Williams v. Home Properties, L.P. et al

Filing 62

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Denying 60 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration; Directing that the case proceed pursuant to existing scheduling. Signed by Judge Marvin J. Garbis on 6/30/2015. (nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ANNISNICOLE WILLIAMS

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Plaintiff

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vs.

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HOME PROPERTIES, L.P. et al.

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Defendants
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CIVIL ACTION NO. MJG-13-2947

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Court has before it Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration [Document 60] and the materials submitted by the
Plaintiff relating thereto.

The Court finds that neither a

response nor a hearing is necessary.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
"ha[s] recognized that there are three grounds for amending an
earlier judgment" under Rule 59(e):
(1)

to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law;

(2)

to
account
for
new
available at trial; or

(3)

to correct a clear error
prevent manifest injustice.

evidence

of

law

not

or

Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th
Cir. 1998); see also Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F.
Supp. 1406, 1419 (D. Md. 1991).

A motion for reconsideration "cannot be used to raise
arguments which could, and should, have been made before [the
determination on which reconsideration is sought was] issued."
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.
1986).

Stated differently, "'[a] motion to reconsider is not a

license to reargue the merits or present new evidence.'"

Gray-

Hopkins v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 201 F. Supp. 2d 523, 524
(D. Md. 2002) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not contend that there has been any change
in the law or that new evidence has become available. Plaintiff,
presumably, is contending that revision of the decision is
necessary to correct clear error or to prevent manifest
injustice. The Court finds neither an error nor injustice in its
decision.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of the
tort of fraudulent concealment1 by clear and convincing evidence.

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In Maryland, a plaintiff who seeks to recover on a
fraudulent concealment claim must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that:
(1)

the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff to disclose a material fact;

(2) the defendant failed to disclose that
fact;
(3)

the defendant intended
deceive the plaintiff;

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to

defraud

or

"To be clear and convincing, evidence should be 'clear' in the
sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, and
unambiguous and convincing in a sense that it is so reasonable
and persuasive as to cause you to believe it."

Attorney

Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Levin, 91 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Md. 2014)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has not

presented evidence adequate to meet that standard, at least with
regard to establishing knowledge of the existence of a bedbug
infestation in the Unit on December 4, 2012 or an intent to
defraud.
Plaintiff's theory is, essentially, that the Hunters Glen
employee who rented the Unit to her on December 4, 2012, must
have known that there had been a bedbug infestation on October
22, 2012 and would have been grossly negligent in not checking
to be sure that the infestation had been eliminated by December
4, 2012.

Plaintiff has not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the person renting the Unit both knew of the past
bedbug infestation, and also checked the Unit and became aware
that the infestation remained.
(4)

the
plaintiff
took
justifiable
reliance
concealment; and

action
on

in
the

(5)

the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the defendant's concealment.

 Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 274 (Md. 2007)

(citation omitted).
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Plaintiff's reliance on the principle that a landlord is
presumed to know of defects is misplaced in the context of her
fraudulent concealment claim.

Mere constructive knowledge is

adequate to subject a landlord to liability under the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act.

As stated in Forrest v. P & L Real

Estate Inv. Co., 759 A.2d 1187 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000):
To prove a violation of the CPA premised on
the breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, it must be shown that, at the
inception of the lease, the landlord made
material misstatements or omissions, which
either had the tendency to or, in fact, did,
mislead the tenant. Thus, the landlord must
have knowledge, constructive or actual, of
the condition of the premises at the time of
the lease.
. . . .
A landlord is charged with knowledge of the
condition of the premises that a reasonable
inspection would disclose.
Id. at 1198, 1200 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
However, Plaintiff provides no legal support for her
position that constructive knowledge of a condition is
sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof for a claim of
fraudulent concealment – more specifically, to prove an intent
to deceive by clear and convincing evidence.
present a claim for fraudulent inducement.

Plaintiff did not

This is a tort which

would impose liability on a defendant who did not have actual

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knowledge of the pertinent falsity, but had constructive or
imputed knowledge.2
In regard to motive, Plaintiff seeks to rely upon an
inference "that Home Properties desired to generate rental
income, and would then deal with complaints after the new
resident moved-in."

[Document 60-1] at 2.

Putting aside the

illogic of any such inference, it is directly contrary to the
actual action of LaChance/Ellison on October 22, 2012, who in
fact knew that the Unit was infested with bedbugs and declined
to rent it to a prospective tenant.
Plaintiff's evidence, if accepted by a jury, could
establish fault on the part of Home Properties and/or JCE in
failing to rid the Unit of the bedbug infestation by December
15, 2012, when Plaintiff moved in to the Unit.

Certainly,

Plaintiff presents evidence that, if accepted by the jury, would
establish a claim for negligence and/or violation of the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act.

2

However, Plaintiff does not

See, e.g., Lawley v. Northam, No. CIV.A. ELH-10-1074, 2011
WL 6013279, at *8 n.25 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2011) ("To prevail on a
fraudulent inducement claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a
material representation of a party was false, (2) falsity was
known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with such
reckless indifference to the truth as to impute knowledge to
him, (3) the misrepresentation was made with the purpose to
defraud (scienter), (4) the person justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation, and (5) the person suffered damage directly
resulting from the misrepresentation." (citation omitted)).
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present evidence adequate to establish fraudulent concealment by
clear and convincing evidence.
For the foregoing reasons:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration [Document 60]
is DENIED.

2.

The case shall proceed pursuant to existing
scheduling.

SO ORDERED, on Tuesday, June 30, 2015.

/s/__________
Marvin J. Garbis
United States District Judge

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