Koninis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Timothy J. Sullivan on 2/4/2015. (c/m 2/4/15 bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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JOHN A. KONINIS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

Case No. TJS-13-2482
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WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Koninis (“Mr. Koninis”) brought this action for negligence against Wal-Mart,
Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) seeking damages for injuries he suffered after falling in a Wal-Mart
store parking lot in North East, Maryland. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10-12.) Wal-Mart’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 33) is now pending before the Court. 1 Mr. Koninis
did not file a response to the Motion and the time for doing so has passed. I find that no hearing
is necessary, see Loc. R. 105.6, and for the reasons set forth below will grant Wal-Mart’s
Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
According to Mr. Koninis’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), in the early morning of February 3,

2011, Mr. Koninis arrived at the Wal-Mart store in North East, Maryland to make a delivery. (Id.
¶ 3.) After he climbed out of his delivery truck, Mr. Koninis slipped and fell on “black ice” in the
parking lot and sustained injuries. (Id., see ECF No. 33-1 at 1.) He alleges that Wal-Mart
breached its duty to protect him from a dangerous condition by caused ice on its parking lot.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 12.)

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Wal-Mart’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) is

granted.
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II.

STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing predecessor to current
Rule 56(a)). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine
dispute of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If sufficient
evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of the party opposing the
motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented and summary judgment should be
denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the “mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position” is insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. The facts themselves, and the inferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing
party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.
2008). A party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but instead must,
by affidavit or other evidentiary showing, set out specific facts showing a genuine dispute for
trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Supporting and opposing affidavits are to be made on personal
knowledge, contain such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively the
competence of the affiant to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
III.

ANALYSIS
1.

Choice of Law

A court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Maryland adheres to the lex
loci delicti rule to determine the applicable law in tort actions. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti,

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358 Md. 689, 744, 752 A.2d 200, 230 (2000). Under this rule, the “substantive tort law of the
state where the wrong occurs governs.” Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123, 453 A.2d 1207,
1209 (1983). Because the alleged tort took place in Maryland, Maryland law governs Mr.
Koninis’s negligence claim.
2.

Negligence Claim

To prevail on a claim of negligence in Maryland, a “plaintiff must [prove] the following
elements: ‘(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the
defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the
loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.’” Valentine v. On
Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 549, 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999) (quoting BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34,
43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995)).
In Maryland, the proprietor of a store owes a duty to an invitee “to exercise ordinary care
to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and will be liable for injuries sustained in
consequence of a failure to do so.” Maans v. Giant Of Maryland, L.L.C., 161 Md. App. 620, 627,
871 A.2d 627, 631 (2005) (quoting Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117, 113
A.2d 405 (1955)). This duty, however, does not arise unless the proprietor has “actual or
constructive knowledge of [the dangerous condition] . . . gained in sufficient time to give the
owner the opportunity to remove it or to warn the invitee.” Rehn v. Westfield Am., 153 Md. App.
586, 593, 837 A.2d 981, 984 (2003) (internal quotation omitted).
Wal-Mart argues that “there is no evidence that [it] had actual or constructive knowledge
of any dangerous or hazardous weather conditions” with sufficient time to warn Mr. Koninis or
to remove the dangerous condition. (ECF No. 33-1 at 6.) In addition, Wal-Mart points to
evidence that there were no adverse weather conditions that created a danger or hazard on its

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property at the time in question. (See ECF No. 33-1 at 6; ECF No. 33-4 at 5, 8-9.) At his
deposition, Mr. Koninis testified that (1) it was cold in early February 2011; (2) it had snowed
within a few days prior to February 3, 2011; (3) he did not think there was snow on the ground
on February 3, 2011; and (4) he did not recall whether the snowfall that proceeded his February
3, 2011 fall was significant. (ECF No. 33-3 at 2.) In his answers to Wal-Mart’s interrogatories,
he stated that “he did not notice anything unusual about the ground when he looked prior to
stepping out of his truck” and falling. (ECF No. 33-2 at 4.)
As the plaintiff, Mr. Koninis has the burden of producing evidence that Wal-Mart had
actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in its parking lot on February 3,
2011. Preliminarily, I note that Mr. Koninis has produced only limited evidence that there
actually was a dangerous condition in the Wal-Mart store’s parking lot on the morning of
February 3, 2011. 2 Wal-Mart denies that there was any such condition. (ECF No. 33-4 at 5.) At
this stage of the proceedings, however, I am required to consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Koninis. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Koninis has produced sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to find that there was at least one icy spot on the Wal-Mart store’s parking
lot that created a dangerous condition on the morning of this incident.
Mr. Koninis has nonetheless failed to produce any evidence (1) that Wal-Mart had actual
or constructive knowledge of the icy condition; or (2) that Wal-Mart had sufficient time to
2

As part of its submission in support of the Motion, Wal-Mart has attached Mr.
Koninis’s answers to interrogatories, as well as a portion of the transcript of his deposition
testimony. In his answers to Wal-Mart’s interrogatories, Mr. Koninis states that he “fell on black
ice” and thereafter observed “an employee of Wal-Mart . . . spreading rock salt over the parking
lot.” (ECF No. 33-2 at 3.) In the portion of the transcript of Mr. Koninis’s deposition testimony
that was submitted to the Court, he testified that he “slipped” as he got out of his truck, but does
not state that he slipped on ice, or that he saw any person spreading rock salt over the parking lot.
(See ECF No. 33-3 at 3.) Mr. Koninis has not produced any evidence about the size of the icy
spot upon which he fell, nor has he produced the statement of any other person who observed the
icy spot, or evidence about how the icy spot came to be.
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remove the dangerous condition or warn its invitees about it. Mr. Koninis’s answers to
interrogatories and deposition testimony are not specific about the weather conditions on
February 3, 2011, and generally state that he did not observe “anything unusual” in the area of
the parking lot on the day that he fell. Unlike other “icy parking lot” cases, see Bass v. Hardee’s
Food Sys., Inc., 229 F.3d 1141 (4th Cir. 2000) and Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 598, 224
A.2d 433, 437 (1966), there is simply no evidence in this case upon which a reasonable jury
could conclude that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition (such
as evidence of a weather event or of a drainage problem in the parking lot known to cause ice in
cold weather), or that once it had obtained such knowledge, it had sufficient time to remedy the
dangerous condition. Even taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Koninis, the facts in this case
would not permit any reasonable jury to conclude that Wal-Mart breached any duty to Mr.
Koninis on February 3, 2011.
IV.

CONCLUSION
As Wal-Mart’s Motion for Summary Judgment is unopposed and there is no evidence in

the record establishing Wal-Mart’s liability, Wal-Mart’s Motion will be GRANTED. By
separate Order, the Clerk of Court will be directed to enter summary judgment in favor of WalMart, to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff John Koninis at the address on file with the Court,
and to close this case.

February 4, 2015
Date

/s/
Timothy J. Sullivan
United States Magistrate Judge

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