Braxton v. Colvin

Filing 17

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 4/29/14. (apls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

April 29, 2014

LETTER TO COUNSEL:
RE:

William B. Braxton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2259

Dear Counsel:
On August 2, 2013, the Plaintiff, William B. Braxton, petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claims for Disability Insurance
benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1). I have considered
the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 14, 16). I find that no hearing is
necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency
if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). I will deny
Mr. Braxton’s motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
The procedural history in this case is lengthy. Mr. Braxton filed his claims for DIB and
SSI on February 28, 2007, alleging a disability onset date of January 15, 2004. (Tr. 111–17).
His claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 72–79, Tr. 81–82). A hearing was
held on April 29, 2009 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 40–67). Following
the hearing, on August 5, 2009, the ALJ determined that Mr. Braxton was not disabled during the
relevant time frame. (Tr. 12–18). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Braxton’s request for review
(Tr. 3–6), and Mr. Braxton sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). On July 5, 2011, this Court remanded Mr. Braxton’s claims to the
Commissioner, finding that the ALJ failed to analyze Mr. Braxton’s osteoarthritis of the knees
and peripheral neuropathy. (Tr. 391–94). A second hearing was held on May 2, 2012 (Tr. 364–
90), and on July 27, 2012, the ALJ determined for a second time that Mr. Braxton was not
disabled during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 402–18). The Appeals Council declined to assume
jurisdiction (Tr. 356–59), so the ALJ’s 2012 decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of
the agency.
The ALJ found that Mr. Braxton suffered from the severe impairments of diabetes,
essential hypertension, bilateral knee osteoarthritis, status post arthroscopy of the left knee,
peripheral neuropathy, and hernias. (Tr. 405). Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined
that Mr. Braxton retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except he can only occasionally push and pull
with the left lower extremity; only occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and must
avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards.” (Tr. 411). After
considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that Mr. Braxton
could perform past relevant work as a housekeeper, and that he was not therefore disabled. (Tr.
417).

William B. Braxton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2259
April 29, 2014
Page 2
Mr. Braxton presents three primary arguments on appeal. First, Mr. Braxton argues that
the ALJ improperly weighed two medical opinions. Second, he disagrees with the ALJ’s RFC
assessment and argues that it was based on an incorrect adverse credibility finding. Third, Mr.
Braxton contends that the ALJ failed to inquire into the demands of his past relevant work before
concluding that he was capable of performing that work.
Mr. Braxton first argues that the ALJ should not have rejected the April, 2012 Physical
RFC Questionnaire completed by Dr. Green, a treating physician. Dr. Green opined that Mr.
Braxton’s impairments would cause him to be absent from work twice a month, and that Mr.
Braxton would require two 15-minute rest periods in an eight-hour day. (Tr. 535–36). Dr. Green
also opined that Mr. Braxton could sit 30 minutes at one time, stand 15 minutes at one time, and
never lift more than 20 or 50 pounds. (Tr. 536–37). The ALJ must generally give more weight
to a treating source’s opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2); 416.927(c)(2). However, where
a treating source’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight. Craig, 76 F.3d at 590. If
the ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ will assign weight
after applying several factors, such as the length and nature of the treatment relationship, the
degree to which the opinion is supported by the record as a whole, and any other factors that
support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)–(6); 416.927(c)(1)–(6).
The ALJ cited several reasons for according the opinion little weight, all of which are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ noted the brief treatment history,
which consisted of only a “few” visits with Dr. Green in the year prior to her opinion. (Tr. 416).
Dr. Green’s treatment of Mr. Braxton consisted largely of medication management, which the
ALJ noted was inconsistent with Dr. Green’s conclusion that Mr. Braxton’s impairments were
disabling. (Tr. 416). Moreover, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Green’s opinion was not supported
by other medical evidence of record, namely Dr. Desai’s treatment notes, which demonstrated
that Mr. Braxton’s diabetes generally improved with medication, but that he was frequently noncompliant. See (Tr. 416–17) (citing Tr. 333–35; 344, 346, 348, 350–51, 353). In fact, Dr.
Green’s own notes demonstrate that Mr. Braxton did not consistently take his medication. See
(Tr. 526) (noting that Mr. Braxton “did not know he had to refill his clonidine and he has been
out for over one month. Also admits to noncompliance with diet”); (Tr. 533) (noting Mr. Braxton
“did not take his meds this morning”).
Likewise, the ALJ’s decision to accord “significant weight” to a September, 2008 opinion
from treating physician Dr. Desai is supported by substantial evidence. In a treatment record,
Dr. Desai opined that Mr. Braxton “could work if his sugars and BP were better controlled.” (Tr.
321). As noted above, the medical evidence of record demonstrates that Mr. Braxton’s diabetes
was uncontrolled due to non-compliance. The ALJ properly reviewed the medical findings and
other evidence and found that Dr. Desai’s opinion was “supported by evidence and explanation”
and “consistent with and not contradicted by the record as a whole.” (Tr. 416). Accordingly,
remand is not warranted.
Next, Mr. Braxton argues that the ALJ failed to consider his subjective complaints of

William B. Braxton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2259
April 29, 2014
Page 3
pain resulting from peripheral neuropathy and his osteoarthritis, both of which the ALJ deemed
“severe impairments.” Pl.’s Mot. 14–17. Mr. Braxton suggests that the designation of his
impairments as severe merited specific restrictions in the RFC assessment. The “[p]laintiff’s
burden of showing a severe impairment at step two is only a ‘de minimis screening device used
to dispose of groundless claims.’ ” Taylor v. Astrue, No. BPG-11-032, 2012 WL 294532, at *8
(D. Md. Jan. 31, 2012) (quoting Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005)). An ALJ
may “find at step two that a claimant’s condition is severe—because the medical evidence does
not conclusively prove otherwise—and yet at step four find no substantial evidence that the
condition actually limits the claimant’s ability to work.” Id. Here, the ALJ discussed the records
evidencing Mr. Braxton’s osteoarthritis and peripheral neuropathy. See (Tr. 405–06). However,
despite finding that the impairments were “severe,” the ALJ did not find that they prohibited Mr.
Braxton from performing medium work. The ALJ cited specific evidence from the medical
record demonstrating that Mr. Braxton’s complaints of knee pain and tingling in the hands and
feet were inconsistent and contradicted by, on average, normal physical examinations. (Tr. 413–
14). The ALJ noted that Mr. Braxton did not complain of knee problems or tingling of the hands
and feet in late 2007. (Tr. 413) (citing Tr. 350, 353–55). Records from Dr. Sherman showed
that he had no knee pathology on examination in 2008 and 2009, and he denied any tingling of
either foot. (Tr. 414) (citing Tr. 299, 310, 312, 316, 318, 324, 326, 328, 331, 334, 339, 344,
346). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Desai’s treatment records lacked any complaints of knee pain
or tingling sensations in the extremities. Id. at 414. Thus, it is clear that the ALJ found that Mr.
Braxton’s osteoarthritis and peripheral neuropathy were not disabling. That finding is supported
by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed.
Mr. Braxton also claims that the ALJ failed to abide by the two-part test for evaluating a
claimant’s allegations of pain. Pl.’s Mot. 15–17. The first prong of this test requires a
determination that there is objective medical evidence of a medical impairment reasonably likely
to cause the pain alleged by the claimant. Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. The second prong requires the
ALJ to consider “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it
affects [his] ability to work.” Id. at 595. The ALJ followed that process in this case and
provided an analysis nearly four pages long. See (Tr. 411–16). As described above, the ALJ
cited to specific evidence from the medical record demonstrating the inconsistencies between
Mr. Braxton’s subjective complaints and the longitudinal medical record. Therefore, remand on
this argument is unnecessary.
Finally, Mr. Braxton argues that the ALJ’s finding at step four that he could perform past
relevant work as a housekeeper did not include a specific finding of fact as to the physical and
mental demands of housekeeping work. Pl.’s Mot. 17–20. I disagree. The ALJ need not adduce
VE testimony to decide a case at step four, but may rely on information about the past relevant
work that is provided by the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560; 416.960. SSR 82-62 requires
that the ALJ consider the requirements of a claimant’s past relevant work.
Determination of the claimant’s ability to do PRW requires a careful appraisal of
(1) the individual’s statements as to which past work requirements can no longer
be met and the reason(s) for his or her inability to meet those requirements; (2)

William B. Braxton v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-2259
April 29, 2014
Page 4
medical evidence establishing how the impairment limits ability to meet the
physical and mental requirements of the work; and (3) in some cases,
supplementary or corroborative information from other sources such as
employers, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, etc., on the requirements of the
work as generally performed in the economy.
SSR 82–62, at *3. The ALJ properly considered Mr. Braxton’s testimony from both hearings
regarding the requirements of his hospital cleaning work. See (Tr. 48–50, 374–77). Mr. Braxton
testified that he lifted nearly 40 to 50 pounds, and that he also collected trash, buffed floors, and
cleaned rooms. (Tr. 48–50; 374–76). The VE was present for Mr. Braxton’s testimony. (Tr.
366). The VE testified that Mr. Braxton’s work was performed at the medium exertional level,
according to the DOT. (Tr. 387). The ALJ’s finding that Mr. Braxton could perform his past
relevant work was based on the RFC assessment, which considered the medical evidence of
record demonstrating that Mr. Braxton was fully capable of performing medium work with
certain limitations. See (Tr. 417); see also (Tr. 172–79, 192–99) (Physical RFC Assessments).
I also do not find that the ALJ failed in his responsibility to ask whether a conflict existed
between the VE testimony and the DOT. Pl.’s Mot. 18–19. SSR 00-04p provides that, in the
instance of an apparent unresolved conflict between VE evidence and the DOT, the ALJ “must
elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict.” SSR 00-04p, at *3. I am not persuaded that an
unresolved conflict exists here. Mr. Braxton contends that his past relevant work was performed
at the “heavy” exertional level. Pl.’s Mot. 19–20. However, that argument is based on a lone
Disability Report stating that the heaviest weight Mr. Braxton lifted as a housekeeper was 80
pounds. (Tr. 132). As noted above, Mr. Braxton testified at both hearings that he lifted up to 50
pounds and performed routine housekeeping work. Accordingly, remand is not warranted.
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14)
will be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) will be
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion.
implementing Order follows.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge

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