Dennis et al v. Board Of Education Of Talbot County et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 5/8/14. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GRAHAM DENNIS, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:
Civil Action No. GLR-13-3731

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TALBOT
COUNTY, et al.,

:
:

Defendants.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’, Board of Education
of

Talbot

County

(the

“Board”),

Karen

Salmon,

Lynne

David Stofa, and Sherry Bowen, Motion to Dismiss.

Duncan,

(ECF No. 3).

Plaintiffs, Graham Dennis and Casey Edsall, are suing Defendants
for constitutional violations arising from when they suspended
Dennis and Edsall for possessing weapons on school property.
Having

reviewed

the

pleadings

and

Court finds no hearing necessary.
2011).

supporting

documents,

the

See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.

For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion will

be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

BACKGROUND1

Dennis and Edsall were students at Easton High School in
Talbot County, Maryland, and members of the school’s lacrosse

1

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are stated as
alleged in the Complaint. (ECF No. 1).

team.2

On April 12, 2011, the Department of Juvenile Services

informed

Duncan,

then

the

Board

Student

Services

Supervisor,

that a parent had alleged Easton High lacrosse team members had
concealed alcohol in water bottles and consumed it on the bus to
and from athletic events.

After discussions with senior staff

members, Duncan decided to search the lacrosse team bus prior to
its departure for an athletic event.
On April 13, 2011, Duncan, Stofa and Bowen, Easton High’s
principal

and

assistant

principal,

respectively,

and

other

security staff boarded the bus and announced to the lacrosse
team that they would be conducting a search.
students

stickers

to

mark

their

While giving the

belongings,

but

before

any

belongings were searched, Dennis told Assistant Principal Bowen
he had a pocketknife in his bag.
it.

He

complied.

Dennis

She told Dennis to retrieve

surrendered

a

two-and-a-half-inch

blade to Assistant Principal Bowen, who instructed him to leave
his bag on his seat and exit the bus.
his

bag

returned

a

Leatherman

tool

A subsequent search of
with

three

tiny

blades.

Similarly, Edsall left his bag on his seat and exited the bus.
When searching Edsall’s bag, Assistant Principal Bowen found a
butane lighter.
Talbot
handed
2

over

County
the

Public

small

Schools

knives

and

staff

contacted

butane

lighter

police
when

and
they

Dennis and Edsall graduated from Easton High in May 2012.
2

arrived.

The police arrested Dennis at the scene for possessing

the pocketknife on school property.
Following the incident,

Principal Stofa

suspended Dennis

and Edsall for possessing dangerous weapons on school property.
Dennis received a ten-day suspension and was further recommended
for

expulsion

suspension.

from

school.

Edsall

only

received

a

one-day

Dennis and Edsall appealed their suspensions to

Salmon, then the Superintendent of Talbot County Public Schools.
Superintendent Salmon affirmed Dennis’s ten-day suspension but
declined to expel him from school.

She also affirmed Edsall’s

one-day suspension.
Dennis and Edsall then appealed their suspensions to the
Board, arguing the small knives and butane lighter were tools
routinely used to maintain their lacrosse sticks.
affirmed their suspensions nonetheless.

The Board

Undeterred, Dennis and

Edsall appealed to the Maryland State Board of Education (the
“State Board”).

On April 10, 2012, the State Board reversed

Dennis and Edsall’s suspensions, and ordered that their records
be expunged.
A

year

and

a

half

later,

Dennis

and

Edsall

filed

this

action against Defendants in this Court, alleging unreasonable
searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution (Count I) and Article 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count II).
3

(ECF No. 1).

They

also allege a violation of

procedural

due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count
III) and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count
IV).

They bring the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims

under

42

U.S.C.

§ 1983

and

ask

the

Court

to

take

jurisdiction of the state constitutional claims.
addition

to

the

Board,

Dennis

and

pendent

Notably, in

Edsall

are

suing

Superintendent Salmon in her individual capacity, and Duncan,
Principal

Stofa,

individual

and

dismiss.

and

Assistant

official

capacities.

Bowen

Defendants

in

now

their

move

to

(ECF No. 3).
II.

A.

Principal

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review
To

motion,

survive
the

a

Federal

complaint

must

Rule

of

allege

plausible claim for relief.

Civil

Procedure
facts

enough

12(b)(6)
state

to

a

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable
inference
alleged.”

that
Id.

the

defendant

(citing

is

Twombly,

liable
550

for

U.S.

at

the

misconduct

556).

Legal

conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice and are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.
U.S. at 555).
4

Id. (citing Twombly, 550

Thus, the Court “must determine whether it is plausible
that the factual allegations in the complaint are enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
City

of

Charlottesville,

579

F.3d

380,

386

(4th

Monroe v.
Cir.

2009)

(quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

And in doing so, the Court

must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

Lastly,

in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may rely on documents
outside the complaint if they are attached to or referenced in
the complaint.

E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,

Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
B.

Analysis
1.

Section 1983 Claims
Official Capacities

Against

Defendants

in

their

Defendants first argue the § 1983 claims against the Board
and individually named Defendants in their official capacities
should be dismissed because they are not “persons” under § 1983.
Dennis

and

analysis

Edsall

involving

seem
the

to

confuse

Eleventh

5

this

argument

Amendment,

with

the

contending

in

response that Defendants cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment to
avoid liability under § 1983.

Regardless, Defendants are more

persuasive.

Whether Defendants are subject to suit under § 1983

and

they

whether

may

assert

the

Eleventh

Amendment

are

two

separate issues.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 66 (1989).

Of them, the only question relevant here is

whether Defendants are “persons” who can be sued under § 1983.
The Court concludes they are not.
Section 1983 allows individuals to sue any “person” who
violates

their

color of law.

constitutional

rights

while

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).

acting

under

the

But state agencies and

state officials acting within their official capacities cannot
be sued under § 1983 because they are not “persons.”

See Will,

491 U.S. at 64; Mayo v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty.,
797 F.Supp.2d 685, 689 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d, 713 F.3d 735 (4th
Cir.

2013).

considered

County
state

school

agencies

boards

and

state

and

their

officials

are

Mayo,

797

officials.

F.Supp.2d at 689; Rosenfeld v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 41
F.Supp.2d 581, 586 (D.Md. 1999); Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 18 A.3d 890, 900 (Md. 2011).
Board

and

individually

named

Defendants

in

Because the

their

official

capacities are a county school board and school officials, they
are not “persons” and cannot be sued under § 1983.

6

The Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment claims will be dismissed against them
accordingly.
2.

Paul D. Coverdell Act Immunity Afforded to Individual
Defendants

Next,

Defendants

argue

the

Paul

D.

Coverdell

Teacher

Protection Act of 2001 (the “Coverdell Act”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 6731
et seq. (2012), protects the individually named Defendants from
suit in their individual capacities.

Dennis and Edsall argue

the Coverdell Act protection does not extend to claims alleging
constitutional violations.

The Court agrees.

The Coverdell Act allows school officials to use reasonable
measures

“to

maintain

order,

educational environment.”

discipline,

Id. § 6732.

and

an

appropriate

Vitally, no teacher,

administrator, or individual member of a school board is liable
for harm to a student if he was acting within his scope of
employment, and the actions complied with the law and were in an
effort

to

discipline

§§ 6733(6)(A),

a

6733(6)(D),

however, is not absolute.
for

which

the

student

defendant

question,

maintain

6736(a)(1)–(2).

control.
The

Id.

immunity,

It does not apply to any “misconduct
has

been

Federal or State civil rights law.”
Without

or

Dennis

and

found

to

have

violated

a

Id. § 6736(d)(1)(C).
Edsall

assert

civil

rights

violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
parallel Maryland constitutional provisions.

7

These are the very

type of claims the Coverdell Act expressly excludes from its
protection under § 6736(d)(1)(C).
al.,

C.J.S.

Schools

and

See 78 Frances Amendola et

School

Districts

§

505

(2014)

(“Professional school employees are not immune from liability
under a statute intended to bar tort liability, where the claims
against them are based on allegations of breaches of state or
federal constitution, and not tort law.”).

Defendants are thus

not immune from those claims here.
Notwithstanding, Defendants argue this decision “render[s]
the [Coverdell] Act meaningless” because it would nullify the
Act’s protection against all federal litigation.
Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 9).
unwarranted:

Not

all

possible

federal

(Reply Mem.

Their concern is

litigation

involving

public school officials derives from alleged federal and state
constitutional violations, as the Coverdall Act is designed to
target tort or statutory causes of action that may, for whatever
reason, find their way into federal court.

See, e.g., C.B. v.

Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1148–50 (E.D.Cal. 2009)
(dismissing under the Coverdell Act an emotional distress claim
against a school district and school official).

But where a

student-plaintiff sues under § 1983 asserting a federal or state
constitutional violation, the Coverdell Act explicitly exempts
that type of claim from immunity.

8

The Coverdell Act, therefore,

does

not

provide

a

basis

to

dismiss

the

claims

against

the

individually named Defendants here.
3.

Qualified Immunity of the Individual Defendants

Defendants
dismissed
individual
immunity.3

alternatively

against

the

capacities

argue

individually
because

they

the

named
are

claims

should

Defendants

entitled

to

in

be

their

qualified

School officials performing discretionary functions

have qualified immunity – they are shielded from liability for
civil damages to the extent “‘their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.’”

Cole

v. Buchanan Cnty. Sch. Bd., 328 F.App’x 204, 208 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
The traditional two-prong inquiry to determine whether a
school official deserves qualified immunity required the Court
to examine: “(1) whether the official violated a constitutional
right; and if so (2) whether the right was ‘clearly established’
at the time of its violation.”

Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski,

3

Dennis and Edsall argue qualified immunity does not apply
to their state constitutional claims and correctly note that
Defendants cite no authority showing otherwise.
Be that as it
may, Defendants assert qualified immunity from the state
constitutional claims, and Maryland law provides a basis for it.
See Dehn Motor Sales, LLC v. Schultz, 69 A.3d 61, 72
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2013).
Accordingly, the Court separately
analyzes whether federal qualified immunity applies to Dennis
and Edsall’s federal constitutional claims and whether state
qualified immunity applies to their state constitutional claims.
9

411 F.App’x 541, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), receded from by Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
mandatory.
deciding

But the two-prong inquiry is no longer

Courts may now “‘exercise their sound discretion in

which

of

the

two

prongs

of

the

qualified

immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances
in the particular case at hand.’”

Id. (quoting Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236).
Indeed, Defendants focus solely on the first prong, arguing
that Dennis and Edsall’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were

not

Dennis

violated

and

by

Edsall

the

search.

sufficiently

The

allege

Court
Fourth

concludes
Amendment

that
and

Article 26 violations, but do not sufficiently allege Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 24 violations.

Specifically as it relates

to the qualified immunity of the individually named Defendants
in their individual capacities, the Court will deny Defendants’
Motion as to Counts I and II, but grant Defendants’ Motion as to
Counts III and IV.
state

a

claim,

The Court will also dismiss, for failure to
Counts

III

and

IV

against

the

remaining

Defendants.
a.
The

Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search and Seizure

Court

addresses

the

Fourth

Amendment

issue

with

abundant caution, considering that qualified immunity in this
context is typically raised at the motion for summary judgment
10

stage.4

See Whisman ex rel. Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303,

1309 (8th Cir. 1997).
Nevertheless,

Dennis

and

Edsall

plausible Fourth Amendment violation.

adequately

allege

a

They allege Defendants

violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures

because

Defendants

search their bags.

lacked

reasonable

suspicion

to

That freedom, undeniably guaranteed by the

Fourth Amendment, extends to school searches.

New Jersey v.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985); DesRoches ex rel. DesRoches v.
Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 337)).
Fourth

Amendment

wrongdoing.’”
305,

In most instances, a reasonable search under the

313

is

on

individualized

suspicion

of

Id. at 574 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.

(1997)).

necessarily

“‘based

an

Though

essential

individualized

element

for

suspicion

school

is

not

searches,

the

reasonableness of a suspicion-based search by a school official
is determined by considering (1) if the action was justified at
its inception, and (2) if the search was permissible in scope.
Id. at 574–75 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4

In fact, none of the courts in the cases Defendants rely
upon decided the Fourth Amendment issue at the motion to dismiss
stage. And in Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F.Supp.2d 648
(D.Md. 2009), which Defendants rely on to urge an early
resolution of the qualified immunity issue, this Court concluded
the defendants there were not entitled to qualified immunity at
the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 665.
11

Where

there

is

no

individualized

suspicion,

the

reasonableness determination requires the Court to examine the
competing

private

and

public

interests

in

a

context-specific

inquiry.

Id. at 574 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 317–18).

There, the suspicion-less search “will be upheld only where the
government’s interests in conducting the search are substantial
–

important

enough

privacy interest.”

to

override

Id.

the

(quoting

individual’s

acknowledged

Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Dennis and Edsall certainly have an expectation of privacy
in their bags, even though that expectation is reduced because
they are student athletes.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–38; id. at

348 (Powell, J., concurring); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515

U.S.

646,

657

(1995).

Moreover,

the

facts

indicate

no

reason to suspect Edsall, who did not admit to possessing a
dangerous weapon prior to the search, of any wrongdoing before
searching his bag.5

As for Dennis, who admitted to possessing a

dangerous weapon only after school officials instructed him to
place a sticker on his bag, Dennis and Edsall raise a valid
question as to what constituted the inception of the search.
They argue the inception may have been when Defendants gained
5

The Complaint does not allege that Edsall admitted to
having the butane lighter before officials searched his bag.
The Court accepts this factual scenario as true for the purposes
of this Motion, even though Defendants dispute whether Edsall
alerted school officials beforehand.
12

access to Dennis’s bag by asking him to place a sticker on it,
rather than when officials physically searched his bag.
United

States

v.

Mowatt,

513

F.3d

395,

400

(4th

See

Cir.

2008)

(noting that a search occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when
officials gain access to property in response to a demand under
color of authority), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v.
King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011).
Defendants

knew

about

The difference is crucial in that

Dennis’s

dangerous

weapon

when

they

physically searched his bag but had no reason to suspect Dennis
in particular

of any wrongdoing when they instructed him to

place a sticker on it.
Because both searches may have been suspicion-less, it is
unclear

whether

Defendants’

justification

for

initiating

the

searches outweighed Dennis and Edsall’s lesser expectation of
privacy

and

whether,

as

apply.

The Fourth Amendment claim would benefit from a more
record

a

and

result,

qualified

greater

insight

immunity

into

the

would

complete

factual

issues

raised.

Accordingly, the Court will decline to dismiss it on

qualified immunity grounds.
b.

Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

Similar to their Fourth Amendment claim, Dennis and Edsall
allege

Defendants

violated

Article

26

of

the

Maryland

Declaration of Rights because they lacked reasonable suspicion
to

search

their

bags.

Article
13

26,

which

outlines

the

requirements for a warrant, has been consistently construed as
being

in

pari

materia

with

the

Fourth

State, 782 A.2d 862, 873 (Md. 2001).

Amendment.

Scott

v.

Therefore, for the same

reasons the Court declines to dismiss Dennis and Edsall’s Fourth
Amendment claim, the Court will also decline to dismiss their
Article 26 claim on the basis of qualified immunity.
c.

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

Dennis and Edsall’s Fourteenth Amendment claim alleges that
they were not provided adequate notice that the small knives and
butane lighter would be dangerous weapons, depriving them of
their interest in a free public education in violation of due
process.

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids state officials from

depriving any person of property without due process of the law.
Goss

v.

Lopez,

419

provides

free

public

property

interest

in

U.S.

565,

572

education,
that

(1975).

students

education

that

Where
have
cannot

without notice and the opportunity to be heard.

a

the

state

legitimate
be

deprived

Id. at 574,

579.
Dennis and Edsall argue nothing in the 2010-2011 Easton
High School Student Handbook (the “Student Handbook”) informed
them that they could be suspended for possessing small knives
and

a

butane

lighter.

They

argue

“dangerous

weapons”

is

undefined in the Student Handbook and that they possessed the
small knives and butane lighter, not as “dangerous weapons,” but
14

for use as tools in maintaining their lacrosse sticks.
arguments

are,

in

essence,

ones

for

vagueness.

“A

The

law

is

unconstitutionally vague if it fails to establish standards for
the government and public that are sufficient to guard against
the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.”

Hardwick ex

rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 442 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
these

standards

if

ordinary

conduct is prohibited.
U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).

A law fails to establish

people

cannot

understand

what

Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461
Dennis and Edsall’s arguments must fail

for a number of reasons.
First, due process does not require school policies to be
as specific or exhaustive as Dennis and Edsall demand.

Rather,

“[g]iven the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary
sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive
of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need
not be as detailed as a criminal code.”
403

v.

Student

Fraser,

478

Handbook

U.S.

675,

provisions

conduct are sufficient.

686

Bethel Sch. Dist. No.

(1986).

prohibiting

Accordingly,

Dennis

and

the

Edsall’s

The School Handbook provides a list of

infractions for which students may be suspended or recommended
for expulsion.
County

Public

EHS 2010-2011 Warrior Student Handbook, Talbot
Schools,

15

(last
15

visited

Apr.

15,

2014),

http://www.tcps.k12.md.us/files/9812/8574/6911/EHS_StudentHandbo
ok2010.pdf.

Among

“Possession

of

the

infractions,

Contraband

it

specifically

(Beepers/pagers,

Cellular

lists
Phones,

Pepper Mace, Laser Pointers, Squirt Guns, Projectile Shooters,
Dangerous Weapons).”
Although

Id.

“Dangerous

Weapons”

is

undefined,

there

is

no

denying that Dennis’s small knives fall squarely within that
category.
Handbook

Regarding
need

conceivable

not

Edsall’s

be

instrument

so
a

butane

specific

school

lighter,
as

to

official

may

the

Student

classify
find

every

dangerous.

Thus, to the extent it is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the
butane lighter’s inclusion as a dangerous weapon here does not
violate due process.
[vagueness]

See Hardwick, 711 F.3d at 442 (“[T]he

doctrine

protects

against

‘arbitrary

and

discriminatory enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Morales, 527
U.S. at 56)).

It was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory that

school officials construed butane lighters as a dangerous weapon
here because they explicitly do so in other contexts of which
Dennis and Edsall were aware.
1-6)

(noting

that

butane

(See Compl. Ex. E, at 7, ECF No.

lighters

are

listed

as

dangerous

contraband on parking permit applications).
Second, their intention to use the small knives and butane
lighter
prohibits

as

tools

is

possession

irrelevant.
of

dangerous
16

School
items

policy

without

expressly
regard

for

intent “to [e]nsure a safe and orderly atmosphere.”
2011 Warrior Student Handbook at 15.

EHS 2010-

School policies are not

open to due process challenges simply because a student wishes
to use a dangerous weapon for a non-deadly purpose.6
Lastly, to the extent their argument genuinely implicates
the notice requirement, Dennis and Edsall’s suspensions meet the
due process requirements established in Goss.

Notice required

only

of

that

Dennis

and

Edsall

were

made

aware

the

charges

against them, written or orally, and the evidence upon which
those charges are based.

See Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.

They were

told on several occasions what their infractions were and the
basis

for

which

they

would

be

suspended.

Principal

Stofa

informed Dennis and Edsall that the grounds for suspension were
for possessing a dangerous weapon on school property.
suspensions

were

affirmed

in

writing,

once

by

Both

Superintendent

Salmon and again by the Board, and later reversed in writing by
the State Board.

Dennis and Edsall were aware at all times of

6

Indeed, in its decision affirming Edsall’s one-day
suspension, the Board noted that the possession of a dangerous
weapon is a strict liability offense. (Compl. Ex. E, at 9). As
unfortunate as these circumstances are, the Court must adhere to
the notion “‘that ignorance of the law will not excuse any
person’” from liability.
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 581 (2010) (quoting Barlow v.
United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833)).
17

the

charges

levied

against

them

and

thus

received

constitutionally sufficient notice.7
Accordingly, Dennis and Edsall’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
does not sufficiently allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation,
and the Court will dismiss it against the individually named
Defendants
entitled

in
to

their

individual

qualified

immunity.

capacities

because

Moreover,

they

because

it

are
is

insufficiently alleged, the claim will also be dismissed as to
the remaining Defendants.

See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440

F.3d 648, 655 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 5A Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990)) (noting that
the Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
7

Dennis and Edsall also argue they received insufficient
notice because the school failed to follow its own procedure in
suspending students only after “repeated rule infraction, and
after
all
other
available
disciplinary
means
have
been
exhausted.”
(Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14, ECF
No. 6). This argument must also fail. Even though the school
failed to follow its own procedure, its disciplinary actions
adhered to the minimum due process requirements. See Ratner v.
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 16 F.App’x 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding a school’s procedure as constitutional, even where it
was imperfect).
Moreover, there is nothing to suggest
Defendants did not comport with Maryland suspension procedures
or the Board’s due process requirements.
See Md. Code Ann.,
Educ. § 7-305(a) (West 2014); Board Policies, Talbot County
Public
Schools,
10.22
(last
visited
Apr.
15,
2014),
http://www.tcps.k12.md.us/files/1313/4989/2220/10.22_STUDENT_SUS
PENSION.pdf (requiring the student and his parent be given
notice of the charges against him and have the opportunity to
present his side of the story).
18

sua sponte if it plainly fails to state a claim for relief on
its face).
d.

Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

Similar

to

their

Fourteenth

Amendment

claim,

Dennis

and

Edsall allege they were deprived of their right to receive a
free public education in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration

of

Article

protects

24

interest.

Rights.

Much

an

Samuels

the

individual’s

v.

(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2000).

like

Fourteenth

procedural

Tschechtelin,

763

Amendment,

due

A.2d

process

209,

230

As such, Maryland “courts have long

equated the Due Process Clause and Article 24.”

Id.

Therefore,

for the same reasons the Court will dismiss Dennis and Edsall’s
Fourteenth

Amendment

claim,

the

Court

will

also

dismiss,

on

qualified immunity grounds, their Article 24 claim as to the
individually named Defendants in their individual capacities.
The Court will also dismiss their Article 24 claim as to the
remaining Defendants because it is insufficiently alleged.
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

will,

by

separate

Order, grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
Board

(ECF No. 3).

and

capacities.

individually

Count I will be dismissed against the
named

Defendants

in

their

official

Counts III and IV will be dismissed against all

19

Defendants.

The

Court

will

deny,

however,

the

Defendants’

Motion as to Count II and the remaining Defendants in Count I.8
Entered this 8th day of May, 2014
/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

8

The remaining claims and Defendants will be as follows:
(1) the individually named Defendants in their individual
capacities remain in Count I; and (2) the Board and the
individually named Defendants in their official and individual
capacities remain in Count II.
Count I is the sole remaining
claim in which the Court has federal question jurisdiction. As
such, for Count II, the Court will exercise pendent party
jurisdiction
over
the
Board
and
the
individually
named
Defendants in their official capacities.
See Price v. Pierce,
823 F.2d 1114, 1119 (7th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Marketplace Rest.,
Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1359–60 (7th Cir. 1985).
20