McDonald v. Arnald et al
Filing
24
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 07/17/2014. (jb3, Deputy Clerk)(C/M 07/18/2014)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DWAYNE MCDONALD, #325-835
:
Plaintiff,
:
v
:
K. ARNALD, et al.,
Civil Action No. GLR-13-2560
:
Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants, Chief of
Security
Arnald,
Sergeant
Gordon,
Officer
Keefer,
Officer
Eagleson, and Officer Eric Durst’s1 Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) and Plaintiff
Dwayne McDonald’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) and
Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 23).
briefed
and
(D.Md. 2014).
no
hearing
is
The issues have been fully
necessary.
See
Local
Rule
105.6
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment will
be granted, McDonald’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Response
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be construed as a response
1
Because Defendant Eric Durst shares the same last name as
Randy Durst, North Branch Correctional Institute (“NBCI”) Inmate
Grievance Office (“IGO”) Coordinator, they will be identified by
their first and last name for clarity.
in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion, and his Motion for
Recusal (ECF No. 23) will be denied.
I. Background2
McDonald
is
an
inmate
in
the
custody
of
the
Maryland
Department of Public Safety and currently incarcerated at NBCI
in Cumberland, Maryland.
On September 3, 2013, McDonald brought
this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
he was subjected to verbal harassment, excessive force, poor
conditions of confinement, inadequate medical care, and denied
access to the courts in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
McDonald
alleges
he
was
verbally
harassed
by
Defendants
Keefer and Gordon during a search of his cell on June 28, 2013.
He further alleges Defendants Keefer, Gordon, and Eric Durst
then used excessive and unprovoked force against him, injuring
him as a result.
He alleges at the time of the incident he had
medical authorization to be handcuffed in front, but when he was
escorted to the nurse following the incident he was handcuffed
in the back, which caused additional harm.
He alleges he was
placed in an isolation cell for ten days following the incident,
where
he
2
was
denied
a
mattress,
sheets,
a
blanket,
or
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the Complaint, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary
Judgment and are construed in favor of the non-moving party.
2
toiletries,
and
permission
to
shower,
regularly
flush
the
toilet, and access his legal mail.
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively,
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 24, 2014. (ECF No. 17).
The
Motion
remains
unopposed.
On
May
22,
2014,
however,
McDonald moved for Summary Judgment in response to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 22).
then moved for Recusal.
On May 23, 2014, McDonald
(ECF No. 23).
All three Motions are
ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
A.
Standard of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, a complaint
must set forth “a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Bell Atl.
A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
556.
In
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
considering
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, read the complaint as a whole, and
take the facts asserted therein as true.
3
Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
A pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less
stringent
standards
than
formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
2.
Summary Judgment
“When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the 12(b)(6) motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56.”
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,
260-61 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving party
demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
255
(1986)
(citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
4
Once
a
motion
for
summary
judgment
is
properly
made
and
supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a
genuine dispute exists.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
“[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat
an
judgment;
otherwise
properly
supported
motion
for
summary
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (alteration in the
original).
A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of a
party’s case.
Id. at 248;
see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash.
Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.) (citing
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a fact is considered to be “material” is determined by
the substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
U.S. at 248;
Anderson, 477
accord Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 265.
Here, because the Court will consider matters outside of
the pleading, Defendants’ Motion will be construed as a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
3.
Under
Motion for Recusal
28
U.S.C.
§
455(a),
5
a
judge
or
justice
“shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”3
Recusal does not depend on
“whether the judge is impartial in fact.
another,
not
impartial,
knowing
might
whether
reasonably
or
not
question
basis of all the circumstances.”
It is simply whether
the
his
judge
is
impartiality
actually
on
the
United States v. DeTemple, 162
F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Hathcock v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d. 36,
41 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137 (1999)).
The
Fourth Circuit has thus adopted an objective standard that asks
whether a reasonable, well-informed observer who assesses “all
the
facts
and
impartiality.
circumstances”
Id.
might
question
the
judge’s
(quoting United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d
884, 887 (4th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Sao Paulo State of the Federative Republic of Brazil v.
Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 232–33 (2002) (per curiam)
3
While McDonald does not specify whether he is relying on
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or § 144 as a basis for recusal, he is barred
from relying on § 144. Section 144 requires McDonald to, inter
alia, file an affidavit to support his Motion for Recusal and
submit “a certificate of counsel of record stating that [the
affidavit] is made in good faith.”
28 U.S.C. § 144.
Here,
McDonald does not submit a formal affidavit and he cannot
provide the required certificate of counsel because he is
proceeding pro se. See Morse v. Lewis, 54 F.2d 1027, 1032 (4th
Cir. 1932) (interpreting predecessor statute to § 144 to require
signed certificate by an attorney regularly admitted to practice
before that court), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 557 (1932).
6
(“[Section]
455(a)
requires
judicial
recusal
if
a
reasonable
person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the
judge would have actual knowledge of his interest or bias in the
case” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
To succeed on a Motion for Recusal under § 455(a), the
alleged bias or prejudice “must, as a general matter, stem from
‘a source outside the judicial proceeding at hand.’”
Belue v.
Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 545 n.1 (1994)).
Conversely,
prior judicial rulings, on their own, “almost never constitute a
valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” nor do opinions
formed by a judge during prior proceedings.
United States v.
Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
required
to
recuse
himself
“simply
because
irrational or highly tenuous speculation.”
A judge is not
of
unsupported,
United States v.
Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287).
B. Analysis
1.
McDonald’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On May 22, 2014, McDonald moved for Summary Judgment in
response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Thus, the Court will
construe McDonald’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Response to
7
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a response in opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
exalt form over substance.
To hold otherwise would be to
See Monge v. Portofino Ristorante,
751 F.Supp.2d 789, 792 n.1 (D.Md. 2010) (noting that, because
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
1
instructs
the
Court
to
construe the rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding,” the Court should
not exalt form over substance (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1)).
2.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants
argue
McDonald
failed
to
exhaust
his
through an available administrative remedy procedure.
claims
The Court
agrees.
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in
pertinent part:
No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other
correctional
facility
until
such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42
U.S.C.
'
1997e(a)
(2012).
Thus,
the
PLRA's
exhaustion
requirement requires inmates to pursue administrative grievances
until
they
through
all
receive
a
available
final
stages
denial
in
of
the
the
claims,
administrative
appealing
process.
Chase v. Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 530 (D.Md. 2003), aff’d 98
8
F.App’x 253 (4th Cir. 2004).
relief
sought
is
not
Exhaustion is required even if the
attainable
administrative remedy procedure.
through
resort
to
the
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 740-41 (2001).
The Maryland Division of Corrections provides inmates three
stages
in
the
administrative
F.Supp.2d at 529 n.10.
remedies
process.
Chase,
286
First, an inmate may file a Request for
Administrative Remedy (“ARP”) with the Warden of the institution
where the inmate is incarcerated.
Id.
If this Request is
denied, the inmate has ten calendar days to file an appeal with
the Commissioner of Correction.
Id.
If this Appeal is denied,
the final option available to the inmate is filing an appeal
with the Executive Director of the IGO within thirty days.
Id.
A claim which has not been exhausted may not be considered by
this Court.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219-20 (2007).
McDonald filed three ARPs with the Warden of NBCI relating
to the incident on June 28, 2013.
54, ECF No. 17-8).45
(Randy Durst Decl. Ex. F, at
ARP NBCI-1869-13 alleged Defendants Keefer,
Gordon, and Eric Durst subjected McDonald to verbal harassment
and excessive force. (Id. at 54, 57-59).
4
The ARP was dismissed
Unless otherwise noted, the Court shall cite to the
pagination found in the electronic docketing system.
5
McDonald also filed a fourth ARP, NBCI-1859-13, but the
complaint was found to be repetitive with NBCI-1869-13. Id.
9
pending
an
investigation
by
(Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1);
6).
the
Internal
Investigative
Unit.
(see also Randy Durst Decl., at 4,
Further, in his Complaint, McDonald admitted he did not
appeal dismissal of this ARP.
(Compl. at 2).
The second ARP,
NBCI-1867-13, alleged McDonald was in isolation confinement for
ten days, in violation of prison policy, without a mattress,
linen, and hygienic supplies.
No.
22-1).
This
ARP
was
(Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 5, ECF
returned
to
McDonald
for
more
information, but he failed to resubmit it by the deadline, and
no further action was taken.
(Randy Durst Decl., at 54).
The
third ARP, NBCI-1857-13, alleged McDonald was denied his legal
mail.
(Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2, ECF No. 22-1).
Again, this
ARP was returned to McDonald for more information, but he failed
to resubmit it by the deadline, and no further action was taken.
(Randy Durst Decl., at 54).
Therefore, none of McDonald’s three
ARPs in connection to the June 28, 2013 incident reached the
second or third stages in the administrative remedies process.
McDonald
insists
that
he
took
his
ARPs
to
the
IGO
but
“never received an answer,” and that he has “certified mail
receipts to prove this.”
5).
(Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., at
McDonald, however, did not offer the receipts to the Court.
“Without additional evidence or more specific facts,” such a
“generalized
allegation
is
insufficient
10
to
demonstrate
administrative
judgment.”
exhaustion
under
the
PLRA
and
avert
summary
Chase, 286 F.Supp.2d at 528 n.9.
Additionally, even if McDonald did successfully appeal his
ARPs to the IGO, his appeal would be dismissed because he did
not exhaust available remedies within the Division of Correction
by appealing his ARPs to the Commissioner.
See Md. Code Corr.
Serv. ' 10-210(a) (requiring exhaustion before grievance can be
considered by the IGO).
relation
to
medical
care
the
due
June
to
Furthermore, none of the ARPs filed in
28,
2013
McDonald
incident
being
alleges
handcuffed
in
inadequate
the
back.
Thus, McDonald’s Eighth Amendment claims will be dismissed.
3.
Respondeat Superior
To the extent Chief of Security Arnald is named in his
capacity as a supervisory official, the claim likewise fails.
It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply in § 1983 claims.
766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d
Liability of supervisory officials
“is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but
rather
is
premised
on
‘a
recognition
that
supervisory
indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct
may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they
inflict on those committed to their care.’”
Baynard v. Malone,
268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737
11
F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Supervisory liability under §
1983 must be supported with evidence that:
(1)
the
supervisor
had
actual
or
constructive knowledge that his subordinate
was
engaged
in
conduct
that
posed
a
pervasive
and
unreasonable
risk
of
constitutional
injury
to
citizens
like
[McDonald];
(2) the supervisor’s response
to the knowledge was so inadequate as to
show deliberate indifference to, or tacit
authorization of, the alleged offensive
practices; and (3) there was an affirmative
causal
link
between
the
supervisor’s
inaction and the particular constitutional
injury suffered by [McDonald].
Shaw
v.
Stroud,
13
F.3d
791,
quotation marks omitted).
799
(4th
Cir.
1994)
(internal
McDonald has provided no evidence
establishing any of Shaw’s three requirements.
Thus, the claims
against Defendant Arnald will be dismissed.
4.
Eleventh Amendment
Defendants
Arnald,
Gordon,
Keefer,
Eagleson,
and
Eric
Durst, sued as individually-named Defendants in their official
capacity, are immune from suit and any claim against them stated
as
such
immunizes
is
subject
states
from
to
dismissal.
suit
brought
The
in
Eleventh
federal
Amendment
court
absent
waiver from the state or a clear congressional exercise of its
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
The State of Maryland has
not expressly waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
12
to such suits.
A suit against a state officer in his official
capacity is the equivalent to a suit against the state itself.
See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
Thus, the
claims against Defendants Arnald, Gordon, Keefer, Eagleson, and
Eric Durst in their official capacity will be dismissed.6
5.
McDonald’s Motion for Recusal
McDonald argues there is a need for recusal because the
Court denied his Motion to Subpoena.
The Court disagrees.
The Court’s denial of McDonald’s Motion to Subpoena has
no
bearing
whatsoever
on
impartiality.
As
mentioned
above,
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis
for
a
bias
(citations
recusal
or
and
motions
partiality
internal
serve
motion.”
quotation
an
Lentz,
marks
important
524
F.3d
omitted).
safeguard
at
530
“[W]hile
against
truly
egregious conduct, they cannot become a form of brushback pitch
for litigants to hurl at judges who do not rule in their favor,”
which is what McDonald is attempting here.
574.
Belue, 640 F.3d at
Thus, McDonald’s Motion for Recusal will be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17),
6
Because McDonald’s claims cannot be considered by the
Court under § 1983 or the Eleventh Amendment, the Court will not
address McDonald’s claims on the merits.
13
construed
as
McDonald’s
Motion
Motion
for
for
Summary
Judgment,
will
Summary
Judgment
in
be
GRANTED,
Response
to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) will be construed as
a response in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion, and his
Motion
for
Recusal
(ECF
No.
23)
will
be
judgment will be entered in Defendants’ favor.
DENIED.
Summary
A separate Order
will follow.7
July 17, 2014
7
/s/
__________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge
Having found no constitutional violation, the Court need
not
address
Defendants’
argument
of
qualified
immunity.
Additionally, to the extent the Complaint can be construed as
raising state law claims, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(c)(3) (2012);
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
14
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