Rockwell et al v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Denying 75 Motion to Strike Declaration of Daniel L. Rockwell; Denying 76 Motion to Strike Plaintiff Rockwell's Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production of Documents and to Dismiss or for other Relief. Signed by Judge Richard D Bennett on 13-3049. (bas, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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DANIEL L. ROCKWELL, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
Civil Action No. RDB-13-3049
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DETECTIVE CLYDE RAWLINS,
et al.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Currently pending before the Court are Defendant Detective Clyde Rawlins’
(“Detective Rawlins”) Motion to Strike Declaration of Daniel L. Rockwell (ECF NO. 75)
and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request for
Production of Document (ECF No. 76).1 The parties’ submissions have been reviewed, and
no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons that follow,
Detective Rawlins’ Motion to Strike Declaration of Daniel L. Rockwell (ECF No. 75) and
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request for
Production of Documents (ECF No. 76) are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the execution of a warrant to arrest Plaintiff Daniel L.
Rockwell (“Rockwell”) in Baltimore City, Maryland. On February 8, 2011, Defendant
Also pending before this Court are Detective Rawlins’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 67) and
Detective Rawlins’ Motion to Continue (ECF No. 79). This Court will address the Motion to Continue
during today’s conference call, and a ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment will follow in the coming
days.
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Detective Clyde Rawlins (“Detective Rawlins”) along with several other officers2 arrived at
Plaintiffs’ home at 4425 Wrenwood Avenue, Baltimore City, Maryland 21212 in order to
execute the warrant. Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 21. Rockwell exited his second story bedroom window
and stood on the roof of the house. Id. ¶ 21. It is undisputed that Defendant Rawlins
subsequently tasered Rockwell, causing Rockwell to fall from the roof to the ground and
fracture his vertebrae. Id.
Plaintiffs3 filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City asserting a variety of
federal and state claims for money damages against Defendants and the Baltimore City
Police Department (ECF No. 2).4 Thereafter, the Defendants removed the action to this
Court pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Defendants filed a number
of motions to dismiss.
This Court held a hearing on February 27, 2014, where Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss
numerous counts, including the false arrest, false imprisonment , and negligence claims.5
Detective Richard Manning, School Police Officer Rodney Coffield, and Department of Juvenile Services
Officer Leo Zilka were the other individuals who arrived at Plaintiffs’ home. These officers were originally
named as Defendants in this action, but this Court dismissed them by its March 11, 2014 Order.
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Demetria R. Holden, Plaintiff Daniel L. Rockwell’s mother, also joined this suit as a named Plaintiff.
Specifically, the Complaint alleged assault (Count I), battery (Count II), false arrest (Count III), false
imprisonment (Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), negligence (Count VI), gross
negligence (Count VII), negligent hiring, retaining, training, and supervision (Count VIII), civil conspiracy
(Count IX), violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Counts X and XI), and
federal claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 (Count
XII).
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Specifically, counsel for Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss Count I (assault) and Count II (battery) with respect to
all Defendants except Detective Clyde Rawlins. See Pls.’ Resp. 17, ECF No. 40-1. In addition, Plaintiff
agreed to dismiss Count III (false arrest), Count IV (false imprisonment), and Count VI (negligence) with
respect to all Defendants. See Pls.’ Resp. 17, 19, ECF No. 40-1. At the hearing, Plaintiff also agreed to the
dismissal of Counts V (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count VII (gross negligence), and the
State Constitutional claims with respect to Officer Zilka, Officer Coffield, and Detective Manning.
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Subsequently, this Court dismissed the action as to the other named individual Defendants
as well as several of the other claims against Detective Rawlins and the Baltimore Police
Department.6 The remaining Counts included claims against Rawlins for assault and battery
(Counts I and II), gross negligence (Count VII), violation of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights (Counts X and XI), and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Count XII). Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the Baltimore Police Department
for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment (Count XII) survived as well.
Thereafter, upon the Baltimore Police Department’s motion, this Court bifurcated
the case. Trial as to the claims against Detective Rawlins was scheduled for November 10,
2014, and the case was stayed as to the Baltimore Police Department.7
The Scheduling Order in this case set the discovery deadline for July 25, 2014.
Plaintiffs submitted a status report on July 25, 2014, indicating that some discovery was still
outstanding due to “difficulties” of a “sensitive” nature. See ECF No. 68. That same day,
Detective Rawlins filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs filed their response
brief on August 29, 2014, and attached a declaration made by Plaintiff Rockwell as an exhibit
in support.
On September 11, 2014, Plaintiffs served their answers to interrogatories and
Specifically, this Court dismissed the claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress (Count V) and civil
conspiracy (Counts IX and X) as to Detective Rawlins and all claims except the federal claims as to the
Baltimore Police Department.
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This procedure comports with this Court’s prior ruling in Marryshow v. Town of Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318
(D. Md. 1991), and allows the case to proceed against the individual officers first. If Plaintiffs are able to
prove a constitutional violation by Detective Rawlins, they will then be permitted to pursue their Monell claim
against the Baltimore Police Department. This procedure allows for quick resolution of the question of a
constitutional violation and prevents the case from being bogged down in the “possibly extensive evidence
necessary to show a custom or pattern of constitutional violations sufficient to hold the inactive Defendants
liable.” See id. at 320.
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responses to requests for production by email and U.S. Mail. Later that day, Detective
Rawlins filed his Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Declaration. Then, on September 19, Detective
Rawlins filed his Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories and Response to
Request for Production of Documents.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Detective Rawlins has filed two motions to strike. His Motion to Strike
Declaration of Daniel L. Rockwell (ECF No. 75) seeks to prevent Plaintiffs from using
Plaintiff Rockwell’s Declaration, attached to his Opposition brief, as evidence in this case.
In support of this motion, Detective Rawlins argues that the material in the declaration
should have been—and was not—produced during discovery and that Plaintiff Rockwell is
incapable of providing admissible testimony due to his mental condition. Detective Rawlins’
Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories and Response to Request for
Production of Document (ECF No. 76) seeks to preclude Plaintiffs from relying upon any
information disclosed in their answers and responses.
Detective Rawlins argues that
Plaintiffs’ responses were untimely and, therefore, Plaintiffs should be precluded from
calling newly-disclosed witnesses or relying upon newly disclosed medical records.
Additionally, Detective Rawlins again asserts that Plaintiff Rockwell should be precluded
from offering testimony due to his alleged mental illness.
This Court first addresses
Plaintiffs’ alleged discovery failures, and then discusses the issue of Plaintiff Rockwell’s
competence.
I.
Sanctions for Alleged Discovery Violations
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Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs sanctions for failure to
respond to interrogatories or requests for production. Rule 37(d) states:
(d) Party’s Failure to Attend Its Own Deposition, Serve
Answers to Interrogatories, or Respond to a Request for
Inspection.
(1) In General.
(A) Motion; Grounds for Sanctions. The court
where the action is pending may, on motion,
order sanctions if:
(i) a party or a party’s officer, director, or
managing agent—or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails,
after being served with proper notice, to
appear for that person's deposition; or
(ii) a party, after being properly served
with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a
request for inspection under Rule 34, fails
to serve its answers, objections, or written
response.
(B) Certification. A motion for sanctions for
failing to answer or respond must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with the party
failing to act in an effort to obtain the answer or
response without court action.
(2) Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act. A failure
described in Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not excused on the
ground that the discovery sought was objectionable,
unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a
protective order under Rule 26(c).
(3) Types of Sanctions. Sanctions may include any of the
orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)—(vi). Instead of or in
addition to these sanctions, the court must require the
party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or
both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 47(d). The sanctions permissible under Rule 37(d) include:
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(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other
designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the
action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; [or]
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(b)(2)(A)(i-vi).
Generally, the decision on sanctions is within the
discretion of the district court, but that discretion is more limited in situations where the
harsher sanctions are sought. See Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc.,
872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989). There are several factors to consider in making the
sanctions determination:
In determining what sanctions are appropriate, the Court must
consider the extent of prejudice, if any, along with the degree of
culpability. Victor Stanley, [Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,] 269 F.R.D.
497, 533 (D. Md. 2010). “The harshest sanctions may apply not
only when both severe prejudice and bad faith are present, but
also when, for example, culpability is minimally present, if there
is a considerable showing of prejudice, or, alternatively, the
prejudice is minimal but the culpability is great.” Id. Less severe
sanctions include costs, attorney’s fees, and fines, which not
only compensate the prejudiced party but also punish the
offending party for its actions, hoping to deter the litigant's
conduct. Id. at 536 (quoting Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal
Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 685 F.Supp.2d at 467, 471
(S.D.N.Y.2010)). The court must “impose the least harsh
sanction that can provide an adequate remedy.” Victor Stanley,
269 F.R.D. at 534 (quoting Pension Comm., 685 F.Supp.2d at
469).
Hastings v. OneWest Bank, FSB, Civ. GLR-10-3375, 2013 WL 1502008 (D. Md. Apr. 11,
2013).
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In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories and responses
to requests for production were not timely. However, nothing in the record indicates any
bad faith on behalf of the Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel. In fact, Plaintiffs’ discovery
materials were provided nearly two months before the scheduled trial date and before
Detective Rawlins reply brief was due on his summary judgment motion. Thus, Detective
Rawlins had the opportunity to address these materials on the merits but chose not to, as he
refrained from filing a reply brief.
Moreover, Detective Rawlins has not demonstrated any prejudice arising from the
late disclosure. Plaintiffs’ theory of the case was clearly laid out in the Complaint, and
Plaintiff Rockwell’s Declaration does not reflect any material deviation in the factual
allegations. Similarly, information relating to Plaintiff’s medical expenses was disclosed in
connection to Plaintiffs’ expert witness disclosures and report.8
Finally, it is important to note that Detective Rawlins seeks the harshest of
sanctions—the dismissal of this case or the striking of all of Plaintiff’s evidence offered in
opposition to Detective Rawlins’ Motion for Summary Judgment. While Plaintiffs clearly
failed to timely comply with their duty to provide interrogatory and requests for production
responses, there is no indication of any further discovery issues. In light of this fact and
those noted above, the Plaintiffs’ discovery failure is insufficient to warrant the drastic relief
sought by Detective Rawlins.
II.
Plaintiff Rockwell’s Competency as a Witness
The only potential prejudice pertains to the late disclosure of seven additional possible witnesses; Detective
Rawlins states that he is prejudiced because he can no longer depose these individuals due to the closing of
discovery. While this Court will not foreclose testimony from these witnesses, this Court will entertain other
suggestions from Detective Rawlins in order to remedy this situation during the teleconference scheduled for
today, October 15, 2014.
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Detective Rawlins has also argued that Plaintiff’s Declaration and discovery responses
should not be considered by this Court because Plaintiff Rockwell has been deemed
incompetent to stand trial in separate criminal matters.
However, “[e]very witness is
presumed competent to testify, Fed. R. Evid. 601, unless it can be shown that the witness
does not have personal knowledge of the matters about which he is to testify, that he does
not have the capacity to recall, or that he does not understand the duty to testify truthfully.
This rule applies to persons considered to be insane to the same extent that it applies to
other persons.” United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir. 1982). The state court
orders referenced in Detective Rawlins’ motion do not provide any indication for the basis
of those decisions, and Detective Rawlins has not provided any evidence that Plaintiff
Rockwell is incompetent to testify under the relevant standards of Rule 601. Accordingly,
Detective Rawlins has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff Rockwell is incompetent to testify
as a matter of law and, therefore, his Motions to Strike will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Detective Rawlins’ Motion to Strike Declaration of Daniel L. Rockwell
(ECF No. 75) and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories and
Response to Request for Production of Documents (ECF No. 76) are DENIED; and
2. The Clerk of the Court transmit copies of this Memorandum Opinion & Order to
Counsel.
Dated:
October 15, 2014
/s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
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