Oliver v. Colvin

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 17 Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment; GRANTING 19 Motion of Defendant for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 10/6/14. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

October 6, 2014
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Yvonne Oliver v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-13-3725

Dear Counsel:
On December 10, 2013, Plaintiff Yvonne Oliver petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 17, 19). I find that no hearing is necessary. Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the agency employed proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3); see Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will
DENY Plaintiff’s motion and GRANT Defendant’s motion. This letter explains my rationale.
Ms. Oliver filed her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) in December 2009. (Tr. 157–162). She alleged a disability onset date
of July 19, 2007. (Tr. 157, 161). Her claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
105–11, 117–120). A hearing was held on March 2, 2012, before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). (Tr. 42–99). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Oliver was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 17–
35). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Oliver’s request for review, (Tr. 1–5), so the ALJ’s
decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Oliver suffered from the severe impairments of “mild
degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the lumbar spine; degenerative changes of the left
acromioclavicular joint; minor degenerative changes of the left knee; keratoconus; obesity;
diabetes mellitus; sleep apnea; and depression.” (Tr. 22). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Oliver retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: she
could occasionally perform close visual activities such as reading and computer
use; she could frequently perform handling and fingering with the dominant left
hand; she could occasionally climb ramps or stairs (never ladders, ropes or
scaffolds), balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; she must avoid even
moderate exposure to workplace hazards; she could carry out simple and routine
tasks in 2-hour increments; she could have occasional interactions with co-

Yvonne Oliver v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-3725
October 6, 2014
Page 2

workers, supervisors and the general public; and she could adapt to simple
changes in a routine work setting.
(Tr. 26). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Oliver could perform her past relevant work and other jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy and that therefore she was not disabled. (Tr. 33–34).
Ms. Oliver raises two arguments on appeal, both related to the ALJ’s assessment of her
RFC. First, she claims that the ALJ failed to accord adequate weight to the opinions of her
treating physicians. Next, she contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her credibility. Each
argument lacks merit and is addressed below.
Ms. Oliver argues that the ALJ erred by assigning the opinions of Dr. McCoy and Dr.
Freas, two of her treating physicians, limited and little weight, respectively. Pl.’s Mem. 6–8; (Tr.
32). The Fourth Circuit set forth parameters for evaluating medical opinions of treating
physicians in Craig, 76 F.3d at 590, which were later refined by amendments to 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527 and 416.927. See Pitman v. Massanari, 141 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
When a medical opinion is from a “treating source,” it is given controlling weight only if it is
“well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
The ALJ assigned limited weight to Dr. McCoy’s February 2012 medical assessment of
Ms. Oliver’s ability to do physical work-related activities, (Tr. 710–13), citing inconsistencies
with her recommended course of treatment as well as lack of support from contemporaneous
treatment records, objective medical findings, and activities of daily living. (Tr. 32). In support
of his analysis, the ALJ cited Dr. McCoy’s treatment records dated August 2011 to February
2012, which, as Ms. Oliver correctly notes, refer to her own statements about her pain symptoms
and their limiting effects. (Tr. 623–41, 678–700, 717–24). However, those records contain no
objective medical findings substantiating her statements or supporting Dr. McCoy’s ultimate
conclusions regarding the severity of her limitations. The ALJ further supported her assignment
by citing a report from another examining source stating that the “movements of all [of Ms.
Oliver’s] joints are full and free,” that she “walked around like a normal person, did not have any
difficulty in going up and down the table,” and that “[h]er sitting, standing, walking, and lifting
in the office was normal.” (Tr. 492–93). I find that the ALJ’s assignment of limited weight to
Dr. McCoy’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the
proper legal standard.
The ALJ also assigned little weight to Dr. Freas’s January 2012 medical assessment of
Ms. Oliver’s ability to do physical work-related activities, (Tr. 702–05), citing a lack of support
from objective findings, treatment records, course of treatment, and Ms. Oliver’s daily activities.
(Tr. 32). Dr. Freas’s conclusions regarding Ms. Oliver’s limitations were based primarily upon
her knee and back pain and her obesity. The ALJ supported her assignment of little weight to
Dr. Freas’s assessment by citing, among other things, Dr. Freas’s treatment notes, which

Yvonne Oliver v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-3725
October 6, 2014
Page 3

reference Ms. Oliver’s back pain only sporadically. On multiple occasions, they actually state
that Ms. Oliver denied experiencing back pain. Compare (Tr. 579 (“patient denies back pain”))
and (Tr. 584 (“patient denies back pain)), with (Tr. 597 (describing back pain “associated with no
known injury” as Ms. Oliver’s chief complaint)). Moreover, the ALJ’s assignment of little
weight to Dr. Freas’s assessment is supported by the fact that Dr. Freas primarily treated Ms.
Oliver for hypertension, rather than the back and neck pain upon which his assessment was
based. (Tr. 558–610). I find that the ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Freas’s opinion
was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the proper legal standard.
Moreover, the ALJ’s evaluation of the assessments of Dr. McCoy and Dr. Freas
regarding Ms. Oliver’s ability to do physical work-related activities was simply one component
of his overall RFC analysis. She also considered all of Ms. Oliver’s treatment records, (Tr. 28–
29), as well as the opinions of a State agency physician and an independent medical consultative
examiner, (Tr. 31). The ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Oliver’s RFC was more limited than that
recommended by the State agency physician and was largely consistent with the assessment of
the independent examiner. (Id.). The ALJ’s analysis of Ms. Oliver’s RFC, then, was well
supported by substantial evidence.
Ms. Oliver next argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her credibility in her RFC
analysis. The Fourth Circuit has developed a two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s subjective
complaints. Craig, 76 F.3d at 594. First, there must be objective medical evidence of a medical
impairment reasonably likely to cause the symptoms alleged by the claimant. Id. After the
claimant meets this threshold obligation, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s [symptoms], and the extent to which it affects her ability to work.” Id. at 595.
The ALJ found that Ms. Oliver’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (Tr. 28). However, he discredited her claims regarding
the extent of the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, finding them
inconsistent with the evidence of record. (Id.).
Ms. Oliver alleges that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility based on her failure
to pursue medical treatment, without considering her lack of medical insurance. Pl.’s Mem. 9–
10. However, in her summary of Ms. Oliver’s hearing testimony, the ALJ specifically noted that
Ms. Oliver was unable to follow up on her physician’s recommendation that she undergo an
additional MRI due to insurance issues. (Tr. 27). The ALJ also noted that Ms. Oliver claimed
she is unable to afford a C-pap machine to assist with her alleged sleep apnea impairment. (Id.).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ plainly considered Ms. Oliver’s explanation for her
failure to pursue medical treatment. Moreover, the ALJ identified an abundance of other
evidence undermining Ms. Oliver’s credibility, including: her activities of daily living, (Tr. 30);
the course of treatment recommended by her physicians, (Tr. 30); her work history, (Tr. 30–31);
and the objective medical evidence and treatment records discussed above, (Tr. 28, 31–32). See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (explaining that the ALJ must consider all evidence of record in
determining credibility); SSR 96–7P, 1996 WL 374168, at *4 (July 2, 1996) (same). I find that
the ALJ’s decision to discount Ms. Oliver’s credibility was therefore supported by substantial
evidence and in accordance with the proper legal standard.

Yvonne Oliver v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-13-3725
October 6, 2014
Page 4

For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Oliver’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
17) will be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19) will be
GRANTED. The clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge