ALJ
followed that process in this case. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Brooks’s “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Tr.
20). However, her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
Georganna Brooks v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2218
September 9, 2014
Page 4
symptoms were not fully credible. Id. The ALJ reasoned that despite Ms. Brooks’s complaints
of chronic severe knee pain and severe effects of depression and anxiety, her treatment “has been
relatively limited and conservative overall…” (Tr. 23). The ALJ noted that Ms. Brooks received
no treatment for her physical or mental conditions from August, 2009 to March, 2010, see (Tr.
23), and that her treatment largely consisted of medication management, which proved effective.
Id. The ALJ also highlighted several of Ms. Brooks’s inconsistent statements. Id. Ms. Brooks
testified that she does “not really” perform household chores, and that she “usually stay[s] in
[her] bedroom most of the time”. (Tr. 50–51). However in Adult Function Reports, Ms. Brooks
indicated that she prepares meals daily when she has energy, performs some cleaning and
laundry, and shops for groceries. (Tr. 241–42, 251, 253–54). She also stated that she visits with
her fiancée’s family once or twice a week, and that she goes fishing “once in a while.” (Tr. 243,
255). In addition, the ALJ noted that in a visit to the emergency room for a finger laceration,
Ms. Brooks reported that she injured herself while using hedge clippers, although she never once
reported being capable of performing outdoor household chores. See (Tr. 23) (citing Tr. 351).
Ms. Brooks argues that the ALJ omitted several of her complaints in the credibility discussion.
Pl.’s Mot. 20. While Ms. Brooks can point to testimonial evidence indicating that her symptoms
are disabling, the function of this Court is not to weigh conflicting evidence, determine
credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner’s. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). The ALJ relied on substantial evidence in reaching the adverse
credibility determination. Accordingly, remand is unnecessary.
Given that I find that the RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence, I do not
need to reach Ms. Brooks’s final argument that the ALJ should have restricted her to sedentary
work, rendering her disabled pursuant to the Medical Vocational Guidelines.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Brooks’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
12) will be DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) will be
GRANTED. The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge
An
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