Shaw v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Catherine C. Blake on 06/24/2014. (bas, Deputy Clerk)(c/m by chambers on 6/24/2014 bca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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JEFFREY SHAW
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil No. CCB-13-2879
Criminal No. CCB-10-0489

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Jeffrey Shaw. For the reasons stated below, the motion to vacate will
be denied.
On May 25, 2011, Shaw pleaded guilty to one count of a four-count indictment,
admitting to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Although his plea agreement stipulated that he was a career offender, he was sentenced
to 140 months imprisonment on October 14, 2011.1 At that time, the court dismissed the
remaining three counts in the indictment. Shaw appealed his sentence to the Fourth Circuit,
which affirmed the judgment in part and dismissed the appeal in part.2 See United States v.
Shaw, 484 Fed. App’x 777 (4th Cir. 2012).

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This sentence was substantially below the advisory guideline range applicable to Shaw as a
career offender.
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The Fourth Circuit found Shaw had no meritorious grounds for appeal and, thus, affirmed his
conviction and dismissed the appeal of his sentence. Shaw challenged the voluntariness of his
guilty plea, but the Fourth Circuit determined his plea was valid. Having rejected Shaw’s
challenge to his guilty plea, the Fourth Circuit concluded that he waived his right to appeal his
conviction and sentence as well as the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. Finally,
to the extent Shaw challenged his plea counsel as ineffective, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
ineffective assistance of counsel did not conclusively appear on the face of the record and that he
should raise this claim in a § 2255 motion.
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Shaw now claims that his counsel was ineffective because he erroneously advised Shaw
to plead guilty, neglected to argue at the suppression hearing whether the police officer who
stopped his vehicle was acting outside the jurisdiction of his department, failed to adequately
advise him at the Rule 11 hearing about the consequences of pleading guilty and to raise an
objection during that hearing, and did not communicate with him during the appeal and breached
his duty to him by filing an Anders brief. To sustain a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
a petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the petitioner must show “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. Specifically,
the petitioner must “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the
result of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. In evaluating such conduct, there is “a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, “[t]he defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Shaw cannot satisfy the Strickland standard, as all his claims are without merit. First,
Shaw’s attorney did not act unreasonably in advising him to plead guilty. Police, upon searching
the trunk of the car in which Shaw was a passenger, discovered a loaded handgun along with
more than 500 grams of cocaine. The close proximity of the handgun to the cocaine, the fact that
the handgun was loaded and was easily accessible to Shaw, and the fact that Shaw possessed the

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handgun illegally as a convicted felon provide a sufficient nexus to conclude the firearm was
possessed in furtherance of a drug crime.3
Next, Shaw fails to show that his attorney acted unreasonably at the suppression hearing
or at the Rule 11 hearing. Shaw’s lawyer did in fact argue at the suppression hearing that the
police officer who executed the traffic stop lacked jurisdiction to do so. That the court ultimately
rejected this argument does not mean counsel was ineffective. See Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421,
429 (4th Cir. 1995). As for Shaw’s claim that his lawyer did not provide effective assistance at
the Rule 11 hearing, there is nothing to which his lawyer could have reasonably objected, and the
record of that hearing plainly indicates that Shaw understood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of pleading guilty to it.4 He was thoroughly advised of the rights he was
relinquishing, and he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence and
conviction and to challenge the disposition of the suppression hearing.5
Finally, Shaw’s counsel was not ineffective on appeal, nor did he breach any duty to
Shaw by filing an Anders brief. Moreover, even if appellate counsel’s performance was
unreasonable, Shaw cannot demonstrate that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Fourth Circuit
was satisfied that his guilty plea was valid and, thus, concluded that Shaw waived his right to
appeal his conviction and sentence as well as the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.

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To the extent Shaw argues that his conviction should be vacated due to insufficient evidence,
this argument must be rejected for the reasons stated above.
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Moreover, he indicated during the Rule 11 hearing that he was completely satisfied with the
representation of his attorney and that there was nothing else his counsel should have done.
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Accordingly, to the extent Shaw once again challenges his guilty plea because he did not
understand the nature of the charge or the protections he was waiving, this argument must also
be rejected.
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The court will deny Shaw’s motion to vacate, and will not issue a certificate of
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A separate Order follows.

June 24, 2014
Date

/s/
Catherine C. Blake
United States District Judge

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