Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. GMRI, Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part 12 Partial Motion of defendant to Dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 8/4/14. (jnls, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
Plaintiff
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vs.
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GMRI, INC. d/b/a RED LOBSTER
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Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-13-2860
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PARTIAL DISMISSAL
The Court has before it Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint [Document 12] and the materials submitted
relating thereto.
I.
The Court finds a hearing unnecessary.
BACKGROUND1
At all times relevant hereto, Defendant GMRI, Inc. d/b/a Red
Lobster ("Red Lobster") has owned and operated a restaurant in
Salisbury, Maryland.
"Since at least March 2007," Red Lobster has
"subject[ed] Valerie Serman, Racheal Cox, and a class of similarly
situated female employees to a sexually hostile and offensive work
environment" at its Salisbury restaurant, primarily through the
actions of Ryan Fisher, the former Culinary Manager.
Compl. ¶ 7.
Fisher's alleged sexual harassment of Valerie Serman
("Serman"), Racheal Cox ("Cox"), and the other similarly situated
1
The "facts" herein are as alleged by Plaintiff and are not
necessarily agreed upon by Defendant.
female employees, included, but was not limited to, frequent:
"sexual touching of female employees," such
as grabbing, groping, biting, and licking;
sexual comments, such as statements about
sexual fantasies about the female employees;
"sexual advances towards female employees,"
such as "soliciting female employees to have
sex with him; and
"[o]ther vulgar sexual conduct."
Id. ¶ 9.
Serman complained to Michael Mannion, the General Manager at
the Salisbury restaurant, about Fisher's conduct and the hostile work
environment, but Mannion "condoned it."
Id. ¶ 10.
Further,
"Mannion himself had a history of making sexually charged and vulgar
comments about the female staff."
Id. ¶ 11.
Red Lobster "allowed
the sexually hostile work environment to persist despite being on
notice of it," and the alleged unlawful employment practices "are
[still] now being committed."
Compl. ¶¶ 2, 12.
Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") filed the instant lawsuit against Red Lobster
in September 2013 pursuant to Section 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction enjoining Red Lobster
from engaging in sexual harassment; compensation to Serman, Cox, and
the similarly situated female employees for past and future pecuniary
2
and nonpecuniary losses; and punitive damages.
Compl. at 4-5.
By the instant Motion, "Red Lobster seeks dismissal of all
claims in the Complaint that relate [to] events occurring more than
300 days before the filing of the first administrative charge on which
the EEOC bases this case, specifically, the claims of all individuals
who were allegedly subject to sexual harassment prior to February
17, 2010."
II.
[Document 12-1] at 1.
DISCUSSION
Regretfully, the parties have filed needlessly extensive
briefings that debate matters beyond the scope of the instant Motion.2
The Court will focus this discussion on the issue presented in Red
Lobster's Motion.
2
For example, Red Lobster argues that the EEOC's introduction
of exhibits attached to its Response in Opposition to the instant
Motion is "troubling" in light of allegedly unfulfilled Freedom of
Information Act requests.
See [Document] 21 at 5.
The EEOC
contends that the Court can consider the exhibits – which include
a Discrimination Complaint Form filled out by Racheal Cox in February
2011 and the EEOC Determination letters issued after the Serman and
Cox investigations - attached to its Response because they are
integral to and relied upon in the Complaint. The parties also
devote considerable time to arguing about the legal standard used
to resolve a claim brought pursuant to Section 707 of Title VII for
an alleged pattern or practice of discrimination. However, the
Complaint does not contain a Section 707 claim, and the EEOC states
it has no intention of pursuing one in connection with the instant
case. See [Document 19] at 12 ("EEOC brought this case pursuant to
Section 706, as it is a relatively small sexual harassment case
involving one facility where the primary harasser was employed by
Defendant for a limited span of years.").
3
A.
Section 706 of Title VII
The EEOC asserts a claim under Section 706 of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual's . . . sex."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Section
706 is one of the two enforcement provisions that allow the EEOC to
bring a civil action against an employer for violations of Title VII.3
See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Section 706 authorizes the EEOC to bring
an action "to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful
employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2."
42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(a).
Under Section 706, the EEOC may seek equitable relief on behalf
of employees subject to violations of Title VII.
In an action
brought pursuant to Section 706, the EEOC may also obtain, for such
employees, legal relief including compensatory and punitive
damages.4
3
The other enforcement provision is Section 707, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6(a), (c).
4
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B) ("In addition to any relief
authorized by section 1981a of this title [which includes
compensatory and punitive damages], liability may accrue and an
aggrieved person may obtain [equitable] relief as provided in
subsection (g)(1), including recovery of back pay . . . ."),
4
B.
The Issue Presented
As clarified in its Reply to the instant Motion, Red Lobster
requests that this Court "bar [the EEOC] from seeking relief for women
who it alleges may have experienced a hostile work environment
before, but not after, February 17, 2010."
(emphasis added).
[Document 21] at 2
However, there is no dispute between the parties
because the EEOC explicitly states that it "does not intend to seek
relief for any aggrieved individual in this matter unless she was
subjected to at least one act of harassment within 300 days of the
filing of Serman's charge, i.e., that any such act (regardless of
whether it is independently actionable) occurred after February 17,
2010."5
[Document 24-1] at 1 (emphasis added).
Title VII states that "[a] charge under [Section 706] shall be
filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."
42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
The EEOC bases the instant lawsuit upon the Charges of
Discrimination that Serman and Cox filed with the EEOC.
5
Serman filed
The Court notes that there may be a debatable issue as to whether
the EEOC might be able to seek relief under its Section 706 hostile
work environment claim on behalf of individuals who only experienced
acts of harassment before February 17, 2010. See E.E.O.C. v.
Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1033-34 (D. Ariz.
2013). However, the EEOC's position in the instant case renders the
matter moot.
5
her charge of discrimination on December 14, 2010.6
12-2].
See [Document
Cox filed her Charge of Discrimination on June 6, 2011.7
[Document 19-2].
See
The Court can consider the Charges of
Discrimination because when examining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
Court does not always have to limit its review to the pleadings.
It
may take judicial notice of public records, including statutes, and
"may also 'consider documents incorporated into the complaint by
reference,' 'as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so
long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.'"
United
States ex rel. Oberg v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,
745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also
Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999);8
Bratcher v. Pharm. Prod. Dev., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 533, 538 n.3
(E.D.N.C. 2008) ("The court takes judicial notice of plaintiff's EEOC
charge and the EEOC right-to-sue letter.").
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that:
A hostile work environment claim is composed of
6
Serman's Charge of Discrimination is attached to Red Lobster's
Motion. See [Document 12-2].
7
Cox's Charge of Discrimination is attached to the EEOC's
Response in Opposition to the instant Motion. See [Document 19-2].
8
See Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir.
1999) ("The Dow Jones article in which Thompson's 'not for sale'
statement is reported contains a summary of much of this information.
We note that although the stockholders failed to attach that article
to their complaint (LCI attached it to its motion to dismiss), a court
may consider it in determining whether to dismiss the complaint
because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint
and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity.")
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a series of separate acts that collectively
constitute one "unlawful employment practice."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). The timely filing
provision only requires that a Title VII
plaintiff file a charge within [300] days after
the unlawful practice happened. It does not
matter, for purposes of the statute, that some
of the component acts of the hostile work
environment fall outside the statutory time
period. Provided that an act contributing to
the claim occurs within the filing period, the
entire time period of the hostile environment
may be considered by a court for the purposes
of determining liability.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002).
In sum, to the extent that the Complaint may be read to assert
claims on behalf of individuals who experienced a hostile work
environment only before February 17, 2010, those claims shall be
dismissed.
However, the Court is not now addressing any issues
regarding the admissibility of evidence relating to such
individuals.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons:
1.
Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint [Document 12] is GRANTED IN PART.
2.
To the extent that the Complaint may be read to assert
claims on behalf of individuals who experienced a
hostile work environment only before February 17,
2010, those claims are hereby dismissed.
3.
Plaintiff EEOC shall arrange a case planning
telephone conference to be held by September 8, 2014.
SO ORDERED, on Monday, August 4, 2014.
__________/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge
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