J.W. v. Corporal Carrier et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 56 Renewal Motion of Defendants for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 5/4/2015. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
J.W.

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Plaintiff
vs.

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CORPORAL CARRIER, et al.

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Defendants
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-13-2386

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Court has before it Defendants' Renewal of Motion for
Summary Judgment [Document 56] and the materials submitted
relating thereto.

I.

The Court finds a hearing unnecessary.

BACKGROUND
The instant case pertains to an incident that occurred at

Arundel Middle School ("School") in Anne Arundel County,
Maryland ("AAC") on February 8, 2013.
student attending the School.

Plaintiff J.W.1 was a

Defendant Corporal Jonathan

Carrier ("Corporal Carrier") was a police officer with the AAC
Police Department, serving as the School's Resource Officer.

On

the afternoon of February 8, 2013, J.W. acted in a manner that
justified Corporal Carrier placing J.W. in handcuffs and
transporting him to a hospital for an emergency psychiatric
1

Plaintiff J.W., a minor child, has brought this lawsuit by
and through his father and next friend Eugene Wikle.

evaluation.

During the encounter, J.W. sustained an injury to

his left wrist.
J.W. subsequently filed a Complaint against Corporal
Carrier, AAC, the Anne Arundel County Board of Education
("BOE"), and three employees of the School - Ramone Jarvis,
Darcel Parker, and Kyle McKnett.2

Defendants timely removed the

case to this Court.
In the Second Amended Complaint3 [Document 29], J.W.
asserted claims in ten Counts:
Count I:

Assault

Count II:

Battery

Count III:

False Arrest

Count IV:

False Imprisonment

Count V:

Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress ("IIED")

Count VI:

Negligence

Count VII:

Excessive Use of Force
(42 U.S.C. §1983)

Count VIII:

Violation of Maryland Declaration of
Rights

2

J.W. also named the School and the AAC Police Department as
Defendants.
3
J.W. filed an Amended Complaint [Document 3]. In response,
Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss [Document 11].
The Court provided J.W. with the opportunity to file a Second
Amended Complaint ("SAC") superseding the Amended Complaint and
directed J.W. to "consider the filings of Defendants addressed
to the Amended Complaint in deciding what to include in the
[SAC]" and to "omit from the [SAC] claims that lack any
reasonable basis in fact and law." [Document 24] at 2.
2

Count IX:

Respondeat Superior

Count X:

Americans with Disabilities Act
(42 U.S.C. § 12101)

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
[Document 31], seeking dismissal of all claims.

In his Response

[Document 35], J.W. voluntarily dismissed certain claims.4
On June 25, 2014, the Court issued its Memorandum and Order
Re: Motion to Dismiss, [Document 50], leaving pending the
following claims based upon allegations that Corporal Carrier
used excessive force after he placed J.W. in handcuffs5:

Count I - Assault

COUNT

AGAINST DEFENDANT(S)
Carrier

Count II - Battery

Carrier

Count VII - 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Carrier

Count VIII - Maryland Declaration of (1) Carrier (2) BOE
Rights
(3) AAC
Regarding, the claims based upon excessive force, the Court
stated:
4

J.W. dismissed completely Counts III, IV, and X, and
dismissed partially Count VII against BOE and AAC. See
[Document 35] at 2.
5
The Court dismissed completely Counts V, VI, and IX. J.W.
had asserted a respondeat superior claim against BOE and AAC for
alleged violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by
Corporal Carrier, asserted in Count VIII. However, "there is no
separate cause of action [in Maryland] for respondent superior."
Stewart v. Bierman, 859 F. Supp. 2d 754, 768 & n.8 (D. Md.
2012). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Count IX as a free
standing claim, but considered Count VIII to include a claim of
respondeat superior liability against BOE and AAC.
3

It is doubtful that JW has pleaded a
plausible excessive force claim. However, to
avoid any doubt as to the lack of merit of
J.W.'s
claims,
the
Court
finds
it
appropriate to convert the instant motion to
one for summary judgment in regard to the
constitutionally-based
excessive
force
claims. By so doing, J.W. will be required
to present evidence - including his own
testimony
rather
than
mere
sweeping
allegations – to support his excessive force
claims.
[Document 50] at 19.
The Court ordered that:
The parties may engage in discovery and
shall . . . present any evidence they wish
considered - in addition to matters now of
record - in regard to Defendants' request
for summary judgment on all claims remaining
in Counts I, II, VII, and VIII.
Id. at 25 (internal footnote omitted).

Specifically, the Court

stated that "[t]he discovery shall include a deposition of J.W.,
so that the Court can be informed precisely and unambiguously
what J.W.'s testimony is regarding material facts that may be in
dispute."

Id. at 25 n.17.

By the instant renewed Motion, Defendants Corporal Carrier,
BOE, and AAC seek summary judgment on all remaining claims
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the

pleadings and supporting documents "show[] that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a).
The well-established principles pertinent to summary
judgment motions can be distilled to a simple statement:

The

Court may look at the evidence presented in regard to a motion
for summary judgment through the non-movant's rose-colored
glasses, but must view it realistically.

After so doing, the

essential question is whether a reasonable fact finder could
return a verdict for the non-movant or whether the movant would,
at trial, be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See,

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir. 1991).
Thus, in order "[t]o defeat a motion for summary judgment,
the party opposing the motion must present evidence of specific
facts from which the finder of fact could reasonably find for
him or her."

Mackey v. Shalala, 43 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (D. Md.

1999) (emphasis added).

However, "self-serving, conclusory, and

uncorroborated statements are insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact."

Int'l Waste Indus. Corp. v. Cape

Envtl. Mgmt., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 542, 558 n.11 (D. Md. 2013);
see also Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App'x 279, 281
(4th Cir. 2008).

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When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must bear in mind that the "[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.'"

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Factual Background6

On February 7, 2013, Corporal Carrier and a guidance
counselor and psychologist at the School had a meeting regarding
J.W.

[Document 31-2] at 4.

Corporal Carrier had been called to

J.W.'s classrooms several times over the previous weeks because
J.W. had been making "concerning" statements to students and
School staff.

Id.

Corporal Carrier was informed that J.W. was

on medications "for his conditions," but that the School planned
to seek additional psychological help during a meeting with
J.W.'s parents scheduled for the following day – February 8,
2013.

Id. at 5.

6

The Factual Background as stated herein is based upon
J.W.'s testimony at his deposition and does not refer to
statements from or actions by J.W. that Corporal Carrier,
Parker, and Jarvis referenced in their Affidavits or that were
included in the AAC Police Department's incident report.
6

The next day - February 8, 2013 - at around 1:30 PM,
Corporal Carrier was called to a classroom because J.W. was
having an outburst.

[Document 31-2] at 5.

J.W. testified at

his deposition7 that he had an "episode" while going from his
fifth period class to his sixth period class because students
had been teasing him.

J.W. Dep. 21:11-20; [Document 31-2] at 5.

Jarvis, a Student Advocate at the School, met J.W. outside
the fifth period class and escorted him to an empty classroom in
an attempt to calm him down.
¶¶ 3-4.

J.W. Dep. 21:21-22:12; Jarvis Aff.

J.W. testified that he was very upset and that Jarvis

was not able to calm him down.

J.W. Dep. 22:10-14.

Jarvis

called Interim Assistant Principal Parker and Corporal Carrier
to provide assistance.

Jarvis Aff. ¶ 5.

Parker and Corporal

Carrier responded with McKnett, a School employee to whom J.W.
had been sent on at least two previous occasions to calm down
after having an outburst.

J.W. Dep. 24:1-24; Carrier Aff. ¶ 3.

J.W. testified that he remained upset while Jarvis, Parker,
McKnett, and Corporal Carrier were in the classroom and that he
lifted up a desk and tipped it over near Parker.
25:1-26:5.

J.W. Dep.

He also told the School employees that he was going

to harm himself.

Id.

7

All references herein to "testimony" from J.W. pertain to
testimony given at his deposition.
7

Corporal Carrier informed J.W. that he (Corporal Carrier)
was going to place handcuffs on J.W., and J.W. was aware that
Corporal Carrier intended to take him to the hospital.
28:3-11.

Id.

J.W. did not want to go to the hospital, and he

testified that he pulled away from Corporal Carrier as Corporal
Carrier tried to handcuff him.

Id. 28:15-29:3.

When Corporal

Carrier handcuffed his right hand, J.W. grabbed a door handle
with his left hand and tried to pull away.

Id. 29:5-7.

After

Corporal Carrier handcuffed J.W.'s hands behind his back, J.W.
was struggling and tried to pull his hands out of the handcuffs.
Id. 32:10-15.
J.W. then kicked Corporal Carrier in the upper thigh.
29:15-30:8.

Id.

J.W. testified that he kicked Corporal Carrier

because he "didn't want to be taken away to prison or wherever I
thought I was going to go . . . like a juvenile detention
center."

Id. 31:11-17.

According to J.W., after he kicked

Corporal Carrier, "he [Corporal Carrier] went around behind me
and lifted up on my [left] arm."
that he "felt a lot of pain.
his left hand.

Id. 31:5-9.

J.W. testified

Like the worst pain in my life" in

Id. 33:1-5.

Corporal Carrier escorted J.W. out of the classroom to a
police car and transported him to Anne Arundel Medical Center
for an Emergency Evaluation.
31-2] at 5.

J.W. Dep. 34:9-35:15; [Document

At the hospital, J.W. complained of pain in his

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left wrist.
splint.

[Document 57] at 6.

Id. at 5.

His left wrist was put in a

Clinicians at Anne Arundel Medical Center

recommended in-patient psychiatric treatment for J.W., but
J.W.'s parents opted to take him home.

J.W. Dep. 39:6-14;

[Document 57] at 4, 8.
When asked at his deposition if he thought Corporal Carrier
was "being real rough with you or just trying to hold on to you
to keep you from getting away?", J.W. responded that he felt
Corporal Carrier was just trying to "[h]old on to me."
Dep. 38:2-4.

J.W.

Moreover J.W. testified that he was not prevented

from doing anything – e.g. playing baseball or other sports –
because of the previous injury to his wrist.

B.

Id. 41:4-18.

Claims Based on Excessive Force

J.W. asserts that Corporal Carrier utilized excessive force
when he "lifted [J.W.]'s arm subsequent to placing [J.W.] in
handcuffs."

[Document 64-2] at 5.

The excessive force

allegation is the basis of all remaining claims – assault,
battery, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Maryland Declaration of Rights.
In Maryland, "[a] battery is the intentional, unpermitted
touching of the body of another that is harmful or offensive to
the person who was touched."

Griffin v. Clark, No. RWT 11-2461,

2012 WL 4341677, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2012).

An assault is

defined as "the attempt to cause a harmful or offensive contact

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with another or to cause an apprehension of such contact."
Wallace v. Poulos, 861 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 n.9 (D. Md. 2012).
Law enforcement officers possess a privilege to commit a battery
in the course of a legally justified arrest.8 See Hines v.
French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1055 (Md. App. 2004); French v. Hines,
957 A.2d 1000, 1037 (Md. App. 2008).

However, a law enforcement

officer's privilege to commit a battery in the course of a
legally justified arrest "extends only to the use of reasonable
force, not excessive force.

To the extent that the officer uses

excessive force in effectuating an arrest, the privilege is
lost."

French, 957 A.2d at 1037; see also Bixler v. Harris, No.

WDQ-12-1650, 2013 WL 2422892, *8 (D. Md. June 3, 2013).
"[A]n 'excessive force' claim against police officers under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to be judged under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence . . . ."
(Md. 2000).

Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56

"The standards for analyzing claims of excessive

force are the same under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland
Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution."

Hines, 852 A.2d at 1069.

The excessive force inquiry "focuses on the objective
reasonableness of the officer's conduct."
at 56.

Richardson, 762 A.2d

"[T]he test of reasonableness 'is not capable of precise

8

In its Memorandum and Order Re: Motion to Dismiss, the
Court found that J.W. had, in effect, conceded there was a legal
justification for his being handcuffed. [Document 50] at 22-23. 
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definition or mechanical application,' [so] its proper
application 'requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.'"
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

Id. (quoting Graham v.

The Supreme Court of the

United States has stated that:
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . .
. With respect to a claim of excessive
force, the same standard of reasonableness
at the moment applies: "Not every push or
shove" . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.
The calculus of reasonableness must embody
allowance for the fact that police officers
are
often
forced
to
make
split-second
judgments — in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the
amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (citations
omitted).
J.W. concedes that Corporal Carrier was justified in
placing handcuffs on him and in transporting him to the
hospital.

[Document 64-2] at 5.

But, he contends that "summary

judgment is not proper" because "Corporal Carrier exerted a
significant amount of force in lifting [J.W.]'s left arm, or
arms, after [J.W.] was handcuffed." [Document 64-2] at 6.
However, J.W. has not presented any evidence that Corporal
Carrier used objectively unreasonable force in detaining him for

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purposes of transporting him to the hospital for an emergency
psychiatric evaluation.
"The first step in assessing whether [Corporal Carrier]
violated [J.W.]'s Fourth Amendment right is to determine the
relevant facts."
2007).

Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 379 (4th Cir.

At the summary judgment stage, "courts are required to

view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.'"
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alteration omitted)
(citation omitted).
During his deposition, J.W. testified that he was very
upset on the afternoon on February 8, 2013 and unable to calm
down.

He admitted to having flipped over a desk and stating

that he wanted to harm himself.

J.W. Dep. 2:1-26:8.

J.W. did

not want to go to a hospital and testified that he "tried to
pull . . . away" when Corporal Carrier attempted to handcuff
him.

Id. 28:5-8, 28:21-29:7.

J.W. also testified that after

being handcuffed, he continued to struggle, attempting to pull
his hands out of the handcuffs and kicking Corporal Carrier in
the upper thigh.

Id. 30:14-16, 32:10-15.

It was at this point,

that J.W. contends Corporal Carrier "went around behind me and
lifted up on my arm," causing injury to his (J.W.'s) left wrist.
Id. 31:6-9.

Despite testifying to having felt "the worst pain

in my life," J.W. stated that he thought Corporal Carrier was

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just trying to "[h]old on to me," and was not trying to "be[]
real rough."

Id. 33:1-5, 38:2-4.

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has explained:
[I]n Scott[ v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007),]
the [Supreme] Court stated that at the
summary judgment stage, once a court has
determined the relevant set of facts and
drawn all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party to the extent supportable by
the
record,
the
reasonableness
of
an
officer's actions "is a pure question of
law."
Henry, 501 F.3d at 383 n.12 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at
372, 381 n.8).
Contrary to J.W.'s contention, there is no genuine dispute
of material fact regarding the circumstances of Corporal Carrier
lifting up on J.W.'s left arm.

J.W.'s testimony from his

deposition corroborates the statements from Corporal Carrier,
Jarvis, and Parker that J.W. was very upset, threatening to
injure himself, and resisting all attempts to calm him down.
The Court finds that Corporal Carrier acted reasonably when
he lifted J.W.'s arm in an attempt to gain control of J.W. to
transport him to the hospital for an emergency psychiatric
evaluation.

Assuming – as J.W. suggests - that Corporal Carrier

could have gained control of J.W. by "grabb[ing] his shoulders
and escort[ing him] from behind," [Document 64-2] at 5 – which,
based on the circumstances, the Court finds unlikely –

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"reasonableness is evaluated from the perspective of the officer
on the scene, not through the more leisurely lens of hindsight."
Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 416 (4th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, the

fact that an arguably less "forceful" alternative to gaining
control of J.W. might have existed, does not render the force
that Corporal Carrier used unreasonable.

Cf.

United States v.

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985).
Accordingly, remaining Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on all remaining claims.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Defendants' Renewal of Motion for Summary
Judgment [Document 56] is GRANTED.

2.

Judgment shall be entered by separate Order.

SO ORDERED, on Monday, May 4, 2015.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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